


**'THE SPECIALL MEN IN EVERY SHERE'. THE EDWARDIAN
REGIME, 1547-1553**

Alan Bryson

**A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of PhD
at the
University of St. Andrews**



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1547-1553.**

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A thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

University of St Andrews


March 2001

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ABSTRACT

This thesis examines clienteles during the reign of Edward VI, particularly those of the dukes of Somerset and Northumberland, and the role of the county elite in political society in order to reassess politics from the perspective of clientage. Edward's reign has not been extensively studied from this perspective but work by Dr Adams, Professor Guy and others on other periods provided the necessary context to reassess Edwardian politics. The aim was to investigate whether the regime continued to rely on the same core within the county elite employed in the 1520s and 1530s and again in Elizabeth's reign. This has involved extensive archival research since 1996 (in St Andrews, London and the midlands). I have found that the privy council tried to foster a closer working relationship with the county elite in order to maintain stability and prevent faction during this period of minority government. The regime depended on the same core of gentlemen in the shires to act as commissioners of the peace and to fill the other vital local offices. Even within this group there was an inner-ring. This relationship was a two-way process and the clientage that underpinned early modern society was central to it.

This study has also explored the extent to which Somerset's and Northumberland's clienteles were involved in central and local government to reassess how much the dukes operated as court-centred or county-centred politicians. Both men dominated government in turn and their clienteles were vitally important. These were made up of their servants, family, friends and clients and were mutual self-support groups that reinforced their political and social status. Although principally intended as a political study, this research has come to incorporate military and local history. It has looked at how clienteles operated during periods of stability and crisis (the activities of Lord Seymour of Sudeley, the 1549 rebellions, the October coup, the second fall of Somerset and the succession crisis in 1553) in order to demonstrate how they really functioned.

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Abbreviations

<i>APC</i>	<i>Acts of the privy council of England</i> , eds. J.R. Dasent <i>et al</i> (new series, xxxvi vols.; London, 1890-1964).
Beer and Jack	B.L. Beer and S.M. Jack (eds.), <i>The letters of William, Lord Paget of Beaudesert, 1547-1563, Camden Miscellany</i> , 25 (Camden Society, 4th ser., 13; London, 1974).
BL	British Library, London
Bindoff	<i>The history of parliament. The House of Commons 1509-1558</i> , ed. S.T. Bindoff (iii vols.; London, 1982).
C	Chancery
CLRO	Corporation of London Record Office, London
<i>DNB</i>	<i>Dictionary of national biography</i> , eds. L. Stephen and S. Lee (lxiii vols.; London, 1885-1900).
DL	Duchy of Lancaster
E	Exchequer
fo(s).	folio(s)
GLRO	Greater London Record Office, London
Hatfield, Cecil	Hatfield House, Hertfordshire, Cecil Papers
Haynes	S. Haynes, (ed.), <i>A collection of state papers...left by William Cecill Lord Burghley</i> (London, 1740).
Hughes and Larkin	P.L. Hughes and J.F. Larkin (eds.), <i>Tudor royal proclamations</i> (iii vols.; New Haven and London, 1964-9).
ITL	Inner Temple Library, London
KB	Court of King's Bench
LPL	Lambeth Palace Library, London
LR	Office of the Auditors of Land Revenue
LRO	Leicestershire Record Office, Leicester
LJRO	Lichfield Joint Record Office, Lichfield
Longleat	Longleat House, Wiltshire
LC	Lord Chamberlain's Department
LS	Lord Steward's Department
MS(S).	Manuscript(s)
m(m).	membrane(s)
M. fo(s).	Microfilm folio(s)
n.s.	new series
n(s).	note(s)

NRO	Northamptonshire Record Office, Northamptonshire
NottRO	Nottinghamshire Record Office, Nottingham
o.s.	old series
Pocock	N. Pocock, (ed.), <i>Troubles connected with the Prayerbook of 1549</i> (Camden Society, new series, 37; London, 1884).
PROB	Prerogative Court of Canterbury and related Probate Jurisdictions
PRO	Public Record Office, London
REQ	Court of Requests
ser.	series
<i>Simancas</i>	<i>Letters, despatches, and state papers, relating to the negotiations between England and Spain, preserved in the archives at Vienna, Brussels, Simancas and elsewhere</i> , eds. M.A.S. Hume, R. Tyler <i>et al</i> (xv vols. in xx; London, 1862-1954).
SP	State Paper
<i>STC</i>	<i>A short-title catalogue of books printed in England, Scotland, & Ireland and of English books printed abroad 1475-1640</i> , eds. W.A. Jackson, F.S. Ferguson and K.F. Pantzer (iii vols.; London, 1986-1991).
StaffRO	Staffordshire Record Office, Stafford
Tytler	P.F. Tytler, (ed.), <i>England under the reigns of Edward VI and Mary...</i> (ii vols.; London, 1839).
unfol.	lacking foliation or other forms of numbering
WRO	Warwickshire Record Office, Warwick

Note on quotations and references

All quotations are in the original spelling, the thorn has been transcribed as in the original, ‘u’, ‘v’, ‘i’ and ‘j’ have been transcribed as individual writers or printers used them and contractions have been expanded using italics (‘kynges’). Capitalisation has been modernised, where necessary. Words crossed out in editing are ~~seered~~ through, textual additions above the line are shown using ^marks^, words are left underlined as in the original, and contemporary deciphered text is in **bold italics**. Conjectural reconstruction, where the manuscript has been damaged or where the words are not fully legible or have been omitted, is shown in [square brackets]. All dates are New Style.

Certain manuscripts have been refoliated a number of times, though not consistently. References to PRO, SP 10, PRO, SP 11 and (usually) PRO, SP 12 are to the microfilm folio. Where there is any ambiguity, the foliation adopted is explained in the footnote. For the Cotton manuscripts in the British Library the foliation used is at the top right corner. For the Corporation of London Record Office manuscripts the foliation used is the original one, also at the top right corner. In both cases this foliation was adopted on the advice of staff. When a document is cited in general, the complete foliation is given, but when specific points are being made, only the specific folios referred to are cited.

Where possible, surnames have been spelt according to the index in C.S. Knighton (ed.), *State papers of Edward VI. Calendar of state papers domestic series of the reign of Edward VI 1547-1553* (London, 1992). Otherwise, it is according to convention or, if neither is pertinent, as referred to by contemporaries. In order to avoid confusion, normally John Dudley, Viscount Lisle, earl of Warwick and duke of Northumberland, will be referred to by his ducal title when writing of him in general terms during the period of his ascendancy; Thomas Seymour, Lord Seymour of Sudeley, will be referred to as Seymour, while the full names of most other members of the Seymour family will usually be given; and Henry Fitzalan, earl of Arundel, will often be referred to as the earl of Arundel to differentiate him from Sir Thomas Arundel and Sir John Arundel of Lanherne.

INTRODUCTION

This thesis is an attempt to reassess Edwardian politics from the perspective of clienteles. The privy council of Edward VI wrote to the justices of the peace during a time of great anxiety, when there was a real possibility of another invasion scare like that of 1544. They were ordered, with the muster commissioners, to accompany the shire levies to the lit beacons in the event of invasion. There, they would serve under the lords lieutenant but specific men were to remain in their counties to ensure order was maintained and the French repulsed there.¹ The conciliar letter was endorsed, 'a minute of the lords to the speciall men in every shere v^o Junii 1548'.² This encapsulates the close relationship the privy council sought to foster during this period of minority government. The regime depended on the same core of gentlemen in the shires to act as commissioners of the peace, commissioners of *oyer et terminer*, muster masters, local and military officers, providers of men and horses for the wars, agents of special commissions and enforcers of government policy. Even within this group there was an inner-ring, a set of names repeated on list after list. The regime needed to know who their men in the shires were. Tudor government depended on the voluntary assistance of the local elite in order to maintain administration and the law. In turn, the local elite depended on the monarch to defend its legal rights and grant the necessary preferment to increase its worship, or status. Central to this relationship was the system of clientage that underpinned early modern political society. This was meant to engender stability. However, although Edwardian administrative changes are beginning to be regarded as positive achievements, high politics is still generally regarded as factional.³ Even though the duke of Somerset (earl of Hertford) and the duke of Northumberland (earl of Warwick) instituted a system of one-party rule, there was little alternative because only an adult monarch could provide the means for a multiplicity of interests to gain royal attention and favour. Yet, Henry VIII removed Stephen Gardiner, bishop of Winchester, and the Howards from power prior to his death and set up a council of regency, largely drawn from his privy council, to govern as a corporate body. This reduced the plurality of the Henrician polity. The council of regency was close to but not identical with, the privy council, being a two-tier organisation made up of executors and assistants. This regency council was a necessary evil for the sake of unity and stability.

¹ PRO, SP 10/4/12, M. fos. 28r-28v.

² PRO, SP 10/4/12, M. fo. 29v.

³ D.E. Hoak, *The king's council during the reign of Edward VI* (Cambridge, 1976), pp. 231-258; D.E. Hoak, 'Rehabilitating the duke of Northumberland: politics and political control, 1549-53', in J. Loach and R. Tittler (eds.), *The mid-Tudor polity, c. 1540-1560* (London, 1980), pp. 29-51; S. Adams, 'Faction, clientage and party: English politics, 1550-1603', *History Today*, 32 (1982), p. 34.

Somerset and Northumberland had to deal with the ‘acephalous conditions’ of Edward’s reign.⁴ What should be done in a system of personal monarchy about the king who cannot rule? Somerset did try to rule as a king would, with a range of interests represented (albeit a narrow range that excluded many conservatives), and presented himself as regent. However, his regime became more autocratic as he isolated himself from his colleagues among the privy council. He identified the interests of the commonwealth more closely with his own than almost any other Tudor politician. Northumberland tried another approach, attempting to identify his own interests as the king’s and turning Edward into something of ‘an articulate puppet’.⁵ Both men alienated their colleagues; both turned increasingly to their clienteles. Somerset and Northumberland, like all substantial figures, headed structures made up of their servants, family, friends and clients. These were self-support groups and reinforced the patron’s political and social status. Therefore, as the two men began to feel isolated, they depended more and more on their own people; people over whom they had authority and with whom they had close connections, people they trusted. Unfortunately, lack of space prevents an examination of the role of these clienteles in Scotland and Ireland and comments will generally be restricted to English politics (although some use of the extensive archival research undertaken on these areas will be made, where appropriate). Somerset and Northumberland may have had contrasting styles of government and different perceptions of their role but they tried to secure the general assent of the privy council and the political nation, while controlling the court and the person of the king. They were also heavily influenced by their clienteles and embarked on ambitious programmes of religious, economic and social reform. Dr McLaren viewed this as a reaction to minority monarchy based on a conception of the citizen possessing ‘an identity ambiguously political and spiritual which had originated in Edward VI’s reign, in part as a means of allowing for the infusion of adult male “virtue” into the body politic during the reign of a minor king’.⁶ The possible consequence of the humanist and protestant promotion of a godly realm was that the ‘egalitarian and acephalic implications of these modes of discourse’ could undermine order. This meant Edwardian ideals had to be contained within the conception of the “mixed monarchy”.⁷ However, these reforms could be a *quid pro quo* to secure popular compliance with the reformation.⁸ These men wanted reform.

The collegiate identity of the privy council was fostered partly by the necessity for stable government during a minority, which gave the privy councillors a special duty of care towards

⁴ P. Collinson, ‘The monarchical republic of Queen Elizabeth I’, in J.A. Guy (ed.), *The Tudor monarchy* (London, 1997), p. 115.

⁵ Hoak, ‘Rehabilitating the duke of Northumberland’, p. 43; *The king’s council*, pp. 118-124.

⁶ A. McLaren, ‘Reading Sir Thomas Smith’s *De republica Anglorum* as protestant apologetic’, *Historical Journal*, 42 (1999), p. 912.

⁷ McLaren, ‘Reading Sir Thomas Smith’s *De republica Anglorum*’, pp. 912-913; J. Ponet, *A shorte treatise of politike power, and of the true obedience which subiectes owe to kynges and other ciuile gouernours, with an exhortacion to all true naturall Englishe men...* (STC 20178; Strasburg, 1556), sig. A5r.

their charge, and partly by Henry's will. This will established the council of regency and attempted to create a 'hermetically sealed political system' that was intended to contain faction and allow for competent rule.⁹ These men generally worked well together and had a homogeneous outlook based on their experience as Henrician politicians and courtiers. This was characterised by loyal service to the crown. Like their counterparts in the localities, they held a variety of posts, increasing their experience and responsibility. Dr Graves has pointed out how experienced many of them were.¹⁰ Their clienteles augmented their authority and consequence. Although faction was the 'dark side' of clientage, the clienteles were central to the high politics of the reign.¹¹

Aspects of the court will be examined in chapter one because it was the environment in which many of these men lived and worked and the setting for much political action. Control of the king gave power in a personal monarchy and control of the court through monitoring access was the practical way to achieve this. The impact of first Somerset and then Northumberland will be assessed in order to judge how successful they were in controlling the court and how they shaped it. Faction and clientage will also be discussed prior to their detailed treatment in the succeeding chapters.

Chapters two, three and five will examine Somerset's ascendancy, including the establishment of the protectorate and the ducal clientele, and the 1549 rebellions. Initially, his ascendancy was based on the consensus of Henry's executors. The protectorate (1547-1550) was intended not just as an elevation of Somerset's power and dignity but as a practical solution to the acephalous problems created by minority rule. However, Somerset and the other executors had different conceptions of what the protectorate meant and this created tension at the heart of government. These differences intensified because Somerset's colleagues felt the special role given to them by Henry's will was being jeopardised with disastrous consequences for the commonwealth. The protectorate provisions will be reassessed and the rewards granted in the unfulfilled gift clause will be examined as part of the patronage system Somerset now controlled as regent. The importance of rewarding colleagues and servants was central to clientage and Somerset increased the wealth and consequence of the elite, contributing to the post-reformation reshaping of political society. The social dynamic of politics extended below the major political figures through the clienteles. It is important to re-examine the informal conversations within clienteles in order to reconstruct this vital aspect of political society. Somerset listened to divergent counsel and made critical errors. This contributed to the political and social crises that marked the end of the protectorate. The role

⁸ M.L. Bush, 'Protector Somerset and the 1549 rebellions: a post-revision questioned', *English Historical Review*, 115 (2000), pp. 103-112

⁹ E.W. Ives, 'Henry VIII's will: a forensic conundrum', *Historical Journal*, 35 (1992), pp. 799-802.

¹⁰ M.A.R. Graves, *The House of Lords in the parliaments of Edward VI and Mary I. An institutional study* (Cambridge, 1981), pp. 33-57.

of clients as counsellors, confidantes and messengers is very interesting and important. Lord Seymour of Sudeley's irresponsible behaviour, especially his methods of recruitment to and deployment of his clientele, will be reassessed from the perspective of clientage in chapter four. Somerset's policies were tied to his concept of good lordship or the society of orders, which in turn, he felt, bolstered his popularity and strengthened his position. However, his self-identification as regent meant he failed to see the divergence between his conception of the protectorate and that of his colleagues, who presented the political nation with an alternative in the autumn of 1549 (chapter six).

Chapters seven and eight will concentrate on Northumberland's period of authority (1549-1553), again reassessing it from the point of view of clienteles. His regime made substantial and lasting contributions to the English polity, including financial and diplomatic retrenchment, a major alteration in relations with France and the empire, the first standing army (*gendarmes*) and the system of lords lieutenant. This creative government was the result of necessity, an attempt to address the chronic problems besetting the Tudor monarchy. Northumberland wanted to ensure stability through control but his identification of the king's interests as his own alienated the elite at court and in the country. Again, this isolated his party and narrowed his support. His attitude was contradictory, often being inclusive and exclusive at the same time, but in different ways and with different constituents of the polity. He restricted his support at court, while trying to widen contact in the localities. Social relations were made more tortuous by the charged atmosphere created by the reformation, which gave clienteles an ideological basis once lacking. Yet, like Somerset before him, Northumberland's ascendancy was founded on consent and consensus and although Edward's reign was undoubtedly factional the collegiate identity engendered by the minority was paradoxically both a stabilising and a destabilising force. Again, Henry's will was critical, affecting the complexion of the Dudley regime. So pervasive was its conciliarism, despite personal monarchy, that it was used as a model for the alteration of the succession in 1553. Citizens could be 'concealed within subjects'. The will had stipulated that the regency council should rule without consulting Edward during the minority. It would continue to govern in the event of an interruption in the succession.¹² Northumberland's personal intervention during the succession crisis may reflect the uglier aspect of minority government, where the political elite were forced to accept his continued personal ascendancy at the expense of the legitimate succession because he was afraid of the loss of power and consequent reaction. However, his regime may have had sincere concerns about protecting the protestant commonwealth (chapter ten).

¹¹ Adams, 'Faction, clientage and party', pp. 33-34.

Chapter nine examines the relationship between the centre and localities in more detail, particularly whether Somerset or Northumberland tried to perpetuate and infiltrate the king's affinity by procuring local offices for themselves and their clienteles. They attempted to increase contact between the centre and localities as a means of control, especially over the commons. However, neither duke dominated the commissions of the peace by filling them with their clients. These continued to be filled by the resident gentry. The working relationship between the crown and the localities was based on the society of orders, consensus as landowners, and patronage. Religious affiliation as a test of capacity to govern would become increasingly important. Mid-Tudor England, although centralised through strong government, was still coloured by local concerns and local politics. The legacy of the aristocratic clientele in the localities remained. However, the leading politicians were now court-centred. The succession crisis forced many of the county elite to make a choice between Northumberland's type of conciliar government and a return to personal monarchy. Although they chose the latter and supported Mary, the implications of Edwardian government and its potential monarchical republicanism would cast a shadow over the second half of the sixteenth century.

¹² S. Alford, *The early Elizabethan polity. William Cecil and the British succession crisis, 1558-1569* (Cambridge, 1998), p. 118; P. Collinson, 'De republica Anglorum: or, history with the politics put back', in his *Elizabethan essays* (London and Rio Grande, 1994), p. 19.

1. Clientage and the court, 1547-1553

This chapter will concentrate on the issues of access, the role of clienteles in political society, faction and patronage, as well as providing a framework by describing changes at the Edwardian court. This is necessary because the court was the locale of politics. Somerset and Northumberland tried to dominate the court as a means of controlling the king. This was particularly important because the king was a minor. Central to this control was the ability of both men to oversee household appointments and in order to monitor the court more carefully and control access they put their own clients into key offices. It is important to examine the extent to which they did this and if their attitudes towards court patronage differed. The court was a large, complicated structure; a pyramid based on rank, title, wealth and kinship. The monarch was at the apex of this structure, heading the system of service and patronage, and capable of altering a person's position within it.¹ This structure was perhaps more heavily dependent on the personality of the monarch than any other institution in English society and the system ran into severe difficulties and was prey to dominance by clienteles when the king was a minor.

I: Faction and clientage

The possibility of faction was a major problem, especially as a consequence of minority government. However, historians do not always agree as to its nature or even the meaning of the term or its relation to patronage. A substantial historical debate grew out of Sir John Neale's classic study of the subject. Many of the issues and conclusions are of general application. Was faction central to the operation of patronage, with the monarch keeping excesses in check, or was it an occasional aberration brought on by unusual stress? Professor Neale saw factions as groups tied by reciprocal relations intent on garnering offices and power for themselves and denying them to their competitors. This faction occurred at court.² Subsequent historians have not readily agreed. Instead, they have challenged Professor Neale over the issue of whether faction was the norm of government or a manifestation of breakdown. This point has been used as the basis for revisionist arguments that patronage was not factional or, even, always political. The 'tightly restricted range of office' could intensify competition for court positions. This was exacerbated by the problems of court politics being subsumed in privy council politics, because many of the leading courtiers were also leading privy councillors. Court politics affected the privy council and

¹ S. Kettering, 'Brokerage at the court of Louis XIV', *Historical Journal*, 36 (1993), pp. 69-70.

² J.E. Neale, *Queen Elizabeth* (London, 1934); 'The Elizabethan political scene', in his *Essays in Elizabethan history* (London, 1958), pp. 59-84.

vice versa.³ An attempt was made to circumvent this problem within the inner-ring of privy councillors and courtiers by maintaining good relations as much as possible. Generally, these men displayed a remarkably homogeneous outlook. This was more than a strained fiction. They were bound together by a mutual viewpoint, increasingly shaped by the conception of England as a providential nation and them as godly magistrates and a shared service relationship with the monarch. Perhaps these are Professor Neale's reciprocal relationships, although they are less frequently factional.⁴ Clients would use more than one channel to gain royal favour and relations appear to have been more individually based than faction based. Elizabeth strove to maintain a body of powerful patrons, widening the base of the patronage structure by creating more conduits to favour. However, Professor Neale believed that the channels to favour were narrowed by the second earl of Essex's attempts to implement single-faction rule in the 1590s, although this has been reassessed in a more nuanced way by Dr Hammer in recent years.⁵

These models can be applied to the 1540s. Sir William Cecil seems to have learned from the political practices established since 1518, especially from his formative political years during Edward's reign. The occasional friction between the council and privy chamber from 1518-1540, which neither Cardinal Wolsey nor Thomas Cromwell could completely curtail, led Somerset and Northumberland to a novel solution, or at least one that their predecessors had been unable to implement fully: they 'merged the memberships of these institutions and enforced religious uniformity on both'.⁶ This was only possible because the king was a minor and even Henry had tolerated a variety of opinions and ideologies at his court as long as they were constrained by circumspection. However, this system was unsatisfactory because the eventual result was that Somerset's and Northumberland's 'regimes were unrepresentative: and amounted to "single-party" government'.⁷ Dr Adams has argued that true faction did not exist at court during the second half of the sixteenth century except between 1548-1552 and in the 1590s, when one party sought to close the other conduits to royal favour.⁸ Faction or factiousness meant placing personal advantage or connection above fairness, the common good and decency. It was the 'dark side' of clientage, the system of personal loyalty and dependence that underpinned early modern society. The question of when clientage became faction must be carefully applied. Were all disagreements over patronage or policy factional? Should faction be applied loosely or strictly? Dr Adams believes that faction should only be applied in the narrow sense, precluding the danger of viewing

³ S. Adams, 'Eliza enthroned? The court and its politics', in C. Haigh (ed.), *The reign of Elizabeth I* (London, 1984), pp. 59-60, 55-56, 61-63.

⁴ Adams, 'Eliza enthroned?', pp. 64-67, 69-70, 75-77; Alford, *The early Elizabethan polity*, pp. 27-28; J.E.A. Dawson, 'William Cecil and the British dimension of early Elizabethan foreign policy', *History*, 74 (1989), 200-205.

⁵ Neale, 'The Elizabethan political scene', p. 81; P.E.J. Hammer, *The polarisation of Elizabethan politics. The political career of Robert Devereux, 2nd earl of Essex, 1585-1597* (Cambridge, 1999), pp. 1-2, 7-9, 78-79, 288-291, 341-388; P.E.J. Hammer, 'Patronage at Court, faction and the earl of Essex', in Guy (ed.), *The reign of Elizabeth I*, pp. 65-68, 75.

⁶ J.A. Guy, *Tudor England* (Oxford, 1988), p. 255.

⁷ Guy, *Tudor England*, p. 255.

all political dynamic in a 'lurid' light. His succinct definition is the best description of the issue: 'a faction was not the same thing as clientage; nor was it the taking of sides on a major political issue: a faction was a personal following employed in direct opposition to another personal following. A faction struggle could involve disputes over patronage or debate over matters of state, but its essence was a personal rivalry that over-rode all other consideration'.⁹ Edwardian court and privy council politics were basically not factional, even between 1548-1552, but the use of clienteles by men like Lord Seymour of Sudeley, Somerset's brother, brought faction into the political system.¹⁰

Patronage and faction were separate. In order to procure patronage it was essential to be based at court, or have a good court connection. During the 1540s the patronage base of the crown shrank dramatically as a result of war, permanently altering the patronage system. However, during the protectorate there was still substantial patronage to be had, especially in lands, annuities and military office, and it was not immediately apparent that the system was being altered beyond recognition. This patronage was diminished by the continuation of war and forced Mary and Elizabeth to take a more frugal approach.¹¹ There was competition for patronage at court and office under the crown was 'both the prize and the instrument of politics'.¹² Dr Adams regards the relationship between patronage and faction as problematic, questioning Professor Neale's model, especially as a result of the major reshaping of the system because of the warfare of the 1540s and the consequent financial collapse.¹³ Whereas Henry utilised patronage through the stewardships of the royal affinity, the breakdown of this system, the serious financial problems caused by increasing demand for military patronage, reduced revenue and greater military expenditure, may have created a "mid-Tudor crisis in patronage". This led to the ending of office holding as an instrument of royal patronage.¹⁴ Instead, new sources were used and a new attitude towards service evolved, a 'more self-consciously classical definition of service' or 'public service'. The monarch no longer defined service at will.¹⁵ Clienteles were not necessarily factional groupings; their objectives and dynamics were more complicated.

⁸ Adams, 'Faction, clientage and party', p. 34.

⁹ Adams, 'Faction, clientage and party', pp. 33-34; 'Eliza enthroned?', p. 55; Hammer, *The polarisation of Elizabethan politics*, pp. 356-357.

¹⁰ See below, pp. 81-105.

¹¹ S. Adams, 'The English military clientele, 1542-1618', in *Patronages et clientélismes, 1550-1750 (France, Angleterre, Espagne, Italie)*, eds. C. Giry-Deloison and R. Mettam, 'Histoire et Litterature Regionales', 10 (Villeneuve d'Ascq Cedex and London, 1990), pp. 217-218; 'The patronage of the crown in Elizabethan politics: the 1590s in perspective', in Guy (ed.), *The reign of Elizabeth I*, pp. 24-27, 31-36; L.L. Peck, 'Peers, patronage and the politics of history', in Guy (ed.), *The reign of Elizabeth I*, pp. 87-108; Hammer, *The polarisation of Elizabethan politics*, pp. 358-359.

¹² Adams, 'The patronage of the crown', p. 20.

¹³ Adams, 'The patronage of the crown', pp. 21-31.

¹⁴ Adams, 'The patronage of the crown', pp. 31-40.

¹⁵ Adams, 'The patronage of the crown', pp. 41-43.

Dr Adams has demonstrated the continued importance of clienteles in the late sixteenth century. He has examined the composition, structure and function of the earl of Leicester's clientele and, although more difficult, assessed its role and effectiveness too. His model applies to the mid-Tudor period too.¹⁶ He preferred the term clientele to affinity when examining the sixteenth century, and it has generally been adopted for this study. The late medieval affinity based on lordships was transformed between the end of the fifteenth century and the early seventeenth century into the gentry county republics. According to Dr Carpenter, these affinities had been held together by the desire for security of property tenure and cohesion was maintained largely by social connections rather than financial reward, access to royal patronage or military obligations.¹⁷ At the core of sixteenth century clienteles were the kinsmen, household servants and estate officers. These groups overlapped. Local gentlemen were drawn into service from counties where the patron's estates were most extensive. This would reinforce local social connections. Retainers continued to be a component of clienteles.¹⁸ At the core of the structure of the clientele was a 'central pool of leading officers, whose responsibilities and range of employment were extremely wide'. Manorial stewards came from this pool or from the local gentry.¹⁹ The officers were usually local gentlemen or professionals, like lawyers. Senior officers usually became prominent in local government and often served in parliament.²⁰ Rewards to clients and servants could be financial (including wages, annuities and rent-charges) or less tangible (including providing access to royal patronage or providing local appointments as sheriffs and JPs).²¹ Clienteles developed religious components lacking in late medieval affinities but they did not become monolithic catholic or protestant blocs. Finally, a tension emerged within late sixteenth century clienteles between loyalty to the clientele and loyalty to the county community. These differences could be reconciled under Elizabeth but the germs of dissension remained. However, this does not apply to the mid-Tudor period because the county community was in its nascent form.²²

There was a social dynamic to clienteles too. A clientele was a client network for mutual reciprocal benefit that combined elements of fidelity relationships and clientele or ordinary relationships, where those in service were usually inferior to those designated clients. However, the distinction between servants and clients is not easy to make and cannot be applied absolutely. Some servants were powerful clients and some powerful clients were not servants. It was an

¹⁶ S. Adams, 'Baronial contexts? Continuity and change in the noble affinity, 1400-1600', in J.L. Watts (ed.), *The end of the middle ages? England in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries* (The fifteenth century series, 6; Stroud, 1998), pp. 155-156.

¹⁷ Adams, 'Baronial contexts?', pp. 157-161.

¹⁸ Adams, 'Baronial contexts?', pp. 166-171.

¹⁹ Adams, 'Baronial contexts?', p. 171.

²⁰ Adams, 'Baronial contexts?', pp. 171-172; S. Adams, (ed.), *Household accounts and disbursement books of Robert Dudley, earl of Leicester, 1558-1561, 1584-1586, Camden Miscellany* (Camden Society, 5th ser., 6; London, 1995), pp. 24-30.

²¹ Adams, 'Baronial contexts?', pp. 172-174.

²² Adams, 'Baronial contexts?', pp. 186-190.

obligatory relationship that combined elements of friendship and kinship, creating an increasingly intimate set of concentric rings around the patron.²³ Clienteles were mutual self-support groups between patron and clients.²⁴ Kinsmen were friends and could, and usually did, become clients.²⁵ Friendship was usually a relationship between equals, although not always, while clientage normally involved an unequal power relationship based on dependency. The degree varied.²⁶ Therefore, there was a group dynamic that altered the nature of friendship. Friendship was a horizontal association that was personal and social, although the intimacy between social friends was less intense than between close friends. Clientage was a vertical structure, either a fidelity relationship or an ordinary clientage relationship, the former being a closer bond built over time through service, association and similar outlook. Friendship was independent; clientage dependent: a failure of reciprocity could terminate the latter but would probably at most impair the former. Similarly, such a failure would strain kinship relations but could not sever them.²⁷ Clients could also have more than one patron (they could literally be in more than one clientele), enhancing ties between patrons. Again, the degree of friendship between a client and his patrons could indicate whether he was in more than one clientele and clienteles were not rigid structures. Dependency was a two-way process, with patron and client needing one another. Friendship and clientage could overlap, friends becoming clients and clients becoming friends. Friendship was possibly a stronger component of clientage in mid-Tudor England than in early modern France.²⁸ Clientage lacked the emotional ties and intimacy of friendship but trusted clients, could become friends; roles could change.²⁹ Clienteles were systems of personal connections and networks.³⁰

II: The reorganisation of the royal household, 1547-1549

One of the first tasks at Edward's accession was to reorganise the royal household. The formal household established for Edward as prince in March 1538 became integrated with the royal household when he became king. It did take some time, though, for all members to be found places.³¹ Membership of his establishment as prince of Wales was a 'prime source of recruitment' to the royal household, both the hall and the chamber. Career servants and courtiers would be

²³ S. Kettering, 'Patronage in early modern France', *French Historical Studies*, 17 (1992), pp. 844-854; S. Carroll, *Noble power during the French Wars of Religion. The Guise affinity and the catholic cause in Normandy* (Cambridge, 1998), pp. 58, 64-65, 84-88; M. Greengrass, 'Noble affinities in early modern France: the case of Henri I de Montmorency, constable of France', *European History Quarterly*, 16 (1986), pp. 282-283, 299-300.

²⁴ S. Kettering, 'Friendship and clientage in early modern France', *French History*, 6 (1992), pp. 139-158.

²⁵ Kettering, 'Friendship and clientage', pp. 139-141; J. Wormald, *Lords and men in Scotland. Bonds of manrent, 1442-1603* (Edinburgh, 1985), p. 86.

²⁶ Kettering, 'Friendship and clientage', pp. 141-143.

²⁷ Kettering, 'Friendship and clientage', pp. 145-146.

²⁸ Kettering, 'Friendship and clientage', pp. 149-150.

²⁹ Kettering, 'Friendship and clientage', pp. 150-155.

³⁰ Kettering, 'Patronage in early modern France', pp. 839-852.

preferred on Edward's accession.³² Several of the more important figures in his privy chamber began service when he was prince. His chamberlain and the countess of Hertford's stepfather, Sir Richard Page, vice-chamberlain, Sir William Goring, and steward, Sir William Sidney, were made gentlemen of the privy chamber in the new reign but their appointment may not have been immediate.³³ Sidney's son, Henry Sidney, and Barnaby Fitzpatrick, Edward's closest companions, had to wait until Somerset fell before being appointed to the privy chamber.³⁴ John Ryther, who had replaced Sir Richard Cotton as cofferer of Edward's household by 1541, was appointed cofferer of the royal household in 1547. He was probably favoured because he was a good friend of Somerset's brother-in-law, Sir Clement Smith, and because he was highly competent. Richard Cox was royal almoner from the start of the reign and may have actually fulfilled this role for both households under Henry. It was a relatively undemanding position and almost a sinecure. Membership of Edward's household as prince was an excellent and obvious way to gain subsequent appointment to the royal household but selection depended on Somerset. However, in the main, the duke continued to run the household as Henry had, with the exception of some of his clients being appointed as monitors.³⁵

As lord protector and governor of the king's person, Somerset had a special interest in the royal household and had to effect the transition of personnel, finding places there for former servants of the prince. This was more easily achieved for the household below stairs.³⁶ John Ashley had been a gentleman waiter to Edward since 1543 but could not be accommodated within the royal household in 1547. Instead, he was given a position in Elizabeth's household.³⁷ Another figure who remained in the royal household after Edward became king was Thomas Wroth of Enfield in Middlesex. He had originally been appointed a gentleman usher in 1541.³⁸ He was transferred to the position of gentleman usher of the privy chamber in 1547.³⁹ Wroth remained a minor, but useful, figure in the royal household until he was appointed on 15 October 1549 as one of four people 'attendantte vpon his highnes person and chiefe gentilmen of his maiestes privie chambre'.⁴⁰ He was closely associated with Northumberland's regime and continued on intimate

³¹ BL Royal MS. 7 C xvi, fos. 92r-92v; BL Royal MS. 7 C xvi, fos. 93r-95v; BL Royal MS. 7 C xvi, fos. 96r-97v; R.C. Braddock, 'The royal household, 1540-1560: a study in office-holding in Tudor England', unpublished Northwestern University Ph.D. (1971), pp. 92-97.

³² Braddock, 'The royal household', pp. 152-156.

³³ PRO, LC 2/2, fos. 49v, 53r; PRO, LC 2/2/3/1, fo. 95r; PRO, E 179/69/62; PRO, E 179/69/63; PRO, E 179/69/64.

³⁴ BL Cotton MS. Nero C. x, fos. 20r, 40r; W.K. Jordan (ed.), *The chronicle and political papers of King Edward VI* (Ithaca, 1966), pp. 25, 77.

³⁵ S.T. Bindoff (ed.), *The history of parliament. The house of commons 1509-1558* (iii vols.; London, 1982), i, pp. 711-713; iii, pp. 240-241; PRO, LC 2/2, fo. 38r; PRO, LC 2/2/3/1, fo. 95r; PRO, E 101/426/8; PRO, LC 2/4/1, fo. 15v; Braddock, 'The royal household', p. 102; J. Loach, *Edward VI* (New Haven and London, 1999), pp. 9, 11-14.

³⁶ Braddock, 'The royal household', pp. 153-156.

³⁷ BL Royal MS. 7 C xvi, fo. 94r; Braddock, 'The royal household', p. 153.

³⁸ PRO, LC 2/2/3/1, fo. 95r; Loach, *Edward VI*, p. 9.

³⁹ Braddock, 'The royal household', p. 154.

⁴⁰ *Acts of the Privy Council of England*, eds. J.R. Dasent *et al* (n.s., xxxvi vols.; London, 1890-1964), ii, p. 345; PRO, E 101/426/8.

terms with the king, attending him when he died.⁴¹ John Seymour, senior, was probably a gentleman waiter, while John Seymour, junior, would be among the gentlemen of the chamber as either a cupbearer, carver or sewer.⁴² Their relationship with Somerset is uncertain but they were incorporated into the royal household too. In 1547 Edward's chamber included some of the most important young nobles, among them, the duke of Suffolk, Lord Strange, the earl of Derby's heir, and the earl of Ormond.⁴³ His household as prince was a replication of the royal household on a smaller, though still massive scale.⁴⁴ It was important to strengthen the ties between the king and his nobility. Ormond was head of one of the most important Anglo-Irish families and the first Butler to become protestant.⁴⁵ This was particularly important because of the vacuum created by the fall of the earl of Kildare in 1534 and the ambiguous behaviour of Ormond's mother after her husband's death.⁴⁶ These youths now became members of the royal household.

Somerset immediately attempted to exercise control over the chamber. Initially, he placed himself at the head of the privy chamber and added some of his closest supporters among the Henrician executors and assistants. These included Warwick, the earl of Essex (the marquis of Northampton), lord great chamberlain, Lord Russell, the lord privy seal, Lord Herbert, heir to the earl of Worcester, Sir Thomas Cheyne, treasurer of the household, Sir Anthony Brown, Sir Anthony Denny, Sir William Herbert, Lord Seymour of Sudeley, Sir Ralph Sadler, Sir Thomas Cawarden, Sir John Gates, Sir Thomas Parry, Sir Philip Hoby, Sir Anthony St Leger, and Sir Edward Bellingham. Many of these men had been gentlemen of the privy chamber to Henry (including Russell, Cheyne, Brown, Denny, Sir William Herbert, Seymour, Sadler, Cawarden, Gates, St Leger and Bellingham) or were executors or assistant executors, giving them a special role through the terms of Henry's will in Edward's upbringing. Somerset also initially relegated some of Henry's old gentlemen of the privy chamber. Sir Thomas Heneage, Sir Francis Bryan, Sir John Welsborne, and Sir Anthony Knevet were made 'Extra Ordinary' gentlemen. This was probably to make way for new appointees, especially figures Edward would be familiar with because they had already served him as prince. However, the coronation list may not have recorded the total number of gentlemen of the privy chamber. Sir Thomas Paston, Sir Thomas Darcy, and Anthony Cooke were not included on it, even though they had been promoted to the position in 1538, about 1544, and 1546 respectively. It is possible they were removed prior to

⁴¹ PRO, E 179/69/63; PRO, E 179/69/64; John Foxe, *The acts and monuments of John Foxe and a life of the martyrologist, and vindication of the work*, ed. G. Townsend (viii vols.; London, 1843-1849), vi, p. 352, n. 1.

⁴² PRO, LC 2/2, fo. 53v; PRO, LC 2/2/3/1, fos. 95r-96r.

⁴³ This was the Brandon duke of Suffolk, not the Grey duke of Suffolk (the marquis of Dorset): PRO, LC 2/2, fos. 53r-53v.

⁴⁴ PRO, LC 2/2, fos. 53r-55r; PRO, LC 2/2/3/1, fos. 95r-105v.

⁴⁵ Loach, *Edward VI*, p. 9.

⁴⁶ C. Brady, *The chief governors. The rise and fall of reform government in Tudor Ireland 1536-1588* (Cambridge, 1994), pp. 1-4; PRO, SP 61/1/1, fos. 1r-1v; PRO, SP 61/1/4, fos. 14r-15v.

reappointment between 1547-1549.⁴⁷ A new list of 1548 did include Bryan, Paston and Darcy, while Cooke was again listed in 1549.⁴⁸

Sir Michael Stanhope's elevation changed this system. Somerset appointed his brother-in-law groom of the stool on 24 August 1547, a chief gentleman of the privy chamber on 13 September and keeper of the privy purse, taking control of the privy coffers from Denny. This reflected anxiety about controlling his nephew while on campaign. By 18 August 1548, Stanhope was elevated to a completely new position as 'first' gentleman, having the practical oversight of Somerset's office as governor.⁴⁹ The lord protector was trying, with some success, to oversee access to the privy chamber in order to limit the influence of others. However, there was no large influx of Somerset's clients, although he has been accused of filling the court with his people.⁵⁰ There were twenty-six officers of the privy chamber in 1546. As well as Goring and Sidney, others who were appointed gentlemen of the privy chamber during the protectorate included Stanhope and Edward Wolf (both Somerset's clients), Sir John Cheke, Sir Maurice Berkeley, Sir Andrew Dudley, Warwick's brother, and, possibly, Thomas Audley of St Ives in Huntingdon.⁵¹ Berkeley had been a gentleman usher since 1539, keeper of Northwood Park in Somerset, constable of Berkeley Castle, Gloucestershire, and chief steward of lands of Bath Abbey. He was also one of the most substantial gentlemen in Somerset and had close connections with Cawarden. His credentials for promotion were good, even though he was not one of Somerset's clients and most of his rewards came during Northumberland's ascendancy. Audley was an eminent soldier (described as 'specially expert in the warres & } well languaged' in about 1547) and gentleman usher of the privy chamber under Henry. He was only listed among the gentlemen of the privy chamber for Edward's coronation and, although appointed to the Huntingdon commission of the peace in 1547, does not appear to have had a closer clientage relationship with Somerset.⁵² Somerset may have placed Nicholas Throckmorton in the privy chamber. Throckmorton could

⁴⁷ PRO, LC 2/2/3/1, fos. 107r-108r; D. Loades, *The Tudor court* (London, 1986), pp. 53-54; PRO, E 23/4/1, fos. 3r-16v; T. Rymer and R. Sanderson (eds.), *Fœdera, conventiones, litteræ...* (xx vols.; London, 1704-1735), xv, pp. 110-117; Bindoff, i, pp. 414-415, 518-521, 599-602, 634-638, 689-691; ii, pp. 14-15, 27-29, 198-199, 335, 341-344; iii, pp. 234-236, 68-69, 249-252, 297-301; *The complete peerage of England, Scotland, and Ireland, Great Britain, and the United Kingdom*, eds. V. Gibbs *et al* (xiii vols.; London, 1910-1940), xii (part 2), pp. 852-854.

⁴⁸ PRO, SP 10/5/17, M. fos. 55r-55v; PRO, E 179/69/62.

⁴⁹ PRO, C 66/811, m. 34; *Calendar of the patent rolls*, i, p. 391; Bindoff, iii, pp. 368-369; D.E. Hoak, 'The king's privy chamber, 1547-1553', in D.J. Guth and J.W. McKenna (eds.), *Tudor rule and revolution* (Cambridge, 1982), pp. 105-106; see below, pp. 47-49.

⁵⁰ A. Hawkyard, 'Uncles to the king and protectors of the throne: the Seymours', in D.R. Starkey, (ed.), *Rivals in power. Lives and letters of the great Tudor dynasties* (London, 1990), p. 123.

⁵¹ Braddock, 'The royal household', p. 75; Bindoff, i, pp. 353-354, 418-419, 626-627; ii, pp. 61-63; iii, pp. 368-369; PRO, LC 2/2/3/1, fo. 108r; PRO, E 179/69/62; see below, p. 175.

⁵² PRO, SP 46/162, fo. 53r; Bindoff, i, pp. 353-354, 418-419; PRO, C 66/801, m. 13d; *Calendar of the patent rolls preserved in the Public Record Office, Edward VI*, ed. H.C. Maxwell Lyte (vi vols.; London, 1924-1929), i, p. 85; APC, iii, p. 259; iv, pp. 49, 277.

have benefited from serving in his cousin Catherine Parr's household and being associated with her husband Seymour.⁵³

At the same time, Somerset replaced important household officials on whose support he felt he could not depend.⁵⁴ Sir William Paget replaced Sir John Gage as comptroller on 29 June 1547. Paget had also been appointed chancellor of the duchy and county palatine of Lancaster five days previously.⁵⁵ Gage was a conservative and, more importantly, not one of Somerset's close adherents.⁵⁶ This change reflected Somerset's need to reward Paget for his role in creating the protectorate. The comptroller, along with the lord steward and treasurer, planned for the annual needs of the household and allocated responsibility among the household officers for achieving these aims. One of these three great officers was to attend his office every day with the cofferer, clerks of the green cloth and one clerk comptroller to examine the daily use of provisions in the hope of eliminating waste.⁵⁷ The comptroller would have close access to the king. This may have attracted Paget because the king was a minor, making the need for frequent recourse to the secretary less likely until he was older. However, the king would continue to have the closest clerical relationship with his tutors until the dissolution of the protectorate.⁵⁸ There is some evidence for Paget's involvement in his duties, although he probably oversaw the household only in general terms, the masters and clerks carrying out the detailed work.⁵⁹ He was more occupied with his office as chancellor because it was more demanding.⁶⁰ Dr Gammon thought Paget's reason for relinquishing the secretaryship for his new offices was to gain direct control of a major source of patronage.⁶¹ However, he had a major role to play in patronage as secretary and this cannot be his only reason. His control of the duchy of Lancaster did allow him to do more than influence patronage (he actively promoted associates and clients) but the secretariat was still a more important office.⁶² By controlling access, the lord protector hoped to control the king and strengthen the protectorate. Gage and Brown may have reduced their presence at court, especially as the protestant complexion there became pronounced. However, the earl of Arundel remained lord chamberlain, despite his conservatism.⁶³

⁵³ BL Additional MS. 5841, fos. 127v-146r; E 179/69/64; *APC*, iii, p. 271; Bindoff, iii, pp. 461-462; Longleat, Thynne MS. 2, fos. 43r-43v.

⁵⁴ Braddock, 'The royal household', p. 165.

⁵⁵ R. Somerville, *History of the duchy of Lancaster* (ii vols.; London, 1953), i, p. 394; *APC*, ii, p. 101; S.R. Gammon, *Statesman and schemer. William, first Lord Paget, Tudor minister* (Newton Abbot, 1973), p. 138.

⁵⁶ Braddock, 'The royal household', p. 165.

⁵⁷ G.R. Elton, *The Tudor revolution in government. Administrative changes in the reign of Henry VIII* (London, 1953), pp. 40-41, 373-374, n. 4, 377, 389.

⁵⁸ Ponet, *A shorte treatise of politike power*, sig. I3v.

⁵⁹ PRO, E 101/424/9, fo. 77r; PRO, E 101/426/1; PRO, E 179/69/76.

⁶⁰ PRO, DL 1/27, fo. 59r.

⁶¹ Gammon, *Statesman and schemer*, p. 138.

⁶² See below, pp. 73-75.

⁶³ Braddock, 'The royal household', p. 165.

Those selected to serve in the privy chamber could have a decisive influence. Cheke and Henry Sidney were particularly close to the king. Cheke's intimacy stemmed from his appointment as tutor in 1544.⁶⁴ Anthony Cooke and he instructed Edward in 'learning, manners and religion'. According to John Strype, even after Edward's accession, Cheke was 'always at his elbow, both in his closet [the privy chamber] and in his chapel, and wherever else he went, to inform and teach him'. The gentlemen of the privy chamber were the king's most intimate attendants and could be used as an direct extension of royal power. Other sources corroborate Cheke's closeness to Edward.⁶⁵ Besides Cox and Cheke, Edward's French tutor Jean Belmain (Cheke's kinsman through marriage and a fellow reformer) probably continued to exercise influence over him. However, Cheke was the central figure in this circle about the king whose outlook shaped Edward's worldview within the cloistered environment of the privy chamber.⁶⁶ The result of this education was Edward's convinced advanced protestantism, which can be traced in his scholastic exercises. This outlook would have an impact on the reformation. Dr MacCulloch has recently demonstrated this, especially regarding Edward's personal interventions over religious matters.⁶⁷ An anonymous French source suggested that Henry Sidney exercised a special influence over the king, was constantly present in the privy chamber and able to persuade him to follow Northumberland's directions.⁶⁸

Although Edward was an unmarried minor and did not need the same establishment as an adult king, people were retained in the household because it represented the monarchy and commonwealth. Besides, households were to some extent self-perpetuating organisations. Somerset occupied the queen's side of the royal palaces with his wife and clientele as an expedient to partially solve this problem and presumably utilised the services of the servants attached to it. He would possibly have felt entitled to live there because his authority as lord protector and governor partially rested on the fact that he was the king's eldest maternal uncle. Occupying the queen's side, where his sister Jane Seymour had once dwelt, would reinforce this. It would also have been a familiar environment for him if he spent any time there with her when she was queen and because of his own apprenticeship in the court.⁶⁹ One of the few pieces of evidence for

⁶⁴ BL Cotton MS. Nero C. x, fo. 11r; Jordan (ed.), *Chronicle*, p. 3; W.K. Jordan, *Edward VI: the young king. The protectorship of the duke of Somerset* (Cambridge, Mass., 1968), pp. 41-42; Bindoff, i, pp. 626-627.

⁶⁵ J. Strype, *The life of the learned Sir John Cheke, kt. First instructor, afterwards secretary of state, to King Edward VI...* (Oxford, 1821), p. 22; Loach, *Edward VI*, pp. 11-14, 163; D.R. Starkey, 'Representation through intimacy: A study in the symbolism of monarchy and court office in early modern England', in Guy (ed.), *The Tudor monarchy*, pp. 52-57, 66.

⁶⁶ Jordan, *The young king*, p. 42; J. Strype, (ed.), *Ecclesiastical memorials, relating chiefly to religion, and the reformation of it, and the emergencies of the Church of England under King Henry VIII, King Edward VI, and Queen Mary I* (iii vols. in vi, London, 1822), ii, I, pp. 13-16; D. MacCulloch, *Tudor church militant. Edward VI and the protestant reformation* (London, 1999), pp. 20-35.

⁶⁷ MacCulloch, *Tudor church militant*, pp. 22-35.

⁶⁸ Hoak, *The king's council*, pp. 123-124, 264-265.

⁶⁹ W.K. Jordan, *Edward VI: the threshold of power. The dominance of the duke of Northumberland* (London, 1970), p. 18.

Somerset's lodging at court comes from a letter of 11 October 1549 from Sir Anthony Wingfield, the vice-chamberlain and captain of the guard, Cranmer and Paget to the London council. During the October coup, while the king was at Windsor, Somerset remained in very close proximity to him. Wingfield took the former lord protector into custody 'and forbycause his chambre was hard adioynyng to the kinges bed chambre he is removid to the towre which is called the lieutenantes t[o]wre which is the high towre next adioynyng to the gate of the myddle warde'.⁷⁰ It is likely that because of the uncertainty of these days, Somerset ensured that he was closer to the king than normal but it does reinforce the idea that he usually lived in close proximity to his nephew when at court. Somerset headed the privy chamber personally from 1547-1548, before placing Stanhope in direct control as chief gentleman and groom of the stool. The latter position in particular afforded Stanhope great intimacy with Edward, including elevation of status through close personal attendance on him (assisting the king when he relieved himself and when he dressed) and the symbolic importance this conveyed. Stanhope held the only other key to the privy lodgings apart from the king's, and could lodge in the bedchamber. This would suggest a frequent residence at court. He must have been one of the most constant figures in Edward's life. Stanhope's elevation as first gentleman changed the existing system but the office of groom already gave him *de facto* control of the privy chamber.⁷¹ As governor, Somerset exercised comprehensive control over the king. It was his duty to protect the king and bring him up well and during the October coup he described Edward as 'the Apple of my eye'.⁷² Seymour wanted to be governor and at the time of his arrest the privy council explained the nature of this custodial responsibility: he 'wold have layed his handes uppon the persone of the Kinges Majeste, and would have taken the same into his order and disposicion'.⁷³ He complained that his brother used his office to prevent access and by controlling the king maintained his authority. Seymour also spoke about general misgivings over how Edward was raised.⁷⁴ Paget had advised Somerset to be cautious in securing control of the king at the accession: 'for the Rest of your apoyntments for the keyping of the towar and the kyngs parsun it shalbe well dunne ye be not to hasti therin'.⁷⁵ Once he achieved this though, Somerset attempted to maintain close control of Edward. He succeeded in controlling the kingdom because he controlled the king.

Professor Loades thought that, unlike at Edward's accession, when Mary came to the throne in 1553 substantial changes were made to personnel, writing that 'whereas the accession of Edward had passed almost unnoticed, Mary added over thirty names to the "check roll" and replaced no

⁷⁰ PRO, SP 10/9/42, M. fos. 82r-83v; P.F. Tytler (ed.), *England under the reigns of Edward VI and Mary...* (ii vols.; London, 1839), i, p. 241; BL Additional MS. 48126, fo. 15r.

⁷¹ PRO, LC 2/2/3/1, fos. 107r-108r; Loades, *The Tudor court*, pp. 53-54; Starkey, 'Representation through intimacy', pp. 52-66.

⁷² BL Additional MS. 48126, fo. 10r.

⁷³ APC, ii, p. 237.

⁷⁴ PRO, SP 10/6/17, M. fos. 47r-48v; Tytler, i, pp. 146-148; see below, pp. 91-92.

fewer than five of Edward's sergeants'. Dr Braddock pointed out that the household below stairs increased in size because of the inability of either Edward's regents or Mary to rationalise it. Instead, they yielded to pressure to admit more servants.⁷⁶ Professor Loades overstates the contrast. Twenty-one servants were added between 1547-1553 compared with thirty-three between 1553-1558.⁷⁷ The figures reinforce his point but, if anything, the alterations to the chamber personnel were greater in 1547 than in 1553 in terms of numbers involved because of the need to incorporate as much of the prince's household as possible, if not equalling the implications of a catholic woman ascending the throne.⁷⁸

Three documents from early 1547 concerned with the discharge of some of Henry's 'officers in ordinary of the chamber' are extant. These list gentlemen, yeomen grooms and grooms 'not plased' and, once this was achieved, recorded the chamber servants 'as ar nuely placed in ordinary of the chamber'.⁷⁹ This was the result of having to incorporate the princely household within the royal household. The 'officers in ordinary of the chamber' discharged in 1547 numbered twenty five, although some might be retained, while only half the yeomen of the chamber were to be kept on.⁸⁰ Professor Loades thinks Somerset and Paget pensioned off large numbers for political reasons, although the evidence suggests the motivation was fiscal.⁸¹ Large numbers of gentlemen, yeomen grooms and grooms were 'nott plased', some of whom were to receive bouche of court by the king's command, others were to be placed in the court and the rest (ten) were to be discharged. These were supernumeraries, county gentlemen drawn to the court to serve for brief periods but superfluous to needs. For example, the Yorkshire gentleman, and Sir John Thynne's cousin, Thomas Ennis, was retained in ordinary as secretary, while the Suffolk gentleman Edward Walgrave was retained in ordinary as a gentleman usher. Twenty 'extraordinarii', who had served in Edward's household as prince, now 'made upp the number of lx yomen'.⁸² Professor Loades notes that the most significant changes on Mary's accession were to the major household officers. This was only natural. Whereas Mary was circumscribed by the need to retain proven politicians and administrators within the privy council, she had greater freedom to chose her household. Apart from Cheyne, all the principal officers were changed and the privy chamber, through which

⁷⁵ PRO, SP 10/1/1, M. fos. 1r-1v; Tytler, i, pp. 15-16.

⁷⁶ D. Loades, *The reign of Mary Tudor. Politics, government and religion in England, 1553-1558* (London, 1991 edn.), pp. 42-44; Braddock, 'The royal household', pp. 82-83, 214.

⁷⁷ BL Royal MS. 7 C xvi, fos. 92r-92v; BL Royal MS. 7 C xvi, fos. 93r-95v; BL Royal MS. 7 C xvi, fos. 96r-97v; PRO, E 179/69/58; Braddock, 'The royal household', pp. 82-83, 214.

⁷⁸ BL Royal MS. 7 C xvi, fos. 92r-92v; BL Royal MS. 7 C xvi, fos. 93r-95v; BL Royal MS. 7 C xvi, fos. 96r-97v.

⁷⁹ BL Royal MS. 7 C xvi, fos. 92r-92v; BL Royal MS. 7 C xvi, fos. 93r-95v; BL Royal MS. 7 C xvi, fos. 96r-97v.

⁸⁰ BL Royal MS. 7 C xvi, fos. 92r-92v.

⁸¹ Loades, *The Tudor court*, p. 65.

⁸² BL Royal MS. 7 C xvi, fos. 93r-95v; J.A. Guy, 'Thomas Wolsey, Thomas Cromwell and the reform of Henrician government', in D. MacCulloch (ed.), *The reign of Henry VIII. Politics, policy and piety* (London, 1995), pp. 53-57.

Northumberland had exercised substantial authority and patronage, was 'completely purged'.⁸³ As an adult regnant, Mary could and did impose her will and shape the character of her court through her choice of personnel. Any role Edward would have in this process was limited until he began to exercise more authority as he neared his majority. However, the number of Somerset's clients placed in the privy chamber was small and he chose to control the household through Stanhope.

The most important thing to a courtier was access to the monarch and the influence and patronage proximity conveyed. Factions sought to gain access for themselves, while denying it to opposing factions, but a monarch was expected to maintain pluralistic access to power.⁸⁴ Access to the king was still important, even though Edward was a minor. In a way, it was more important because, as a child, the king was not expected to be as independent and could be considered more amenable to manipulation by undesirable elements at court. A good example of this problem was Seymour's behaviour. By the end of 1548, with his relations with Somerset worsening rapidly, he attempted to use Cheke and other members of the privy chamber to influence the king into supporting his political activities.⁸⁵ Seymour had argued with his brother over the running of the admiralty and asked John Fowler, one of the grooms of the privy chamber, whether Somerset had visited the king recently because he wanted to know if these differences had been discussed with Edward. On learning that he had not, Seymour asked Fowler to tell the king about the disagreement between the brothers. Fowler agreed. Seymour wanted this, 'lest my Lorde [Somerset] shuld tell him his grace [Edward] being ignorannt of the mater'. Seymour hoped to persuade Edward to favour his account by using men who were close to the king in the privy chamber. However, Seymour conceded that if the details were presented by Somerset, rather than his own adherents, the king would have an unbiased account: 'than said he nothing but that his grace [Edward] wold be indifferent betwene vs and to consider we be bothe brotherne and that we must agreea as brotherne'. This was a remarkable concession, both to the eleven-year-old's discretion and the ability of the regime to curtail faction. However, it was not what Seymour wanted. He wanted the king to hear a coloured report. Fowler thought that Cheke and Wroth did 'breke with the king to'.⁸⁶ It is uncertain by what means they achieved this but Somerset wanted to prevent it happening again. In the immediate aftermath of Seymour's fall (January 1549), having detailed depositions of just how the lord admiral had circumvented the security around the young king, inveigling some of Edward's most trusted servants to achieve his purposes, concrete measures were taken to make the

⁸³ D.E. Hoak, 'Two revolutions in Tudor government: the formation and organization of Mary I's privy council', in C. Coleman and D.R. Starkey, (eds.), *Revolution reassessed. Revisions in the history of Tudor government and administration* (Oxford, 1986), pp. 87-115; Loades, *The reign of Mary Tudor*, pp. 42-43.

⁸⁴ P. Wright, 'A change in direction: the ramifications of a female household, 1558-1603', in D.R. Starkey *et al* (eds.), *The English court: from the Wars of the Roses to the Civil War* (London, 1987), pp. 147-172; D.R. Starkey, 'Intimacy and innovation, the rise of the privy chamber, 1485-1547', in Starkey *et al* (eds.), *The English court*, pp. 71-118; Starkey, 'Representation through intimacy', pp. 42-78; G.R. Elton, 'Tudor government: the points of contact. iii. The court', *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, fifth series, 26 (1976), pp. 211-228.

⁸⁵ *APC*, ii, p. 260.

palaces more secure. Henry Ronynge, a smith, was paid for work done at Whitehall in January 1549. He made 'viij boltes in plate occupied and sett on vpon the prevey chamber dores', a new 'bye key' for the privy kitchen on the queen's side, mended a master key for the king's locks and did other work.⁸⁷ At the same time, provision was being made for a more careful watch over the king at St James's Palace. Five 'Matlayers' were paid for laying and matting the privy chamber. One of them, John Ansell, also received £5.15.0 for one hundred and fifty six mats laid in the privy chamber. This was probably coarse sacking on which pallets would be laid. These changes would accommodate the gentlemen of the privy chamber and other privy chamber staff more comfortably and in larger numbers.⁸⁸ Four men were paid for repairing windows 'about' the king's lodgings there.⁸⁹ David Martin, comptroller of the king's works, oversaw all this work.⁹⁰ Although part of the general upkeep of the palaces, it is interesting that it was carried out at this time and that increased security was such a pronounced feature. The main reason for Arundel's removal from office would be the issue of access. He was accused of, among other things, 'certaine crimes of suspicion against him, as plucking downe of boltes and lokkes at westminter'. Whether or not he was guilty does not matter as much as Warwick's need to exercise control over access and to preclude potential threats. Sir Richard and Sir Robert Southwell were also removed from court and these actions curtailed the influence of the earl of Southampton's (Lord Wriothesley) party.⁹¹

III: The household under the duke of Northumberland, 1549-1553

Warwick 'exploited the household to the full'.⁹² He probably benefited from the king's religious outlook. Edward may have played a role in the establishment of Warwick's ascendancy over the privy chamber because he would have found the appointment of conservative gentlemen unacceptable. The court could not be controlled separately from the government during a minority and Warwick's protestant clientele was therefore welcome to the reformers around the king. Warwick was greatly assisted in this by Thomas Cranmer, archbishop of Canterbury, who was close to Edward.⁹³ This control also enhanced his patronage. The privy chamber numbered

⁸⁶ PRO, SP 10/6/10, M. fos. 24v-25r.

⁸⁷ PRO, E 101/474/19, fos. 1r, 2v.

⁸⁸ PRO, E 101/474/19, fo. 3r; BL Additional MS. 71009, fo. 19v; BL Additional MS. 71009, fo. 30r.

⁸⁹ PRO, E 101/474/19, fo. 3v.

⁹⁰ PRO, E 101/474/19, fos. 2r-15v; APC, ii, pp. 495-496; H.M. Colvin (ed.), *The history of the king's works*, (vols. iii-iv; London, 1975, 1982), iii, pp. 57-59, 87, 407.

⁹¹ BL Cotton MS. Nero C. x, fos. 17r, 18r; Jordan (ed.), *Chronicle*, p. 19; *Letters, despatches, and state papers, relating to the negotiations between England and Spain, preserved in the archives at Vienna, Brussels, Simancas and elsewhere*, eds. M.A.S. Hume, R. Tyler *et al* (xv vols. in xx; London, 1862-1954), x, p. 14; see below, pp. 166-168, 170-174.

⁹² Braddock, 'The royal household', p. 166.

⁹³ J. Murphy, 'The illusion of decline: the privy chamber, 1547-1558', in Starkey *et al* (eds.), *The English court*, p. 128; MacCulloch, *Tudor church militant*, pp. 35, 38, 41; BL Lansdowne MS. 160, fos. 264r-267r; BL Additional MS. 48126, fos. 15r-16r; BL Additional MS. 11042, fos. *53r-*53v; Hoak, *The king's council*, pp. 241-258; Hoak, 'Rehabilitating the duke of Northumberland', pp. 36-39.

twenty-six in 1546 and thirty-seven in 1553, while the number of grooms trebled and four knights or lords were established to control the privy purse. This increase in positions was partly a response to pressure for office.⁹⁴ In October 1549 Stanhope was arrested, removing him from the privy chamber. Wolf was also removed.⁹⁵ With Somerset's fall, a new order was devised to ensure that six officers were in constant attendance on the king (at least two of them to be drawn from the six newly appointed lords and the four knights). These men were closely identified with Warwick. The knights were paid double the salary of ordinary gentlemen of the privy chamber and carried out the most intimate bodily duties for the monarch, being in closest proximity and shielding him from the unwanted attentions of the rest of the court. Stanhope's office was abolished.⁹⁶ Arundel was a victim of Warwick's counter-coup.⁹⁷ He was replaced by Lord Wentworth, who, although Somerset's cousin, was regarded as less threatening than the earl was and more amenable to the new regime. Wentworth had a very important role in the more closely controlled privy chamber under Warwick because he oversaw the king's most personal servants, the gentlemen who increasingly shaped Edward's worldview. Wentworth was also 'a genuine and enthusiastic supporter of Protestantism' in Suffolk and this must have made him even more invaluable to Warwick.⁹⁸ Security was further enhanced when the yeomen of the guard were increased from one hundred to four hundred, while many from the more prestigious gentlemen pensioners were retired and replaced by sixty 'light horsemen' from Boulogne. These were highly competent professional soldiers, who would now serve under Northampton as lord great chamberlain, while Lord Clinton would command six hundred men-at-arms, 'whereof cc to attende on the Kinges person', while the others were employed where necessary. This decision was taken on the same day Somerset was readmitted to the privy chamber. These returning professional soldiers probably formed the nucleus of the *gendarmes* established by Warwick in 1551.⁹⁹

The lord great master could exercise substantial control over the household, including making the routine appointments. As he dominated the privy council through the office of lord president, it was natural for Warwick to wish to dominate the court as lord great master and he was duly appointed on 20 February 1550. The patent cited his 'constancy in the christian religion, bravery in war, sedition and tumult, and benevolent and most faithful spirit towards us we have always

⁹⁴ PRO, LC 2/4/1, fos. 18r-19v; BL Stowe MS. 571, fos. 30r-30v; Braddock, 'The royal household', pp. 75-79.

⁹⁵ Bindoff, iii, pp. 368-369; PRO, E 179/69/62; PRO, E 179/69/63; PRO, E 179/69/64.

⁹⁶ The six lords were Northampton, Warwick, Arundel, Russell, Lord St John and Lord Wentworth; the four knights, who were to be in constant attendance, were Sir Andrew Dudley, Warwick's brother, Sir Edward Rogers, Darcy and Wroth: BL Cotton MS. Nero C. x, fo. 17r; Jordan (ed.), *Chronicle*, p. 18; APC, ii, p. 345; Starkey, 'Intimacy and innovation', pp. 71-118; Loach, *Edward VI*, pp. 94-95.

⁹⁷ BL Cotton MS. Nero C. x, fos. 17r, 29r; Jordan (ed.), *Chronicle*, pp. 19, 51.

⁹⁸ Braddock, 'The royal household', p. 166; Loach, *Edward VI*, pp. 95, 139; D. MacCulloch and J. Blatchly, 'Pastoral provision in the parishes of Tudor Ipswich', *Sixteenth Century Journal*, 22 (1991), p. 462; D. MacCulloch, *Suffolk and the Tudors. Politics and religion in an English county, 1500-1600* (Oxford, 1986), pp. 159-160.

⁹⁹ APC, iii, pp. 29-30; Adams, 'The English military clientele', p. 219; Loach, *Edward VI*, pp. 95-96.

known, and whose presence and personal residence in our royal household and around our royal person we especially desire in this our tender age'.¹⁰⁰ His intimacy with Edward was assured and this office underlined the importance of being close to the king and exercising legitimate control over access. Northumberland put his people in the chamber between 1549-1553; his heir became master of the horse; Sir Henry Gates and Sir Andrew Dudley became gentlemen ushers; his son, Sir Robert Dudley, was gentleman of the privy chamber and chief carver; Sir Henry Sidney was cupbearer; Lord Thomas and Lord John Grey, the marquis of Dorset's brothers, were sewers; and John Darcy was esquire of the body.¹⁰¹ By 20 April 1550 it was necessary to use three officers from the outer privy chamber to replace absences from among the original ten (the lords and knights): 'ordre taken for the chambre that three of th'utter previe chamber gentlemen shuld alwaies be here and tow lie in the palat, and fill the rom of on of the foure knightes'. At the same time the new regulation was to ensure that esquires 'shuld be diligent in ther office', while five grooms were to be always present, with one set to watch the bedchamber.¹⁰² Professor Jordan thought this was to afford the king greater protection in his chamber. However, Dr Braddock thinks it was an attempt to enforce attendance by household officers.¹⁰³ Both interpretations could be correct. The other duties of the six lords and four knights meant that they could not give constant attendance and it was important to provide adequate officers for the king, as much for his protection as for his needs. Similarly, the vital office of master of the horse was granted to Sir William Herbert on 2 December, vacant on the death of Brown.¹⁰⁴ Brown's son (also called Anthony) did not inherit this post from his father, nor did he retain the office of captain of the gentlemen pensioners, which went to Northampton. The younger Brown was conservative and made his opinions known, which antagonised the regime, especially under Northumberland.¹⁰⁵ However, these were not hereditary offices and Brown, who was too young to occupy his position as standard-bearer (held jointly with his father from 1546), would not be senior enough to hold them. Dr Braddock's explanation is useful; 'the highest offices went only to those who would be a political asset'.¹⁰⁶ Herbert, as chief gentleman of the privy chamber, had extensive experience of the court and would not only oversee Edward's transportation but fill an office that was noted for the degree of intimacy it afforded with the monarch. He would also be a substantial figure in the 'protection' of the king from Somerset and other undesirables who hoped to emulate Seymour's

¹⁰⁰ PRO, C 66/827, mm. 16-17; *Calendar of patent rolls*, iii, pp. 189-190; Rymer and Sanderson (eds.), *Fædera*, xv, p. 209; Loades, *The Tudor court*, p. 66.

¹⁰¹ BL Stowe MS. 571, fos. 30r-31r, 37v, ; Braddock, 'The royal household', pp. 166-170.

¹⁰² BL Cotton MS. Nero C. x, fo. 20r; Jordan (ed.), *Chronicle*, p. 26.

¹⁰³ Jordan (ed.), *Chronicle*, p. 26, ns. 32-33; Braddock, 'The royal household', p. 30.

¹⁰⁴ *Calendar of the patent rolls*, ii, p. 368.

¹⁰⁵ Braddock, 'The royal household', pp. 157-159.

¹⁰⁶ Braddock, 'The royal household', p. 159; Bindoff, i, pp. 513-516, 518-521.

behaviour and would be one of Northumberland's closest adherents, receiving substantial rewards for his services.¹⁰⁷

Northumberland also excluded undesirables. Sir Edward Rogers was arrested in January 1550 and removed from the position of knight in constant attendance to the king. This was because of an alleged connection with Arundel and perhaps because he was a good friend of Thynne. Rogers was a committed protestant who remained in the chamber as carver, received an annuity of £50 and continued to participate in court life.¹⁰⁸ Similarly, Paget, who had been expected to replace Wentworth as lord chamberlain in March 1551 ('I am glad of the lyklehode of my lord pagettes placing in to romme of my Lord Chamberlayn. for so shall he thatt can well sarve haue good occasion to tary att the cowrt'), was removed from power and friends like Sir William Petre, principal secretary, and Cecil began to distance themselves from him.¹⁰⁹ Court politics was entangled with privy council politics and household servants could be removed because of their clientage connections with disgraced politicians. The king's servants made explicit the royal will and Northumberland made good use of this. In 1549 Wingfield, captain of the guard, arrested Somerset, and the guard attended the duke's execution in 1552 and held musters during Northumberland's ascendancy in periods of tension.¹¹⁰ These measures were meant to effectively secure the king from outside influences unwelcome by Northumberland's party but they also succeeded in narrowing the base of his support and constricting the conduits to favour.

Political life was centred at court. The privy council met there and politicians, as much as courtiers, spent their careers there. Politicians often held office within the royal household, having begun service there. The regency council set up by Henry's will tried to replace personal monarchy with conciliar government during the minority but this did not mean it established a more bureaucratic political structure than before. Northumberland would revive personal monarchy and attempt to control the king through controlling the privy chamber. He would use this control and his influence over Edward to 'manipulate' the 'tools of administration' by saying his actions were done in the king's name.¹¹¹ It was important for Somerset to monitor access to the privy chamber and he achieved this through appointing his clients to important positions within

¹⁰⁷ The intimacy with the king afforded by the position of master of the horse explains why substantial men were willing to serve in the stable. For example, in 1547 Sir William Penyston, Sir Andrew Dudley, Richard Audley, Anthony Brown, Sir Anthony Brown's son, Henry Norris and Lord Chidiock Paulet, St John's son, were equerries of the stable. The equerry was something of a supernumerary, charged with only occasional official attendance on the king, but the position did give gentlemen an *entrée* to the court: Bindoff, i, 513-516; ii, pp. 61, 341-344; iii, pp. 70-71; PRO, LC 2/2, fo. 34r; LC 2/4/1, fo. 21v; J.A. Simpson and E.S.C. Weiner (eds.), *The compact Oxford English dictionary* (Oxford, 1991 edn.), p. 526; Guy, 'Thomas Wolsey, Thomas Cromwell and the reform of Henrician government', pp. 53-57.

¹⁰⁸ APC, ii, p. 399; BL Cotton MS. Nero C. x, fos. 45v-46r; Jordan (ed.), *Chronicle*, pp. 18, n. 24, 91-92; PRO, SP 11/2/33, M. fos. 70r-71r; BL Stowe MS. 571, fo. 31v; Braddock, 'The royal household', p. 169.

¹⁰⁹ PRO, SP 10/13/7, M. fo. 15r, Petre to Cecil, 4 March 1551; F.G. Emmison, *Tudor secretary. Sir William Petre at court and home* (London, 1961), pp. 90-92; Braddock, 'The royal household', pp. 169-170.

¹¹⁰ BL Cotton MS. Nero C. x, fos. 50r-50v; Jordan (ed.), *Chronicle*, p. 100.

¹¹¹ J.A. Guy, 'Tudor monarchy and its critiques', in his *The Tudor monarchy*, pp. 90-91.

it and created the new office of first gentleman for Stanhope. However, most of the personnel of the Henrician privy chamber were retained. Although he removed Somerset's clients and abolished the office of first gentleman, Northumberland initially went back to the Henrician system before filling the privy chamber with his own clients and like-minded colleagues more comprehensively than his predecessor had. He was more effective at controlling the court and the king as a result, especially as Edward became more articulate. The court was a large, complicated structure, with the monarch at the apex, heading the patronage system. The system ran into severe difficulties when the king was a minor and was prey to dominance by the clienteles that underpinned mid-Tudor society. These needed to have open access to patronage but the system of personal monarchy made this difficult when the king could not exercise control. In Edward's reign it was vital to control the court in order to exercise authority and this led to "single-party" government. Whereas Henry intended the executors of his will to continue to run the household on the same lines, it came to be dominated by first one party, then another.

2. *The ascendancy of the duke of Somerset*

The Edwardian regime has been described by Dr Adams as a manifestation of a new 'phase in the post-Reformation reshaping of the social basis of the Tudor political nation'.¹ This process began with Cromwell, was further developed during Edward's reign, and was consolidated under Elizabeth. It involved the consolidation of and fresh recruitment to a new court-centred protestant nobility possessed of a remarkable degree of homogeneity and characterised by loyal service to the crown.² These changes were based on developments evident since the reign of Henry VII. Somerset was representative of the new men the early Tudors promoted.³ He headed a powerful clientele that will be more fully examined in the succeeding chapters. This was made up of kinsmen, colleagues, ducal servants, courtiers and those fostering clientage relations with him in return for patronage. His fidelity clientele was augmented by his relationship with his colleagues and the wider political community (the latter two being ordinary clientage associations). This was heightened by his position as the head of the regency government and by his role in popular politics.⁴ He replaced the king at the centre of the patronage system. This ascendancy was achieved through his offices with the agreement of Henry's executors. However, despite the apparent ease of his rise to pre-eminence the political situation was still uncertain. It is necessary to begin by recounting Somerset's career prior to 1547 to show how court connection and ability in a variety of roles make him a good example of the mid-Tudor royal servant. Then, the establishment and refinement of the protectorate and the privy council that emerged from Henry's regency council will be discussed in detail in order to show how the structures of power relate to Somerset's new authority. The protectorate provisions of January-March and December 1547 will be re-examined to demonstrate the basis for Somerset's authority. These provisions provide excellent evidence for why Somerset behaved as he did during the protectorate. His relationship with his colleagues will be reassessed as will his role in rewarding the inner-ring. Paget was a conciliar politician, whereas Somerset intended to govern as a regent, almost being king in all but name. Paget supported him in this with the understanding that he would be the duke's principal advisor. This arrangement was unlikely to work from the outset because Somerset identified the interests of the kingdom more closely with his own than any other politician of his generation and established a personal ascendancy over the court and privy council with the support of the other executors with the determination of subverting their intent. This failure of reciprocity eventually

1 S. Adams, 'The Dudley clientèle, 1553-1563', in G.W. Bernard (ed.), *The Tudor nobility* (Manchester, 1992), p. 258.

2 Adams, 'Eliza enthroned?', p. 68; 'Faction, clientage and party', pp. 33-39.

3 S.J. Gunn, 'The courtiers of Henry VII', in Guy (ed.), *The Tudor monarchy*, pp. 163-189; M. Condon, 'Ruling élites in the reign of Henry VII', in Guy (ed.), *The Tudor monarchy*, pp. 283-307; G.W. Bernard, 'The Tudor nobility in perspective', in his *The Tudor nobility*, pp. 1-48; G. Walker, 'John Skelton, Cardinal Wolsey and the English nobility', in Bernard (ed.), *The Tudor nobility*, pp. 111-133.

4 See below, pp. 43-80, 108-112, 119-121.

severed the clientage relationship between Somerset and the majority of the political elite in the most spectacular way. Edwardian court and privy council politics were basically not factional, even between 1548-1552, but the use of and recruitment to clienteles, especially if done irresponsibly, created faction. Faction emerged during crises and will be examined in this and the following chapters.

Somerset's clientage relations had five layers that overlapped but did not always converge. These were: his colleagues on the privy council, at court and among the nobility; his household; his county clientele; the county elite; and his 'new men'. The first group had ordinary clientage relationships with him. These men were not members of Somerset's fidelity clientele, with the exception of Paget, and often had clienteles of their own. They had a top-down role and played a prominent part in politics, initiating political action in their own right. Somerset's household was the most identifiable part of his clientele. Some of the most important members, including Thynne, Richard Whalley, esquire, the chamberlain, and Richard Fulmerston, the comptroller, were also part of the duke's county clientele. However, Somerset's men in the counties included people like John Bonham, who were not members of his household.⁵ Just like his reliance on his colleagues on the privy council and at court, Somerset had to rely on the county elite—the nobles, leading gentry, other substantial men and 'the speciall men'—who governed the localities in partnership with the crown. He tried to bind them to him through ordinary clientage relationships, especially because he was head of government.⁶ The final strand of Somerset's clientele were the 'new' men he promoted, men like Thomas Smith, William Cecil and John Hales, who acted as his servants and agents. There is a grey area between this group and the others. For example, Thynne was one of these men too but he also acted as Somerset's county client and, as steward, was head of his household. Although most were not traditional gentry or men of worship, but rather men of proven ability making their way in political society, the 'new men' became leading county figures through ministerial service.⁷ These different constituents of Somerset's and Seymour's clienteles will be examined over the next three chapters and chapter nine.

I: Somerset's early career

Edward Seymour, later earl of Hertford and duke of Somerset, was the son of Sir John Seymour of Wolf Hall, Wiltshire, a relatively minor but reasonably prosperous knight with court connections.⁸ He was a contemporary of John Dudley, but unlike him, had no substantial blood ties to the

⁵ Longleat, Seymour MS. 10, fo. 167r; see below, pp. 43-46, 49-54, 57-68.

⁶ See below, pp. 72-76, 229-237.

⁷ Longleat, Seymour MS. 10, fo. 167r; see below, pp. 43-66, 108-111.

⁸ *Dictionary of national biography*, eds. L. Stephen and S. Lee (lxiii vols.; London, 1885-1900), li, pp. 299-301; A.F. Pollard, *England under Protector Somerset* (London, 1900), pp. 8-10; Bindoff, iii, pp. 293-294.

aristocracy. The family did have a service connection to the third duke of Buckingham. Sir John Seymour was steward of Buckingham's lands in Wiltshire by 1503 and constable and doorward of Bristol Castle, Gloucestershire, by August 1509 (jointly held with Edward Seymour by July 1517).⁹ Edward Seymour inhabited the world of the upper gentry. He rose steadily through the ranks of Henry's court, fought in France in 1523, being present throughout the duke of Suffolk's campaign, and was knighted on 1 November. His first office at court came in 1525 when he was appointed master of the horse to the duke of Richmond, Henry's illegitimate son. This office would have brought him into close proximity with the young duke and was an important administrative position. Further appointments as esquire of the royal household, esquire of the body and gentleman of the privy chamber followed. Seymour was drawn closer and closer to the centre of power, gaining greater familiarity with the operations of the court and becoming more favoured by the king as one of his trusted intimates. He was rewarded with lands in Wiltshire, Somerset and Yorkshire and was able to introduce members of his family into court, including his younger brother Thomas and his sister Jane, who became a lady-in-waiting to Catharine of Aragon and then to Anne Boleyn. This enhanced his own position by increasing his power to do well for his family and following. On marrying Jane on 30 May 1536, Henry elevated Edward Seymour to the peerage, making him Viscount Beauchamp, and granting him further estates and offices. These new positions, as first governor and then captain of Jersey and chancellor of North Wales, were of some administrative importance. After the birth of Henry's heir Edward, Beauchamp was created earl of Hertford and now possessed extensive landed estates. He had firmly established himself among the aristocracy.¹⁰ Hertford was even able to procure patronage independently of Cromwell, although it still came through influence at court.¹¹

During the 1540s Hertford, along with Dudley (now Viscount Lisle), rose to political prominence. He became a member of the privy council in 1540. In 1541 he was made a knight of the Garter and the following year was first lord admiral and then lord great chamberlain. He served successfully in Scotland in 1543-1544 and was appointed lieutenant of England under Catherine Parr. Hertford became the principal English military commander and held key offices at court that allowed him to build more intimate relations with the king.¹²

⁹ S. Adams, 'Because I am of that Countrey & Mynde to Plant myself there'; Robert Dudley, earl of Leicester and the west midlands', *Midland History*, 20 (1995), pp. 21-74; D. Loades, *John Dudley, duke of Northumberland* (Oxford, 1996), pp. 17-85; Bindoff, iii, pp. 293-294.

¹⁰ *DNB*, li, pp. 299-301; Pollard, *Protector Somerset*, pp. 8-10; Starkey, 'Intimacy and innovation', pp. 71-118; Starkey, 'Representation through intimacy', pp. 42-78.

¹¹ Loades, *The Tudor court*, p. 140.

¹² *DNB*, li, pp. 301-303; *Protector Somerset*, pp. 10-14.

Although he did not intrigue to cause the fall of the Howards, Hertford definitely benefited from it.¹³ The most important issue in the closing years of Henry's reign was who would lead the executors in what would essentially be a regency council for Edward. The accession of a minor raised the prospect of one-party rule and this heightened tension within the political elite and made faction more dangerous. In June 1546 Hertford and Lisle secured the compliance of the earl of Arundel, king's or lord chamberlain, and 'one of the wealthiest and most respected nobles in England'.¹⁴ This is remarkable because Arundel is normally considered to be a conservative, who was uncomfortable with the reforming party. What this demonstrated was the fluidity of affiliations and that the labels conservative and reformer could be misleading. Dr Loach recently pointed out that Stephen Gardiner, bishop of Winchester, was removed from the list of executors because of a wrangle with Henry over land, not because of his religious views. Similarly, it is not possible to regard the Howards as a monolithic bloc, all as conservative Henrician catholics. The third duke of Norfolk eagerly supported the break with Rome, while his heir, the earl of Surrey, may have dabbled in protestantism and Lord Thomas Howard was among a party accused in 1546 of 'undiscrete meddling in Scripture thinges'. Norfolk hoped for marriage between one of his daughters and Sir Thomas Seymour as a means of increasing stability.¹⁵ Norfolk's daughter, the dowager duchess of Richmond, was one of the leading court patrons of protestants, protecting John Bale and appointing John Foxe tutor to Surrey's children. She was responsible for encouraging her father to receive the protestant bishops of Lincoln, Rochester and St Davids as his confessors in late December 1549.¹⁶ Professor Ives has tended to view the fall of Gardiner, Norfolk and Surrey as factional, arguing that Hertford and Paget engineered the bishop's difficulties, while identifying the Howards as representing "the old"—in tradition and in religion'.¹⁷ Dr Houlbrooke has questioned his findings.¹⁸ This is reinforced by the fact that the Howards were so numerous and their familial ties were so extensive. Henry probably selected his executors on the basis of administrative and political ability, while the religious complexion of most of them may not have been as radical as thought.¹⁹ Certainly, perceptions were important and many of the executors only emerged as reformers in Edward's reign. It was expedient for Arundel to be more closely associated with Hertford and Lisle if he wanted to be well placed in the minority government. Unease at the extensive Howard clientele, Norfolk's generally conservative

¹³ Pollard, *Protector Somerset*, pp. 14-16; Guy, *Tudor England*, pp. 189-199.

¹⁴ Guy, *Tudor England*, p. 198; PRO, E 179/69/45; PRO, E 179/69/46; PRO, E 179/69/51; PRO, E 179/69/49; PRO, E 179/69/75; L. Stone, *The crisis of the aristocracy: 1558-1641* (Oxford, 1965), p. 760. By 1547 the correlation between assessment and real landed wealth was diminishing but the subsidy rolls are still useful: H. Miller, 'Subsidy assessments of the peerage in the sixteenth century', *Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research*, 28 (1955), p. 21.

¹⁵ APC, i, p. 408; R.A. Houlbrooke, 'Henry VIII's will: a comment', *Historical Journal*, 37 (1994), p. 892; Loach, *Edward VI*, pp. 22-25.

¹⁶ Loach, *Edward VI*, p. 24; S. Brigden (ed.), 'The letters of Richard Scudamore to Sir Philip Hoby', *Camden Miscellany*, 30 (4th ser., vol. 39; London, 1990), pp. 102-103.

¹⁷ Ives, 'Henry VIII's will', pp. 783, 792-793, 795-799.

¹⁸ Houlbrooke, 'Henry VIII's will', p. 892.

¹⁹ Ives, 'Henry VIII's will', pp. 797-799; Houlbrooke, 'Henry VIII's will', p. 893; Loach, *Edward VI*, pp. 24-25.

attitude and Surrey's aggressive posturing all contributed to Henry's reaction and Surrey was executed for treason on 21 January 1547 and his father attainted.²⁰

Hertford and Lisle had succeeded in capturing the king from the more conservative grouping of the Howards and Gardiner. This was possible through the mechanics of the court because they controlled access to the king in the closing months of the reign through their presence in the privy chamber and their success in excluding others. The collusion of Sir Anthony Denny, chief gentleman of the privy chamber, and Sir William Herbert, second chief gentleman, provided the necessary means.²¹ Similarly, the assistance of the king's trusted secretary, Paget, was vital. In order to achieve this, the image of intimacy with the old king was essential and these men, among his closest attendants, provided that. They were among those who witnessed the final signing of Henry's will on 30 December 1546; the men 'whose influence most completely encompassed the dying king'.²² Although some sources and historians argue that the king signed his will, it is generally agreed that it was stamped, though no decisive determination can be made. To all concerned at the time, it amounted to the same thing. Denny controlled the dry stamp (overseeing John Gates and William Clerk, a clerk of the privy seal). Historians have been suspicious about his motivations because he was a noted reformer but he appears to have followed instructions and was known for his integrity.²³ Gates kept the dry stamp in a box, Clerk applied it and kept a register of documents so stamped, which Henry signed monthly. Then Clerk inked the signature while overseen by Denny and Gates to create a perfect copy.²⁴ The 1536 Succession Act (18 Henry VIII, c. 7) provided for the succession to be decided by the king's last will.²⁵ Clerk said that the will was signed on 30 December in the presence of ten people, six of them members of the privy chamber.²⁶

II: Henry VIII's will and the protectorate provisions

²⁰ *A chronicle of England during the reigns of the Tudors from 1485 to 1559*, by Charles Wriothesley, *Windsor Herald*, ed. W.D. Hamilton (ii vols.; Camden Society, n.s., 11, London, 1875-1877), i, p. 177.

²¹ Starkey, 'Intimacy and innovation', pp. 71-118; D.R. Starkey, 'Court and government', in Guy (ed.), *The Tudor monarchy*, pp. 201-208.

²² H. Miller, 'Henry VIII's unwritten will: grants of lands and honours in 1547', in E.W. Ives, R.J. Knecht and J.J. Scarisbrick (eds.), *Wealth and power in Tudor England. Essays presented to S.T. Bindoff* (London, 1978), pp. 95-96.

²³ Pollard, *Protector Somerset*, p. 5; L.B. Smith, 'The last will and testament of Henry VIII: a question of perspective', *Journal of British Studies*, 2 (1962), pp. 18-19, 22-27; Jordan, *The young king*, pp. 54-55, n. 2; Loach, *Edward VI*, pp. 24-25, n. 29; Bindoff, ii, pp. 27-29.

²⁴ Guy, *Tudor England*, pp. 197-198.

²⁵ *Statutes of the realm*, eds. A. Lunders, T.E. Tomlins, J. France, W.E. Taunton and J. Raithby (xi vols.; London, 1810-1828), iii, p. 655.

²⁶ Ives, 'Henry VIII's will', pp. 779-804; Loach, *Edward VI*, pp. 20-22. The version of the will in the Inner Temple Library is a draft or another copy, not the final document: ITL, Petyt MS. 538/47, fos. 398r-406xv; Guy, *Tudor England*, pp. 196-198, 481, ns. 57, 61-62.

Hertford and Paget orchestrated the implementation of the new regime while Henry lay dying and 'the consequences reverberated down the corridors of power'.²⁷ Hertford was assisted by colleagues who were increasingly entering into relationships of noble sociability and clientage with him, especially as he arrogated the king's authority. These included Paget, Lisle, Essex, Lord St John, Herbert, Denny, Cheyne and Sir Anthony Brown, master of the horse. Hertford's colleagues found themselves progressively reduced to vertical clientage relationships. Sometimes, as in the case of Paget, this was the closer fidelity relationship built over time through association and similar outlook. With others, the ordinary clientage relationship developed, creating dependency and mutual reciprocity that could be terminated (by either party). They found themselves in the peculiar position of both seeing one of their own elevated above them by his own will (not the king's) into a unique position of power and dignity and of having to alter their relationship with him accordingly. They acquiesced and assisted in this but failed to understand the full implications. Hertford's elevation also led to a change in personal style that Dr MacCulloch has described as seeming 'like Barnum and Bailey's circus to his fellow-Councillors'.²⁸ After the king's death (28 January 1547), Hertford agreed with Paget that the terms of the will should only be made known in part. Paget was to choose the best time to publish the king's death and the will was, quite literally, the basis of the new regime's power. Therefore, the authenticity of the document had to be made manifest and parliament was deemed the best agent through which to achieve this. The backing of the political nation was essential to the stability of conciliar rule. Paget was 'to schow that this ys the will naming unto them jenerally ho be executars that the kyng dyd spsially trust and ho be cownselars', then the two men would 'meght and agre therin as ther may be no contravarse hereafter'. The situation was so sensitive that Hertford did not employ his secretary but wrote to Paget himself.²⁹ The importance of the will to Hertford's power and the establishment of conciliar authority is underlined by the behaviour of Lord Wriothesley, the lord chancellor, when he informed the house of commons of the king's death on 31 January: '& by Cause the people all shulde be fully persvadid to the trewth of the same/ he redde his said will & Testament signed & sealed openly & made aplayne demonstration of the same'.³⁰ However, the commons heard the edited version.³¹ Any appearance of hastiness was to be avoided and the regency council was to present a unified front.³² The correspondence and discussions were between Hertford and Paget alone and did not involve the other executors. However, there did appear to be general assent to the creation of the protectorate. This was

²⁷ PRO, SP 10/8/4, M. fos. 8r-11v; Strype (ed.), *Ecclesiastical memorials*, ii, II, pp. 429-37; Guy, *Tudor England*, p. 211.

²⁸ A.J. Slavin, 'The fall of Lord Chancellor Wriothesley: a study in the politics of conspiracy', *Albion*, 7 (1975), p. 284; Kettering, 'Friendship and clientage', pp. 141-143, 145-149; MacCulloch, *Tudor church militant*, pp. 41-52.

²⁹ PRO, SP 10/1/1, M. fo. 1r. Hertford's secretary, Thomas Fisher, had been in his service since the end of 1543, having initially served Lisle, who allowed him to assist his friend and rewarded him with the stewardship of Kibworth Beauchamp: Bindoff, ii, p. 137.

³⁰ BL Additional MS. 71009, fo. 45r.

³¹ PRO, SP 10/1/1, M. fo. 1v.

because Paget envisaged it as a conciliar system of government with Hertford acting as first among equals.³³ We know that they were discussing these changes in government at this time because Paget reminded Hertford of their conversations two-and-a-half years later.³⁴

On the same day the house of commons was informed of Henry's death, a constitutional coup was taking place in the council chamber. Initially, on 31 January, Hertford was essentially appointed to act as a chairman, 'hable to be a special Remembrancer and to kepe a moste certaine accompte of all our procedinges', and spokesman in dealing with ambassadors. He was selected because of his experience and because he was the king's uncle. This would avoid inevitable 'disordre and confusion' and was perfectly legal because the will sanctioned any changes that the executors thought necessary for good government, as well as having general support, even from religious conservatives like Brown.³⁵ This was done after the regency councillors had taken their oaths to fulfil Henry's will 'to the uttremoste of our powres, wittes and connynges' and was recorded in language reminiscent of the document itself ('full powre and auctorite').³⁶ Professor Jordan is probably correct to state that Paget then urged the other executors to elevate Hertford above them, though there is no evidence to support this.³⁷ Paget was certainly the man of business behind the establishment of the protectorate. A contemporary manuscript source described the circumstances surrounding the creation of the protectorate. When the lords temporal and spiritual met the king in the presence chamber in the Tower on 1 February, Wriothesley declared the contents of the will, telling them that there were to be sixteen executors, and that 'yt was condessendyd & agreed with one assent & consent of aȝl them all' that Hertford should be governor and lord protector 'because yt was expedyent' for one to have such a position during the king's nonage.³⁸ Hertford wished to hold both offices because he did not want faction to arise between rival holders, as had happened between the duke of Gloucester and the bishop of Winchester during the minority of Henry VI.³⁹ The lords agreed that Hertford was fittest for the position and he replied that 'he trusted in god he shulde so vsse hym selfe that thay shulde be well contentyd', while hoping they would all assist. They replied that they should be ready at all times to fulfil their traditional role by defending the realm.⁴⁰ This is confirmed by the king himself, who wrote that the regency council 'sat euery day for the performaunce of the will'.⁴¹ Edward's account probably comes from the official version in the register of the privy council, although it does not mention his uncle's fitness for the offices due

³² PRO, SP 10/1/1, M. fo. 1v.

³³ BL Egerton MS. 2603, fos. 33r-34v.

³⁴ PRO, SP 10/8/4, M. fo. 8r.

³⁵ APC, ii, pp. 4-7; PRO, E 23/4/1, fos. 12v-13r; Rymer and Sanderson (eds.), *Fædera*, xv, p. 115; PRO, SP 10/7/8, M. fo. 33r; Tytler, i, p. 169.

³⁶ APC, ii, pp. 3-5.

³⁷ Jordan, *The young king*, p. 58.

³⁸ Alnwick Castle, Northumberland, Syon MS. 467, fo. 106r.

³⁹ BL Additional MS. 48126, fo. 6r.

⁴⁰ Alnwick Castle, Northumberland, Syon MS. 467, fos. 106r-106v.

⁴¹ BL Cotton MS. Nero C. x, fo. 12r; Jordan (ed.), *Chronicle*, p. 4.

to ability.⁴² Professor Jordan believed Hertford violated the terms of the will but recognised that these changes ‘made it workable’.⁴³ The imperial ambassador, François van der Delft, thought Hertford had general support for his elevation but commented that ‘it is, of course, quite likely that some jealousy or rivalry may arise between’ Warwick and him. He contrasted Warwick’s abilities, affability and popularity with Hertford’s character and found the latter to be ‘not so accomplished in this respect, and is indeed looked down upon by everybody as a dry, sour, opinionated man’. These are quite telling characterisations.⁴⁴ Although Hertford may have been acting against the spirit of the will, he did act within the letter.⁴⁵ He was legally capable of altering the composition of the regency government with the support of his fellow executors. However, the terms of Hertford’s appointment stipulated ‘that he shall nat do any Acte but with thadvise and consent of the reste of the coexecutours in suche maner, ordre and fourme as in the saide wille’. He accepted this term.⁴⁶

Henry’s will fascinated contemporaries as well as a succession of historians.⁴⁷ William Honynges, clerk of the signet and clerk of the privy council, wrote it in a uniform hand with no room for insertions at a later date. Two key issues were dealt with in the early months of the reign; the creation of the protectorate that gave Hertford greater power and the rewarding of his colleagues. Henry had envisaged a conciliar system with the sixteen named executors governing the realm by majority decision making and possessing authority ‘in all Maters concerning both private Affaires and publicq Affaires of the Realm’.⁴⁸ The power of these executors, described as a privy council, but in fact a council of regency, was absolute.⁴⁹ They had the authority of the crown vested in them and this makes the position of quasi-king achieved by both Somerset and Northumberland more easily and readily comprehensible. Henry gave:

...full powre and authorite vnto our sayd Consaillours that they all or the moost part of them being assembled togedres in connsaill or if any of them fortune to .dye the more part of them which shalbe for the tyme lyving being assembled in Counsaill togidres shall and may make diuise and ordeyn what thinges soeuer they or the more part of them as aforesayd shall during the minorite aforesayde of our sayd sonne think meet necessary and conuenient for the benefit honour and surety or the weale profit or commodytie of our sayd sonne his Realmes dominiones or Subjects or the discharge of ^{our} conscience.⁵⁰

⁴² BL Cotton MS. Nero C. x, fos. 11r-12r; Jordan (ed.), *Chronicle*, xiii, xvii-xviii, pp. 3-4, n. 5.

⁴³ Jordan, *The young king*, pp. 57-58.

⁴⁴ *Simancas*, ix, pp. 7, 19-20.

⁴⁵ PRO, E 23/4/1, fos. 12v-13r; Rymer and Sanderson (eds.), *Fædera*, xv, p. 115.

⁴⁶ *APC*, ii, p. 5-6.

⁴⁷ G. Burnet, *History of the reformation of the church of England*, ed. N. Pocock (vii vols.; Oxford, 1865), iv, pp. 533-536; Pollard, *Protector Somerset*, pp. 2-7; Miller, ‘Henry VIII’s unwritten will’, p. 96.

⁴⁸ PRO, E 23/4/1, fo. 13r; Rymer and Sanderson (eds.), *Fædera*, xv, p. 115.

⁴⁹ Ives, ‘Henry VIII’s will’, p. 801.

⁵⁰ PRO, E 23/4/1, fo. 13r; Rymer and Sanderson (eds.), *Fædera*, xv, p. 115.

This would continue until Edward was eighteen.⁵¹ Why did he do this?

Henry had been explicit about the power of the executors: they were not ‘to do any thing appointed by our sayd will alone onles the moost part of the hole nombre of their coexecutours do consent and by writting agree to the same And will that our said executours or the moost part of them may lafully do what they shall think moost conuenient for the execution of this our will without being troubled by our sayd sonne or any others for the same’.⁵² He recognised his inability to anticipate every eventuality and gave them full power and authority to make changes by majority agreement during the minority.⁵³ The creation of a ‘hermetically sealed political system’ was meant to preclude faction, while giving the regency council enough independent authority to govern competently.⁵⁴ Henry had provided for a situation where the most senior officers of the crown (the great officers of state and eight other executors) would supervise his son until his majority. Among the most important of these officers were: the archbishop of Canterbury, the lord chancellor, the lord great master, the lord privy seal, the lord great chamberlain, and the lord admiral. That is, Cranmer, Wriothesley, St John, Russell, Hertford and Lisle. Sir Richard Rich replaced Wriothesley and Lisle became lord great chamberlain, leaving the admiralty to Seymour. The only great officer of state not included was the lord chamberlain, Arundel, and he was one of the assistant executors. This conciliarism had a lasting influence on Cecil.⁵⁵ Somerset tried to take advantage of it to solidify the connection between his colleagues and himself. All the king’s actions during the protectorate were carried out with ‘thadvice of our derest vncle and counsellor the duke of Somerset gardion of our person and protector of our realmes and dominions and the rest of our privie counsell’.⁵⁶ No new members could be sworn in until October 1555 when the king would reach his majority and the executors could not be challenged for the actions they had taken.⁵⁷ This latter point applied to divisions within the council as well as external challenges. Equally, all were to have a voice and none were set above the others. The intention was that these measures would force the executors to work closely, binding them together and leading to good government. However, there was no provision for a protectorate and although Henry had set things so that Hertford must dominate, the system established was not that intended by the king. Yet, the provisions of his will made this eventually possible. The will was intended to prevent dominance of government by clienteles. Henry’s

⁵¹ *APC*, ii, p. 3.

⁵² PRO, E 23/4/1, fos. 10v-11r; Rymer and Sanderson (eds.), *Fædera*, xv, p. 114.

⁵³ PRO, E 23/4/1, fos. 12v-13r; Rymer and Sanderson (eds.), *Fædera*, xv, p. 115.

⁵⁴ Ives, ‘Henry VIII’s will’, pp. 799-802.

⁵⁵ PRO, E 23/4/1, fos. 12r-12v, 14r; Rymer and Sanderson (eds.), *Fædera*, xv, pp. 115-116; Alford, *The early Elizabethan polity*, pp. 118-119, 176-179, 206-207.

⁵⁶ PRO, SP 10/1/36, M. fo. 114v.

⁵⁷ PRO, E 23/4/1, fos. 8r, 8v, 9v, 13r-13v; Rymer and Sanderson (eds.), *Fædera*, xv, pp. 113, 115-116.

“single-party” government was to have been made up of the executors and assistants, not by one clientele, even if it attempted to recruit as many of the regency councillors as possible.⁵⁸

This recruitment was more readily facilitated through substantial inducements. However, it is likely that these rewards did not come from Hertford, although he may have influenced the situation. Paget, Herbert and Denny claimed that Henry wished to reward his loyal servants and much of Norfolk’s and Surrey’s lands were dispensed among the leading figures at court as a result. Initially, Henry intended to keep the Howard lands, the most extensive private patrimony in England, but then changed his mind and decided to grant much of it away, excepting some estates in Sussex and Kent. According to Paget, as Henry became increasingly ill, he thought ‘he could not long endure, [and] mynded to place us all about his sonne as men whom he trusted and loved above all others specially, and therefore I must (said he) consider them the more’.⁵⁹ This statement came prior to the second increase in honours listed in the register.⁶⁰ Paget would later carefully record the promotions and elevations that occurred at this period.⁶¹ Professor Beer and Dr Jack believe he might have produced this letter book as a precaution against future attacks on his conduct.⁶² Henry granted farms of certain of the forfeited Howard estates to the loyal household men Sir Edward Warner, Sir Edmund Knevet and Henry Gates.⁶³ Denny was regarded as Henry’s most trusted servant and his affirmation of the unfulfilled gift clause reinforces the likelihood that the king intended to reward his servants.⁶⁴ The total lands granted by the unfulfilled gift clause amounted to more than £3200 per annum.⁶⁵ Professor Ives extended his analysis of the will and the protectorate provisions, suggesting that Henry might have intended to reward financially Hertford and his supporters.⁶⁶ He believes that this might have been done because Henry felt that Hertford, Lisle and Cranmer were more likely to preserve the royal supremacy and therefore protect the interests of the monarchy than Norfolk and Gardiner.⁶⁷ Henry made his concern about the preservation of the supremacy explicit in his will: ‘our chief labour and studye in this woorld is to establishe him [Edward] in the croun imperial of this Realme after our deceasse in such sort as may be pleasing to god’.⁶⁸ However, to view the executors as one cohesive and ascendant party would be misleading, because they included the apparent conservatives Wriothesley and Brown.⁶⁹

⁵⁸ PRO, E 23/4/1, fos. 14r-14v; Rymer and Sanderson (eds.), *Fædera*, xv, p. 116.

⁵⁹ *APC*, ii, pp. 17-18.

⁶⁰ *APC*, ii, pp. 18-19.

⁶¹ NRO, F[itzwiliam] (M[ilton]) C[orrespondence] [MS.] 21, fos. 23r-26v, Paget’s holograph.

⁶² NRO, F. (M.) C. 21, fo. 3r; B.L. Beer and S.M. Jack (eds.), *The letters of William, Lord Paget of Beaudesert, 1547-1563*, *Camden Miscellany*, 25 (Camden Society, 4th ser., 13; London, 1974), pp. 6-7.

⁶³ Miller, ‘Henry VIII’s unwritten will’, pp. 91-92; *APC*, ii, pp. 17-18.

⁶⁴ Bindoff, ii, pp. 27-29.

⁶⁵ Miller, ‘Henry VIII’s unwritten will’, p. 96.

⁶⁶ E.W. Ives, ‘Henry VIII’s will: the protectorate provisions of 1546-7’, *Historical Journal*, 37 (1994), p. 907.

⁶⁷ Ives, ‘The protectorate provisions’, pp. 912-914.

⁶⁸ PRO, E 23/4/1, fo. 12r.

⁶⁹ Foxe, *The acts and monuments*, v, pp. 691-692.

Hertford had to gain general assent by trying to build a coalition of interests that would make the council of regency more amenable to his authority. Before they returned to London, having retrieved Edward from Hertfordshire, Hertford discussed the creation of a protectorate with Brown in the garden at Enfield. After ‘commoning’ together Brown agreed that Hertford should be lord protector (presumably the limited position of 31 January), ‘thinking it (as indede it was) both the surest kynde of governement, and most fyt for this common welthe’. Having consented, Brown, according to his servant William Wightman, was never heard to speak ‘woorde contrarye his first determynacion till the daye of his deathe’.⁷⁰ Brown was rewarded when his son was knighted as part of the coronation ceremony.⁷¹ Dr Houlbrooke examined the political activity of Hertford and Paget and argued that even though the will of 30 December was probably genuine the rewards of the unfulfilled gift clause must have been increased later (probably after 12 January). This involved manipulation of the king by Paget and greatly strengthened the position of Hertford’s party, allowing for the establishment of the protectorate.⁷² The remaining councillors benefited, but would have been prominent in the minority government anyway, as they had been on the Henrician privy council. Professor Ives argued that personal monarchy made Henrician politics factional but the executors were those in whom Henry had ‘speciall trust and confidence’ as leading figures at court and in government.⁷³ With the removal of the Howards and Gardiner, Hertford was the most powerful among them but this does not mean that the executors constituted a Hertford faction. Hertford also took Norfolk’s offices of lord treasurer and earl marshal. If Paget’s statements concerning the unfulfilled gift clause are accepted, then Henry probably intended Hertford to receive one of these positions.⁷⁴ After Norfolk’s confession, Paget claimed to have suggested to Henry that, because ‘the nobilitie of this realme was greatly decayed’, the Howard lands and offices should be dispersed among the leading courtiers. Henry was said to have agreed but died before the grants could be made.⁷⁵ This does not make sense in the light of Henry’s earlier desire, also recorded in the register, to retain the land but Paget may have persuaded the king of the need for greater generosity so that the new dignities would be sufficiently endowed. Henry’s emendations satisfied the recipients.⁷⁶ It is possible that there was a degree of inflation between Henry’s initial, or even subsequent, grants and those finally made but only those who dealt with the creation of the will (Brown, Denny, Herbert, Hertford, Lisle,

⁷⁰ Wightman was Brown’s clerk by 1547-1548, only entering Seymour’s service as secretary when the master of the horse died: PRO, SP 10/7/8, M. fo. 33r; Tytler, i, pp. 167-174; Bindoff, i, pp. 518-521; iii, p. 611.

⁷¹ Braddock, ‘The royal household’, pp. 157-158.

⁷² Houlbrooke, ‘Henry VIII’s wills’, pp. 891-899.

⁷³ Ives, ‘The protectorate provisions’, pp. 912-913; ‘Henry VIII: the political perspective’, in MacCulloch (ed.), *The reign of Henry VIII*, pp. 13-34; *Faction in Tudor England* (Historical Association Appreciations in History, 6; London, 1979); PRO, E 23/4/1, fo. 13r.

⁷⁴ PRO, SP 10/1/11, M. fo. 28r.

⁷⁵ Houlbrooke, ‘Henry VIII’s wills’, pp. 892-898; *APC*, ii, pp. 16-17.

⁷⁶ Henry may have corrected Paget’s book himself: PRO, SP 10/1/11, M. fos. 28r-29v; *APC*, ii, pp. 16-19.

Paget and Russell) knew who were among the executors and it is uncertain if they discussed it with them.⁷⁷

According to Paget, the unfulfilled gift clause was based on Henry's verbal instructions on his deathbed.⁷⁸ On 15 February, the regency council determined the elevations and promotions, although the 'formalities' were delayed until two days later.⁷⁹ Hertford became duke of Somerset, lord treasurer and earl marshal, Wriothesley became earl of Southampton, Rich became Lord Rich and Seymour became Lord Seymour of Sudeley. All received additional lands.⁸⁰ Lisle became earl of Warwick and lord great chamberlain, with a grant of lands worth £300 per annum (an increase of fifty per cent on Paget's initial suggestion).⁸¹ Essex was promoted to marquis of Northampton.⁸² Sir William Willoughby was elevated as Lord Willoughby of Parham as part of an attempt to reconcile and reward the elite.⁸³ Most of the other leading councillors and courtiers were rewarded too, especially with grants that increased their local consequence. These additions to their wealth and influence would enhance the impact of the king's servants in the localities too. Somerset would benefit from this, even if Henry was behind most of it. Paget suggested that Denny receive lands worth £200 per annum, Herbert lands worth four hundred marks per annum, and Sir John Gates, Henry Gates's elder brother and Denny's brother-in-law (knighted at the coronation), and Cawarden, both gentlemen of the privy chamber, lands worth one hundred and two hundred marks per annum respectively. Denny was also rewarded with the Howard property of Bungay Priory, Suffolk. Denny, Gates and Cawarden were all intimate with Henry: the king 'wold alwayes when Mr. Secretary [Paget] was gone tell us what had passed betwene them aswell in that matter as for the most parte in all other thinges'.⁸⁴ At the same time lesser but still important figures were to receive patronage: Hoby was to be appointed master of the ordnance, replacing Seymour on 26 March, although his prospective grant of lands worth £66.13.4 per annum was subsequently deleted; Sir Thomas Paston was to be a steward of the duchy of Lancaster and keeper of Rising Chase; Sir Thomas Darcy, steward of the liberty of Bury St Edmunds and of Norfolk's and the bishop of Norwich's lands in Suffolk, and keeper of Framlingham Castle, Suffolk; Sir Richard Southwell, keeper of Kenninghall and steward of Norfolk's and the bishop of Norwich's lands in Norfolk; while the stewardships of the earl of

⁷⁷ Ives, 'The protectorate provisions', pp. 908-911; Ives, 'Henry VIII's will', pp. 789, 793.

⁷⁸ *APC*, ii, p. 19.

⁷⁹ *APC*, ii, pp. 22, 34-35; PRO, SP 10/1/11, M. fos. 28r-29v; PRO, SP 10/1/12, M. fos. 30r-39v; PRO, SP 10/1/14, M. fos. 55r-55v; BL Cotton MS. Nero C. x, fo. 12r; Jordan (ed.), *Chronicle*, pp. 4-5; Jordan, *The young king*, p. 65.

⁸⁰ PRO, SP 10/1/11, M. fo. 28r.

⁸¹ *APC*, ii, pp. 16-17.

⁸² PRO, SP 10/1/11, M. fo. 28r; *APC*, ii, pp. 34-35.

⁸³ PRO, SP 10/1/11, M. fo. 28r; MacCulloch, *Suffolk and the Tudors*, pp. 61-64.

⁸⁴ PRO, SP 10/1/11, M. fo. 28r; *APC*, ii, pp. 19-20.

Lincoln's lands were divided between Sir William Goring and Sir Ralph Vane; and Knepp Park was given to Sir John Mason.⁸⁵

Wriothesley was granted lands worth £300 per annum on his promotion to an earldom. He apparently did not voice complaint about this arrangement.⁸⁶ Henry originally intended to make him earl of Winchester but in the final promotion he received the more prestigious earldom of his own county, Hampshire, where he had successfully planted himself in the 1530s and 1540s. His original grant of £100 per annum was increased to £200 per annum.⁸⁷ The substantial increase made to the unfulfilled gift clause may have reflected Wriothesley's importance to Henry. That he fell from power in March 1547 suggests that Paget's claim concerning Henry's grants was more than self-aggrandisement. After all, there were others who benefited, like Sir Edmund Sheffield, who were hardly at the centre of power, while more obvious candidates were dropped: St John, Russell (to be earls of Winchester and Northampton respectively), Sir Thomas Arundel, Sir John St Leger and Sir Christopher Danby.⁸⁸ Southampton may have opposed the extension of the protectorate.⁸⁹ He accepted the limited changes that took place on 31 January but probably objected to further alteration. Paget and Hertford formulated the more extensive protectorate provisions of 12 March from the outset, discussing them in the gallery as Henry lay dying (as Paget put it, 'devising with me concerning the place which youe now occupie'). Professor Ives points out that it would have been 'naive' for Paget to think that the January provisions would give them sufficient power.⁹⁰ Southampton was reappointed lord chancellor immediately after Hertford's nomination as lord protector.⁹¹ The burden of judicial work as lord chancellor made it difficult for him to play a more substantial role in administration, politics and policy-making. He tried to free himself from this problem through delegation.⁹² Southampton was charged with having illegally delegated his authority when lord chancellor, removed from office and fined £4000.⁹³ This effectively eliminated a powerful threat to Somerset for the mean time but the unity of the executors was beginning to crack.⁹⁴

With the dignities of duke of Somerset, lord protector and governor of the king's person, Edward Seymour had attained a new level of power. In considering Somerset's pretensions, conception of

⁸⁵ APC, ii, pp. 17-19; PRO, SP 10/1/11, M. fos. 28r-28v; MacCulloch, *Suffolk and the Tudors*, p. 78.

⁸⁶ PRO, SP 10/1/11, M. fo. 28r; APC, ii, pp. 15-22; Miller, 'Henry VIII's unwritten will', pp. 88-91. Henry also left him £500 in his will: PRO, E 23/4/1, fo. 15v.

⁸⁷ Ives, 'The protectorate provisions', pp. 909-910; A.L. Rowse, 'Thomas Wriothesley, first earl of Southampton', *Huntington Library Quarterly*, 28 (1965), pp. 105-129; APC, ii, p. 17; PRO, SP 10/1/11, M. fo. 28r.

⁸⁸ PRO, SP 10/1/11, M. fo. 28r.

⁸⁹ BL Additional MS. 48126, fo. 15r; *Simancas*, ix, p. 106.

⁹⁰ PRO, SP 10/8/4, M. fo. 8r; Ives, 'The protectorate provisions', pp. 909-911.

⁹¹ APC, ii, p. 6.

⁹² A.F. Pollard, 'Council, star chamber and privy council under the Tudors', *English Historical Review*, 37 (1922), pp. 533-534; Elton, *The Tudor revolution in government*, pp. 301-302.

⁹³ APC, ii, pp. 48-59, 102-104; Jordan, *The young king*, pp. 71-72.

⁹⁴ Slavin, 'The fall of Lord Chancellor Wriothesley', pp. 265-286.

power and mode of political management, Dr Starkey has likened him to Wolsey.⁹⁵ However, 'Somerset achieved what Wolsey could not manage: he ruled at Court as well as at Westminster'.⁹⁶ Dr MacCulloch has aptly described Somerset's style in the best recent survey of Edward's reign; the lord protector 'uneasily combined the reforming zeal of Thomas Cromwell, the *chutzpah* of Cardinal Wolsey and the flashy populism of Queen Elizabeth's doomed Earl of Essex'.⁹⁷ Somerset's new rank greatly augmented his power and he succeeded in holding several critical offices (lord treasurer and earl marshal) much as Wolsey had. This allowed him to limit the number of key positions that could be occupied by potential rivals, as well as increasing his income. All his offices were subservient to the protectorate, though. For example, he ran economic affairs through his position as lord protector not lord treasurer (in this sense his offices were a matrix of power) and he did not handle the day-to-day running of the latter office, except in the most general terms.

Somerset felt strong enough to greatly augment his power through letters patent between 12-21 March. The earlier provisions had made him essentially chairman of the regency council; the new provisions made him regent. He was not to transgress the law and all officers were to follow the will of the privy council, suggesting conciliar government. Somerset was to take the advice of the privy council 'as he thincke mete'. His colleagues agreed to these changes.⁹⁸ The privy council was created out of the executors and assistants to Henry's will in the same patent. The ostensible reason for Somerset's elevation was to allow the king to be educated free from the pressures of political manipulation, something that was particularly important in a minority.⁹⁹ Somerset was to hold office until the king was eighteen, as were the privy councillors, at which time Edward was expected to be able to rule in his own right. Edward had consented to this 'by word of mouthe in the presence of our seid Counseill'. Somerset was chosen because his '*proxymyte of blode*' gave him a special charge to oversee the king's upbringing and education and because of his 'longe and greate experyence'. Importantly, Somerset was lord protector of the king's realms and dominions, 'and of the subiectes of the same'. This included his colleagues on the privy council.¹⁰⁰ He had a special relationship with the king's subjects through the protectorate provisions and was to have the authority to rule on the same terms granted to earlier protectors and governors in both domestic and foreign affairs.¹⁰¹ However, this and the subsequent increases in power meant that the protectorate, 'in its first infancy during the tenure in office by the dukes of Bedford and Gloucester

⁹⁵ D.R. Starkey, 'Wolsey and Cromwell: continuity or contrast?', *History Today*, 35 (1985), pp. 18-19.

⁹⁶ Guy, *Tudor England*, p. 200.

⁹⁷ MacCulloch, *Tudor church militant*, pp. 49-52.

⁹⁸ *APC*, ii, pp. 63-74.

⁹⁹ PRO, C 66/802, m. 1; PRO, C 66/814, m. 1; *Calendar of patent rolls*, i, p. 97; ii, p. 96.

¹⁰⁰ PRO, C 66/802, m. 1; MacCulloch, *Tudor church militant*, pp. 49-50.

¹⁰¹ PRO, C 66/802, m. 1; see below, pp. 119-120.

between 1422 and 1429, had clearly put on weight'.¹⁰² Somerset could now appoint additional privy councillors but apparently could not remove them. He could be selective in summoning them to the board, though. The privy council was no longer 'hermetically sealed'. Somerset and his colleagues had an indemnity for their actions in office until the king was eighteen.¹⁰³ This was probably intended to preclude faction. Apart from the augmentations in the authority of one man, many of the protectorate provisions had already been made in Henry's will. The letters patent of 12 March ended by ordering judges, JPs, sergeants at law, lawyers, sheriffs, escheators, bailiffs 'and all other our offycers mynysters and subiectes' to obey the lord protector and privy council.¹⁰⁴ This patent was recorded at the thinly attended meeting of the privy council the following day. However, this was not, as Professor Beer thought, the means of authorising Somerset's elevation. Therefore, Lisle was probably not protesting at the change by absenting himself.¹⁰⁵

III: Somerset and government

The twenty-six members appointed to the new privy council did not act as one body but they had never been intended to.¹⁰⁶ Somerset would succeed in alienating the men whom Henry had tried to build into a conciliar party. He wrecked the unity he had achieved in the process. Between March 1547 and July 1548 Northampton, Cuthbert Tunstall, bishop of Durham, Gage, Sir Edward Wotton (brother of Dr Nicholas Wotton) and Sir Edward Montague, chief justice of the common pleas, were removed from the privy council. Sir Ralph Sadler, Sir John Baker, chancellor of the exchequer and treasurer of the court of first fruits and tenths, Smith, the earl of Shrewsbury and Wentworth replaced them. Gage and Durham were Henrician catholics and opposed reform. Montague may have supported Southampton. Northampton was disgraced over his marital problems.¹⁰⁷ Professor Hoak may be correct to view these men as dismissed (Somerset did not regard them as active privy councillors) but the clerk's list of the 'holl Council' drawn up on 17 January 1549 may not have been absolutely definitive; otherwise why would the London council call Gage and Durham back to the board both during and immediately after the October coup?¹⁰⁸ Instead, their status as privy councillors could have gone into abeyance because it was Somerset's desire that it should. Equally, Southampton was restored to some prominence in January 1549,

¹⁰² J.S. Roskell, 'The office and dignity of protector of England, with special reference to its origins', *English Historical Review*, 68 (1953), pp. 228-229.

¹⁰³ PRO, C 66/802, mm. 1-2.

¹⁰⁴ PRO, C 66/802, m. 2.

¹⁰⁵ APC, ii, pp. 63-64; B.L. Beer, *Northumberland. The political career of John Dudley, earl of Warwick and duke of Northumberland* (Kent, Ohio, 1973), pp. 57, 204, n. 16.

¹⁰⁶ PRO, SP 10/5/17, M. fos. 55r-55v; Hoak, *The king's council*, p. 46.

¹⁰⁷ Wotton may not have been dropped: Hoak, *The king's council*, pp. 46-49.

¹⁰⁸ APC, ii, pp. 236-237; Hoak, *The king's council*, pp. 46-48.

probably for his co-operation during Seymour's fall, began attending the privy council again, sued for patronage and sought to mediate on behalf of his Hampshire neighbours.¹⁰⁹

The men Somerset promoted to the board were mostly not members of his immediate clientele or household (with the exception of Smith) but had vertical clientage relationships with him. They were not his creatures but like-minded, important and highly competent men, with a range of experience in local and national office. Smith had a fidelity relationship with the lord protector. Sadler may have had such a relationship with Somerset, although this is uncertain. He did successfully recommend Lewis Jones to be a ducal servant.¹¹⁰ Sadler was Somerset's contemporary, clerk of the hanaper, gentleman of the privy chamber, prothonotary of chancery, and chamberlain or receiver of the court of general surveyors. He had extensive experience of household administration and was a financial expert. Henry had rewarded him with extensive grants of land, making him one of the wealthiest landowners in Hertfordshire.¹¹¹ Sadler was one of the assistant executors and received a bequest of £200.¹¹² He was closely associated with Somerset from 1547, returning to active duty as a privy councillor by July 1548, and was heavily involved in Scottish affairs. One reason for this involvement was that, as master of the great wardrobe, he was much concerned with the logistics of the royal household, giving him the necessary skill and experience for involvement in pay and supply during war. He was appointed treasurer of the army in 1544-1545, working closely with Hertford, and again in 1547. Another reason for his involvement in the Scottish campaign was his diplomatic experience, which went back to 1537, when he had been sent as ambassador to Scotland. He had also been principal secretary from 1540-1543. Sadler's experience and connections probably recommended him to the lord protector and made him a potential fidelity client.¹¹³ Wentworth was similarly experienced in government and may have had a fidelity relationship with Somerset because they were related.¹¹⁴ The others had ordinary clientage relationships with Somerset. Baker was an assistant executor and retained his offices under Somerset, who held him in such high regard that he sought his return for Kent and assisted his election as speaker. His legal expertise recommended him but so did his financial offices because of the large exchanges and grants from the royal estate during the protectorate.¹¹⁵ Shrewsbury's appointment probably appealed to

¹⁰⁹ PRO, SP 61/2/3, fo. 6r; PRO, C 82/894; Longleat, Seymour MS. 4, fos. 106r-107v; Longleat, Seymour MS. 4, fos. 108r-109v; Longleat, Seymour MS. 4, fos. 112r-113v.

¹¹⁰ Longleat, Seymour MS. 4, fos. 8r-8v; Longleat, Seymour MS. 4, fos. 9r-9v; Longleat, Seymour MS. 10, fo. 167v.

¹¹¹ Bindoff, ii, pp. 276-277; iii, pp. 249-252; PRO, E 179/69/51; PRO, E 101/424/9, fo. 75r; PRO, E 351/43; A. Clifford (ed.), *The state papers and letters of Sir Ralph Sadler* (ii vols.; Edinburgh, 1809), i, pp. 355-364; PRO, E 351/2932; PRO, LC 2/2/3/1, fo. 108r; PRO, LC 5/49, fos. 19r, 21r, 22r, 25r.

¹¹² PRO, E 23/4/1, fos. 14r-14v, 16r; Rymer and Sanderson (eds.), *Fœdera*, xv, pp. 116-117.

¹¹³ PRO, SP 10/5/17, M. fo. 55r; PRO, E 351/44; Clifford (ed.), *The state papers and letters of Sir Ralph Sadler*, i, pp. 355-364; PRO, E 351/122; PRO, E 351/128; PRO, E 351/129; PRO, E 351/136; PRO, E 351/137; PRO, E 351/142; PRO, SP 50/3/88, fos. 13-18; Bindoff, iii, pp. 249-252; Braddock, 'The royal household', pp. 105-115.

¹¹⁴ Braddock, 'The royal household', p. 166; Loach, *Edward VI*, pp. 95, 139.

¹¹⁵ PRO, E 23/4/1, fos. 14r-14v, 16r; Rymer and Sanderson (eds.), *Fœdera*, xv, pp. 116-117; Bindoff, i, pp. 366-369.

Somerset because of his great local consequence and service in Scotland (serving under and then replacing him as lieutenant-general of the army in the north in 1544-1545). It was also vital to incorporate able leading members of the established nobility into the conciliar government. As a result, Shrewsbury was appointed lord president of the council of the north in May 1549.¹¹⁶ Somerset did not fill the privy council with his closest servants, men like Thynne, Whalley or Thomas Fisher, his secretary, but he did try to enlarge his party of supporters on the board. The roster of those to furnish light horses and demi-lances of about July 1548 listed, among others, the privy councillors, 'the privie chamber & certen of the connsell at large'. Among the privy councillors 'at large' were Sir Edmund Peckham and Sir Richard Southwell, suggesting they were not actively called to sit. The 'lordes & others of the privie connsell' do seem to represent the active inner-ring rather than the entire board. This may explain the absences from the privy council during the protectorate.¹¹⁷

Somerset's powers as lord protector were increased when a new patent was issued on 24 December 1547.¹¹⁸ Immediately prior to the Pinkie campaign, an order was issued on the king's authority that Somerset's power be construed in the widest sense so that he could raise an army against the Scots. His original patent was vague and with his appointment on 11 August as the king's lieutenant and captain-general for the wars, he was given wide discretion to array subjects for military service, hire foreign mercenaries for war, exercise martial law, issue safe conducts and negotiate with foreign powers.¹¹⁹ The augmentation of power was extraordinary and Somerset took full advantage of it. The political nation was to be apprised of the changes. At the state opening of parliament on 4 November, the king ordered the clerk of parliament, Francis Spilman, to read a commission given under the great seal the previous day. By this commission, which reiterated several points from the letters patent of 12 March, Somerset was to sit alone by the right side of the throne, enjoying the privileges granted to uncles of the king, whether paternal or maternal, 'of any of our most noble progenitores'.¹²⁰ Somerset was given greater powers than Henry VI's uncle, the duke of Gloucester, but was still circumscribed.¹²¹ He had to recognise his peers and their role in governance. Whether or not this would effectively bind him remained to be seen.

¹¹⁶ *The complete peerage*, eds. Gibbs *et al*, xi, pp. 710-711; see below, pp. 59, 133, 149-150.

¹¹⁷ The 'lordes & others of the privie connsell' numbered, Somerset, Cranmer, Rich, St John, Warwick, Russell, Arundel, Seymour, Cheyne, Paget, Wingfield, Denny, Herbert, Sir Edward North, Baker, Petre and Sadler: PRO, SP 10/5/17, M. fos. 55r-67v; PRO, C 66/814, m. 4; *Calendar of patent rolls*, ii, p. 97; Longleat, Seymour MS. 10, fo. 167r.

¹¹⁸ PRO, C 66/814, mm. 3-5; *Calendar of the patent rolls*, ii, pp. 96-97; J.G. Nichols (ed.), 'The second patent appointing Edward duke of Somerset Protector', *Archaeologia*, 30 (1844), pp. 463-489.

¹¹⁹ PRO, C 66/814, mm. 2-3; Rymer and Sanderson (eds.), *Fædera*, xv, pp. 174-178.

¹²⁰ BL Cotton MS. Faustina C. viii, fo. 22r; PRO, C 66/802, m. 1.

¹²¹ BL Cotton MS. Faustina C. viii, fo. 22v.

The second patent appointing Somerset lord protector differed from the first because it substantially increased his power.¹²² It reiterated his appointments of 12 March and of 11 August. The result had been 'quyete' and, through God, victory over the Scots to the king's 'immortall fame'.¹²³ Somerset surrendered his patent of 12 March and Edward, 'of our speciall grace *certeyn* knowledge and mere mocion', with the advice of the privy council, appointed him lord protector and governor 'duryng our pleasure and vntill suche tyme as we shall declare to our said vncle our pleasure to be otherwyse by writynge'.¹²⁴ Somerset was to exercise these offices as fully as any of his predecessors, being 'our chife and principall Councellour and chifeste and higheste of our pryuy Counseill', and had the privy council to advise him because he 'shuld be furnysshed wythe men qualified in witte knowledge and experience for his aide and assistance in the maynenge and accomplysshement of our said affaires'. Somerset was to appoint new privy councillors 'frome tyme to tyme', the appointees being called to the board with as much authority as if they were named in the current patent. He had sole authority to do this, as he 'shall thynke meate and convenyent'.¹²⁵ The indemnity granted to the lord protector and privy council was repeated but with important alterations. Somerset was to exercise authority with the advice of those privy councillors selected by him to sit at various times, without having to use statutes and proclamations to enforce his will, until the king decided otherwise. He, the privy council and their heirs should be free from imprisonment and loss of wealth or property.¹²⁶ All his actions had legal sanction, even his very extensive use of proclamations, without retrospective parliamentary support. His prerogative powers were regal but he may have used them less than expected and many of the proclamations issued during the protectorate were in response to unrest or rebellion.¹²⁷ Also, Somerset had legal authority to govern this way. It may not have been politically astute but it was technically correct. His appointments as lieutenant and captain-general were confirmed and were to be held for the same term as his protectorate. This allowed Somerset to wage war for the king and 'to call and gather together for vs and in our name of all all [*sic*] and synguler our liege men and subiectes suche and as many of theym thoroughout all and euery our said Realmes and Domynions or any parte or parcelles therof as our said vncle from tyme to tyme shall thynke convenyent and necessarie', levying and mustering them whenever he thought it essential too. He could raise mercenaries and had complete control over the military resources (including 'asmoche of our Treasure') and operations of the realm, being authorised to exercise war abroad if necessary. Somerset could also make peace or withdraw English forces with the advice of the privy council. He was to appoint a marshal and practice martial law within the army and could appoint a deputy,

¹²² PRO, C 66/814, mm. 3-5.

¹²³ PRO, C 66/814, mm. 3-4.

¹²⁴ PRO, C 66/814, m. 4.

¹²⁵ PRO, C 66/814, m. 4.

¹²⁶ PRO, C 66/814, mm. 4-5.

lieutenants and captains if unable to carry out the office in person, authorising this process with his signature and seal and determining the amount of power his appointees could use. All clergy, nobles, gentlemen, officers, mayors, sheriffs, JPs, other local officers, mariners, soldiers, 'and other our liegemen and subiectes' were to assist the duke in this office.¹²⁸ The privy council, nobility, prelates and leading officers and courtiers, signed the patent.¹²⁹

The second patent of 24 December gave Somerset his greatest authority with the consent of the political elite. The protectorate probably initially had the general assent of the privy council because it attempted to curtail faction and appeared to be a feasible alternative to Henry's conciliar government. Somerset tried to create stable rule by incorporating his colleagues as ordinary clients through the unfulfilled gift clause and through other patronage. He then made himself more independent but did not fill the court and privy council with his household and fidelity clientele. This would have been too provocative. Somerset's clientage network was more complex than any other leading politician's and mimicked Henry's. He enlarged it beyond the normal confines of fidelity clients, servants and county clients to include his colleagues in government and the political elite even though this made it less coherent. Somerset acted as regent but the nature of his power undermined confidence in him over 1548-1549, especially his increasingly unsuccessful conduct of the Scottish campaign. Edwardian high politics was basically not factional but Somerset, even as lord protector, could not prevent faction without the assistance of his colleagues and the wider political elite. This support was only forthcoming when his government was successful.

¹²⁷ G.R. Elton, 'Government by edict?', in his *Studies in Tudor and Stuart politics and government* (iv vols.; Cambridge, 1974-92), i, pp. 300-307; M.L. Bush, *The government policy of Protector Somerset* (London, 1975), pp. 130-131, 140-141, 146-159; R.W. Heinze, *The proclamations of the Tudor kings* (Cambridge, 1976), pp. 201-223.

¹²⁸ PRO, C 66/814, mm. 3-5.

¹²⁹ Nichols (ed.), 'The second patent', p. 484.

3. *Somerset's clientele, 1547-1549*

It is necessary to attempt a more systematic analysis of Somerset's clientele, both at the centre and in the localities. Often the same men acted on his behalf in both capacities. The core of his clientele was made up of his servants and fidelity clients and was central to the protectorate because it gave him the necessary consequence in political society and acted as a mutual self-support group. It was court-centred and spanned the public and private domains. Somerset's clientele will be examined in detail in this and subsequent chapters. His kinsmen (except his brothers), major household servants, 'new men' and county clients will be considered in turn before discussing his relationship with the county elite. Somerset sought to enlarge his clientele based on influence at court, in parliament and in the counties and acted as the main patronage broker rather than the king. The consequence of this attempted expansion was that his clientele's homogeneity was weakened. However, these structures were never completely controlled by the patron. A two-way process occurred; both top-down and bottom-up. Clients were recruited but they also sought new and more successful patrons if there was a failure of reciprocity. Somerset relied on his clientele to assist him in political society and, where possible, this gave them a prominent role in national politics. However, these were often very able men who had been advanced by Henry in national and local politics and Somerset attempted to curtail any attempts by his clients to advance their interests to the detriment of the crown. He viewed himself as the most successful exponent of the partnership between the monarchy and the clientele. A more detailed examination of Somerset's and Northumberland's attitudes towards the commissions of the peace and local clientage will be made in chapter nine.

The issue of the extent of Somerset's legal competency was unresolved in 1547 and the divergence between his conception of his powers and that of the privy council would have great repercussions. He became increasingly isolated from the privy council in 1548-1549 and removed conciliar business to his own clientele. For example, Somerset's secretary, Cecil, handled much of the business of government and it is difficult to assess how the duke perceived this. Was Cecil his man or the king's? Could he be both at the same time? Although suitors wrote to Cecil as they would to a principal secretary, they did so because Somerset had vice-regal powers and this blurred the distinction, as far as it existed, between the royal household and clienteles.¹ John Hales provides another clear example. Somerset listened intently to his advice and appointed him to the

¹ PRO, SP 10/2/3, M. fos. 5r-6v; PRO, SP 10/2/4, M. fos. 7r-8v; PRO, SP 10/2/5, M. fos. 9r-10v; PRO, SP 10/4/11, M. fos. 27r-27v; PRO, SP 10/4/19, M. fos. 42r-43v; PRO, SP 10/7/13, M. fos. 45r-46v; PRO, SP 10/8/50, M. fos. 90r-91v; PRO, SP 10/8/65, M. fos. 119r-120v.

enclosure commissions in 1548 and 1549.² Somerset certainly relied on this intimate circle but, equally, he operated within the confines of conciliar action and relied on the regime to underpin his policies. Accusations concerning his inner-ring only took hold after he fell from power. The Imperial ambassador reported that Somerset was increasingly relying on this 'new council' of 'enthusiastic admirers in his household' to conduct affairs and was becoming more arbitrary and intolerant of an uneasy privy council as the regime's problems mounted.³ This 'new council' included Stanhope, Thynne, Smith, Paget, Cecil, Edward Wolf, a gentleman of the privy chamber, and William Grey of Reading.⁴ These were among Somerset's closest clients and were more than members of a general party. This became obvious as faction emerged within the conciliar and court inner-ring in 1548-1549, creating a marked division between Somerset's fidelity clients and his ordinary clients, who began to diminish in number and importance. The latter were those members of the privy council and elite who had been tied to the lord protector's interests by bonds of dependency and mutual reciprocity. These ties could be terminated, though. Somerset was failing to reciprocate by not allowing his colleagues a greater hand in government and may also have reduced his patronage towards them. Who were this 'new council' and how did Somerset's clientele relate to political society?

Somerset saw his role as different from that of any other privy councillor. He often exercised personal authority as a king would. For example, he oversaw much of the conduct of the Scottish campaign (1547-1550) personally as would befit a regent. This became more apparent after the Battle of Pinkie but Somerset had been given this authority by his colleagues.⁵ He regarded it as acceptable to utilise the staff of the secretariat, the secretaries and clerks, still including Paget after he became comptroller, to conduct business from his residences and frequently relied on ducal officers too.⁶ Paget was still busy carrying out duties pertaining to the office of secretary at the end of August 1547 (including dealing with ambassadors and organising privy council meetings), two months after relinquishing it to become comptroller.⁷ The king's secretariat worked for both the monarch and his privy council, while members of the household often handled aspects of the administration of warfare (especially supply).⁸ Somerset used his own secretariat and household in the same way and blurred the distinction between public and private. Several of his men, especially Smith and Cecil, were then recruited into government. Ducal officers were most

² P.L. Hughes and J.F. Larkin (eds.), *Tudor royal proclamations* (iii vols.; New Haven, 1964-1969), i, pp. 427-429, 471-472; see below, pp. 108-112.

³ *Simancas*, ix, p. 445; C. Read, *Mr. Secretary Cecil and Queen Elizabeth* (London, 1962 edn.), p. 54.

⁴ Slavin, 'The fall of Lord Chancellor Wriothesley', p. 284.

⁵ PRO, SP 15/1/8, fos. 11r-11v; PRO, SP 15/1/31, fos. 66r-67v; PRO, C 66/814, mm. 2-3; Rymer and Sanderson (eds.), *Fœdera*, xv, pp. 174-178; Bush, *Government policy*, pp. 1-39; Hoak, *The king's council*, pp. 114-117.

⁶ PRO, SP 46/5, fos. 268r-268v; Hoak, *The king's council*, pp. 114-116.

⁷ NRO, F. (M.) C. 21, fos. 4r-4v; Beer and Jack, pp. 12-14.

⁸ C.S.L. Davies, 'Supply services of English armed forces, 1509-1550', unpublished University of Oxford Ph.D. (1963), pp. 97, 102-105, 140-141, 143-145, 170-181.

heavily utilised in the administration of the Scottish campaign, particularly Thynne and Fisher.⁹ For example, Thynne endorsed Petre's draft instructions of 1 August 1547 to Clinton, admiral of the fleet for the Pinkie campaign. Many letters pertaining to Scotland, especially in late 1547 and early 1548, having been addressed solely to Somerset, passed through Thynne's hands and the duke's Scottish clients attempted to procure patronage through his secretaries, Fisher and Cecil.¹⁰ Fisher was more directly involved. He was a victualler during the Pinkie campaign (perhaps because of his background as the son of a retail fishmonger), when he first acted as advisor to Shrewsbury, and returned north in 1548 to campaign with the earl. He negotiated, along with Sir John Luttrell, with the earl of Argyle over the future of Mary queen of Scots in early 1549 and was involved in relieving the English garrison at Haddington before returning south.¹¹ Somerset's circle was intimate. Fisher wrote to Cecil from Berwick on 30 July 1548. He ended his sensitive letter by asking Cecil to commend him to Thynne, Richard Whalley, esquire, the chamberlain, Richard Fulmerston, the comptroller, and 'John Seymour also *with* the rest of my feloes in the chambre'.¹²

I: Somerset's fidelity clientele

Somerset clientele solidified during his years as the leading English military commander between 1542-1546, before expanding rapidly between 1547-1549. However, he had enjoyed a substantial comital income since 1536-1537 and his household must have grown quite rapidly from a small and informal structure to a substantial institutional establishment, similar to that of an established peer like Shrewsbury, although of less pedigree. Several of Somerset's most experienced and most important household servants were recruited in the 1530s. Similarly, he had been developing connections with his colleagues from at least the mid 1530s. By the time of Somerset's execution in 1551, the core of his clientele had existed for sixteen years but the more peripheral aspects were

⁹ Bindoff, ii, pp. 136-138; iii, pp. 463-467.

¹⁰ PRO, SP 50/1/37, fos. 70r-71v; PRO, SP 50/1/11, fos. 21r-22v; PRO, SP 50/1/18, fos. 35r-36v; PRO, SP 50/1/41, fos. 78r-79v; PRO, SP 50/1/54, fos. 115r-116v; PRO, SP 50/2/25, fos. 73r-75v; PRO, SP 50/2/47, fos. 126r-128v; PRO, SP 50/2/68, fos. 171r-173v; PRO, SP 50/3/69, unfol.; PRO, SP 50/4/67, unfol.; PRO, SP 50/4/68, fos. 126-141; PRO, SP 50/5/19, fos. 42r-43v. The foliation of PRO, SP 50/4 is irregular and inadequate but for convenience of reference to specific parts of documents I have used the numbering in the top right corner.

¹¹ LPL, MS. 3193, fos. 23-24; E. Lodge (ed.), *Illustrations of British history, biography, and manners, in the reigns of Henry VIII, Edward VI, Mary, Elizabeth, and James I, exhibited in a series of original papers...* (iii vols.; London, 1838 edn.), i, pp. 147-149; PRO, SP 50/4/44, fos. 413-422; PRO, SP 50/4/45, fos. 71-90; PRO, SP 50/4/85, fos. 307-310; PRO, SP 50/4/86, fos. 317-320; PRO, SP 50/4/87, fos. 311-312; PRO, SP 50/5/12, fos. 21r-24v; PRO, SP 50/5/13, fos. 25r-26v; APC, ii, pp. 221, 323; Bindoff, ii, p. 137.

¹² PRO, SP 50/4/87, fos. 311-312; Longleat, Seymour MS. 10, fo. 167r; PRO, SP 10/4/35, M. fos. 67r-68v; PRO, SP 10/4/36, M. fos. 69r-70v; Tytler, i, pp. 117-119; PRO, SP 50/4/44, fos. 413-422; PRO, SP 50/4/45, fos. 71-90; PRO, SP 50/4/86, fos. 317-320.

of much more recent origin and less stable.¹³ Northumberland's clientele was less stable, despite his best efforts, because it only really emerged after 1542.¹⁴

One of Somerset's most important advisors was his wife, although not a fidelity client. Anne Stanhope, duchess of Somerset, had an appreciable role in political society. A tract produced during the October coup blamed many of Somerset's problems on his obstinate refusal to listen to any but her counsel. He was 'ruled by that imperious & insolent woman his wife, whose ambitious wit & mischevous perswasions led him & directed him even also in the waightie affaires and gouernance of the realme to the great harme and dishonour of the same'.¹⁵ Paget was later explicit when discussing the former lord protector's problems with the imperial ambassador, telling van der Delft that 'he has a bad wife'. Van der Delft thought this 'amounted to a confession of his unworthiness, since he allowed himself to be ruled by his wife'.¹⁶

How reliable are these sources? Apart from the duchess's relationship with the Smiths and Seymours, another example strengthens the case.¹⁷ Cheke wrote to her on 27 January 1549, having already come under suspicion over his dealings with Seymour.¹⁸ His wife, Mary Hill, had upset her and he wanted to apologise because he was Somerset's client. Cheke promised to amend his wife's gaucheness, while hoping she could be excused for her inexperience because she was pregnant. It is interesting that Cheke concluded his letter in terms of clientage: 'onli I beseche your grace and that moost humblie, to extende your gracioys fauor so far above the requirirs desert, towards mi wife and me both, as mi good minde towards your grace which is equal with your gretest clientes, is above mine habilltee, which is vnderneath your comen state of wel minded'.¹⁹ Perhaps he hoped that this would not only please her ego but also solidify his identification as one of her husband's adherents. However, Cheke's difficulties were also caused by his connection with Seymour (who had just been arrested for treason) and hostility between men often manifested itself in the relations between their wives. The duchess was one of the most conspicuous examples of this behaviour and took umbrage with the wives of other men who displeased or opposed her husband. Catherine Parr, the dowager queen, was also prepared to fight vigorously for Seymour's interests. The whole family was geared towards assisting the interests of the head. However, wives also worked hard to mediate between powerful men.²⁰ As well as being haughty, arrogant, argumentative and difficult, the duchess was also greedy. For example,

¹³ Longleat, Seymour MS. 9, fos. 190r-191r, 192v-193r, 194v-195r, 228r; Longleat, Seymour MS. 12, fos. 3r-354r; Adams, (ed.), *Household accounts*, pp. 24-30; see above, pp. 26-28.

¹⁴ See below, pp. 157-165.

¹⁵ BL Additional MS. 48126, fo. 2r; MacCulloch, *Tudor church militant*, p. 204.

¹⁶ *Simancas*, ix, p. 429. For an even-handed assessment of the duchess, see: Jordan, *The young king*, pp. 496-498.

¹⁷ See below, pp. 56-57, 84, 95-96.

¹⁸ Strype misdated this document: BL Lansdowne MS. 2, fos. 85r-86v; Strype, *The life of Sir John Cheke*, p. 44; Bindoff, i, 627-630.

¹⁹ BL Lansdowne MS. 2, fo. 85r.

when Sir William Sharington's money and goods were being removed from his properties in about February 1549 (some to be kept by Somerset, some by the king), a diamond and white ruby worth at least £100 were delivered by Fulmerston to the duchess, 'who afterwarde tolde my [Sharington's] wife that the same were of no value. wheare in very dede they were no lesse worthe but rather better'.²¹ The duchess's behaviour may, in part, have stemmed from insecurity, especially in relation to her husband's first marriage. She may have encouraged him to construct Somerset Place on the Strand in order to increase their prestige, especially as the surrounding nobles' houses were grander.²² At this time the Strand was becoming the home of the nobility and was the main thoroughfare between London and Westminster, making it a suitable site for Somerset's architectural statement and a convenient location. However, the insensitivity with which construction took place alienated ordinary Londoners and his colleagues.²³ The duchess was on close terms with Mary, despite religious differences and the fact that she was the leading patroness of protestant writers and preachers.²⁴ She took the leading role in aristocratic reforming circles, especially after Catherine's death.²⁵ When Somerset sent his wife to safety on 6 October 1549, while making preparations to defend Hampton Court against the London council, the courtiers and assembling commons mishandled her and 'put all this trouble down to her'.²⁶ The duchess had unpleasant traits but this should not obscure the supporting role she played for her husband or her value to him as an advisor, especially when his younger brothers did not play this role as kinship clients.²⁷

Somerset perpetuated his power by successfully dominating the court. The importance of personal monarchy was still great in the mid-sixteenth century and control of the king was vital to Somerset. The most obvious way to do this was to appoint his own clients but Somerset only partially used this method.²⁸ Stanhope (the duchess of Somerset's half-brother) was placed in control of the privy chamber early in the reign. He was one of Somerset's 'new men', rather than a servant, but he was very close to his brother-in-law. As groom of the stool, he supervised the

²⁰ Kettering, 'Friendship and clientage', p. 153; see below, pp. 56-57, 84, 86-87, 89, 94-96.

²¹ PRO, SP 10/6/29, M. fo. 75r.

²² Jordan, *The young king*, pp. 46, n. 1, 496-500, 509; see below, p. 254, n. 148.

²³ BL Egerton MS. 2815; Jordan, *The young king*, pp. 498-501; J. Summerson, *Architecture in Britain, 1530-1830* (London, 1993 edn.), pp. 43-62; PRO, SP 10/9/41, M. fos. 75r-75v; BL Additional MS. 48126, fos. 3v-4r; MacCulloch, *Tudor church militant*, pp. 134-136.

²⁴ PRO, SP 10/1/38, M. fos. 122r-123v; PRO, SP 10/2/24, M. fos. 84Ar-84Bv; Tytler, i, pp. 51-52, 60-61; Jordan, *The young king*, pp. 206-207; P.C. Swensen, 'Noble hunters of the romish fox: religious reform at the Tudor court, 1543-1564', unpublished University of California, Berkeley, Ph.D. (1981), pp. 250-253; Loach, *Edward VI*, pp. 43-45.

²⁵ Swensen, 'Noble hunters of the romish fox', pp. 250-253; J.N. King, 'Freedom of the press, protestant propaganda, and Protector Somerset', *Huntington Library Quarterly*, 40 (1976), pp. 1-9; Loach, *Edward VI*, pp. 43-45, 47; MacCulloch, *Tudor church militant*, pp. 199-204.

²⁶ *Simancas*, ix, p. 459.

²⁷ See below, pp. 81-105, 130-131.

²⁸ Starkey, 'Intimacy and Innovation', pp. 71-118; Murphy, 'The illusion of decline', pp. 119-146; Starkey, 'Representation through intimacy', pp. 42-78; see above, pp. 10-19.

king's most intimate activities. He also took control of the privy coffers from Denny.²⁹ The seventeenth century historian Sir John Hayward thought Stanhope owed his success to his half-sister and kinship was certainly important in recruitment to clienteles. However, Stanhope was favoured by Henry and more capable than Hayward believed, reinforcing the idea that clienteles were of vital utility to the regime.³⁰ Although he was one of Somerset's closest clients, he was also a substantial and able man in his own right. Stanhope was a servant of the first earl of Rutland by 1532 but entered the royal household in the late 1530s (perhaps as a yeoman of the stable), becoming an esquire of the body in 1540. These promotions may have been due to his relationship with Hertford but Henry showed confidence in him, which suggests he was an able servant.³¹ He was originally from a Nottinghamshire gentry family but, through royal favour, was appointed first lieutenant and then governor of Kingston-upon-Hull (1542, 1544) and oversaw construction of the new fortress there. Again, he possibly owed his position to his brother-in-law's influence. Consequently, Stanhope began purchasing estates in Yorkshire, principally at Beverley, as part of a process whereby he planted himself there. Already by May 1547 he was being assessed in Yorkshire rather than Nottinghamshire on lands and fees valued at £300 per annum.³²

Stanhope remained a channel of information for Somerset. On 13 September 1547 he was making payments to Wroth to forward letters to the lord protector while the latter was on campaign.³³ In July 1548, along with other members of the privy chamber, he was licensed to furnish light horses and demi-lances for the Scottish campaign. As Stanhope did not go north with Somerset and the figure he was to raise was only six horses and four demi-lances, a figure that seems to accord with his own household, this licensing appears to be different from controlling the stewardships of the king's affinity. By contrast, in 1544 he was ordered to raise two hundred men to serve under Hertford as lieutenant of the north from among his '*seruantes tenantes and others within suche rules and offices as yow haue*'. They were to be drawn from Hull, his stewardships and estates.³⁴ Plainly, during the protectorate the last place Somerset wanted Stanhope was away from the king and to ensure this he elevated him above all other chief gentlemen of the privy chamber, giving him comprehensive control over the privy chamber and greatly enhancing his political power. By

²⁹ His declared account ran from 24 August 1547 to 25 March 1549 but there is no evidence he left office on the latter date: PRO, E 351/2932; *APC*, ii, p. 128; Hoak, 'The king's privy chamber', pp. 105-108; D.E. Hoak, 'The secret history of the Tudor court: the king's coffers and the privy purse, 1542-1553', *Journal of British Studies*, 26 (1987), pp. 213-214, 216-220; Bindoff, iii, pp. 368-369.

³⁰ Sir John Hayward, *The life and raigne of King Edward the Sixth*, ed. B.L. Beer (Kent, Ohio, 1993), p. 148; Kettering, 'Patronage in early modern France', pp. 844-854; Kettering, 'Friendship and clientage', pp. 139-141, 145-146; Guy, 'Thomas Wolsey, Thomas Cromwell and the reform of Henrician government', p. 49.

³¹ Bindoff, iii, pp. 368-369.

³² E. Gillett and K.A. MacMahon, *A history of Hull* (Oxford, 1980), pp. 102-105; PRO, E 179/69/51; PRO, SP 46/1, fos. 217v, 219r-219v; PRO, E 179/69/62; Bindoff, iii, pp. 368-369; BL Additional MS. 29597, fos. 6r-6v; BL Additional MS. 29597, fos. 7r-8v; BL Additional MS. 29597, fos. 9r-10v.

³³ PRO, E 351/2932; *APC*, ii, p. 128.

18 August 1548, Stanhope was described as 'first' gentleman of the privy chamber but not governor, a title reserved for Somerset alone. He seems in practise to have exercised Somerset's office as governor and is described as such but he did not hold the patent of office as did his patron.³⁵ He usually remained in close proximity to the king and monitored access to the privy chamber, to which he had the key. In directing the privy purse expenses he controlled aspects of Edward's lifestyle too. The privy purse was used for personal purchases and quite substantial expenditure on things like ambassadorial costs. Seymour was keen to have Stanhope's office. He had Fowler ask Edward if he could replace Stanhope but received no answer.³⁶ He then tried to procure Cheke's assistance in getting Edward to write a 'Bill' endorsing this claim to be governor.³⁷ Cheke knew that the king was forbidden to sign anything without Somerset's counter-signature and would not permit Edward to do it. Later, the king discussed the situation with Cheke privately, agreeing with the course he had taken. Cheke was concerned about being implicated in Seymour's factious activities, concluding his holograph deposition, 'and nether afore nor after I hard of ye L. Adm. partie ani more of this bil'.³⁸ Because the king was a minor, Somerset wanted to prevent anyone from attempting to manipulate him or to solicit unauthorised patronage through him. These problems had been chronic during the reign of Henry VI.³⁹ Men like Stanhope and Sir Richard Page were meant to prevent this. Stanhope was, as Professor Hoak put it, '*de facto* Governor of Edward VI'.⁴⁰ Somerset rewarded his brother-in-law by appointing him master of the king's 'harryers' (a type of dog) in July 1548, something of a sinecure, and procuring extensive grants of land in the form of favourable purchases.⁴¹ Somerset's success as Henry's servant had allowed him to assist his clientele but his more important followers were equally capable of procuring patronage through able royal service, suggesting clienteles usually played a positive part in political society.

The aristocratic household provided 'the mechanics behind the exercise of power'.⁴² Members of the household could be used as messengers or deputies for their patron. They could take counsel with the county gentry to settle local issues. These duties required able servants, who were usually gentlemen and had their own connections. They formed the core of the patron's clientele, even though he cultivated connections with local nobles and influential figures at court and in

³⁴ Stanhope was keeper of Knessall Park in Nottinghamshire and bailiff of the lordship from 1538, bailiff of the former estates of Lenton priory in Nottinghamshire from 1539, and keeper of Beddington house in Surrey from 1547: PRO, SP 10/5/17, M. fo. 55r; BL Additional MS. 29597, fo. 6r; Bindoff, iii, pp. 368-369.

³⁵ PRO, C 66/811, m. 34; *Calendar of the patent rolls*, i, p. 391; Bindoff, iii, pp. 368-369.

³⁶ PRO, SP 10/6/27, M. fo. 70r; APC, ii, p. 260.

³⁷ APC, ii, p. 260.

³⁸ PRO, SP 10/6/26, M. fo. 68r; Tytler, i, pp. 154-155.

³⁹ J.L. Watts, *Henry VI and the politics of kingship* (Cambridge, 1996), pp. 103-111, 151-180, 216-221, 321-323.

⁴⁰ Hoak, 'The king's privy chamber', pp. 105-106.

⁴¹ *Calendar of patent rolls*, i, pp. 170, 250, 274, 390-394; ii, pp. 37-39, 204-208; Bindoff, iii, pp. 368-369.

⁴² K. Mertes, *The English noble household 1250-1600. Good governance and politic rule* (Oxford, 1988), pp. 121-122.

government.⁴³ The household was essential to the patron's public image and was used 'both to create and represent a visible, tangible expression of the lord's power'. It represented the image the patron wished to present to the world.⁴⁴ The household numbered Somerset's personal servants and the most important officers managing his estate but not his tenants. These tenants were not part of his clientele, except in terms of the forces he could raise for military service. Somerset displayed his '*magnificentia*' on a great scale and his attitude towards his colleagues and men he tried to make his clients was increasingly autocratic, while his style of government became more personal. However, was this reflected in his household?⁴⁵ Although Somerset's household was large, numbering one hundred and sixty seven servants in livery in late 1547, it was not excessive. At Edward's death, Northumberland had two hundred and twenty eight servants in wages and Professor Beer put his total household, including the men of business who made up the duke's council (like his controller, Thomas Blount, and his auditor, William Kynyat), at two hundred and forty six. The second earl of Rutland's household numbered ninety in June 1549. Most of these were domestic servants but could be used for quite important work, like carrying messages, if circumstances dictated.⁴⁶

Thynne was perhaps the most important member of Somerset's household. He had been his steward of the household since 1536, having been recruited from the household of Lord Vaux of Harrowden. Thynne was also an important man in his locality. He was surveyor of the court of augmentations in Wiltshire from 1545-1553 and sheriff of Somerset and Dorset in 1548-1549. He could accurately be described as Somerset's man of business during the protectorate. Substantial amounts of the correspondence concerning the lord protector's affairs and crown patronage passed through his hands (a major complaint during the October coup) and, as steward, he seems to have been the pre-eminent household officer since the early 1540s, before Cecil began to play a role in ducal affairs.⁴⁷ He was the prime example of the successful household servant and benefited greatly from service, receiving substantial rewards through Somerset. The aristocratic household was still a place of advancement to political, social and economic consequence in the mid-sixteenth century, a place to make a career, rather than a place solely of domestic service.⁴⁸ Thynne was able to recruit his own kinsmen into the ducal household too. William Thynne was in wages in 1547.⁴⁹ Sir John Thynne owed his appointment as sheriff to Somerset and used John

⁴³ Mertes, *The English noble household*, pp. 122-131.

⁴⁴ Mertes, *The English noble household*, pp. 131-133.

⁴⁵ Mertes, *The English noble household*, pp. 131-133; MacCulloch, *Tudor church militant*, pp. 50-51. Somerset's tenants have not been examined as part of his clientele because it has been defined more narrowly: see above, pp. 6-10.

⁴⁶ Longleat, Seymour MS. 10, fos. 166r-170r; PRO, LR 2/118, fos. 34r-39r, 105r; Beer, *Northumberland*, p. 197; Loades, *Northumberland*, p. 274; Royal Commission on Historical Manuscripts, *The manuscripts of his grace the duke of Rutland, preserved at Belvoir Castle* (iv vols., London, 1888-1905), iv, pp. 362-363; see below, pp. 130, 133.

⁴⁷ Longleat, Seymour MS. 10, fo. 167r; BL Egerton MS. 2815; Bindoff, iii, pp. 463-464; Longleat, Thynne MS. 2, fos. 136r-137v; Longleat, Thynne MS. 2, fos. 145r-145v; BL Additional MS. 9069, fos. 44v-45r.

⁴⁸ Mertes, *The English noble household*, pp. 188-193.

⁴⁹ Longleat, Seymour MS. 10, fo. 167r.

Berwick, Somerset's receiver-general, to oversee his work with the commissions of the peace. For example, Berwick wrote to the JPs of Somerset and Dorset on 30 December 1548 to ask them to come to the next session with as many other local gentlemen as possible. The tone suggests that Thynne was leading the sessions, despite the fact that he was not a JP for Dorset.⁵⁰ However, this seems unusual and, like his attitude towards the privy chamber, Somerset was conservative about selecting sheriffs, preferring to advance established county gentry rather than his clients. Thynne was both, though.⁵¹

Thynne received extensive patronage from Somerset and was returned as MP for Marlborough and Salisbury through Seymour influence (1545, 1547). He was able to increase his landed estate by purchasing properties in Gloucestershire, Herefordshire, Lincolnshire and Yorkshire at favourable rates.⁵² Thynne was given the Savoy (the chancellor and office of the duchy of Lancaster were housed in its precinct) as a desirable London residence.⁵³ Professor Guy's characterisation of the late Elizabethan court as 'politically fluid and culturally polycentric' is pertinent; it 'spilled over into the West End of London, where the nobility were increasingly building city mansions'.⁵⁴ This process occurred under Somerset too. His new mansion on the Strand was becoming an additional arena for politics and patronage.⁵⁵ Thynne had a house in Cannon Row, as did Paget, Hoby and Lord Wharton. This was a very convenient location for court and parliament because it lay between the palaces of Westminster and Whitehall. Cecil would acquire Paget's property there for the same reason.⁵⁶ Thynne's constant business in London and role as one of Somerset's patronage brokers made the Savoy, a short distance from the Strand and adjacent to Somerset Place (separated by Somerset Yard), ideal, and created a kind of Somerset quarter. As Thynne was probably also overseeing the construction of Somerset Place, the Savoy was a practical base of operations.⁵⁷ This replicated the situation in Wiltshire, where Somerset had assisted his client in acquiring Longleat Priory, which was only three miles north of his own estate at Maiden Bradley. Thynne was originally from Shropshire and had been planted by Somerset as a county gentleman in Wiltshire (he was elevated to a knighthood on 10 September 1547).⁵⁸ Paget attacked Thynne's

⁵⁰ Thynne was a member of the quorum for Somerset. He worked with Somerset's clients and servants, Lord Stourton, William Barlow, the bishop of Bath and Wells, and Matthew Colthurst, as well as William Hartgill, father of his own servant, John: PRO, SP 46/1, fos. 194r-194v; PRO, C 66/801, mm. 10d, 21d; *Calendar of patent rolls*, i, pp. 83, 89; see below, pp. 230-237, 239-241.

⁵¹ See below, pp. 239-241.

⁵² Bindoff, iii, pp. 463-465.

⁵³ Hatfield, Cecil MS. 1, fo. 85r; *The complete peerage*, eds. Gibbs *et al*, iv, p. 78; Hatfield, Cecil MS. 151, fo. 94r; S. Haynes (ed.), *A collection of state papers...left by William Cecill Lord Burghley* (London, 1740), p. 147; Somerville, *Duchy of Lancaster*, i, pp. 328-330.

⁵⁴ J.A. Guy, 'Introduction. The 1590s: the second reign of Elizabeth I?', in Guy (ed.), *The reign of Elizabeth I. Court and culture in the last decade* (Cambridge, 1995), p. 2; L.L. Peck, 'The mental world of the Jacobean court: an introduction', in Peck (ed.), *The mental world of the Jacobean court* (Cambridge, 1991), pp. 10-12.

⁵⁵ APC, ii, pp. 25-28, 91-96, 102-103, 107-108, 143.

⁵⁶ Read, *Mr. Secretary Cecil*, p. 67; Gammon, *Statesman and schemer*, p. 174; LPL, MS. 3193, fo. 173.

⁵⁷ Summerson, *Architecture in Britain*, pp. 43-44.

⁵⁸ Bindoff, iii, p. 463.

'greedy covetousness' in a letter to Petre of July 1549, demonstrating the tension within clienteles over patronage. Paget was finding his attempts to procure a suit for one of his servants were being frustrated by Thynne and warned that Somerset's reputation was being impaired by his steward's 'proceedings, for his Grace may be assured the world noteth them much'. However, Thynne had good relations with most of Somerset's friends and clients, including Cecil and St John, and Paget and he had never really got on.⁵⁹

Despite his acquisitiveness, Thynne was more than 'a grey eminence who wielded a pernicious influence on his master'; 'he appears rather in the light of a hard working man of affairs struggling to keep abreast of the mass of business created by the Protector's multifarious concerns'.⁶⁰ Thynne's duties involved: overseeing all of Somerset's estate officers, including the stewards of the various estates (essentially under-stewards) and the keepers of castles; legal work; auditing; acting as a land agent, including negotiating exchanges and sales of land; maintaining and altering buildings; adjudicating in disputes between tenants and addressing their complaints; land management; overseeing new leases; surveying; and managing the ducal woods and parks. He needed a variety of skills, experience and good management practices, especially considering Somerset's burgeoning interests.⁶¹ A second steward, Francis Newdigate, may have assisted Thynne.⁶² It was quite common for a man with very extensive landed estates to have two stewards of his household. For example, Rutland had two in 1549, John Leke and William Seygrave.⁶³ Several examples illustrate the range of Thynne's duties and the connections he developed with other Somerset servants and clients as a result of his office. He negotiated with Sir Anthony Hungerford, of Down Ampney in Gloucestershire, in July 1549 to exchange lands prior to construction of a new house between Bedwyn Brail and Wilton, Wiltshire. Thynne worked on the deal with Berwick, who was also ranger of Savernake Forest, Wiltshire. Berwick was an expert and drove a hard bargain, Hungerford commenting pointedly, 'butt he beyng over sore in my lordes graces behalf offers nothyng leke as they [timber] be worthe'.⁶⁴ In October 1547 Thynne and Berwick procured building materials for modifications to the king's fort on Jersey by Somerset's servant and the king's lieutenant, Henry Cornish. Somerset installed his own ordnance there along with the king's and Cornish handled the administration with Sir Hugh Paulet. Somerset was carrying this work out as part of his office of governor of Guernsey and Jersey but

⁵⁹ Tytler, i, p. 190; Bindoff, iii, pp. 465-466.

⁶⁰ Bindoff, iii, p. 464.

⁶¹ Thynne's duties and range of abilities were very similar to a surveyor's: BL Cotton MS. Titus B. iv, fos. 111r-112v; J.E. Jackson, 'Wulfhall and the Seymours', *The Wiltshire archaeological and natural history magazine*, xv (1875), pp. 171-188, 193-195, 197.

⁶² *The complete peerage*, eds. Gibbs et al, xii (part 1), p. 64; Jordan, *Threshold of power*, p. 85, n. 3.

⁶³ *The manuscripts of... the duke of Rutland*, iv, pp. 201, 362.

⁶⁴ BL Additional MS. 34566, fos. 3r-4v; BL Additional MS. 34566, fos. 5r-6v; Jordan, *The young king*, pp. 499-500.

he seems to have paid for it himself. Again, this blurs the distinction between public and private.⁶⁵ Thynne's activities on behalf of Somerset did alienate some of their neighbours but such property disputes were widespread. Sir Henry Long wrote to Somerset in about July 1548 about his failure to secure the continued lease of the herbage of Vastern Park in Wiltshire. Thynne would not assist Long. Long had also petitioned Warwick, because he was close to Somerset. Thynne countered that Long had surrendered his lease in return for £200, keeping the forest of Braydon, and concluded that Somerset would be his 'good lorde' as a result. Thynne's explanation seems sound but there were irregularities over other property and this potential bad lordship looks inept because the Longs were related to the Seymours and were one of the principal families of Wiltshire. The Longs also had a clientage relationship with the Seymours.⁶⁶

Thynne's domestic duties included overseeing the ducal household and maintaining discipline among Somerset's servants. For example, Somerset wrote to Thynne in March 1549 (a time of some unease because of the fall of Seymour) about the absence of his servant Lewis Jones. Jones's truancy was over a woman. This is understandable, considering the ratio of men to women in the ducal household was fourteen to one (not an uncommon difference), and most of these women were probably married. For example, the ducal servant Winifred Fisher was married to Somerset's secretary.⁶⁷ Somerset believed Jones was either with Lord Herbert at the London house of Sir Edward North, chancellor of the court of augmentations, or with Sadler's 'folkes'. Thynne was to 'diligently and covertly' find and detain him until Somerset sent more news.⁶⁸ Having apprehended Jones, Thynne relented somewhat in his charge by letting him 'abe abroad & so he hath repaiered onto Elen'. Thynne was rebuked for this by Somerset and ordered to find them and send her to the duke at Syon (probably to receive a severe lecture).⁶⁹ Discipline was important within households for the maintenance of cohesion and proper service but Thynne does not appear to have been a martinet.

Thynne also handled ducal finances with Fulmerston's assistance. This was normal for a steward and comptroller. Thynne often audited the accounts with Somerset himself, as well as fulfilling a wide range of duties, including planning and overseeing Somerset's building programmes,

⁶⁵ Longleat, Seymour MS. 4, fos. 90r-91v; Longleat, Seymour MS. 4, fos. 98r-99v; Longleat, Seymour MS. 4, fos. 100r-101v; PRO, SP 10/1/14, M. fos. 55r-55v; Hatfield, Cecil MS. 207, fos. 5r-10v; Longleat, Seymour MS. 10, fos. 167r, 168v; PRO, SP 10/10/38, M. fos. 82r-82v; Royal Commission on Historical Manuscripts, *Report on the manuscripts of the most honourable marquess of Bath, preserved at Longleat*, eds. M. Blatcher *et al* (v vols.; London, 1904-1980), iv, pp. 106-108; see below, p. 69.

⁶⁶ Royal Commission on Historical Manuscripts, *Calendar of the manuscripts of the most honourable the marquis of Salisbury, K.G. etc., preserved at Hatfield House, Hertfordshire*, eds. R.A. Roberts *et al* (xxiv vols., London, 1883-1976), i, p. 48; Hatfield, Cecil MS. 231, fos. 34r-34v; Hatfield, Cecil MS. 231, fos. 44r-44v; Hatfield, Cecil MS. 231, fos. 58r-58v; Bindoff, ii, p. 544.

⁶⁷ Longleat, Seymour MS. 4, fos. 8r-8v; Longleat, Seymour MS. 4, fos. 9r-9v; Longleat, Seymour MS. 10, fos. 167r-167v; Loades, *The Tudor court*, p. 95; Bindoff, ii, pp. 136-138.

⁶⁸ Longleat, Seymour MS. 4, fo. 8r.

⁶⁹ Longleat, Seymour MS. 4, fo. 9r.

counselling him and acting on his behalf in the localities.⁷⁰ He also acted as a patronage broker for Somerset in the same way as Cecil and increased his ties with gentlemen eager to obtain preferment, including Sir John Salisbury, Cheke, Sir Ralph Bulmer, commander of the garrison at Jedburgh, Sir Edward North and Lady Dacre (who wrote that Thynne's assistance 'shall bynd me to do for you suche lyke pleisor as in me ys').⁷¹ Bulmer was grateful to Thynne for assistance in his restoration to blood, thanking him for the 'gentlenes/ ye haue done nowe as ye haue in tymes past in tyme of nede proved euer my ffreinde'. He then petitioned Thynne on behalf of his cousin, Anthony Bulmer, for the position of lieutenant at Jedburgh, which would reinforce his own standing there through the presence of his kinsman. Thynne obviously had influence over Somerset's military patronage, as he did over his civil patronage, by virtue of his clerical role and through his strong ties with other gentlemen. Friendship was an important component of these relationships.⁷² This was reinforced by his membership of a clientele that had a pronounced protestant character. Thynne was a committed protestant himself, whose circle included Christopher Mompesson, Sir Ralph Hopton and Sir Edward Rogers. These men were regarded with suspicion by the Marian regime because they were protestants 'whyche neuer commytt to masse ressefyng in theyar howsses Engelysshe serwysse [and] dotthe offtime mete and c[o]nnsel to gethere'.⁷³

Smith, who was a regius professor and vice-chancellor at Cambridge, was another of these 'new men', perhaps the most important, but he was not a ducal servant.⁷⁴ Although John Strype stated that Smith entered Somerset's household 'soon after' Henry's death, he was not listed among those taking livery and receiving wages in the second half of the year.⁷⁵ This seems unusual because Somerset's other officers were recorded but Smith's omission was probably either an irregularity or because he was among those men of business not recorded in the ducal household (like the lawyers).⁷⁶ However, Smith may have been either an informal member of the household at this time, like Cecil, or a client awaiting patronage and living with Somerset, like John Hooper. Mary Dewar stated that he was appointed clerk of the privy council in March 1547 but there is no evidence for this. On 3 January 1548, he was referred to as 'Clerc of the Counsaile'.⁷⁷ Professor Hoak suggested that because there is no evidence of Smith's appointment it is likely that as one of

⁷⁰ BL Egerton MS. 2815; Longleat, Seymour MS. 10, fos. 1r-188v; Mertes, *The English noble household*, pp. 25-26; Longleat, Thynne MS. 2, fos. 48r-49v.

⁷¹ Longleat, Thynne MS. 2, fos. 25r-25v; Longleat, Thynne MS. 2, fos. 26r-26v; Longleat, Thynne MS. 2, fos. 39r-40v; PRO, SP 50/1/38, fo. 72v; PRO, SP 50/2/31, fos. 88r-89v; PRO, SP 50/2/50, fos. 132r-133v; PRO, SP 50/2/68, fos. 171r-173v; Longleat, Thynne MS. 2, fo. 51r; Longleat, Thynne MS. 2, fos. 54r-54v.

⁷² Longleat, Thynne MS. 2, fo. 39r.

⁷³ PRO, SP 11/2/33, M. fos. 70r-71r.

⁷⁴ M. Dewar, *Sir Thomas Smith. A Tudor intellectual in office* (London, 1964), pp. 13-25, 36.

⁷⁵ J. Strype, *The life of the learned Sir John Smith, kt. DCL. Principal secretary of state to King Edward the sixth, and Queen Elizabeth...* (Oxford, 1820), pp. 29-32; Longleat, Seymour MS. 10, fos. 166r-170r; Dewar, *Smith*, p. 25.

⁷⁶ Longleat, Seymour MS. 10, fo. 167r.

⁷⁷ Dewar, *Smith*, p. 26; APC, ii, p. 156.

Somerset's servants he may have performed the duties of the clerk prior to Armigil Waad's entering into unpaid service in the office. If this is the case, Smith may have been acting as one of the lord protector's 'agents on the council staff', while the reference to him as 'Clerc', an office he did not officially hold, 'reflects the informality of Somerset's personal government'.⁷⁸ However, Waad and Cecil both gave unpaid assistance in the offices of clerk and secretary, possibly as an apprenticeship before appointment to these positions. The difference is that Smith was probably learning about the clerical procedure of the privy council through the clerkship but was appointed secretary and privy councillor instead (17 April 1548), while Waad became clerk. Cecil followed the same pattern as Smith, his compatriot at Cambridge. It was these men among his household that Somerset was grooming for membership of the privy council and they were men of substance. According to his most recent biographer, Smith appreciated the political situation clearly at Edward's accession, recognising that Somerset would dominate government. Several colleagues and pupils were already involved in administration and he was appointed master of requests to Somerset in March 1547, acting in an unofficial capacity by redirecting private legal suits to the pertinent court.⁷⁹ Dr McLaren states that Smith was, in effect, Somerset's secretary, and this was not lost on contemporaries.⁸⁰ Like Northumberland, Somerset had an eye for talent. Several of his most astute choices were retained by his successor, including Cecil. Certainly, as secretary, Smith would be expected to work closely with the lord protector, as he would with an adult king. However, Somerset relied heavily on his own secretaries and other key figures in his household, as well as important allies like Paget, to fulfil his clerical duties. Smith's promotion was part of this lack of distinction between public and private.

Smith became senior MP for Marlborough in November 1547, a borough that was heavily influenced by Somerset. The duke probably recommended Smith to Catherine, who was lady of the borough. Smith could use his rhetorical skills to the lord protector's advantage as Sir Thomas More had for Henry when he was employed as secretary.⁸¹ It is probable that he had a substantial role in the formulation of some of the most important legislation passed, including the Vagabonds Act (1 Edward VI, c. 3), the Act of Uniformity and the new Prayer Book (2 & 3 Edward VI, c. 1).⁸² As a more able and influential client of Somerset, Smith increased the duke's parliamentary importance. Perhaps, like More, Somerset desired having Smith in service because of his brilliant mind.⁸³ In describing the 'positive' motivation More had for entering the council in 1517, Professor Guy outlined the general appeal of an administrative and political career: 'royal service

⁷⁸ Hoak, *The king's council*, p. 271.

⁷⁹ Dewar, *Smith*, pp. 26-27.

⁸⁰ APC, ii, p. 183; McLaren, 'Reading Sir Thomas Smith's *De republica Anglorum*', p. 914.

⁸¹ Dewar, *Smith*, p. 28; Bindoff, iii, p. 338; J.A. Guy, *The public career of Sir Thomas More* (New Haven and London, 1980), p. 15.

⁸² Bindoff, iii, pp. 338-339; Dewar, *Smith*, p. 38; C.S.L. Davies, 'Slavery and Protector Somerset: the vagrancy act of 1547', *Economic History Review*, 19 (1966), pp. 533-549.

was a natural avenue, the only one that offered unlimited scope'.⁸⁴ Somerset ensured that Smith was sufficiently rewarded and in December 1547 he was elected provost of Eton, while being appointed dean of Carlisle in January 1548. Smith used his situation to establish himself in a wide-ranging and influential position and his greatest reward was the knighthood conferred in April 1549.⁸⁵ He built up a close relationship with Thynne and assisted his suit to have Sharington's manor of Lacock Abbey, Wiltshire, after the under treasurer of the Bristol mint fell.⁸⁶ Thynne was a cultivated man, interested in learning, books and, especially, architecture, which might have increased Smith's intimacy with him.⁸⁷ They were part of the intimate circle at the heart of Somerset's household.⁸⁸

Although Somerset was keen to assist his clients, he would not necessarily put their interests before those of the crown. In response to Thynne's suit to have Sharington's estate, he replied that his steward should not have it 'beforr thend was taken for all other'. Smith told Somerset of Thynne's patience and had the warrant ready but the lord protector would not sign it. Smith promised Thynne, 'I will not leave it so'. The steward had financial considerations at stake and Smith hoped to assist him.⁸⁹ Smith's situation was also complicated by his difficult relationship with the duchess of Somerset. He was shown continued favour, having been offered lodgings close to the duke at Syon in April 1549 by Fulmerston (comptroller of the duke's household and marshal of the king's bench from 1548).⁹⁰ Initially his problems stemmed from the apparent gaucheness of his wife, Elizabeth, daughter of William Carkeke of London. He told Fulmerston 'that my wif had taried *with* me now a while at the court/ and lerned well to play the courtier & much better amended then she was in London/ so than I *perceive* it mych better for hir to be abrode'. He wanted Thynne to ask if Lady Elizabeth Smith could do the duchess 'eny service' and meant to attach his wife to her. However, 'yf hir grace hath enough all redie as I vnderstand ther is & my wife shuld be combyrannce I had mych rather she tarid still *with* me'.⁹¹ Despite Lady Elizabeth Smith's social inexperience, her husband was not attempting to keep her from the public eye. He solicited a place for her as the duchess's lady-in-waiting, and, failing that, intended that she remain with him at court and in London.⁹² The situation became more serious as the duchess increasingly interfered in politics. There had been complaints about some of Smith's actions in government and when these reached the duchess, he utilised Thynne's assistance against his critics

⁸³ Guy, *The public career*, pp. 7, 15; Dewar, *Smith*, p. 32.

⁸⁴ Guy, *The public career*, p. 8.

⁸⁵ Dewar, *Smith*, pp. 29-35.

⁸⁶ Longleat, Thynne MS. 2, fo. 56r.

⁸⁷ Bindoff, iii, pp. 463-467; Summerson, *Architecture in Britain*, pp. 43-62.

⁸⁸ See above, p. 45.

⁸⁹ Longleat, Thynne MS. 2, fo. 56r.

⁹⁰ Longleat, Thynne MS. 2, fo. 56r; Longleat, Seymour MS. 10, fo. 167r; Longleat, Seymour MS. 4, fos. 272r-272v; BL Egerton MS. 2815; Bindoff, ii, pp. 176-177.

⁹¹ Longleat, Thynne MS. 2, fo. 56r.

⁹² Longleat, Thynne MS. 2, fo. 56r.

and to attempt to fend off her reproaches. However, Smith had to justify his character and explain his behaviour to her, denying that he was haughty, 'a severe or extreme' litigant, grasping, or a 'neutral' in religion. He defended himself against charges that he was corrupt and a harsh landlord too.⁹³ These problems with the duchess also suggest tension with his patron because relations between wives often indicate the social dynamic within clienteles.⁹⁴ However, the duchess was a haughty and severe woman and her troubled relations with Smith may not reflect problems between her husband and his client. In June he attempted to procure the office of customer, an act of minor patronage, and used Thynne's services again.⁹⁵ Smith retained Somerset's favour. Smith, like Cheke, 'blazed the way for the advancement of others'.⁹⁶

Cheke initially benefited from Somerset's good will. He was part of the 'evangelical establishment' headed by the lord protector and had such influence because of his important role as chief royal tutor, who carefully monitored his charge's development. Cheke's prosperity and importance were enhanced, with grants of land, increased status, election as MP for Bletchingley, Surrey, on 1 October 1547, promotion to gentleman of the privy chamber (because of his status as tutor), and appointment as provost of King's College, Cambridge. He also received an annuity of one hundred marks in August 1547. Somerset was attempting to maintain clientage relations through patronage. Cheke's association with the circle around Somerset was strengthened by marriage to Sir John Mason's stepdaughter. He participated in the visitations of the colleges and chantries in 1548. Cheke's standing deteriorated sharply because of Seymour's interference in the privy chamber, which disrupted the unity of the inner-circle. Cheke could not be removed because he was so close to Edward, although Cooke may now have assisted him as royal tutor, but he remained out of favour for most of 1549. Cheke's attack on the Western Rebellion and Kett's Rebellion recommended him to Somerset again and did much to restore him to favour, although it was not until after the protectorate that he received more signal signs of favour from Warwick.⁹⁷

Cecil's *entrée* came through connection and education. His father, Richard Cecil, was a prosperous Lincolnshire gentleman, worth £100 per annum in lands in 1548, who had been in the royal household since 1517, rising to the position of yeoman of the robes in 1539.⁹⁸ William Cecil increased his connections with Lincolnshire through the burgesses of Stamford and Boston, becoming recorder of Boston in May 1545. His growing standing at court accelerated these

⁹³ Bindoff, iii, p. 339.

⁹⁴ Kettering, 'Friendship and clientage', p. 153; see below, pp. 84, 86-87, 89, 95-96, 185, 199.

⁹⁵ Longleat, Thynne MS. 2, fo. 74r; Bindoff, iii, p. 339.

⁹⁶ W.S. Hudson, *The Cambridge connection and the Elizabethan settlement of 1559* (Durham, 1981), p. 77.

⁹⁷ Bindoff, i, pp. 626-628, 689-691; Loach, *Edward VI*, pp. 11-14; MacCulloch, *Tudor church militant*, pp. 8, 21, 25-26, 153, 174; PRO, SP 10/4/24, M. fos. 49r-49v; *Calendar of patent rolls*, i, p. 284; Longleat, Thynne MS. 2, fos. 26r-26v; Sir John Cheke, *The hurte of sedicion howe greueous it is to a Commune-welth* (STC 5109; London, 1549); see above, pp. 15, 18.

connections.⁹⁹ Although Conyers Read stated, based on one of Cecil's diaries, that he entered the lord protector's service in May 1547, he was not listed as among Somerset's household later that year.¹⁰⁰ He was certainly working for Somerset in what may have been a secretarial capacity by July 1547.¹⁰¹ Professor Read suggested Cecil followed the example of several Cambridge friends, including Cooke, his father-in-law, Cheke and Roger Ascham, another of Edward's tutors, by entering public service. It was probably through Smith's attachment to Somerset's household that Cecil entered the lord protector's service.¹⁰² He joined his father as a commissioner of the peace for Holland and Kesteven (Lincolnshire) on 26 May and sat on a variety of other commissions in 1548-1549. As well as gaining more administrative experience, Cecil acquired several minor offices as rewards, including grants for life as keeper of the writs and rolls of the common bench in May 1548 and *custos rotulorum* for all three districts of Lincolnshire in July 1549, replacing Richard Ogle.¹⁰³ Generally, the *custodes rotulorum* were appointed by the lord chancellor and, in turn, appointed the clerks of the peace. It was important for the government to select them with care in order to maintain 'a strict supervision' of the local officers. The *custodes rotulorum* were assigned by the last clause in the commission, were members of the quorum, had to attend the sessions in person or by agent and kept the session records, while producing the writs, processes, precepts and indictments.¹⁰⁴ One of the more interesting and important commissions Cecil sat on, although he did not make up the quorum, was set up in April 1549 to enquire into heresies. He now attended commissions whose activities formed national policy.¹⁰⁵

Cecil seems to have acted as an informal ducal secretary, assisting in the organisation of the Pinkie campaign, and became Somerset's master of requests around January 1548.¹⁰⁶ This gave him substantial influence over patronage. People began to rely on him. Dr Swensen may be correct in thinking Somerset appointed Smith and Cecil for ideological reasons.¹⁰⁷ The old Parr circle may have began gravitating towards Cecil but, if this was so, then it was clearly because he was orbiting a greater patron himself. The dowager duchess of Suffolk developed close relations with him at this time.¹⁰⁸ As master of requests, he was deputed with Smith to handle petitions to

⁹⁸ PRO, SP 46/1, fo. 216r; PRO, E101/424/9, fo. 137r; PRO, E 179/69/77; PRO, LC 5/31, fo. 19r; Bindoff, i, p. 603; Read, *Mr. Secretary Cecil*, pp. 19-21.

⁹⁹ Bindoff, i, pp. 603-604; Jordan, *Threshold of power*, p. 506.

¹⁰⁰ Read, *Mr. Secretary Cecil*, pp. 38, 471, n. 1; Hatfield, Cecil MS. 140, fo. 13r; Longleat, Seymour MS. 10, fos. 166r-170r.

¹⁰¹ PRO, SP 10/2/4, M. fos. 7r-8v; Tytler, i, pp. 73-74.

¹⁰² Read, *Mr. Secretary Cecil*, pp. 35-36; Hudson, *The Cambridge connection*, pp. 77-79; Loach, *Edward VI*, p. 12.

¹⁰³ Richard Cecil was also a commissioner for Lindsey, Northamptonshire and Rutland: PRO, C 66/801, mm. 14d-16d, 18d; *Calendar of patent rolls*, i, pp. 85-88; ii, pp. 3, 136, 174, 354, 406; iii, p. 59; Bindoff, i, pp. 603-606.

¹⁰⁴ C.A. Beard, *The office of justice of the peace in England in its origins and development* (New York, 1904), pp. 76-77, 156-157; Guy, *Tudor England*, p. 170.

¹⁰⁵ *Calendar of patent rolls*, ii, p. 406.

¹⁰⁶ PRO, SP 10/2/4, M. fos. 7r-8v; PRO, SP 10/2/5, M. fos. 9r-10v; Read, *Mr. Secretary Cecil*, p. 41; PRO, SP 10/4/27, M. fos. 55r-56v.

¹⁰⁷ Swensen, 'Noble hunters of the romish fox', pp. 256-257.

¹⁰⁸ Read, *Mr. Secretary Cecil*, pp. 40-44, 58-59, 62; Swensen, 'Noble hunters of the romish fox', p. 258.

Somerset, redirecting them to the court of requests, another pertinent court, or back to the privy council.¹⁰⁹ Somerset used Cecil for sensitive tasks, including visiting Gardiner prior to the latter's public sermon of June 1548 to try to get him to accept that Edward was informed of and involved in religious reform.¹¹⁰ Cecil may have been part of the nebulous clientele surrounding a substantial patron, and probably did not take livery of his lord. Smith, Wolf and Grey, all close adherents of Somerset, do not appear to have been formal members of his household either (they were not on the wages or livery list for the second half of 1547).¹¹¹ Unfortunately, no other household lists for the lord protector survive for the period 1548-1549 and Cecil may have taken livery when he became Somerset's secretary. Alternatively, these more important officers, with the exception of traditional household positions like the steward, were not always paid wages and Cecil may never have taken livery. Instead, they were the recipients of patronage. He 'was evidently attached to Somerset's household in some quasi-clerical and administrative capacity, not quite an officer of the Crown and definitely not part of the household of the young King'.¹¹² He epitomised the mid-Tudor client, with one foot in the private world of the aristocratic clienteles, the other in the public world of royal service. Such men were ripe for recruitment by the king.

In the course of 1548 Cecil became one of Somerset's closer intimates and joined the ducal secretariat in September.¹¹³ Even prior to this appointment, Somerset was relying on him. For example, in July 1548 Sir Thomas Chaloner, clerk of the privy council, was asking Cecil for advice on what to tell the imperial and French ambassadors concerning the defeat of a relieving force led by Sir Robert Bowes and Sir Thomas Palmer before Haddington.¹¹⁴ Cecil worked with Somerset to increase ducal connections and enhanced his own relationship with others too. He wrote to Shrewsbury on 9 April 1548 to profess his attachment to and friendship towards him, explaining that 'in ony service nexte to my L. grace/ [Somerset] I will not faule to declare' and the earl should turn to him at need.¹¹⁵ Somerset wrote to Shrewsbury in similar terms on the same day, complimenting his continued good service and assuring him of his 'hartie good will and favour towardes' him.¹¹⁶ Cecil also had a close working relationship with Fisher and Thynne, with both of whom he was on friendly terms.¹¹⁷ For example, Fisher wrote to Somerset in July 1548 with questions concerning his instructions while serving in Scotland and knew that Cecil 'shall be

¹⁰⁹ Read, *Mr. Secretary Cecil*, pp. 41-42; M.L. Bush, 'Protector Somerset and requests', *Historical Journal*, 17 (1974), pp. 451-464; BL Additional MS. 9069, fos. 43v, 44v.

¹¹⁰ C.J. Bradshaw, 'Protestant polemic and the nature of evangelical dissent, 1538-1553', unpublished University of St Andrews Ph.D. (1997), pp. 97-98.

¹¹¹ Longleat, Seymour MS. 10, fos. 166r-170r.

¹¹² Read, *Mr. Secretary Cecil*, pp. 41-42; BL Egerton MS. 2815.

¹¹³ BL Lansdowne MS. 118, fo. 82v; Read, *Mr. Secretary Cecil*, p. 471, n. 10.

¹¹⁴ Longleat, Seymour MS. 4, fos. 92r-93v; PRO, SP 50/4/76, fos. 269-276; Jordan, *The young king*, pp. 285-286; *Simancas*, ix, p. 286.

¹¹⁵ LPL, MS. 3193, fo. 55.

¹¹⁶ LPL, MS. 3193, fo. 57.

¹¹⁷ PRO, SP 10/4/36, M. fos. 69r-70v.

made privie'. Fisher had been forthright in his advice to Somerset and expected Cecil to have discussed this with the duke but wished 'neuertheles both one and all were in your graces devocion betwene Shene and London bridge'. He asked Cecil to mediate and to 'wryte me two wordes in what parte his grace taketh the same, for bicause I haue very bluntely both wrytten and termed my *lettre*, I doubt his graces contentacion therin'.¹¹⁸ Cecil did not replace Fisher as secretary, as Professor Read thought, even after the latter was sent north to take up a supervisory role in the Scottish campaign. Warwick was still writing of Fisher as secretary in a letter to Thynne in July 1549.¹¹⁹ Cecil did begin to work with the officers of the privy council. William Honynges, clerk of the privy council, may have assisted Cecil in Somerset's secretariat after Fisher's departure, although the evidence is uncertain. He does not seem to have been in the ducal household as well as the royal household, although Somerset used him to deliver letters between the parties during the October coup.¹²⁰ He had been Wriothesley's client but this did not affect his career under Somerset and he was probably elected for Winchester in 1547 through the lord protector's influence following the bishop of Winchester's disgrace.¹²¹ Honynges was also associated with the Howards and Lord Stafford and was an officer of the dowager duchess of Norfolk and keeper of several of her properties.¹²² This was not irreconcilable with his public offices and was not uncommon. Paget and Cecil held these kinds of offices too. However, this blurring of the distinction between public and private increased the intrusion of factional politics into government, even at mundane levels.

Honynges, Waad and Chaloner may have received unpaid assistance from Cecil in the clerkship. Cecil was now working close to the heart of government in Somerset's household and with the privy council staff. This could be a difficult work environment, though. Waad served a similar apprenticeship to Cecil between June 1547-April 1548, gaining valuable experience in the clerkship prior to entering the office.¹²³ Honynges was useful to Somerset and he was on good terms with Thynne, Fisher and Cecil.¹²⁴ He continued to be associated with Southampton and assisted him in his suits for patronage in the summer of 1549.¹²⁵ Honynges retained his post after the October coup but had been removed by 11 March 1552, perhaps falling victim to the charged atmosphere created by Somerset's second fall. He then concentrated on his work in the signet

¹¹⁸ PRO, SP 50/4/85, fo. 307; PRO, SP 50/4/87, fo. 311.

¹¹⁹ Read, *Mr. Secretary Cecil*, pp. 42, 471, n. 10; Longleat, Thynne MS. 2, fos. 6r-7v; Longleat, Thynne MS. 1, fo. 24r.

¹²⁰ Read, *Mr. Secretary Cecil*, pp. 42, 471, n. 11; Longleat, Thynne MS. 2, fos. 6r-7v; PRO, SP 10/9/24, M. fos. 32r-33v; BL Harley MS. 353, fos. 76r-77r; Longleat, Seymour MS. 10, fos. 166r-170r; PRO, SP 10/9/26, M. fos. 39r-40v; PRO, SP 10/14/53, M. fo. 119r; PRO, E 179/69/62.

¹²¹ Bindoff, ii, p. 383.

¹²² StaffRO, [Lord Stafford's Correspondence] (D (W) 1721/1/10), fos. 331-333.

¹²³ *APC*, ii, pp. 183-184.

¹²⁴ Longleat, Thynne MS. 2, fos. 56r-57v.

¹²⁵ Longleat, Seymour MS. 4, fos. 106r-107v; Longleat, Seymour MS. 4, fos. 108r-109v.

office (having been appointed in 1543) but this must have felt like a demotion.¹²⁶ Honynges's reappointment to the clerkship of the privy council by Mary reinforces the idea that he was removed for political reasons.¹²⁷ He may have been dismissed because the clerks were privy to sensitive information. He was imprisoned on 1 February 1550 for removing documents pertaining to Winchester's case. William Thomas, a 'vigorous Protestant' and inveterate gambler, who was brother-in-law to Sir Walter and Thomas Mildmay and Sir William Herbert's client, was sworn as clerk on 19 April. He was given sole responsibility for writing the registers. The next day Ely and Dr Wotton were ordered to examine Honynges.¹²⁸ He was probably removed from office at this point. E.R. Adair regarded his treatment as a consequence of the conflict between Somerset and Warwick and his Southampton connection made him a liability but in June he was granted 'libertie to go wheare he woll' on a recognisance of £200.¹²⁹ Professor Hoak thinks Honynges may have attempted to strengthen Southampton's position by stealing the judges' opinions in Winchester's case and, because 'the politics of the board seeded every connection with potential disaster', he lost his place with his patron's fall.¹³⁰ That Thomas's handwriting predominated in the registers from April 1550 is not definitive proof that Honynges had officially been dismissed at this point; neither Chaloner nor Waad worked on the registers as extensively either. Thomas, 'having nothing elles to attend unto', so that 'he may the better applie his chardge to see that nothing worthie to be registred be omitted or left unwritten', was entrusted with a special role. Bernard Hampton appears to have succeeded him in September 1551.¹³¹

It is probable that Honynges was removed from office in April 1550 but he was not described as 'the late Clerk of the Council' until March 1552, when he was recompensed for land 'surrendered' to Somerset.¹³² Unlike their Elizabethan counterparts, the Edwardian registers could record 'sensitive "high political" issues'.¹³³ Warwick wanted people he felt he could trust. Honynges was not among them. However, he was still useful, being elected for Orford in March 1553,

¹²⁶ PRO, E 179/69/62; PRO, E 179/69/63; APC, iii, p. 502; PRO, E 179/69/64; PRO, E 101/427/6, fo. 81r. However, Honynges was not listed among the 'iiij clarckes of the Signet' at Edward's coronation and little is known of his role in that office after mid-1545: PRO, LC 2/2/3/1, fo. 117r. I am grateful to Andrew Johnston for bringing this to my attention.

¹²⁷ C.S. Knighton (ed.), *State papers of Mary I. Calendar of state papers domestic series of the reign of Mary I 1553-1558* (London, 1998), p. 263.

¹²⁸ BL Cotton MS. Caligula E. iv, fo. 207r; APC, iii, pp. 3-4, 7; Hoak, *The king's council*, p. 271; E.R. Adair, 'William Thomas: a forgotten clerk of the privy council', in R.W. Seton-Watson (ed.), *Tudor studies presented...to Albert Frederick Pollard* (London, 1924), pp. 136, 139-140; Bindoff, iii, pp. 439-443.

¹²⁹ Adair, 'William Thomas', pp. 139-140; APC, iii, pp. 59-60; Bindoff, ii, pp. 383-384.

¹³⁰ Hoak, *The king's council*, pp. 162-163.

¹³¹ E.R. Adair, 'The rough copies of the privy council register', *English Historical Review*, 38 (1923), pp. 415-416; APC, iii, pp. 4, 362; J.E. Neale, (ed.), 'Sir Nicholas Throckmorton's advice to Queen Elizabeth on her accession to the throne', *English Historical Review*, 65 (1950), p. 94; Alford, *The early Elizabethan polity*, pp. 13-14, 50-51, 207-208, 214.

¹³² Bindoff, ii, p. 383; APC, iii, p. 502.

¹³³ Alford, 'Reassessing William Cecil', p. 242.

having been unsuccessfully recommended for the borough of Ipswich.¹³⁴ Cecil, on the other hand, was one of those who would succeed in making the transition from one regime to the next.¹³⁵

Cecil sat for the borough of Stamford in 1547 and increasingly handled Somerset's business in 1548-1549. This allowed him to build up relations with powerful men, including St Leger, the lord deputy of Ireland, Shrewsbury and Warwick.¹³⁶ Like his relationship with Paget in Henry's reign, when the secretary had smoothed his way at court, Warwick maintained close ties with Cecil and regularly petitioned him for patronage.¹³⁷ Warwick was discussing his business in detail with Cecil by February 1549, when he successfully petitioned to have Henry Makerell granted a joint patent as royal surgeon and hoped to procure in farm some of the chantries of Deritend for his servant Turpyn, who had served well at Boulogne.¹³⁸ He procured favours for Cecil in turn and asked him for advice: 'I trust this matter wherof you & I Comunyde of will take goode affect for as I Can perceyve thother party ys very well inclyned to seke yt by all dilligent meanes'. At the same time, Warwick was seeking favour through Thynne. Proximity to Somerset made them useful; just like proximity to the king: Warwick addressed one letter 'to my very loueng frend Master Cissell with my Lord Protectours grace'.¹³⁹ Cecil's abilities were recognised and clienteles were connected with one another. This was part of the system of clientage, where one patron's clients were well disposed towards allied patrons and their clients. An atmosphere of mutual support and friendship was meant to prevail and clearly often did. Cecil may have supported action against enclosures, although he was not involved in the 1548 commission. In February 1549 he was appointed a commissioner in his native Lincolnshire to enquire into chantries and other properties affected by new legislation.¹⁴⁰ In August Cecil was chosen with Petre, Smith and the polemicist John Mardeley to examine all books printed in England prior to sale. They had authority to grant permission for publication. Although it made sense for the secretaries to regulate this trade, Cecil's inclusion attests to his familiarity with their office and he may have done most of the work because of their other commitments.¹⁴¹

¹³⁴ Bindoff, ii, pp. 383-384.

¹³⁵ Read, *Mr. Secretary Cecil*, pp. 43-68; C. Goff, *A woman of the Tudor age* (London, 1930), p. 236.

¹³⁶ Bindoff, i, pp. 603-604; PRO, SP 10/4/6, M. fos. 9r-10v; PRO, SP 10/7/32, M. fos. 86r-86v; PRO, SP 10/4/27, M. fos. 55r-56v; PRO, SP 10/8/50, M. fos. 90r-91v.

¹³⁷ Loades, *Northumberland*, pp. 65, 74; Gammon, *Statesman and schemer*, pp. 63-64, 120-121; G. Redworth, *In defence of the church catholic. The life of Stephen Gardiner* (Oxford, 1990), pp. 204-206; PRO, SP 10/4/11, M. fos. 27r-27v; PRO, SP 10/4/17, M. fos. 39r-40v; PRO, SP 10/6/23, M. fos. 60r-61v; PRO, SP 10/8/38, M. fos. 71r-72v.

¹³⁸ PRO, SP 10/6/23, M. fos. 60r-60v; PRO, LR 2/118, fos. 34r-39r, 105r; PRO, E 179/69/62; PRO, E 179/69/63; PRO, E 179/69/64.

¹³⁹ PRO, SP 10/6/23, M. fos. 60v-61v.

¹⁴⁰ Read, *Mr. Secretary Cecil*, pp. 49-52; BL Lansdowne MS. 2, fos. 49r-49v.

¹⁴¹ Somerset knew and approved of Mardeley's work, including a tract of September 1547 attacking the ingratitude of the Scots, and promoted him to the position of clerk of the Southwark mint: APC, ii, p. 312; *Calendar of the manuscripts of the...the marquis of Salisbury*, eds. R.A. Roberts *et al*, i, p. 50; Bradshaw, 'Protestant polemic', p. 121.

Cecil continued to be on good terms with Thynne in 1549, writing from Westminster to inform him of Denny's death ('wherof none hathe greter losse than very honest men'). In August he petitioned Thynne for an office on behalf of John Aylworth, particular receiver of the court of augmentations, over Whalley, who might, without the steward's assistance, 'ride before hym'. Cecil informed Thynne of the latest developments in the siege of Boulogne and the rebellions, which would prevent the assizes from being held, and ended his letter, 'I praye yow be merye and so I wold I had lesure'.¹⁴² Cecil may have been carrying out the secretary's duties, especially if Somerset had relegated Smith. As Professor Read noted, Cecil signed one of the letters sent by the privy council in June.¹⁴³ Although he held no office connected with either the privy council or secretariat, he was carrying out work pertaining to both and was on good terms with the privy councillors and their staff. Again, Somerset's private interests encroached into the public sphere but the lord protector was regent and like Henry, his servants, including his secretaries, would be expected to participate comprehensively in public life.¹⁴⁴ Professor Elton pointed out that secretaries like Richard Pace, dean of St Paul's, William Knight and Gardiner, 'were officials of standing and influence, men whom proximity to the king's person enabled to dispense favours and affect events'.¹⁴⁵ The principal secretary was also the king's private secretary. Indeed, the former position developed out of the latter office. In Edward's reign, Paget was still being described as 'cheffe secretary to ye kings maiestye'. Paget fulfilled this role for Henry in the 1540s and, as illness and the gentlemen of the privy chamber isolated the king, he became closer to him, possessing the power to speak on his behalf. Paget later described how 'it is well knowen he [Henry] used to open his plesour to me alone in many thinges'.¹⁴⁶ The bonds of affection and intimacy between them were quite pronounced.¹⁴⁷ Dr Alford has shown the importance of the intimacy between the monarch and the secretary and the clerks of the privy council by examining Sir Nicholas Throckmorton's advice to Elizabeth at her accession. They 'were very personal servants of the crown'. Throckmorton wrote of 'the rome of Secretarie about your person' and of the clerks having 'to attend uppon your person for the dispatch of your lettres and orders'. Cecil swore two oaths, one as privy councillor and another as principal secretary.¹⁴⁸ He performed a similar role for Somerset. It is probable that Somerset would have appointed him principal secretary if the October coup had not prevented it.

¹⁴² Longleat, Thynne MS. 2, fo. 116r; Bindoff, i, pp. 355-356.

¹⁴³ Read, *Mr. Secretary Cecil*, p. 472, n. 47; N. Pocock (ed.), *Troubles connected with the Prayerbook of 1549* (Camden n.s., 37, London, 1884), p. 7.

¹⁴⁴ J.D. Mackie, *The earlier Tudors, 1485-1558* (Oxford, 1988 edn.), pp. 257, 301; Elton, *The Tudor revolution in government*, pp. 31-32, 56-59, 298-299; Guy, *Tudor England*, pp. 16, 19, 78.

¹⁴⁵ Elton, *The Tudor revolution in government*, pp. 56-59, 298-299; Starkey, 'Court and government', p. 205; J. Wegg, *Richard Pace. A Tudor diplomatist* (New York and London, 1971 edn.).

¹⁴⁶ PRO, LC 2/2/3/1, fo. 116r; PRO, SP 10/1/28, M. fo. 101v; APC, ii, p. 16; Simancas, ix, pp. 30-31; F.M.G. Evans, *The principal secretary of state. A survey of the office from 1558 to 1680* (Manchester and London, 1923), pp. 1-60; Gammon, *Statesman and schemer*, pp. 55-69.

¹⁴⁷ APC, ii, pp. 16-20.

¹⁴⁸ Neale, (ed.), 'Sir Nicholas Throckmorton's advice', p. 94; Alford, *The early Elizabethan polity*, pp. 9-10.

Smith wrote to Cecil from Eton on 19 July 1549. He had moved there either because of a disagreement with Somerset or through illness. He told Cecil he hoped to return to court soon, being 'able to serve agayn there & to ease yow of some of your paynes/ except it be my *Lordes* grace[s] pleasure I shuld still tarrie here'.¹⁴⁹ This suggests Cecil was carrying out much of the secretarial work. Mary Dewar may be correct to suggest Somerset and Smith differed over the prudence of debasement, which had led to a four hundred per cent price increase and contributed to the rebellions. Smith sought to advise the lord protector through Cecil, stressing that proclamations were too vague and went unenforced because 'everie man lookith vpon *another*', while one or two principal gentlemen were needed in each county to preserve order with the assistance of the other gentry and the chief yeomen householders. This would encourage the county elite. These men could act decisively if they received more specific orders and 'myght give the kynges maieste good accomptes of the order & quiet of that shere as men in whom the kyng puttith a speciall trust'.¹⁵⁰ They would be willing to serve because they feared for their property and the social order.¹⁵¹ Smith advocated severity, especially against 'the boystorers', as a means of control and had several practical suggestions which were quite similar to those advanced by Paget at this time: those specially appointed should form, after discussions with their neighbours, companies of sixty to one hundred horsemen drawn from the gentry to maintain law and order; and the watchmen, especially around Saffron Walden in Essex, caused 'the mischeif' because most of them 'hath nothyng' and should only be employed with the approval of the JPs. Cecil perhaps smoothed relations between Somerset and Smith and the latter returned to the court in September.¹⁵² He recognised that, for the moment at least, Cecil had greater influence with Somerset. Clients sought to counsel their patron in matters of national policy as well as more domestic concerns. Cecil had been appointed to the sensitive enclosure commission of 8 July 1549 and Somerset wrote to him six days later with instructions about how it should be conducted, with the commissioners acting jointly rather than dividing to deal with their circuits.¹⁵³ Somerset was relying on him more heavily.

Cecil had little involvement in the activity surrounding Seymour's fall but the ramifications within Somerset's household would have been pronounced. In April Somerset wrote to Sir Robert Tyrwhitt, now a Lincolnshire gentleman but originally based in Bedfordshire, to request Mortlake lodge and park for Cecil. The house was then in Tyrwhitt's possession but he seemed willing to

¹⁴⁹ Read, *Mr. Secretary Cecil*, p. 57; PRO, SP 10/8/33, M. fo. 58r; Tytler, i, pp. 185-189.

¹⁵⁰ PRO, SP 10/8/33, M. fo. 57r; Dewar, *Smith*, pp. 49-52.

¹⁵¹ PRO, SP 10/8/33, M. fo. 57r.

¹⁵² PRO, SP 10/8/33, M. fos. 57v-58r; Dewar, *Smith*, pp. 49-52; see below, pp. 122-126.

¹⁵³ PRO, SP 10/8/25, M. fos. 47r-47v.

part with it.¹⁵⁴ Somerset also wanted Wimbledon parsonage for Whalley and Stanhope assisted in securing the compliance of the chancellor of augmentations (North). The duke found Cecil and Whalley invaluable during the fall of Seymour and wished Tyrwhitt to befriend and assist his secretary: 'prayinge me that for as mych as he had fonde hyme hys very trueste frende sethens hys trobel that I wold be hys frend to'. Somerset was enhancing his client base. Cecil initially petitioned for Wimbledon but Somerset preferred to have his secretary 'ney vnto hyme' at Mortlake because it was closer to his own houses at Syon and Sheen.¹⁵⁵ Somerset also wanted to do more for Whalley. Cecil expected Whalley to succeed to one of Denny's offices in September but the October coup confounded any expectation the chamberlain may have had.¹⁵⁶ Having felt betrayed by his own brother and under increasing pressure from unfolding events, Somerset relied even more on his closest clients. Cecil did have contacts outwith Somerset's clientele, including his local connections. During September 1549 Aucher, Cecil's Lincolnshire neighbour, kept Cecil informed of developments in Kent and was alarmed at the disorder and Somerset's equivocal response.¹⁵⁷

Edward Wolf is a shadowy figure. He was appointed a gentleman of the privy chamber between 1547-1549. Wolf had been a member of Edward's cellar as prince of Wales and rose to the post of gentleman by 1547, putting him in control, with two yeomen and two grooms under him. At the accession, he was familiar with the personnel and character of Edward's household but the cellar was a department below stairs and more distant from the core of the household, making access to the privy lodgings difficult.¹⁵⁸ However, Wolf recommended himself to Somerset, became a trusted and prominent adherent, who gave counsel, was identified as of his party, and was relied on during the October coup.¹⁵⁹

William Grey of Reading was chamberlain and receiver of the court of general surveyors of the king's lands by 1545, king's plumber in 1547 and JP for Berkshire from 1547. Somerset recruited him in the early 1540s because of his polemical works and legal background. He assisted in Grey's election as MP for Reading in 1547. Grey resided at Somerset's house at Sheen and was intimately connected with the polemical authors cultivated by the lord protector as a means of propagating religious reform. This circle included Somerset's physician, William Turner, his chaplain, Thomas Becon, and William Samuel. Grey led two companies of soldiers to the west

¹⁵⁴ Hatfield, Cecil MS. 150, fos. 103r-103v; Haynes, p. 104. Tyrwhitt was commissioner of the peace for Lindsey, Lincolnshire: Bindoff, i, pp. 501-502; PRO, SP 10/5/17, M. fo. 58r; PRO, SP 10/5/18, M. fo. 78v; PRO, SP 46/1, fo. 218r; PRO, C 66/801, m. 15d; *Calendar of patent rolls*, i, p. 86.

¹⁵⁵ PRO, SP 10/6/36, M. fo. 82r; PRO, SP 10/6/35, M. fos. 81r-81v. In 1550 Cecil leased the Old Rectory at Wimbledon: Read, *Mr. Secretary Cecil*, pp. 87-89.

¹⁵⁶ Longleat, Thynne MS. 2, fos. 116r-116v.

¹⁵⁷ PRO, SP 10/8/56, M. fos. 103r-104v.

¹⁵⁸ PRO, LC 2/2/3/1, fo. 102r; PRO, E 179/69/62; Loades, *The Tudor court*, pp. 65-66.

country in August 1549 and may have participated in the pacification of unrest there. Somerset's other clients were being sent out to their localities to do the same thing.¹⁶⁰ Grey became increasingly wealthy during the protectorate and had extensive estates in Berkshire, Oxfordshire and elsewhere. He was one of Somerset's more important clients and advised him to reassert his authority in the late autumn of 1550. Somerset used his influence to reward his clients after his restoration to the privy council and in June 1550 presided over a meeting that granted Grey £400 as a reward for his services. Like Somerset's other leading clients, Grey was a substantial and able man with a range of abilities and experience, both civil and military. By the time of his death in May 1551, Grey owned forty per cent of the properties in Reading, Berkshire. He continued to act as Somerset's local man in Berkshire after the October coup, recommending in July 1550 that the mayor of Reading move the churchyard further from the duke's house and advising that the two annual fairs be removed from the grounds of the house into the town in order to reduce disorder. He was sufficiently well regarded by Somerset to be lent £591, which was repaid by his executors in June 1551.¹⁶¹

Matthew Colthurst, of Wardour Castle in Wiltshire and Claverton in Somerset, was Somerset's auditor. While being one of Somerset's more important servants, he was also strongly associated with his locality. He lived separately from Somerset's establishment when in London, having a house in Castle Baynard Ward, and was wealthy enough (£400 in goods) to provide for a demi-lance in 1548. He had been comital and ducal auditor and auditor of the court of augmentations for Cornwall, Devon, Dorset and Somerset, from 1539 and, at Seymour's recommendation, treasurer of the ordnance at Boulogne in 1544. Colthurst benefited from extensive patronage from the Seymours, becoming MP for Bath in 1545.¹⁶² Robert Kelway, esquire, whose father was from Salisbury, was Somerset's lawyer. He was not listed among his servants taking livery in late 1547 but had been acting as Somerset's client since 1544-1545, when he became recorder of Bristol. Somerset was constable of the castle and steward of the city and probably utilised his local influence to advance Kelway. Kelway had become Somerset's servant by 1545, and was a fidelity client during the protectorate and a prominent figure in local politics. He was appointed surveyor of liveries in the court of wards in 1546 and this may have been through Somerset's patronage too. Like Thynne, he benefited from Somerset's generosity over land grants and received land and property in Wiltshire as a result. The new reign allowed Somerset to advance Kelway further. He was on the quorum for Wiltshire, *custos rotulorum* for Berkshire from 1549, replacing Sir William

¹⁵⁹ *Simancas*, ix, p. 445; BL Additional MS. 48126, fo. 11r; A.J.A. Malkiewicz, 'An eye-witness's account of the *coup d'état* of October 1549', *English Historical Review*, 70 (October, 1955), pp. 606-607, n. 2.

¹⁶⁰ PRO, C 66/801, m. 8d; *Calendar of patent rolls*, i, p. 81; *APC*, ii, p. 309; Bindoff, ii, pp. 256-257; Bradshaw, 'Protestant polemic', pp. 114-115, 164-165, 178-179; see below, pp. 113-115, 121.

¹⁶¹ BL Additional MS. 48126, fo. 3v; Longleat, Seymour MS. 4, fo. 114r; BL Egerton MS. 2815; Bindoff, ii, pp. 256-257; Jordan, *Threshold of power*, p. 70, n. 3.

¹⁶² *Calendar of patent rolls*, i, p. 89; PRO, SP 10/5/18, M. fo. 78r; Bindoff, i, pp. 679-680.

Essex, and one of the most active commissioners because of his office. To take two examples, he sat as a commissioner of *oyer et terminer* for Southampton, Wiltshire, Somerset, Dorset, Devon, Cornwall and Exeter and was, from September 1547, a commissioner to examine the state of the revenue courts.¹⁶³ Kelway was also one of the common lawyers who gave their judgement against Southampton in March 1547.¹⁶⁴ He was active in Somerset's affairs and in government. It is not always clear when he was acting in which capacity, something that would not have been regarded as entirely distinct at the time. Sir Walter Mildmay and Kelway were appointed to control the dissolution of the chantries in 1548 to guarantee education did not suffer as a consequence. They also supervised the charity and public works established by the government as a result. In April 1549 Mildmay and Kelway wrote to Thynne about the condition of the collegiate church of Penryn, Cornwall, after the dissolution of the chantries. The local gentry wanted to re-establish it as a parish church, while ensuring that the school was sufficiently endowed. Mildmay and Kelway were acting in their capacity as officers of the court of augmentations but Somerset probably wanted his own lawyer to work on this rather than another officer of the court of augmentations.¹⁶⁵ Kelway also assisted Cecil, Somerset's master of requests, in hearing a suit involving John Daniell, brother-in-law of William Fitzwilliam, a gentleman of the privy chamber.¹⁶⁶ Kelway continued to act on Somerset's behalf in Bristol affairs, including informing the lord protector of Lady Jane Grey's prospective visit.¹⁶⁷

Somerset's household and closest clients included other substantial men. Francis Newdigate, kinsman by marriage to Sharington and Leonard Chamberlain, was one of Somerset's servants, possibly steward of his household, and married the dowager duchess of Somerset after his execution.¹⁶⁸ He was among those who oversaw Somerset's finances and was described on 5 August 1552 as having been one of his principal officers. Newdigate was one of the senior ducal servants who busied themselves with Somerset's complex and expanding interests. John Pykarell was paymaster of the duke's building works as well as cofferer of the household.¹⁶⁹ Pykarell handled Somerset's finances with Fulmerston, John Seymour and Henry Helderhead or Wetheredd, surveyor of the works, although Thynne also worked on them. Pykarell would be employed as an auditor of the court of augmentations for Berkshire, Buckinghamshire,

¹⁶³ Longleat, Seymour MS. 10, fos. 166r-170r; PRO, C 66/801, mm. 8d, 22d; *Calendar of patent rolls*, i, pp. 76, 81, 91, 93; ii, p. 57; PRO, SP 10/2/9, M. fos. 24r-36v; Bindoff, ii, pp. 458-459.

¹⁶⁴ APC, ii, pp. 48-59; BL Harley MS. 39, fos. 213r-216v.

¹⁶⁵ Hatfield, Cecil MS. 231, fos. 79r-79v; Bindoff, ii, pp. 458-459.

¹⁶⁶ PRO, SP 10/7/13, M. fos. 45r-46v; PRO, LC 2/2/3/1, 95r; PRO, LC 2/4/1, fos. 15r, 18r; PRO, E 179/69/64; PRO, E 101/426/4. For other examples of Kelway's activities, see: LPL, MS. 3193, fo. 35; Lodge (ed.), *Illustrations of British history*, i, pp. 149-150; Hatfield, Cecil MS. 231, fo. 27r.

¹⁶⁷ PRO, E 101/546/19, fo. 64r; Bindoff, ii, p. 459.

¹⁶⁸ Bindoff, i, pp. 613-614; iii, pp. 302-304, 450; *The complete peerage*, eds. Gibbs et al, xii (part 1), p. 64; Jordan, *Threshold of power*, p. 85, n. 3.

¹⁶⁹ BL Egerton MS. 2815.

Oxfordshire and Bedfordshire, after the duke's execution.¹⁷⁰ The other principal officers included Thynne, Whalley, Fulmerston, John Raves, clerk comptroller, John Cowell, Ralph Goodyere, Michael Apesley (who had served as Lord Seymour of Sudeley's clerk of the kitchen), Thomas Raves and Robert Donne, clerks of the kitchen, John Crane and Thomas Blagrove, auditor of the household.¹⁷¹ Another important ducal officer was Richard Palady, clerk of the works, who worked closely with Pykarell on Somerset's building programme.¹⁷² The sources contradict one another but it was Francis, not his father or brother (both John Newdigate of Harefield in Middlesex), who was arrested and indicted for treason with Somerset in 1551. Most of the sources do not give 'Nidegates' christian name.¹⁷³

II: Somerset's military, county and ordinary clients

Their military role may partly explain why Stanhope, Sir Ralph Vane, Sir Miles Partridge, and Sir Thomas Arundel from among Somerset's clients were executed on 26 February 1552.¹⁷⁴ The aristocratic household had been central to the military activities of the master but servants mainly carried out administrative and logistical roles usually pertaining to royal service.¹⁷⁵ Somerset and Northumberland emerged as the heads of large military clienteles as a result of the wars of the 1540s. These clienteles were 'to some degree *ad hoc* affairs'. Somerset was trying to enhance the military aspect of his affinity by 1550-1551. Some of his servants were military officers or had military experience. By 1551 he had a military retinue of twenty-five (the *gendarmes*), including eight recruited from among his servants, suggesting he used this force as a source of patronage. However, only William Billemore was in the ducal household prior to 1548 and Somerset may have used the new patronage available when the *gendarmes* were formed to reward former soldiers he had already recruited between 1548-1551. Others were clients or were recruited specifically as *gendarmes*. Roland Bracebridge was probably an adherent (presumably sitting for Chipping Wycombe in 1545 and 1549 as a Seymour client) before being recruited into Somerset's military retinue by April 1548. Bracebridge had served under him as gentleman porter of Blackness, Boulogne, from 1546-1547, which suggests that as a garrison officer he was adept at the newest and most important methods of warfare (skilled in firearms and artillery and in siege warfare). He

¹⁷⁰ BL Egerton MS. 2815; Longleat, Seymour MS. 4, fos. 127r-128v; BL Harley MS. 284, fo. 115v; PRO, SP 10/18/40, M. fos. 67r-72v; PRO, SP 10/9/52, M. fos. 100r-100v; Pocock, pp. 120-122.

¹⁷¹ BL Egerton MS. 2815; Longleat, Seymour MS. 10, fos. 167r, 168v; Longleat, Seymour MS. 4, fos. 126r-126v; PRO, SP 10/9/52, M. fos. 100r-100v.

¹⁷² PRO, SP 10/4/35, M. fos. 67r-68v; PRO, SP 10/9/48, M. fo. 94r; PRO, SP 10/10/18, M. fos. 48r-49v.

¹⁷³ BL Cotton MS. Nero C. x, fos. 44v, 48v; Jordan (ed.), *Chronicle*, pp. 88, 97; Jordan, *Threshold of power*, pp. 85, 93-94; Longleat, Thynne MS. 2, fos. 25r-25v; PRO, SP 10/13/70, M. fo. 137r; BL Harley MS. 249, fo. 40v; PRO, KB 8/19, mm. 16, 24, 27; *Fourth report of the deputy keeper of the public records* (London, 1843), App. ii, pp. 228-229; PRO, SP 10/13/64, M. fos. 124r-125v; Bindoff, iii, pp. 12-14.

¹⁷⁴ J. G. Nichols (ed.), *Chronicle of the Grey Friars of London, Camden Miscellany* (Camden Society, 1st ser., 53; London, 1851), pp. 73-74; Tytler, ii, pp. 47-51; Hayward, *The life and raigne of King Edward the Sixth*, pp. 147-148.

¹⁷⁵ Mertes, *The English noble household*, pp. 133-136.

may also have involved himself in Somerset's parliamentary patronage by assisting in Fisher's and Waad's election for Chipping Wycombe in 1547. Although retained for his military ability, Bracebridge did not suffer as a consequence of Somerset's second fall. Perhaps this was because he was a relatively obscure man, despite his local connections and ability, in comparison with some other military clients, like Arundel.¹⁷⁶ Like Bracebridge, several of Somerset's other minor military clients were more than just proficient soldiers. John Sydenham and Trencher were possibly members of the west country gentry. George Ferrers was a courtier, part of the protestant circle associated with Edward Underhill, and had served in the duke's military clientele since the Pinkie campaign. He was regarded as highly proficient and described in about 1547 as 'lernerd in the lawes & otherwise expert in the war & mete for the most part of things'.¹⁷⁷ However, the majority were probably professional soldiers of modest background who had served in the various campaigns of the 1540s; men like Henry Bellingham, Richard Laston and Morgan Thomas.¹⁷⁸ Somerset kept his military retinue well supplied with the most modern military equipment. An inventory of his possessions in 1551 included fifty handguns, eighty-two javelins, twenty-five black demi-lances and fourteen white demi-lances in an armoury worth £442.7.4. Somerset also had the most modern ordnance, including brass falcons and iron culverins. His military clientele was a formidable force.¹⁷⁹

Arundel was a new recruit, having initially been an opponent of Somerset. Both Vane and Arundel were expert soldiers, the former had been lieutenant of the gentlemen pensioners since about 1545 and had wide military experience, capturing the earl of Huntly at Pinkie and being made banneret during the campaign, and the latter was a constant source of worry to the regime.¹⁸⁰ While Vane served in the north, Somerset protected his interests from his 'enemies'. Vane was a combative man, whose disputes alienated members of the Kent gentry.¹⁸¹ He wrote to Thynne on 17 January 1548 to ask that his grants, which he had received 'of the kings maiestie by my lords grace preferment', be protected because of the 'good wille and service I have and yet do owe him'. He also agreed that the commonwealth needed reform but was outspoken enough to complain of

¹⁷⁶ I am grateful to Dr Adams for information on the *gendarmes* and additional servants: BL Egerton MS. 2815; Longleat, Seymour MS. 10, fo. 168r; Bindoff, i, p. 480; Adams, 'The English military clientele', pp. 217-220.

¹⁷⁷ Trencher may have been Richard Trenchard of North Bradley in Wiltshire: BL Egerton MS. 2815; PRO, SP 46/162, fo. 54r; Bindoff, ii, pp. 129-131; iii, pp. 414-415, 478; Bradshaw, 'Protestant polemic', p. 122.

¹⁷⁸ BL Egerton MS. 2815.

¹⁷⁹ Adams, 'The English military clientele', pp. 222-223; BL Egerton MS. 2815; Hatfield, Cecil MS. 207, fos. 5r-10v; N.A.M. Rodger, *The safeguard of the sea. A naval history of Britain. Volume one, 660-1649* (London, 1997), pp. 213-218; see above, pp. 52-53.

¹⁸⁰ Goring, 'The military obligations of the English people', pp. 238-240; Bindoff, iii, p. 513; PRO, SP 10/2/1, M. fos. 1r-3Av; PRO, SP 10/2/2, M. fos. 4r-4v; W. Patten, *The expedition into Scotlande of the most woorthely fortunate prince Edward, duke of Soomerset, vncler vnto our most noble souereigne lord ye kinges maiestie Edward the .VI. Goouernour of hys hyghnes persone, and protectour of hys graces realmes, dominions & subiectes...* (STC 19479; London, 1548), sigs. K1v-K2r, O4r-O4v; A.F. Pollard (ed.), *Tudor tracts, 1532-1588* (London, 1903), pp. 127, 149; Hayward, *The life and raigne of King Edward the Sixth*, pp. 147-148; C. Given-Wilson, *The English nobility in the late middle ages. The fourteenth-century political community* (London and New York, 1996 edn.), pp. 60-62, 189, n. 15; Jordan, *Threshold of power*, pp. 110-111.

the prohibitive expense of the Scottish campaign, yet 'feare to be misconstrued'.¹⁸² Again, clients were individuals with their own motivations. Vane ended his letter with uncharacteristic caution, 'I have been to bolde in geving secrete advertisements/ but from hensforthe I shall forbear them to all save only your self ffor I perceive I have bought theym to deare'. He seems to have been relying on Somerset more heavily and the fidelity clientage between them was strengthening.¹⁸³ His wife's association with the polemicists cultivated by Somerset reinforced Vane's relationship with his patron.¹⁸⁴ Partridge was a member of Somerset's household and had substantial estates at Kew. He was an excellent gambler and fine soldier but had a reckless personality. He may have been recruited through the duchess of Somerset, although Hayward appears to be the only source for this.¹⁸⁵ These martial qualities may also explain why Somerset turned to these particular men, especially Stanhope, Vane, Partridge, and Arundel, more readily than other clients, some of whom were of longer standing, when he began to feel isolated and politically vulnerable from mid 1550. Somerset may have used his military patronage to strengthen his position against Warwick, although this need not be conspiratorial. The practical support these men were accused of offering Somerset in his alleged treason of April 1551 involved incitement, advice and raising forces within London.¹⁸⁶ These military clients were integral to Somerset's fidelity clientele. His household servants played prominent roles in activities for which he would be severely criticised (his finances, his land acquisitions and his building works), activities commentators and opponents thought to be overtly political. Livery, size of retinue, display and magnificence were all-important indicators of political status and Somerset was aping a king.¹⁸⁷ At the same time, Somerset's household and 'new' men (his fidelity clientele) were close-knit, cohesive and loyal, with substantial connections to other clienteles.

Somerset recruited or made connections with local men and members of other clienteles, including Sir Thomas Arundel, John Bonham, who became members of his county clientele, and Sir John York. Arundel was actually an opponent of Somerset during the protectorate and was not recruited until 1550-1551. He was typical of the mid-Tudor gentlemen who filled central and local civil and military offices, while being extensively connected to the leading aristocrats and the court. Henry initially regarded him as of sufficient standing for elevation to the peerage in 1547. It is probable that he was not elevated because too many names were originally put forward, the

¹⁸¹ Hatfield, Cecil MS. 231, fos. 68r-69v.

¹⁸² Hatfield, Cecil MS. 231, fos. 68r-68v.

¹⁸³ Hatfield, Cecil MS. 231, fo. 69r.

¹⁸⁴ Bradshaw, 'Protestant polemic', p. 115; Bindoff, i, pp. 535-536; iii, p. 513.

¹⁸⁵ PRO, SP 10/9/52, M. fo. 100r; Hayward, *The life and raigne of King Edward the Sixth*, p. 148; DNB, xliii, p. 431; Jordan, *Threshold of power*, pp. 110-111.

¹⁸⁶ PRO, KB 8/20, mm. 1-27; *Fourth report*, App. ii, pp. 230-232; Adams, 'The English military clientele', pp. 222-223; see below, pp. 212-213, 217-221.

¹⁸⁷ BL Additional MS. 48126, fos. 2r-5v; E.J. Davis, 'The transformation of London', in Seton-Watson (ed.), *Tudor studies*, pp. 287-288; Mertes, *The English noble household*, pp. 131-133.

final number being restricted to eight.¹⁸⁸ He was closely associated with Southampton, being related to the Howards and brother-in-law to Sir Richard Southwell, general surveyor of crown lands, and Sir Robert Southwell, master of the rolls.¹⁸⁹ This increased his importance because of the personal connections he could make to build alliances. Arundel was also catholic. He planted himself in Dorset and Wiltshire because of his extensive family connections there. He seems to have been a man of ability and was receiver-general of the duchy of Cornwall, JP for Cornwall, Dorset and Wiltshire and constable of Taunton Castle in Somerset. By 1547 his landed income was at least £400 per annum, making him a substantial gentleman.¹⁹⁰ He was active on the commissions of the peace and in May 1547 was appointed *custos rotulorum* and *ex officio* member of the quorum for Dorset. Like an increasing number of gentlemen, he had legal training, having completed his education at Lincoln's Inn. Arundel had been appointed to the council of the west in 1539, must have known Russell reasonably well as a result, was sheriff of Somerset and Dorset twice, and JP for Somerset between 1538-1541. He was MP for Dorset twice. Having initially served in Wolsey's household, by about 1530 he was a client of the eleventh earl of Arundel and then served as chancellor to Catherine's household (despite his catholicism), working closely with Tyrwhitt, formerly Catherine's master of the horse, then her comptroller, and Sir Walter Buckler, her secretary. It was probably through her that he became steward of some of Lord Seymour of Sudeley's property by 1548.¹⁹¹ Very few men had such extensive connections or administrative experience, both civil and military.

Arundel's elder brother, Sir John Arundel of Lanherne, was not so closely associated with the Edwardian regime, being one of the leading catholics of Cornwall (they were first cousins of the western rebel Humphrey Arundel). He was actually removed from the commission of the peace for Cornwall in 1544. The new Edwardian commissions included the head of the junior branch of the family though, Sir John Arundel of Trerice.¹⁹² Sir John Arundel of Lanherne fell under suspicion of colluding with the western rebels in 1549, when he apparently ignored an order from Russell to mobilise the gentry against them and actually permitted two masses to be said, 'which he sayd he did only to appease the people'. His situation was more delicate because one of his servants, Thomas Holmes, was directly implicated, and several prominent gentlemen were heavily involved, including Sir Thomas Pomeroy and Paget's brother, Robert.¹⁹³ He was arrested as a

¹⁸⁸ APC, ii, pp. 34-35; PRO, SP 10/1/11, M. fos. 28r-29v; PRO, SP 10/1/12, M. fos. 30r-39v; PRO, SP 10/1/14, M. fos. 55r-55v; Bindoff, i, 337-339.

¹⁸⁹ A.F. Pollard, *The political history of England* (London, 1910), vi, pp. 42-43.

¹⁹⁰ Bindoff, i, 337-339; PRO, C 66/801, m. 10d; *Calendar of patent rolls*, i, p. 83; PRO, E 179/69/57.

¹⁹¹ PRO, C 66/801, m. 10d; *Calendar of patent rolls*, i, p. 83; iv, p. 386; PRO, SP 10/1/43, M. fos. 132r-133v; PRO, E 179/69/57; Bindoff, i, 337-339.

¹⁹² Bindoff, i, pp. 334-336; PRO, C 66/801, m. 8d; *Calendar of patent rolls*, i, p. 82.

¹⁹³ PRO, SP 10/8/47, M. fos. 85r-86v; Pocock, pp. 38-39, 63-64; PRO, SP 10/8/54, M. fos. 97Ar-97Av; F. Rose-Troup, *The Western Rebellion of 1549. An account of the insurrection in Devonshire and Cornwall against religious innovation in the reign of Edward VI* (London, 1913), pp. 18-19, 98-100, 103-104, 138-139, 184-186, 208, 219-220, 269-270, 286-288, 298-301, 360, 365; Jordan, *The young king*, p. 456; MacCulloch, *Tudor church militant*, pp. 140-141.

result and sent to London. Interestingly, he claimed in his defence that he could not muster the gentry effectively, 'being but a stranger in the countrey where he lay'. He was released on 27 July 1550 on a recognisance of £4000, along with his brother and Thomas Stradling of Glamorgan, but was to remain within one mile of the London and its suburbs and subject to re-examination by the privy council.¹⁹⁴ Sir Thomas Arundel was a late recruit, who might have proved useful to Somerset because of his range of abilities and local consequence. However, Somerset did not trust him and Arundel could offer little practical support because of long incarceration.¹⁹⁵

John Bonham of Hazelbury in Wiltshire was a county gentleman who had little connection with the court. He came from an established gentry family. Although, like Arundel, he was one of Somerset's county clients, Bonham was a client for several years and continued his ties with the duke's more important servants, especially Thynne, after 1552. Again, Bonham filled local offices and had other client connections. He was probably one of Catherine's servants in 1544 and a commissioner for musters and subsidies. Somerset enhanced his local status by appointing him JP for Wiltshire in 1547, possibly made him collector of customs at Bristol (1547-1549), a town where Seymour influence was strong, and had him pricked as sheriff of Wiltshire from 1549-1550. In 1550 Bonham became keeper of Farleigh Park, Wiltshire. He was probably removed in 1552. He acted as Somerset's local agent, especially in land matters, in return for this patronage. However, Bonham was also associated with Sir William Herbert, who supported his election for Chippenham, Wiltshire, in 1545.¹⁹⁶ Although Herbert was making himself a prominent figure in Wiltshire, there was no evidence of tension between him and the Seymours prior to the summer of 1549. Bonham was not a member of Somerset's household and it was normal, even desirable, to have more than one patron.¹⁹⁷

Somerset fostered his ties with the local gentry by making several of them members of his household. This was quite common in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. These were largely honorary positions, with no personal service (unlike household service to the king) and were meant to increase sociability between the patron and his clients. Sir Henry Parrie, Sir Clement Leulydew and Sir Michael Eturt were members of Somerset's household in 1547. Their wages were no larger than average for a member of the household, though, and they do not seem to have received any annuities.¹⁹⁸ He also reinforced his relationship with west country boroughs through his county connections. For example, he used his influence in Bristol to replace Berwick with

¹⁹⁴ Bindoff, i, pp. 335-336; Pocock, pp. 26, 28-29, 38-39; Rose-Troup, *The Western Rebellion*, pp. 351-352; *APC*, ii, pp. 304; 366; *Calendar of patent rolls*, i, p. 63.

¹⁹⁵ Hayward, *The life and reign of King Edward the Sixth*, p. 148; Bindoff, i, p. 338; see below, pp. 208, 212, 221.

¹⁹⁶ Bindoff, i, pp. 461-462; PRO, C 66/801, m. 22d; *Calendar of patent rolls*, i, p. 91; see below, pp. 114, 141.

¹⁹⁷ Bindoff, ii, pp. 341-344; Longleat, Seymour MS. 10, fos. 166r-170r.

¹⁹⁸ Mertes, *The English noble household*, pp. 122-131; Longleat, Seymour MS. 10, fos. 167v, 169v; BL Egerton MS. 2815.

William Allen of Calne, Wiltshire, as collector of customs in 1550. Allen came from one of the minor gentry families and had been in Somerset's service since 1544. Somerset probably assisted him in acquiring ex-monastic land near Calne in the 1540s and Allen was involved in property transactions with Berwick. Allen managed to successfully change allegiance when Somerset again fell from power by becoming Herbert's servant.¹⁹⁹ Somerset had to be careful over his local patronage. He advanced David Brooke of Bristol and Horton in Gloucestershire, despite his catholicism. Brooke came from a Bristol family and was a leading lawyer as well as being related to the Wiltshire gentry (Sir John Brydges was his brother-in-law). He was closely involved in civic politics in the 1540s and this recommended him to Somerset. Somerset replaced Brooke with Kelway as recorder of Bristol in 1545 but compensated him by appointing him sergeant-at-law in 1547 and adding him to the commission of the peace for Staffordshire. It was to Somerset's advantage to promote Brooke because he was an important figure in Bristol.²⁰⁰

Although he procured local patronage on behalf of his clients, Somerset had no overall pattern and did not attempt to make the king's affinity his own by filling the royal stewardships with his people. Instead, he continued Henry's policy of incorporating the county elite into the royal affinity by granting them available stewardships. For example, Russell was reappointed steward of the manor of Stamford, Lincolnshire, in 1548.²⁰¹ Somerset did not want to alienate the incumbent stewards in the duchy of Lancaster (source of much preferment) by replacing them with his own supporters. This patronage was granted largely in response to pressure from below for grants that augmented the petitioners' local standing, either as landowners or local officers, rather than a pattern created by the patron to increase his security and most of the candidates were not clients in the narrow sense. Instead, they were clients of Somerset in his regental capacity, although he could not (as he would find during the October coup) command their loyalty as Henry had. In contrast, Northumberland did try to reward his party more systematically but not at the expense of the incumbents. With the exception of Paget's replacement of Gage as chancellor of the duchy in 1547, the motivation for appointment under Somerset was usually not political. Paget did appoint some of his clients and servants, including Edmund Twynho, esquire, who was made surveyor of the south in February 1548, and the lawyer George Frevell, who was retained of counsel between 1548-1576. Both men were trustees in Paget's will. In March 1549 Paget added the positions of master forester and master of the game of Enfield Chase to his other duchy offices of surveyor of Tutbury honor, keeper of Tutbury ward and keeper of Rolleston, Stockley and Barton parks. He granted his heir, Sir Henry Paget, the rent of one of the duchy estates. Sir Thomas Paston was steward of Norfolk, Suffolk and Cambridgeshire from 14 March 1547. His

¹⁹⁹ Bindoff, i, pp. 311-312.

²⁰⁰ Bindoff, i, pp. 500-501; see below, pp. 255-256.

²⁰¹ Bindoff, iii, p. 234.

appointment had been made by Henry's unfulfilled gift clause, suggesting Somerset was trying to be scrupulous. George Owen, esquire, was typical of the appointments to the principal offices. His selection as receiver general in September 1547 was largely due to his court connection and was a reward for royal service (he was a physician to Henry and Edward). John Arscott, esquire, of Tetcott in Devon, was surveyor of the north parts from February 1548. Arscott was very well connected, especially to the Carews and Sir John Gates, whom he assisted in his office of steward at Havering, Essex, but had no close association with Somerset. Owen, Arscott and Twynho remained in office under Northumberland.²⁰²

This pattern also emerges for the ordinary officers. For example, William Rawlinson, junior, was appointed bailiff of the possessions late of Conishead Priory in 1547 because his father had held the office. Lord Neville, the earl of Westmorland's heir, was made steward, receiver and bailiff of the liberty of Pickering in Yorkshire (which was the family's principal county). Many new officers were local men with limited connections with Somerset. These included Thomas Kyddall, who was appointed during pleasure as bailiff of the duchy liberties in Northamptonshire and feodary, coroner, escheator and clerk of the market in 1548. Others appointed during pleasure under the protectorate included Henry Tylney, bailiff of Gallow and Brothecross Hundreds from June 1547, and Sir Thomas Morgan, receiver of Kidwelly during pleasure from 1547. Charles Herbert of Troy, Monmouthshire, was receiver of Monmouth during pleasure from November 1547. He was already an officer of the duchy, steward of other royal estates and properties and a gentleman pensioner. Somerset appointed him sheriff of Monmouthshire in 1548-1549 and he was made steward of Eddw at some point during the reign but these favours reflected his local importance rather than a direct relationship with the lord protector as a fidelity client.²⁰³ Very few of Somerset's fidelity clients became royal stewards during the protectorate. Even in parts of the country that were more amenable to Seymour influence, like the west country, Somerset did little to insert his clients into duchy offices or other royal stewardships. Sir William Herbert had already been appointed duchy steward of Wiltshire and lieutenant of the forests and chases of Aldbourne and Everleigh in 1546 and Richard Brydges and William Thornehill, esquires, had been receivers for Dorset, Wiltshire, Hampshire, Berkshire, Buckinghamshire, Oxfordshire, Gloucestershire and Herefordshire for life from 1541. Brydges, of West Shefford in Berkshire, did

²⁰² Somerville, *Duchy of Lancaster*, i, pp. 394, 403-404, 445-447, 449, 455-456, 545, 595, 612; APC, ii, pp. 17-19, 27; PRO, SP 10/1/11, M. fos. 28r-28v; PRO, E 179/69/46; PRO, E 179/69/62; PRO, E 179/69/63; PRO, E 179/69/64; PRO, E 101/426/4, fos. 1r-5v; PRO, E 101/531/39; PRO, LC 2/2, fo. 38v; PRO, LC 2/2/3/1, fo. 116r; PRO, LC 2/4/1, fo. 20r; Bindoff, i, pp. 331-333; iii, pp. 42-46, 68-69, 234, 495-496; Gammon, *Statesman and schemer*, p. 174; see below, pp. 230-242.

²⁰³ Somerville, *Duchy of Lancaster*, i, pp. 496, 509, 527, 533-535, 554, 571-572, 579-580, 590, 601, 620, 626, 643, 649, 651, 653; PRO, E 179/69/46; PRO, LC 2/2/3/1, fo. 111r; Bindoff, ii, pp. 336-337.

have a service connection to Somerset as his keeper of Ludgershall Park, Wiltshire, from 1539, but does not seem to have been a close client.²⁰⁴

The nobility continued in their stewardships because of their traditional military role. This was heightened by the constant warfare during the protectorate. The earl of Cumberland was constable and steward of Knaresborough in Yorkshire and Penrith in Cumberland; Lord Ferrers of Chartley was bailiff of Sutton Coldfield in Warwickshire; Lord Morley was steward of Hatfield Regis in Essex; and Northampton was joint keeper of Brigstock Park, Northamptonshire, steward of the honor of Rayleigh and of Writtle, both in Essex, and keeper of Beaulieu Park, Hampshire. Warwick was constable of Warwick Castle, high steward and master of the game; Herbert was governor of the castles of Aberystwyth and Carmarthen, steward of the estates of the duchy of Lancaster in Wiltshire, and keeper of Baynard's Castle in London; Lord Scrope was constable of Richmond and Middleham castles and chief warden of Richmond forest, all in Yorkshire; Southampton was constable of the castles of Donnington, Southampton and Porchester; and Lord Windsor was feodary of the duchy of Lancaster in Bedfordshire and Buckinghamshire. These men were Henrician appointees. Worcester received a great range of local offices under Henry. He was joint constable of Ruthin Castle in Denbighshire, Cardiff Castle in Glamorgan, Pains Castle and Montgomery Castle, joint chief steward of Abergavenny, joint steward of Ewyas Lacy and Monmouth, joint constable of Monmouth and Three castles, joint steward and constable of Usk and Dynas castles, steward of Woking, steward and constable of Brecknock Castle, joint coroner of Usk, constable of Caerleon Castle, and justice eyre of Newport. Somerset continued the system of offering local nobles increased consequence in their localities through local offices in return for bringing the king's retinue to war in good order.²⁰⁵ He did cultivate some of the more important nobles. Rutland was appointed constable of Nottingham Castle and warden of Sherwood Forest in 1547. Shrewsbury was appointed chief steward and coroner of Wigmore, Herefordshire, before June 1548, chief justice and justice in eyre of the king's forests beyond the Trent in May and granted chantry lands in Derbyshire and Yorkshire. His heir, Lord Talbot, was appointed to the commission of the peace in May 1547 and to the council of the north two years later (reinforcing his father's authority as lord president of the council of the north). Somerset also assisted colleagues to county patronage. St John was made keeper and captain of St Andrew's Castle, Hamble, and lieutenant or keeper of Alice Holt and Woolmer forests, Hampshire, for life in July

²⁰⁴ Somerville, *Duchy of Lancaster*, i, p. 624; Bindoff, i, pp. 534-535.

²⁰⁵ Herbert was also joint attorney-general of Glamorgan, doorward of Devizes Castle, Wiltshire, and steward of several of Catherine's estates in Dorset and Wiltshire: *The complete peerage*, eds. Gibbs *et al*, iii, p. 567; vi, p. 478; ix, pp. 222-223, 669-670, 723; x, pp. 405-407; xi, p. 547; xii (part 1), pp. 123-124, n. i; xii (part 2), pp. 851-852; Bindoff, ii, pp. 341-344; Somerville, *Duchy of Lancaster*, i, p. 592; see below, p. 191. In 1547 Cumberland was assessed for the subsidy in Yorkshire, Ferrers in Staffordshire, Morley in Essex, Herbert in Wiltshire, the countess of Southampton in Sussex, Windsor in Bedfordshire and Worcester in Monmouthshire: PRO, E 179/69/46.

1547.²⁰⁶ The earl of Arundel was named steward of Eagle honor, Pevensey lordship and lands in Sussex on 8 April 1549. He was one of the principal landowners in the county. Similarly, Russell was high steward of the duchy of Cornwall, one of the counties in which he held large amounts of land. Again, local consequence made him a suitable candidate for the office but court connections were important too. Local office also reinforced Russell's local influence, making it a two-way process.²⁰⁷ Unlike Northumberland, Somerset made no attempt to fill positions with his clients. This reinforces the argument that in some respects there was truth to Somerset's belief that his policies reflected Henry's wishes. His belief may have had little basis in reality but, at least in terms of stewardships, Somerset was maintaining the *status quo ante*. In certain respects the 1540s should be viewed as a continuum.

If Somerset assisted his colleagues to patronage, he enriched himself even more. This was necessary because of his clientele and style of government. Somerset was among the wealthiest peers at Edward's accession, with an income of about £2500 per annum (at least £1700 per annum came from estates), and this strengthened his political base. Most of this wealth came through royal favour and the successful opportunities that came with it (perhaps grants, acquisitions and other revenues totalling £4000 per annum between 1536-1547).²⁰⁸ About nine per cent of aristocratic income was spent on annuities and gifts.²⁰⁹ Somerset could use his own patrimony for the purposes of patronage and increase his standing through such evidence of good lordship, especially in the west country. For example, the customer of Southampton received an annuity of £20 for four years in 1551 'for the supportac of Thescatchons and dignitie of therldome of Hartforde', paid by Sir Clement Smith, an Essex gentleman and the duke's brother-in-law; Lady Dorothy Mountjoy (Lord Mountjoy was one of the principal landowners in Dorset) received an annuity of £20; and one of the sheriffs of Bristol, either Roger Philpott or Thomas Seward, received £14.3.8 from Christopher Smith, one of the officers of the exchequer. Somerset spent lavishly on clothes during Edward's reign, not only for himself and his family, but also for resident guests, including Lord Dacre and Lady Katherine de Vere, the earl of Oxford's daughter. This expenditure totalled an astonishing £10,386.18.1 between 1548-1551. Somerset looked the part. Other fees and annuities granted during the same period were made totalling £970.18.6.²¹⁰ This demonstrates that Somerset attempted to build up favourable relationships in his locality, as well

²⁰⁶ *The complete peerage*, eds. Gibbs *et al*, xi, pp. 256, 711-712; xii (part 2), p. 760; PRO, C 66/801, m. 9d; *Calendar of patent rolls*, i, p. 82; PRO, E 179/69/46.

²⁰⁷ Somerville, *Duchy of Lancaster*, i, p. 617; Bindoff, iii, pp. 234-236; PRO, E 179/69/46.

²⁰⁸ In 1536 a partial valuation of his estate came to £1301.20.2¾ per annum, of which £448.3.0¾ per annum was inherited or did not come from royal favour (£275.12.9¾ per annum came through his father): Longleat, Seymour MS. 9, fos. 190r-191r, 192v-193r, 194v-195r, 228r; Longleat, Seymour MS. 12, fos. 3r-354r; PRO, E 179/69/46; PRO, E 179/69/51; PRO, E 179/69/49; PRO, E 179/69/75; Jackson, 'Wulfhall', pp. 189-190; Jordan, *The young king*, p. 497.

²⁰⁹ Mertes, *The English noble household*, pp. 121-122.

²¹⁰ BL Egerton MS. 2815; see below, pp. 255-256.

as showing that some public expenditure, including the payment of the clerk of parliament, was being disbursed by himself.²¹¹

The kinship connection with Sir Clement Smith provided a useful client, who would be important because of Somerset's desire to attain more land in Essex. Smith was a close friend of Sir Robert Rochester, Mary's comptroller (he was also a commissioner for the subsidy in her household in 1550), and of Ryther. He may not have benefited as fully from the Seymour relationship as expected because he was a catholic and probably owed his return for Maldon in 1545 and 1547 to Catherine (although she might have followed Somerset's advice). However, he antagonised Warwick in April 1550, even though he was only carrying out his duties as lord treasurer's remembrancer in the exchequer. Smith's recorded association with Somerset occurs from May, suggesting he may have been cultivated by Somerset, anxious to secure friends and associates in the wake of his loss of power and keen to make common cause with those among the political elite bereft of authority. Sir Henry Seymour, Somerset's brother, was one of Smith's executors, along with Rochester, Ryther and two others. Smith's clientage relationship with the Seymours was familial and strengthened with circumstance.²¹²

Somerset was also currying favour among the reformers, offering patronage to various ministers, including Turner, his physician and 'daily writer', Becon and Hooper. These were not moderates. Becon and Jean Calvin regarded Somerset as a major spokesman for reform and hoped for his release after the October coup. Somerset's household offered daily prayers while he lay in prison at this time and Becon led the celebration on his release. Somerset's association with Hooper alienated Martin Bucer. These men had an impact on the duke's clientele and Professor Bush thought he developed from Zwinglianism during the protectorate towards Calvinism by 1549-1550. This has been questioned recently by Dr MacCulloch, who points out that Heinrich Bullinger was the greatest influence on Edwardian religious reform. Somerset patronised conservative clerics too, including Thomas Magnus, George Heneage and Thomas Robertson. This may have reflected his cautious approach to reform. Dr MacCulloch sees it as a dual outlook that attempted to encourage evangelicals to support reform, while placating and diverting the uncommitted majority and mollifying Charles V; a process of 'gradualism in the service of calculated destruction' of the old church. Alternatively, it could be good lordship provided for needy clerics, especially as Somerset tried to attain consensus.²¹³

²¹¹ BL Egerton MS. 2815.

²¹² Smith was a JP for Essex from 1541 and member of the quorum from 1547: PRO, C 66/801 m. 10; *Calendar of the patent rolls*, i, p. 83; Bindoff, iii, pp. 240-241, 290-291, 331-332.

²¹³ Bush, *Government policy*, pp. 3, 66-70, 104-112; *DNB*, iv, p. 93; xxvii, p. 304; lvii, pp. 363-364; Bradshaw, 'Protestant polemic', pp. 115-119, 126-129; J. Calvin, *An epistle both of Godly consolacion and also of aduertisement, written by Iohn Caluine the pastour & preacher of Geneva, to the right noble prince Edwarde duke of Somerset...* (STC 4407; Whitchurch, 1550). Somerset's annuity to Robertson was granted until 25 March 1549 and, therefore, it could not

Somerset had to sustain his appeal through patronage. He was at the apex of the patronage structure and procured favours and grants of office and land, substantial and modest, for the elite and the commons. Most of the letters written to the secretaries asking for patronage were directed towards Somerset, not the king, as the arbiter of that patronage.²¹⁴ Somerset was said by a seventeenth century antiquarian to have thought there were three means by which a courtier should be selected for preferment out of the many suitors: 'in the throng of Courtiers, there (there [sic]) are but three steps to raise a man to observation: 1. some peculiar sufficiency; 2. some particular exploit; 3. an especial friend'. He was said to think sufficiency the least significant qualification.²¹⁵ These collected aphorisms may be no more than conjecture but they are quite useful because they reflect current ideas about what was important in the procurement or distribution of patronage, so essential to building and sustaining a clientele.²¹⁶ People were selected for office through the system of patronage. Connections were central. Somerset may have believed that sufficiency and merit would not suffice without contacts. Normally appointments about which the monarch was indifferent would be a source of patronage for the courtiers.²¹⁷ However, because Edward was a minor and could exercise little influence over appointments, there was a danger that Somerset would monopolise the entire system to procure office for his clients. Usually, he did not reward men whose only recommendation was connection to him. As already noted, most of his major servants were substantial men who had been advanced by Henry too. Somerset attempted to reward people outside his household in order to widen his support and achieve a consensus in the ruling elite. Connection was so important, not just to build a clientele, but to ascertain capability for a position. This could include whether the suitor had the necessary range of experience and sufficient influence. For example, Francis Knollys, a gentleman pensioner and master of the horse to Edward as prince, wrote to Paget in March 1547 to ask for patronage because he had received little reward for his long service in the royal household. He began his career as a soldier and was knighted during the Pinkie campaign. His return for Camelford, Cornwall, and appointment as JP for Oxfordshire in 1547 were probably due to Somerset's influence. He would receive favour from both Somerset and Northumberland. His brother, Henry, was Russell's parliamentary client and friends with Hoby. Henry Knollys also

reflect any attempt by him to appeal to catholic sentiment after the October coup. I am grateful to Dr Rex and Scott Amos for their assistance and advice concerning the possible religious affiliations of Magnus, Heneage and Robertson: BL Egerton MS. 2815; D. MacCulloch, *Thomas Cranmer. A life* (London, 1996), pp. 396-397; *Tudor church militant*, pp. 2, 4, 20, 34-36, 42-43, 57-104, 112, 117-118, 133-134, 138, 142-143, 147, 149, 151, 165, 167-168, 170-179, 195-196, 218-219.

²¹⁴ PRO, SP 10/1/28, M. fos. 100r-101v; PRO, SP 10/2/4, M. fos. 7r-8v; PRO, SP 10/3/2, M. fos. 3r-3v; PRO, SP 10/4/34, M. fos. 66r-66v; PRO, SP 10/7/20, M. fos. 59r-60v; PRO, SP 10/8/62, M. fos. 114r-114v.

²¹⁵ BL Sloane MS. 1523, fo. 36v; Braddock, 'The royal household', p. 107.

²¹⁶ BL Sloane MS. 1523, fos. 29v, 30v, 32v, 36v-37v, 39r.

²¹⁷ Braddock, 'The royal household', pp. 117-119; BL Sloane MS. 1523, fo. 37r.

succeeded in recommending himself to Northumberland.²¹⁸ Lady Elizabeth Brown petitioned Somerset through Cecil in July 1547 for her brother to be a member of the lord protector's military retinue.²¹⁹ Warwick wrote to Cecil about patronage. For example, in July 1548 he asked him to assist his chaplain to a living by putting his petition to Somerset.²²⁰ Sir Edward Wotton wrote to Cecil on 18 September 1549 to petition for the office of crown bailiff of lands in Kent on behalf of his kinsman Hugh Darrell. The late John Dering had purchased the office from Sir Thomas Wyatt I.²²¹ All these suitors used connections to attain influence and, hopefully, preferment. It was a relatively small and cohesive circle.

The reason given for the grants of early 1547 was the need to maintain the nobility from 'decay' in order to serve the realm better. They were still regarded as the backbone of the Tudor regime but only as royal servants. This would suggest public and private interests were linked with Somerset's but it does mask a great degree of self-interest. Control of greater amounts of wealth gave more political power but it also created instability as people antagonised one another in their attempts to procure both. Again, this suggests factionalism. Somerset rewarded himself more than any other. However, resentment towards this and unease about it, with the exception of Lord Seymour of Sudeley, did not emerge until 1549 because Somerset was too strong and because he had been very generous to his colleagues and the political elite. Professor Jordan made the convincing point that Somerset's increased wealth was not unreasonable because he was acting as head of government. Some of his financial rewards would last only as long as the minority. However, his wealth was greatly increased and must have caused unease. Initially, in the unfulfilled gift clause he was to have land grants worth £666.13.4 per annum, which, on Paget's advice, Henry raised to £800 in land per annum and £300 'of the next bishopes landes' (originally £600 and £200 in the document). Somerset acquired land from the new bishops of Lincoln and Bath and Wells. When the latter see fell vacant in September, Somerset was able through a licence of exchange to purchase from the new bishop (William Barlow) seven manors in Somerset, having already exchanged lands with the king in return for others in Somerset and Dorset valued at £1679.15.3 per annum.²²² The lord protector was concentrating even more of his landed estate in the west country, creating for himself a dominant position there and acting, in the words of his son, as 'his owne carver after the death of King Henry theight'.²²³ On 9 July 1547, Somerset was granted an annuity of eight thousand marks during the protectorate in order to maintain his estate.

²¹⁸ PRO, SP 10/1/28, M. fos. 100r-101v; Bindoff, ii, pp. 479-481; PRO, C 66/801, m. 18d; *Calendar of patent rolls*, i, p. 88; PRO, LC 2/2/3/1, fo. 99r.

²¹⁹ PRO, SP 10/2/4, M. fos. 7r-8v; Tytler, i, pp. 73-74; Bindoff, i, pp. 518-521.

²²⁰ PRO, SP 10/4/34, M. fos. 66r-66v.

²²¹ PRO, SP 10/8/62, M. fos. 114r-114v; Tytler, i, 203; Bindoff, ii, p. 39; iii, pp. 669-670.

²²² PRO, SP 10/1/11, M. fo. 28r; *APC*, ii, pp. 16-18; Jordan, *The young king*, p. 497; Miller, 'Henry VIII's unwritten will', pp. 102-104; *Calendar of the patent rolls*, i, pp. 118-124, 124-133; see below, pp. 114, 233-234.

²²³ Longleat, Seymour MS. 11, fos. 2r-2v; Longleat, Seymour MS. 11, fos. 4r-4v; *Report on the manuscripts of the...marquess of Bath*, ed. Blatcher, iv, pp. 179-180.

This was payable from 24 June but he was to receive backdated pay of four thousand marks towards his expenses for the previous six months.²²⁴ Here was the clearest example of public and private interest enmeshed. Eight privy councillors signed the patent and Somerset retained a copy, along with a copy of his patent as lord protector, entrusting them to Cecil, along with notes on the office.²²⁵ Between 1547-1552 Somerset increased his income from land by another £3000 and, with the wealth drawn from his offices, this probably made him the wealthiest subject since Wolsey.²²⁶

Somerset headed one of the strongest clienteles during Edward's reign and sought to enhance his power and influence at court, in parliament and in the counties through it. At the core of this clientele were Somerset's household servants, 'new men' and major county clients and often the same men acted on his behalf in the centre and the localities. This fidelity clientele was central to the protectorate because it gave him the necessary consequence in political society. It also acted as a mutual self-support group and was court-centred, bridging the public and private domain. Somerset's most important clients were given the greatest role in this system because of their abilities. Relatively new recruits like Cecil could rise very rapidly through the clientele because of their ability and the trust Somerset bestowed on them. Somerset came to rely on these 'new men' more and more and the distinction between public and private service was blurred. Somerset's fidelity clientele had a central role in ducal affairs and a two-way process occurred that was top-down and bottom-up. Like all clienteles, there was a dynamic relationship between Somerset and his clients. The homogeneity of his clientele was dependent on a reciprocal relationship and the provision of adequate patronage. Somerset was both discerning in his choice of men and in the rewards he gave. He also tried to prevent his clients from monopolising favour to the detriment of the crown. However, the next chapter will examine how Somerset was severely hampered in this by the behaviour of his brother, Lord Seymour of Sudeley.

²²⁴ *Calendar of patent rolls*, i, p. 184.

²²⁵ Hatfield, Cecil MS. 150, fos. 31r-31v; Hatfield, Cecil MS. 150, fos. 32r-33v.

²²⁶ Jackson, 'Wulfhall', pp. 189-190; Jordan, *The young king*, pp. 63, 116, 497.

4. *The Seymour of Sudeley clientele, 1547-1549*

Sir Thomas Seymour, like others, tried to build a clientele based on influence at court, in parliament and in the counties. This was a court-centred following that bridged the public and private worlds. The way Seymour recruited to and deployed his clientele was precisely what Somerset had hoped to avoid by dominating government because it led to factional politics. Somerset probably wanted his colleagues to be connected to him through fidelity or ordinary clientage but relations with his brother soured rapidly, especially after Seymour married Catherine, and did irreparable harm to the prestige of the protectorate. Seymour was dissatisfied, despite the greater wealth, power and prestige his brother gave him and would not play the role of principal fidelity client expected of him. He wanted a less subsidiary role and independent authority as governor of the king's person. This would have been insupportable because he lacked experience or the assent of his colleagues but he would not accept this. Seymour tried repeatedly to gain greater influence over Edward, which reinforces the importance of possession of the king's person, and also attempted to retain control over both Elizabeth and Lady Jane Grey to make his position stronger. Like Somerset, Seymour's relationship to the court, privy council and protectorate will be examined, before analysing his clientele in more detail. Seymour's activities are particularly well known because of the large number of depositions gathered as a result of his fall, and this means his attitude towards clientage and his clientele can be studied in detail. We get a vivid, if biased, picture of Seymour's activities and the dynamic of mid-Tudor clientage from these depositions. His clientele was of recent origin and he attempted to increase it rapidly, especially its military capacity. He achieved this by marrying Catherine and absorbing her household into his own. Seymour's roles in central and local political society will be examined. His attitude towards clientage was a strange combination of the atavistic and the innovative, as he attempted to compete aggressively for patronage and power, while also currying the favour of the lesser gentlemen and substantial yeomen. Seymour does not appear to have had a large core of fidelity clients, like his brother, although he was charismatic enough to create quite strong ties with some of his more powerful colleagues. There is some evidence that his clientele was coalescing round him, especially as he encouraged and incorporated quite a wide circle in his following, and these men were beginning to act as a mutual self-support group. Yet, Seymour attempted too much too soon and was one of the most disruptive elements in political society during the protectorate. His behaviour has come to typify Edwardian factional politics but in certain respects he was atypical.

I: Seymour of Sudeley's fidelity clientele and the protectorate

How normal was Seymour's behaviour? Professor Hoak suggests that faction lay just below the surface of Edwardian politics, erupting when the pressure within the political elite became too great.¹ Somerset's authority was debilitated by Seymour's behaviour and this is surprising because kinship relations lay at the core of clientage. However, unlike the Dudley clientele, the Seymours were not a coherent kinship group. One of the main problems with much of the evidence for Seymour's aims is that it comes from the depositions taken during his fall. This evidence was collected to support the charges against him and the act of attainder followed the Treason Act (1 Edward VI, c. 12) closely.² Nevertheless, these are invaluable sources if examined objectively. Somerset initially attempted to elevate his brother's wealth, status and power at court and in the localities to make him an important fidelity client. Already a gentleman of the privy chamber, master of the ordnance and wealthy Wiltshire gentleman (with an income of about £458.6.8 between 1545-1547), Seymour was admitted to the privy council on 2 February 1547, after having demanded Somerset make him governor. Professor Hoak suggests that Warwick encouraged Seymour in order to divide the brothers because of his own ambition. According to an account of these events written in the early 1560s by Fisher, when the issue of revived Dudley-Seymour rivalry was still pervasive, Warwick told Seymour to 'haue all the furtherannce he colde make'. It went on to recount that between 31 January and 1 February Warwick lied to Seymour when he told him the privy council had agreed he should be governor. Seymour asked him to petition the privy council on his behalf but was persuaded to do so himself.³ This was a period of uncertainty because more than a month elapsed before the regime had full legal authority. Professor Beer suggested that Warwick may have been uneasy about the legality of Somerset's growing authority and pointed out that the earl did not sign the second patent appointing Somerset lord protector on 24 December.⁴ However, Warwick did not attend parliament either and this was not because he wanted to distance himself from Somerset. It was presumably because his health was poor. He would be increasingly ill during 1548, culminating in a probable heart attack or severe food poisoning while dining with the Wriothesleys in September.⁵ Warwick said to Somerset after Seymour was given a place at the board 'your grace may see this mans ambytion'.⁶ Most of this, if not Warwick's machiavellian role, is corroborated by the entry in the privy council register recording Seymour's arrest on 17 January 1549. It recorded that just after Edward's

¹ Hoak, *The king's council*, pp. 20, 41-43, 50, 232-234; G.W. Bernard, 'The downfall of Sir Thomas Seymour', in his *The Tudor nobility*, pp. 212-240.

² J. Bellamy, *The Tudor law of treason. An introduction* (London, 1979), pp. 50-51, 104-105.

³ Fisher noted that he was well placed to observe developments, 'being than in the duke of Somersets howse I might well perceve and see'. I am grateful to Dr Adams for discussing with me the authorship of BL Additional MS. 48126: PRO, E 179/69/45; PRO, E 179/69/46; PRO, E 179/69/51; PRO, SP 46/1, fo. 215r; Bindoff, ii, pp. 137-138; BL Additional MS. 48126, fos. 6v-7r; BL Additional MS. 48023, fo. 350r; Hoak, *The king's council*, pp. 41-43, 232-234.

⁴ APC, ii, pp. 63-64; Beer, *Northumberland*, pp. 57, 204, n. 16. Most of the other leading politicians did sign the second patent: PRO, C 66/802, m. 1; PRO, C 66/814, m. 5.

⁵ Hatfield, Cecil MS. 231, fos. 61r-61v; Beer, *Northumberland*, pp. 65-66; Graves, *The House of Lords*, pp. 250, n. 46, 259, n. 167.

⁶ The author of this account was probably John Hales. I am grateful to Dr Adams for discussing with me the authorship of BL Additional MS. 48023: BL Additional MS. 48023, fo. 350r.

accession Seymour recklessly demanded to be governor and undermined conciliar unity at a time when the country was unstable. Somerset first heard of his brother's intentions through 'informacion given'. The source was not confirmed.⁷ It was almost certainly Warwick. Warwick may have been assisting Somerset and tension existed between Seymour and him that developed over the next two years.

Seymour was made lord admiral and ennobled as Lord Seymour of Sudeley with a grant of lands worth £500 per annum on 6 February. He now had extensive estates, principally in Wales and the marches, with a large holding at Holt Castle.⁸ His new grants were in Gloucestershire and Shropshire, as well as the former Howard estates at Bramber and elsewhere in Sussex.⁹ Somerset was keen to give his brother a freer hand by planting him in these counties in order to reduce potential tension in Wiltshire (Seymour had been assessed in Wiltshire for the subsidy in 1545-1547).¹⁰ Seymour wanted to enhance this greater local wealth and power through an increased clientele and the most readily available means was marriage to the dowager queen, who already headed a large household and possessed one of the largest estates in the country. He used his court connections and set John Fowler, one of the grooms of the privy chamber and a Seymour adherent, to attempt to gain a dubious consent from the king. Fowler was not a member of Seymour's household but a fidelity client because he acted as an agent at court. Wroth was used in a similar way and became almost a familiar.¹¹ By early June Seymour was soliciting Mary's good will too but she was cautious, saying she was a 'mayde' and knew nothing of 'woweng matters'. However, she was being disingenuous and must have understood that he wanted support, not advice. Mary was well aware of the Seymours' special role in political society because of 'hys blodds sake, that you be of' but did not commit herself.¹² Seymour secretly married Catherine at about this time. Edward put Somerset's reaction well: 'the Lord Seimour of Sudley maried the quene whos nam was Katarine with wich mariag the L. of Protectour was much offended'.¹³ Seymour continued to use Fowler to solicit the king for support to strengthen himself against Somerset.¹⁴ From at least July 1548 he was giving Edward small sums of money through

⁷ *APC*, ii, p. 237.

⁸ PRO, SP 10/1/11, M. fos. 28r-29v; *APC*, ii, pp. 15-22; Miller, 'Henry VIII's unwritten will', pp. 88-91, 102, 104; PRO, SP 10/4/19, M. fos. 42r-43v; PRO, SP 10/6/3, M. fos. 5r-10v; PRO, SP 10/6/4, M. fos. 11r-14v; PRO, SP 10/6/13, M. fos. 35r-38v.

⁹ *Calendar of patent rolls*, i, pp. 25-33; Miller, 'Henry VIII's unwritten will', pp. 88-91, 102, 104.

¹⁰ PRO, E.179/69/51.

¹¹ PRO, SP 10/6/10, M. fos. 24r-25v; PRO, SP 10/6/27, M. fos. 69r-69v; *APC*, ii, p. 259; BL Harley MS. 249, fos. 27v-28r, 31v; PRO, LC 2/2/3/1, fo. 95r; Loach, *Edward VI*, p. 9; Bindoff, iii, pp. 667-668.

¹² BL Lansdowne MS. 1236, fos. 26r-27v. Seymour appears to have had the tacit support of the dowager duchess of Suffolk and the Herberts for his marriage. Herbert was married to Catherine's sister, Anne: PRO, SP 10/1/43, M. fos. 132r-133v; Bindoff, ii, pp. 341-344; Longleat, Thynne MS. 2, fos. 58r-59v.

¹³ BL Cotton MS. Nero C. x, fo. 13r; Jordan (ed.), *Chronicle*, p. 6; Bindoff, iii, p. 299.

¹⁴ PRO, SP 10/1/41, M. fos. 128r-129v; Tytler, i, pp. 64-67; *Simancas*, ix, pp. 88-89; Loach, *Edward VI*, p. 140; Bindoff, ii, pp. 166-167.

Fowler.¹⁵ Seymour was using other grooms of the privy chamber to influence the king as well. The privy council later believed he did 'corrupt with money and rewardes diverse persones that were of the Privy Chamber and of the nerest about his Majesties persone'.¹⁶ Fowler said that about 5-6 January 1549 Seymour visited the privy chamber while the king slept and spoke with John Philpot, Robert Maddox and himself, promising 'if god send me lief I will do yow all pleasures'.¹⁷ They were familiar figures to the king because they had held the same position in his household as prince.¹⁸ Seymour admitted that he gave them money.¹⁹ Surprisingly, Fowler and Philpot, at least, survived Seymour's fall.²⁰

Seymour's marriage upset the duke and duchess of Somerset because Catherine and he questioned the order of precedence at court. This impaired Somerset's image. Catherine found it increasingly difficult to exercise control over her estate servants and this may have been because of the uncertain situation regarding her lands. Her biographer thought Somerset was interfering heavily.²¹ However, initially some of these problems may have been normal when trying to run a large and disparate group of estates, especially dower lands. In general, Catherine seems to have been able to administer her estates as she wished; though there were conflicts.²² There were professional sources of tension between the brothers too. Somerset's promotion of Seymour was proving embarrassing; he was not only a lacklustre lord admiral but also a major liability. Seymour was often indifferent to his duties and may have actively supported piracy.²³ The situation caused their relationship to deteriorate so badly that by the end of 1548 Somerset had 'fallen owt *with* him concerning thadmiraltie, and how his grace toke their part afore his'. Seymour did not explain to whom he was referring, although he probably meant the privy council. Somerset would not put his brother's interests before the state's, especially when Seymour's activities were so dangerous. Seymour expected Somerset to put his kinsmen and clients before all else, despite the rift between them and his own lack of reciprocity. Seymour was becoming more extreme, telling Fowler, who had become something of a confidante, that Somerset 'wold have my hed vnder his girdle'.²⁴ His nineteenth century biographer accepted that, like Somerset, he was

¹⁵ Hatfield, Cecil MS. 150, fos. 111r-111v; Haynes, p. 75.

¹⁶ *APC*, ii, p. 238.

¹⁷ PRO, SP 10/6/10, M. fos. 26v-27r. Philpot and Maddox were grooms of the privy chamber: PRO, LC 2/4/1, fo. 19r; PRO, E 101/427/6, fo. 85r; PRO, LC 2/4/2, fo. 26r; Bindoff, ii, pp. 166-167.

¹⁸ PRO, LC 2/2/3/1, fo. 109r.

¹⁹ PRO, SP 10/6/27, M. fos. 69r-69v; *APC*, ii, p. 259.

²⁰ PRO, SP 10/4/31, M. fos. 61r-62v; PRO, SP 10/4/31(i), M. fo. 62r; PRO, SP 10/4/31(ii), M. fo. 62r; PRO, SP 10/6/10, M. fos. 24r-28v.

²¹ PRO, SP 10/6/10, M. fos. 25r-25v; PRO, E 101/426/3, fo. 27r; *Calendar of patent rolls*, i, pp. 192; S.E. James, *Kateryn Parr. The making of a queen* (Aldershot, 1999), pp. 305-309, 312, 326-327.

²² PRO, E 101/426/3, fos. 1r, 3r, 5r, 15r, 16r, 17r, 27r, 44r; PRO, SP 10/1/43, M. fos. 132r-133v; Hatfield, Cecil MS. 133, fo. 2r; Haynes, p. 61.

²³ PRO, SP 10/1/37, M. fos. 120r-121v, PRO, SP 10/4/8, M. fos. 13r-13v, PRO, SP 10/4/40, M. fos. 77r-80v; *Simancas*, ix, pp. 332-333; D. Loades, *The Tudor Navy. An administrative, political and military history* (Aldershot, 1992), pp. 141-142, 151-152.

²⁴ PRO, SP 10/6/10, M. fo. 25r.

arrogant, 'but being a man of far greater ability than his brother, he was more feared if not more loved'.²⁵ This must be questioned. Although energetic, Seymour created uncertainty and instability, adding little to good government, and his competence and judgement must be seriously doubted.

Somerset did begin to openly antagonise Catherine over land after her marriage. There is no evidence of a similar attitude towards Anne of Cleves, with whom Somerset had a good relationship.²⁶ His treatment of Catherine's dower lands was a consequence of the tension between the brothers and his desire to reward his colleagues. This was reflected in the behaviour of his clients. From 28 July 1547 he began to grant to himself and his clients and colleagues, including Northampton, Herbert and Warwick, large portions of her dower in reversion, including Vastern Park and much of her estate in Gloucestershire, Dorset and Wiltshire. Thynne, her former servant, oversaw much of this activity.²⁷ The justification for this was to endow Somerset with lands to the value of £800 per annum as stipulated by the unfulfilled gift clause.²⁸ In July 1548 Somerset was granted lands worth £500 per annum, including more of Catherine's dower in reversion.²⁹ However, his interference in the actual running of her estate was not too serious.

Seymour's desire to control the king and the belief that he hoped to marry into the royal house precipitated his fall. To do the latter without the monarch's approval was treason, to attempt the former was no less dangerous (35 Henry VIII, c. 1). Therefore, Seymour began constructing a powerful clientele. While Elizabeth was staying with Catherine, Seymour had made advances towards her and, after the dowager queen died on 7 September 1548, he made suits to marry her through her governess Katherine Ashley. These overtures would have created tension in the Seymour household and Elizabeth may have been sent to Cheshunt in Hertfordshire in late 1547 because the dowager queen was jealous of her husband's attentions towards her.³⁰ Cheshunt belonged to Denny, who was married to Ashley's sister, Joan. Elizabeth wrote to Catherine in warm terms shortly after she left her and thanked her for offering to warn her 'of al euelles that you shulde hire of me' and for continuing to act as one of her closest 'frendes'.³¹ It is possible that her departure in mid 1548 was for prosaic reasons but the evidence suggests that she left under a cloud. Seymour and Elizabeth were sometimes alone together unsupervised and he had been

²⁵ J. MacLean, *The life of Sir Thomas Seymour* (London, 1869), pp. 58, 82.

²⁶ Jordan, *The young king*, pp. 240-241.

²⁷ *Calendar of patent rolls*, i, pp. 118-133, 168-170, 193-198, 252-257; James, *Kateryn Parr*, pp. 146, 307.

²⁸ *Calendar of patent rolls*, i, p. 124.

²⁹ *Calendar of patent rolls*, ii, pp. 27-29.

³⁰ Hatfield, Cecil MS. 150, fos. 79r-81r; Hatfield, Cecil MS. 150, fos. 87r-89r; Haynes, pp. 95-96, 100-101; PRO, SP 10/2/25 M. fos. 84Cr-84Dv.

³¹ PRO, SP 10/2/25 M. fo. 84Cr; Tytler, i, pp. 69-70; Neale, *Queen Elizabeth*, p. 30; Bernard 'The downfall of Sir Thomas Seymour', pp. 215-216; C.S. Knighton (ed.), *State papers of Edward VI. Calendar of state papers domestic series of the reign of Edward VI 1547-1553* (London, 1992), p. 19.

overly familiar with her.³² At Catherine's house at Chelsea, Middlesex, this familiarity went further; he would visit Elizabeth in her chamber in the mornings, sometimes before she had risen or was ready, ask how she was and would 'strike hir vppon the bak or on the buttockes famylearly'. On one occasion he joked about this to his servant and illegitimate half-brother, John Seymour, asking him to enquire 'whither her great buttokes were grown eny les or no'.³³ At Chelsea or Hanworth in Middlesex he strove to kiss Elizabeth, eliciting Ashley's alarmed response that he should 'go away for shame'. That this was portrayed by Seymour as innocent fun, was demonstrated by Catherine's involvement, when Elizabeth was 'tytled my Lady Elizabeth in the bed' by them.³⁴ One of the most famous incidents took place in the garden at Hanworth, when the Seymours cut up Elizabeth's dress 'yn a c peces'. When Ashley saw Elizabeth she said 'I wold my lorde wold schowe more reuerence to you al though he be homely *with* the quene'.³⁵ Relations between the Seymours generally appeared good but his lack of 'reuerence' towards Elizabeth was creating tension and unease.

Seymour's behaviour was unsettling Elizabeth's tight-knit household. She was strongly attached to him. John Ashley warned his wife that 'the *Lady Elizabeth* did bere som affection to my *Lord Admirall*/ Ffor he did mark that when eny body did talk ^well^ of my *Lord Admirall*/ she semyd to be well pleasid ther*with*/ & somtyme she wold blush when he were spoken of'.³⁶ The duchess of Somerset was scathing, although this was nothing new. She expressed displeasure about the way Katherine Ashley permitted Elizabeth to behave, thinking 'she was not worthy to have the gouernance of a kinges doughter'. Denny warned Ashley to moderate her behaviour and she had already been brought before Somerset.³⁷ S.E. James, Catherine's biographer, argues that Seymour did not seriously intend to marry Elizabeth but was being recklessly over-familiar.³⁸ Northampton attested in depositions that Seymour had said he had no intention of marrying, although he did want Lady Jane Grey, Dorset's eldest daughter, to marry the king, rather than Somerset's heir, the earl of Hertford.³⁹ The duchess believed that Ashley's fondness for Seymour would lead to her dismissal.⁴⁰ Ashley was concerned about this and sent William Russell, a gentleman of Elizabeth's chamber who had served in Catherine's household, to see her in December 1548 '*with a token from my La. Eliz.*'.⁴¹ This attempted friendliness was intended to improve relations between Elizabeth and the duchess, engendering familiarity and cementing a sociable bond. Similarly, Somerset had been keen to secure friendly relations with the princess, demonstrating his

³² Hatfield, Cecil MS. 150, fos. 74r-74v; Hatfield, Cecil MS. 150, fo. 86r; Haynes, pp. 93, 99.

³³ Hatfield, Cecil MS. 150, fos. 85r-87r; Haynes, pp. 99-100.

³⁴ Hatfield, Cecil MS. 150, fos. 85r-85v.

³⁵ PRO, SP 10/6/21, M. fo. 55r; Hatfield, Cecil MS. 150, fo. 85v; Haynes, p. 99.

³⁶ Hatfield, Cecil MS. 150, fo. 86r; Haynes, p. 100.

³⁷ Hatfield, Cecil MS. 150, fo. 80r; Hatfield, Cecil MS. 150, fo. 86r; Haynes, pp. 96, 100.

³⁸ James, *Kateryn Parr*, pp. 315-320.

³⁹ Hatfield, Cecil MS. 150, fos. 122r-123v; Haynes, pp. 79-81.

⁴⁰ Hatfield, Cecil MS. 150, fo. 80r; Hatfield, Cecil MS. 150, fo. 86r; Haynes, pp. 96, 100.

concern for her by sending his physicians and Dr Thomas Bill when she was ill in about September 1548.⁴² Ashley was uneasy about Seymour's behaviour, telling him that she believed 'yt my lady was evill spoken of', which elicited an angry response.⁴³ She had spoken to Catherine about it and she agreed to accompany her husband in future.⁴⁴ Catherine may have felt unable to acknowledge Seymour's behaviour. Her anger and jealousy became evident as rumours began circulating within the household. She found Seymour with Elizabeth 'in his armes'.⁴⁵ Thomas Parry, Elizabeth's cofferer and comptroller, thought 'this was the cause why she was sent from the quene/ orelles that her grace partid from the quene'.⁴⁶ Catherine was angry and shortly after this incident the household was broken up into the two components (which had been merged within the same establishment), Elizabeth's servants departing with her to Cheshunt. Elizabeth did make comment on this situation (what Parry described as parting 'a sondre their famylies') but her cofferer could not 'perfitly remembre whether of bothe she said she went of herself or was sent away'.⁴⁷ Catherine may have wished to remove Elizabeth in order to protect her, as well as safeguarding her husband and herself from gossip and the consequent actions of Somerset and the privy council. Catherine was close to Elizabeth, particularly because of their shared religious outlook, and this may have given impetus to her concern for her charge.⁴⁸

Despite her youth and initial gaucheness, Elizabeth increasingly handled the lord admiral well. When Ashley tried to persuade her after Catherine's death to consider marrying Seymour, Elizabeth would only heed what she had heard from Denny, still a gentleman of the privy chamber. She trusted him and he was still a man of influence, who was greatly respected for his probity. Parry was also discussing marriage with Elizabeth.⁴⁹ Seymour wanted Parry to persuade Elizabeth to ask the duchess of Somerset to mediate with her husband on her behalf. Although Parry certainly complied, he had misgivings about the admiral, whom he believed to be a jealous and covetous man, and 'an oppressor', who had mistreated Catherine. He seems to have been coerced by his powerful and forceful better. Seymour wanted Elizabeth to ask the duchess to procure Somerset's assistance in providing her with an adequate London residence.⁵⁰ He promised to try to secure Durham Place for her, or failing that, would allow her to use Seymour Place. Elizabeth's behaviour was ambivalent but she prevented Ashley from going to London in October or November 1548 to speak with Seymour, 'for it wold be said than she [Ashley] did stud her

⁴¹ PRO, SP 10/6/20, M. fo. 53r; PRO, E 179/69/57; PRO, E 179/69/68.

⁴² PRO, SP 10/5/4, M. fos. 8Ar-8AAv.

⁴³ Hatfield, Cecil MS. 150, fo. 85v; Haynes, p. 99.

⁴⁴ PRO, SP 10/6/22, M. fo. 58v.

⁴⁵ Hatfield, Cecil MS. 150, fo. 86r; Haynes, pp. 99-100.

⁴⁶ Hatfield, Cecil MS. 150, fo. 80v; Haynes, p. 96. Parry may have owed his appointment to Elizabeth's household to the Seymours: Bindoff, iii, p. 63.

⁴⁷ Hatfield, Cecil MS. 150, fo. 80v; Haynes, p. 96.

⁴⁸ James, *Kateryn Parr*, pp. 320-323; MacCulloch, *Tudor church militant*, pp. 185-189.

⁴⁹ PRO, SP 10/6/19, M. fo. 51r; Hatfield, Cecil MS. 150, fo. 79r; Haynes, p. 95; Bindoff, ii, pp. 27-29.

⁵⁰ Hatfield, Cecil MS. 150, fos. 79r-82v; Haynes, pp. 95-97.

[Elizabeth]'. Parry was also pressuring Elizabeth into considering marriage.⁵¹ Patrons and clients were involved in a dynamic relationship, whereby they sought to influence one another's actions. Patrons were often under considerable pressure from clients. Elizabeth's response to Seymour's requests was that she would only see him if the privy council permitted, although she did send him two letters.⁵² Seymour was trying to gain Mary's goodwill at this time too, which he promised would 'bynde me duringe my lief to be at your graces commandement with anye thing that lyeth in me'.⁵³ He may have hoped that marriage with Elizabeth would allow him to continue to maintain a large clientele and this would explain why he wanted her to acquire lands near his own. His ability to maintain his household was impaired by Catherine's death.⁵⁴ During his last meeting with him at court, on 6 or 7 January 1549, Parry thought that Seymour was angry with Somerset because he opposed the marriage. Seymour may already have sensed that the privy council was taking action against him. Interestingly, Somerset had not yet resolved when Elizabeth would join the court and it is likely that she was being kept away during the manoeuvres against his brother.⁵⁵ Parry claimed Seymour offered to reward him but was detained by the privy council '^to sone^ for I was but new entred into it'.⁵⁶

Seymour discussed Elizabeth's estates with Parry, who as her cofferer, was one of her principal financial officers. Seymour advised her to acquire the letters patent in order to secure her land and to exchange with the crown to procure better land, preferably in Wales or the marches. He offered to exchange Bisley in Gloucestershire. This demonstrated Seymour's desire to build good relations with one of the heirs to the throne. It is also important that he wanted her to concentrate her estates near his own, which lay principally in the areas he recommended.⁵⁷ Seymour was also interested in Elizabeth's household and his questions to Parry allow us to know how large her establishment was. It was one of the largest in England. In 1548 Elizabeth had a substantial household of about one hundred and twenty to one hundred and forty. Between 1549-1552 the core of this household was made up of about twenty five people, including William Grindal, her tutor, Matthew Parker, her chaplain, Blanche Parry, Lady Troy and Cecil, who was surveyor of her estates from 1550.⁵⁸ This household was an appealing prospect to Seymour.

⁵¹ PRO, SP 10/6/19, M. fo. 51v; Hatfield, Cecil MS. 150, fos. 79r-80r; Haynes, pp. 95-96.

⁵² Hatfield, Cecil MS. 150, fos. 79r-84v; PRO, SP 10/6/19, M. fo. 51v; Haynes, pp. 95-99.

⁵³ Hatfield, Cecil MS. 150, fos. 126r-126v; Haynes, p. 73.

⁵⁴ Hatfield, Cecil MS. 150, fos. 43v-44v; Haynes, pp. 68-69.

⁵⁵ Hatfield, Cecil MS. 150, fos. 83r-83v; Haynes, p. 98; PRO, SP 10/6/1, M. fos. 1r-2v.

⁵⁶ Hatfield, Cecil MS. 150, fos. 83v-84r; Haynes, p. 98.

⁵⁷ Hatfield, Cecil MS. 150, fos. 81v-82v; Haynes, p. 97.

⁵⁸ Hatfield, Cecil MS. 150, fo. 81v; Haynes, p. 97; PRO, E 179/69/68; PRO, E 179/69/69; PRO, E 179/69/70, fos. 1r-20v; PRO, E 101/303/4; Viscount Strangford (ed.) 'Household expenses of the Princess Elizabeth during her residence at Hatfield...1551-1552', *Camden Miscellany* (Camden Society, 55; London, 1853), ii, pp. 1-48; PRO, SP 10/10/33, M. fos. 73r-74v; PRO, SP 10/6/6, M. fos. 16r-17v; BL Cotton MS. Titus B. iv, fos. 111r-112v.

Despite enormous pressure on her, Elizabeth always remained studiously circumspect on the whole subject and loyal to her servants. This was an important quality in a patron. In particular, she staunchly supported Ashley and her husband and pleaded for their reinstatement.⁵⁹ Tyrwhitt was sent to Hatfield near the end of January to examine Elizabeth. He and other senior Parr servants, including Buckler, now took over her household. Tyrwhitt had been Catherine's servant and friend, along with his wife (a lady of her privy chamber). He wrote to Somerset, explaining the very close relationship between Elizabeth and Ashley. 'The love she sayth to Aschlay ys to be wondered at wych must nedes be for eyll'. However, he hoped to make Ashley 'cowghe owt the huoll'.⁶⁰ Somerset was partially absorbing Seymour's and Catherine's households at the same time he was reorganising Elizabeth's. Tyrwhitt would have known Elizabeth from her time with Catherine. His wife replaced Ashley as Elizabeth's governess, causing bitter resentment that resulted in a rebuke from the privy council; Tyrwhitt was to persuade her to treat Elizabeth more honourably.⁶¹ Somerset wanted to monitor the princess's activities, ensuring that she was less open to influence. He had to act cautiously, though.

The relations between Elizabeth and the duke and duchess of Somerset were tense. However, Somerset appeared less of a culprit than his wife and seemed to be much more prudent in handling Elizabeth, acting through the privy council and receiving letters from her when she complained that rumours were damaging her reputation, including that she was pregnant by Seymour.⁶² Elizabeth acknowledged that Somerset 'willeth and counselleth me, as an earnest Frende, to declare what I knowe in this Matter'.⁶³ The lord protector certainly had a vested interest in prizing the truth from her and seems to have been more successful than the privy council or his clients. This consideration and discretion would demonstrate his political acumen had his temper not got the better of him. His angry response to her letters of 28 January and 6 February 1549 elicited a careful reply from Elizabeth.⁶⁴ However, Somerset was still willing to assist in suppressing rumours against her if she was more specific. Yet, she 'wolde be lothe to do' this.⁶⁵ Somerset was in a difficult position because he was obliged to protect Elizabeth's interests and this forced him to relent his harshness.⁶⁶ Elizabeth carefully extricated herself from Seymour's fall and her political acumen allowed her to preserve her clientele and maintain some independence.⁶⁷

⁵⁹ BL Lansdowne MS. 1236, fos. 33r-34v, BL Lansdowne MS. 1236, fos. 35r-36v; J. Wormald, *Mary queen of Scots. A study in failure* (London, 1988), pp. 79-80.

⁶⁰ PRO, SP 10/6/6, M. fo. 17r; James, *Kateryn Parr*, pp. 128, 146, 153, 175, 219, 269, 271. Tyrwhitt, Buckler and Parry were being addressed as 'cowncellers to the most excellent prynces the lady Elyzabethe hyr grace' by April 1552: PRO, E 179/69/57; PRO, E 179/69/69; E.179/69/70, fos. 12v, 14r.

⁶¹ Hatfield, Cecil MS. 150, fos. 100r-100v.

⁶² Hatfield, Cecil MS. 133, fo. 4/2r; Haynes, pp. 89-90; BL Lansdowne MS. 1236, fos. 33r-34v; BL Lansdowne MS. 1236, fos. 35r-36v.

⁶³ Hatfield, Cecil MS. 133, fo. 4/2r; Haynes, p. 89.

⁶⁴ Hatfield, Cecil MS. 133, fo. 4/2r; Haynes, pp. 89-90; BL Lansdowne MS. 1236, fos. 33r-34v.

⁶⁵ BL Lansdowne MS. 1236, fos. 33r-33v.

⁶⁶ BL Lansdowne MS. 1236, fo. 33v; BL Lansdowne MS. 1236, fos. 35r-36v.

⁶⁷ Pollard, *Political history*, vi, p. 177.

Another part of Seymour's plan was a projected marriage between Jane and the king. He sent his servant John Harrington to see Dorset at his Westminster house soon after Henry's death. Harrington told Dorset that Seymour 'was like to come to greate aucthorite, and that being the kinges maiesties vncle and placed as he was he might doo me [Dorset] much pleasure, aduising me therefore to reasorte vnto him, and to enter a more frendeship and familiaritie with him'. Harrington then suggested the marquis allow his daughter Jane to reside with his master, saying the lord admiral would be able to procure her marriage to the king. He persuaded Dorset to visit Seymour early in February 1547 and the latter agreed to send Jane as a result.⁶⁸ With continued promises of good lordship as well as his assistance in the projected marriage, Seymour kept Jane at his home after Catherine's death, despite requests from her parents for her return.⁶⁹ He laughed when he told Parry about the general rumours that he intended to marry her himself.⁷⁰ Jane was eventually returned and Dorset wrote a nervous letter to Seymour on 17 September 1548, telling him 'my meaning herin ys not to withdrawe anie parte of my promise to yow for hyr bestowing for I assure your Lordshype I entend god wylling to use your discrete advise and confer in that behalfe no lesse than myne owne'.⁷¹

Seymour's promise to Dorset that he could procure marriage to the king was a means of persuading the marquis to support him and was based on his belief that he could become governor. In a minute of his examination on 25 January 1549, Seymour said that the king would be a man soon and in three years would desire greater freedom than he now had, especially in the exercise of patronage. He told the king this, as well as Dorset and Rutland.⁷² Seymour wished to gain greater influence over Edward in the mean time. He was angry at not being appointed 'to haue the gouernment of the king before so dronken a sole as Page was'.⁷³ Page was the duchess of Somerset's stepfather and had replaced Sir William Sidney as chamberlain of Edward's household in 1544. He had risen through the household and it seems natural that he should be promoted to this office rather than Seymour, who had less experience.⁷⁴ During Easter 1548 Seymour discussed with Fowler the possibility of becoming governor of the king in the same capacity as Page. Therefore, he was considering alternative roles to that of governor of the king's person.⁷⁵ He discussed with Rutland how Edward should be governed but claimed in his first deposition not to have spoken to anybody else on the subject. During a second examination on 27 January 1549

⁶⁸ PRO, SP 10/6/7, M. fos. 18r-18v.

⁶⁹ Hatfield, Cecil MS. 150, fos. 119r-120v; Hatfield, Cecil MS. 150, fos. 118r-118v; Hatfield, Cecil MS. 150, fo. 121r; Haynes, pp. 77-79; PRO, SP 10/5/6, M. fos. 9r-10v; PRO, SP 10/6/7, M. fos. 18r-18v.

⁷⁰ Hatfield, Cecil MS. 150, fo. 82v; Haynes, p. 98.

⁷¹ Hatfield, Cecil MS. 150, fos. 118r-118v.

⁷² Hatfield, Cecil MS. 150, fo. 64r; Hatfield, Cecil MS. 150, fos. 64v-65r; Haynes, p. 87; PRO, SP 10/6/7, M. fo. 18v.

⁷³ PRO, SP 10/6/13, M. fo. 35r; *APC*, ii, pp. 258-259.

⁷⁴ See above, pp. 11, 49.

⁷⁵ PRO, SP 10/6/27, M. fo. 69r; *APC*, ii, pp. 258-259.

he admitted talking to the king in general terms about it too.⁷⁶ Access was vitally important because it allowed him to open his mind to Edward and assess the feasibility of any plans he had to force the issue of control of the king's person. Fowler deposed that Seymour had once come to St James's and told him Edward was so poorly guarded that:

I said agayne Thanks be to god we are in a quiet Realme and the Kings Maiestie. is welbeloved if it were not so an hundreth men wold make a fowle worke here/ And as I remember he made this answer. A man might steele away the King now, for there came more with me than is in all the howse besides. And then went into the inner Galerie, and from there to the King with whom he talked a while what I knowe not and than departed home to dyner, for he said he had strangers [guests].⁷⁷

Somerset's tightly controlled privy chamber was not impenetrable, especially for those with reason to be in or near the royal apartments, including privy councillors. It is also probable that the privy councillors were meant to have regular access to the king, as they had had during Henry's reign, nor were the privy chamber staff all the duke's clients. Instead, Somerset had the privy chamber monitored by his people. Seymour spoke on a number of occasions of the benefit 'if he might ones get the kinge at libertye', promising Dorset that it would result in Edward's marriage to his daughter.⁷⁸

Seymour sought to gain increasing influence in parliament too. Again, this was done in the hope of increasing his chances of being named governor of the king's person. Between them, Seymour and Catherine had substantial influence over seats in Wales and Wiltshire. He was summoned to the Lords in 1547 and attempted to build a following there: 'he hadde the names of all the Lordes/ and tottid them whome he thoughte he mighte haue to his purpose to labour them'. He had looked into the issue of the division of the offices of lord protector and governor during the minority of Henry VI (1422-1437) and found that one brother, the duke of Gloucester, held the former and another, the duke of Bedford, was regent of France, while the duke of Exeter and his brother, the bishop of Winchester, were governors. He hoped to become governor through his parliamentary support.⁷⁹ Seymour spoke with Sir George Blagge, an esquire of the body, able soldier and one of the principal gentlemen of Kent, about this. Blagge said Seymour intended to challenge his brother for the office through parliament and complained about Somerset's close control of the king and attempts to prevent others from gaining access.⁸⁰ This desire to be governor was the main reason Seymour curried favour with the king and his attendants in the privy chamber. He did have a case and was correct to have misgivings about one man monopolising so much power but

⁷⁶ Hatfield, Cecil MS. 150, fo. 64r; Hatfield, Cecil MS. 150, fos. 64v-65r.

⁷⁷ PRO, SP 10/6/10, M. fos. 25r-26r.

⁷⁸ PRO, SP 10/6/7, M. fos. 18r-18v; Tytler, i, pp. 137-141.

⁷⁹ PRO, SP 10/6/27, M. fo. 69r; Bindoff, iii, pp. 298-300; Roskell, 'The office and dignity of protector', pp. 193-233.

⁸⁰ PRO, SP 10/6/17, M. fos. 47r-48v; Tytler, i, pp. 146-148; PRO, SP 46/162, fo. 53r; Bindoff, i, pp. 440-442.

he was singularly unqualified for the role himself. After a conversation at Ely Place, Paget believed he had successfully persuaded Seymour not to pursue it further by reminding him that he had consented to the protectorate.⁸¹ However, Seymour did not heed Paget's warning, becoming increasingly irresponsible in his attempts to achieve parliamentary backing for his claim. He voiced his discontent to Sharrington about not being placed in the lords in the order of precedence as one of the king's uncles.⁸² It was claimed he had said to several peers, including Dorset and Clinton, that if he could not get his way then he would severely disrupt parliamentary proceedings. This occurred during the first session of Edward's first parliament (4 November-24 December 1547), suggesting Seymour had become disgruntled very quickly. He spoke to Clinton 'of a blacke parliament, by goddes pretious soule if I be thus vsed I woll make this the blackest parliament that euer was in Englande'. According to Clinton's deposition, this was in response to the passage of the first Treason Act (1 Edward VI, c. 12) repealing the Henrician Treason Act (26 Henry VIII, c. 13), which had made it treason to speak against the king, his wife or heir.⁸³ Seymour thought this would give 'lyberty to a spokyn any thing agenst the quene'.⁸⁴ His reaction could be viewed as defensive because he thought people, especially his brother's clients, were attacking Catherine's reputation. She had certainly been denounced for her morals after marrying Seymour.⁸⁵ Clinton warned him to moderate his behaviour in case he impaired his relations with his brother. Seymour replied somewhat caustically 'yt he wold I shold know it yt he had no nede of his fauer and yt he myght better lyue with owte my sayd Lordes gras then he myght do with owte hym'.⁸⁶ It is possible that, failing to have himself made governor in January-February 1547, Seymour secretly pressured the king, 'to write letters of his devising to the Parliament, mynding by colour of the same to have sett sedicion in the realme'.⁸⁷ Somerset 'thought best to passe over in silence'. Like the other leading councillors, Seymour recognised that control of the king and maintenance of good terms with him were important, but one could not act alone and his behaviour tended to isolate him in 1547 and 1548.⁸⁸

Somerset tolerated his brother's behaviour until it became imprudent to do so for the safety of the state. It is possible that, as Strype thought, he had tried to maintain Seymour's loyalty by generous grants of land.⁸⁹ The critical point appears to have been reached when Rutland reported to the privy council the conversations Seymour had had with him. It is possible that in the middle of January 1549 Seymour attempted to seize Edward and Elizabeth. Seymour was arrested because

⁸¹ PRO, SP 10/6/27, M. fo. 69r.

⁸² Bindoff, iii, pp. 299-300; PRO, SP 10/6/13, M. fo. 36v; APC, ii, p. 237.

⁸³ G.R. Elton (ed.), *The Tudor constitution. Documents and commentary* (Cambridge, 1982 edn.), pp. 62-67.

⁸⁴ PRO, SP 10/6/7, M. fos. 19v-20r; PRO, SP 10/6/11, M. fo. 29r.

⁸⁵ James, *Kateryn Parr*, pp. 309-313.

⁸⁶ PRO, SP 10/6/11, M. fos. 29r-29v.

⁸⁷ APC, ii, p. 237.

⁸⁸ APC, ii, pp. 237-238.

⁸⁹ Strype (ed.), *Ecclesiastical memorials*, ii, II, pp. 194-195; Bernard, 'The downfall of Sir Thomas Seymour', p. 225.

of either Sharington's or Rutland's confession, or John Burcher's tale that he or his clients were caught at Whitehall in the act of attempting to assassinate the king, having procured a key from 'one of the king's chamberlains' (presumably Fowler).⁹⁰ Burcher informed Bullinger that the yeomen of the guard had been alerted by chance but access to the bedchamber in the privy lodgings by passing through the presence chamber and the privy chamber, as well as several other rooms, would have been difficult without being seen. This would have to be achieved unopposed, despite the fact that gentlemen of the privy chamber were supposed to sleep in the presence chamber and a night watch was meant to be kept. The privy gallery had been one of the main routes used by courtiers between St James's Park and the buildings on the west side of King Street and the residential parts of Whitehall on the east side until access was blocked off in 1543-1544. After that, the western end of the privy gallery was very private. Also, it was not devoid of security, especially at night. The exact relationship between the various gates, lodging ranges and chambers above stairs cannot be precisely determined but ingress would not have been easy.⁹¹ Seymour may have intended to abduct the king and Elizabeth, taking them to Holt, which he was preparing. He was residing there at Christmas and his preparations were a cause for concern.⁹² However, it is more probable that Burcher's account is erroneous, being uncorroborated by any other source, and was possibly an example of the wild rumours circulating at the time either as a result of stress in the polity or conciliar black propaganda. More probably, Seymour was contemplating attempted evasion of Somerset's and the privy council's authority. His nocturnal visits to the court in the week prior to his arrest, as recounted by his secretary William Wightman, leaving Dorset and Huntingdon behind at Seymour Place, may have been intended to glean rumours pertaining to himself, rather than preparing the ground work to kidnap Edward.⁹³

This is reinforced by the observations of those around Seymour. Wightman was a substantial member of Seymour's clientele because he was his secretary. He advised Seymour to refer the dispute with Somerset over Catherine's jewels to parliament and acted as a principal counsellor.⁹⁴ He spoke with Nicholas Throckmorton, a former servant of Northampton and sewer in Catherine's household between 1544-1547/48, who was probably also one of Seymour's clients. Throckmorton regarded Seymour as his 'spokesman' and 'perfect Friende', who 'sheilded me

⁹⁰ Nichols (ed.), *Chronicle of the Grey Friars*, p. 58; *Simancas*, ix, pp. 332-333; H. Robinson (ed.), *Original letters relative to the English Reformation... chiefly from the archives of Zurich*, Parker Society (ii vols.; Cambridge, 1846-1847), ii, no. ccci, pp. 647-649; PRO, SP 10/6/7, M. fos. 18r-18v; Bernard, 'The downfall of Sir Thomas Seymour', pp. 227-229. The privy council was sitting at Whitehall throughout January, suggesting the court was there too: *APC*, ii, p. 236; PRO, C 82/894.

⁹¹ Robinson (ed.), *Original letters*, ii, no. ccci, pp. 648-649; Colvin (ed.), *The king's works*, iv, p. 301; S. Thurley, *Whitehall Palace. An architectural history of the royal apartments, 1240-1698* (New Haven and London, 1999), pp. 13-62; BL Additional MS. 71009, fo. 10r; BL Additional MS. 71009, fo. 30r. I am grateful to Andrew Johnston for discussing the layout of the privy lodgings at Whitehall with me.

⁹² BL Harley MS. 249, fo. 39v; *APC*, ii, pp. 255-256; Bernard, 'The downfall of Sir Thomas Seymour', pp. 227-228.

⁹³ Hatfield, Cecil MS. 150, fo. 43v; Haynes, p. 68; Bernard, 'The downfall of Sir Thomas Seymour', p. 228.

⁹⁴ Bindoff, iii, p. 611.

from Injurie'.⁹⁵ Throckmorton, generally considered to be the earl of Leicester's 'political brain' in the 1560s, sought to counsel Seymour through his clients to moderate himself, especially now that the dowager queen was dead.⁹⁶ He was a clever man, being described in about 1547 as 'somwhat lerned & langauged'.⁹⁷ His advice had some effect on Seymour's servants, with Wightman attempting unsuccessfully to dissuade his master from pursuing private quarrels against Sir John Brydges of Coberley in Gloucestershire, Sir George Blount of Kinlet in Shropshire, Robert Long of Draycot Cerne in Wiltshire over Vastern Park, Paget over Feckenam Park in Worcestershire, and Matthew Hull. Despite the fact that even Seymour's own lawyer, Richard Weston, told him that he had no legal claim to these properties, he continued to pursue them. Wightman and several of Seymour's other important servants, clients and friends (Tyrwhitt, Edward Rous, Harrington and Hurleston) felt that their patron was being factious and attempting to procure greater patronage by whatever means possible.⁹⁸ Land disputes tended to increase tension between clienteles. The disagreement with the Longs would be of some standing and had some justification. Sir Henry Long, Robert Long's father and steward of Catherine's Wiltshire estates, was concerned about the situation over the lease of the herbage of Vastern Park. Somerset had interfered by buying it in 1548 without Catherine's knowledge and, although this encouraged Long, it ultimately led to a breach because he felt the duke and Thynne relegated his own interests.⁹⁹ Catherine had been furious but did not want to impair Seymour's political prospects.¹⁰⁰ She asked Seymour to tell her 'how I schall vse myself to my new brother'.¹⁰¹ Seymour's other land disputes, especially with Blount and Paget, were less justified and his clients were naturally concerned.¹⁰²

Commenting on Catherine's death, having agreed that Seymour should be less covetous, Throckmorton then said to Wightman 'I trust it wooll make him a good wayter at the Courte/ and make him more humble in harte and stomacke towardses my Lord protectours grace/ I promise

⁹⁵ PRO, E 179/69/57; BL Additional MS. 5841, fo. 134v; Bindoff, iii, p. 459.

⁹⁶ Adams, 'The Dudley clientèle', p. 243; Hatfield, Cecil MS. 150, fos. 43v-44v; Haynes, pp. 68-69.

⁹⁷ PRO, SP 46/162, fo. 53v; Neale (ed.), 'Sir Nicholas Throckmorton's advice', pp. 91-98.

⁹⁸ Hatfield, Cecil MS. 150, fos. 43v-45r; Haynes, pp. 69-70; Bindoff, i, pp. 445-447, 533-534; ii, pp. 543-544, 546-547; iii, pp. 588-590; Hatfield, Cecil MS. 201, fos. 66r-66v; Haynes, pp. 73-74. Rous and Harrington were both important servants of Seymour. Rous was comptroller of the household and a central and intimate figure, charged with running a great establishment: PRO, SP 10/6/8, M. fos. 22r-22v. Harrington was so heavily involved in Seymour's activities that he was arrested with him, questioned several times by St John, Southampton and Smith and remained in the Tower until 22 October when Petre noted that he was 'to be discharged': PRO, SP 10/6/7, M. fos. 18r-18v; PRO, SP 10/9/48, M. fo. 90v. Hurleston was possibly John Huddleston, whom Elizabeth had recommended to Catherine in 1545 for a scholarship at King's Hall, Cambridge, and who came from a Cumberland gentry family long associated with the Parrs. He was a commissioner of the peace for Cambridgeshire. Alternatively, he may have been Roger Hurleston, one of the gentlemen waiters when Edward was prince of Wales: James, *Kateryn Parr*, p. 251, n. 105; PRO, C 66/801, m. 9d; *Calendar of patent rolls*, i, p. 81; PRO, LC 2/2, fo. 53v; PRO, LC 2/2/3/1, fo. 96r.

⁹⁹ PRO, SP 10/1/43, M. fos. 132r-133v; Hatfield, Cecil MS. 133, fo. 2r; Haynes, p. 61; PRO, SP 46/124, fos. 24r-24v.

¹⁰⁰ Hatfield, Cecil MS. 133, fo. 2r.

¹⁰¹ Hatfield, Cecil MS. 133, fo. 2r.

¹⁰² Paget was appointed steward to various Worcestershire estates belonging to Catherine on 19 February 1547, including Bromsgrove and Feckenham, of which he was also master of the game, keeper and ranger of the forest and park, as well as keeper of the house: *Calendar of patent rolls*, i, p. 191; Bindoff, i, pp. 445-447.

youe sayde he if my Lorde be eyther wyse or polyticque he wooll becoome a newe maner of man bothe in harte and *seruice*'.¹⁰³ Any 'grudge' between the duchess of Somerset and Seymour should be forgotten—'it was (as most men gesse) for the Quenes cause'. This reinforces Hayward, despite his misogyny and questionable reliability, who blamed the jealousy of the duchess towards Catherine, especially over the order of precedence, for her rift with Seymour.¹⁰⁴ Like Paget, Throckmorton's counsel was blunt: 'he sayde moreouer that it stode my Lorde vppon to alre his manners/ Ffor the worlde begynneth to talke verye evill fauourablye of him/ bothe for his slouthefulnes to *serue*/ and for his greedines to get/ noting him to be oone of the most covetous men lyving'.¹⁰⁵ Although Wightman had been arrested and was being interrogated, putting him in an extremely awkward position, his characterisation of Seymour does appear accurate. Throckmorton did point out that the general perception of Seymour was not universally hostile, saying that he was 'thought to be a verye ambitious man of hono^{ur}'. This ambition was the desirable, active kind, if only he would exercise it properly. Throckmorton believed that Seymour wanted to marry either Mary or Elizabeth and told Wightman to advise his master against this course because it would be treason if done without the consent of the king, lord protector and privy council, and even should this be given, he would still be regarded as a pariah, not fit to be within ten miles of the court. Throckmorton explained that, as Seymour's client, Wightman should 'in any wyse in the worlde/ as youe loue him and beare him your good hearte if euer youe heare any thing sounding that waye, woorke all that youe canne possiblye to stopp that intent'. Wightman agreed that he would do so.¹⁰⁶ It is uncertain, apart from the direct evidence, how much counsel his clients gave him but Seymour was oblivious, did not temper his actions and persisted in haunting the court in early 1549. Although dangerous, such behaviour would not be out of character with his reckless nature.

Seymour took pains to avoid his colleagues. He may have seriously contemplated removing the king from the custody of both Stanhope and Page, perhaps to force the government's hand over his desire to be governor, although he later claimed 'he spoke merelye, meaninge no hurte'.¹⁰⁷ This does not mean that he was caught in the act. Again, paucity of corroborating evidence undermines this theory. It would surely appear more fully in the bill used to convict him in parliament.¹⁰⁸ What these thirty three charges made clear was that Seymour sought to gain the office of governor, tried to persuade the king to agree, corrupted members of the privy chamber to gain access, and attempted to convince Edward 'to take uppon himself the Gouvernement and mayning of his owne affaires'. Whether he 'fully entended and appointed to have taken the Kinges Majestes persone

¹⁰³ Hatfield, Cecil MS. 150, fos. 43v-44r.

¹⁰⁴ Hatfield, Cecil MS. 150, fo. 44r; Hayward, *The life and raigne of King Edward the Sixth*, pp. 19, 98-100.

¹⁰⁵ Hatfield, Cecil MS. 150, fo. 44r.

¹⁰⁶ Hatfield, Cecil MS. 150, fos. 44r-44v.

¹⁰⁷ PRO, SP 10/6/27, M. fos. 69r-70r.

into your owne hands and custodie', cannot be confirmed.¹⁰⁹ The use of the verb 'entended' shows that this had not yet happened and may never have happened. Rumours had been circulating by the end of 1548, and by 1 January 1549 Seymour seemed to have an inclination that his fall was imminent. He excused himself in a hastily written letter for not coming to see Somerset when the duke's servant had bidden him. Somerset may have been attempting to handle the situation discreetly and informally by trying to resolve it from within his clientele. Instead, Seymour wanted the meeting to be public, either in parliament or at Whitehall, 'so that the counsel may be present'.¹¹⁰ He ended, 'I wyche your grace as well as I wolde to my selff, altho ye sholde do me wrong'.¹¹¹ Whether or not Somerset was attempting a private reconciliation, is difficult to say. Elizabeth did later remark that he might have been reconciled to Seymour if the lord admiral had only agreed to see him. Conyers Read thought that either Warwick or the duchess of Somerset might have prevented this rapprochement. The duchess has had a poor reputation. Hayward ascribed the initial rift between the brothers to 'the pride, the haughty harte, the vnquiet vanity of a mannish or rather of a diuelish woman'. This cannot be verified easily but Throckmorton did comment on it at the time.¹¹² The duchess's behaviour did have a notable impact, affecting Somerset's judgement and impairing his popularity at court. Seymour was arrested on 17 February because of the instability his actions created and probably not because he had been caught attempting to kidnap the king. His attitude towards the localities was also a source of great anxiety to the regime.

II: Seymour of Sudeley's wider clientele

Seymour had a competitive view of local power and Dr Bernard has speculated about whether or not this was retaining.¹¹³ It does appear to have been an attempt to build up a clientele based on influence at court, in parliament and in the counties and was a clear example of the kind of court-centred following other leading privy councillors had created to straddle the public and private worlds. Again, this was normally a two-way process between the king and the aristocracy, but with the minority and Somerset acting as regent, the process was more one-sided. Seymour regarded his offices solely as a means of enhancing his power. The office of lord admiral gave him access to the strength of the navy for his own use. He also sought to gain as many stewardships as he could, augmenting the number of soldiers he could draw from his broad acres. The reasons for all this activity become most apparent from Sharington's statement that:

¹⁰⁸ APC, ii, pp. 248-256; *Statutes of the realm*, eds. Lunders et al, iv, pt. i, pp. 61-65.

¹⁰⁹ APC, ii, pp. 248-250.

¹¹⁰ PRO, SP 10/6/1, M. fos. 1r-2v.

¹¹¹ PRO, SP 10/6/1, M. fo. 1r.

¹¹² H. Ellis (ed.), *Original letters, illustrative of English history...from autographs in the British Museum and...other collections* (1st ser., iii vols.; London, 1824), ii, p. 256; Read, *Mr. Secretary Cecil*, p. 54; Hayward, *The life and reign of King Edward the Sixth*, p. 98; Hatfield, Cecil MS. 150, fo. 44r.

the lord Admyrall hathe divers tymes caused me to loke with him uppon a cart of England in the loking wherof he wold many tymes shewe me howe strong he was, what nombres of men he was able to make, how farre his landes and dominions did stretch, And howe his said landes lay betwene his house of Brouham and the Holtehe.¹¹⁴

How extensive were Seymour's stewardships? He had been appointed joint master steward of Chirk and Holt castles, Denbighshire, in 1537, as well as Bromfield and Yale. These were strategically important, being situated in the north marches of Wales. Seymour may have intended to use Holt at Christmas 1548 as a bolt-hole, ordering his deputy, steward and other officers there to make provision for 'a great number of men'.¹¹⁵ He benefited from the concentration of the Seymour landed interest in Wiltshire, although he had no great holdings there himself, being made keeper of Farleigh Hungerford Castle and park in 1544. He was also an important steward of the royal estates, being named steward of the duchy of Lancaster in Essex, Hertfordshire and Middlesex, as well as constable of Hertford Castle, from 28 May 1544. Seymour was also master forester of Enfield Chase, having been appointed for life as early as 1532.¹¹⁶ His stewardships were impressive but, interestingly, he had received no more since Edward's accession. Although he was the recipient of other significant offices, especially that of lord admiral, reflecting the increasingly enmeshed matrix of political power in mid-Tudor England, it was probably felt that he controlled enough of the royal estate and could command a sufficiently extensive manred. Somerset granted him no more stewardships and was generally conservative in dispensing this kind of patronage. Therefore, when Seymour talked of being keen to procure stewardships, he was really referring to his earlier endeavours or his future prospects.¹¹⁷

Seymour's appreciation of his military strength is in remarkable contrast to that of Somerset and Thynne, neither of whom knew how large their retinues could be. This would hamper their efforts against the October coup.¹¹⁸ Seymour seemed to have an overview of English and Welsh military strength and of his own capacity to control it. Here a privy councillor was subverting any notion of a clientele serving both the interests of the crown and the political elite. This was factional politics. The way Seymour recruited to and deployed his clientele was precisely what Somerset had hoped to avoid by dominating the minority government. The lord protector wanted leading

¹¹³ Bernard, 'The downfall of Sir Thomas Seymour', pp. 221-223.

¹¹⁴ PRO, SP 10/6/13, M. fo. 35r.

¹¹⁵ APC, ii, pp. 255-256; PRO, SP 10/6/8, M. fos. 22r-22v; Bernard, 'The downfall of Sir Thomas Seymour', pp. 225, 227.

¹¹⁶ Paget was appointed master forester for life on 3 March 1549: Somerville *Duchy of Lancaster*, i, pp. 604, 606, 612; Bindoff, iii, 297-301.

¹¹⁷ Somerville, *Duchy of Lancaster*, i, pp. 394, 403-404, 445-447, 449, 496, 509, 527, 533-535, 554, 571-572, 579-580, 590, 595, 601, 617, 620, 626, 643, 651, 653; APC, ii, pp. 17-19, 27; PRO, SP 10/1/11, M. fos. 28r-28v; Bindoff, iii, pp. 68-69, 495-496.

¹¹⁸ Longleat, Seymour MS. 4, fo. 127v.

colleagues to be connected to him through fidelity clientage or ordinary clientage. Seymour boasted that he had ten thousand men and could probably call on greater support among the gentry than Somerset could, while asking Sharington, under treasurer of the Bristol mint since 1546, to embezzle money for him.¹¹⁹ However, the figure of £4000 was insufficient and he told Sharington that he wanted enough to pay his men at six pence per day for a month.¹²⁰ Seymour intended to pressure the privy council into making him governor by force, if necessary. His attitude was similar to that of the second earl of Essex, who made politics factional in the late 1590s. Essex finally railed against evil councillors like Sir Robert Cecil and spoke of removing them by force if necessary. Like Seymour, he headed a powerful military clientele. However, Seymour had little support from the military leadership.¹²¹

Seymour's local influence was increased by his role as a JP. In May 1547 he was appointed to the commission of the peace in no less than thirteen counties, making him one of the most heavily appointed. However, like Somerset, this seems to have reflected his importance at court, rather than in the localities, because he was not an active commissioner, having not been appointed *custos rotulorum*, even of a county where he had extensive estates. Strictly, the *custos rotulorum* would be somebody with legal expertise. However, Seymour was appointed to the quorum in Gloucestershire and Wiltshire, suggesting that he did have an important and active role in the counties where his consequence was greatest.¹²²

Seymour needed powerful clients too and tried to build fidelity clientage relationships, even with social superiors. This recruitment was partially successful but it made Edwardian politics factional. Sharington had probably first come to Seymour's notice when they were both in Bryan's service. Sharington entered Bryan's service in about 1538, being his kinsman through his first marriage to Ursula Bouchier, natural daughter of the second Lord Berners. He was groom of the privy chamber from 1542, having gained his first court position three years previously, but his relationship with Seymour probably solidified in 1544-1545, when he was a member of Catherine's household. He benefited from Seymour patronage, probably through the lord admiral rather than Somerset. Seymour was presumably behind Sharington's knighthood at the king's coronation and election for Bramber, Sussex, in 1547. Sharington was JP for Wiltshire from 1547 until his death, not being removed even after Seymour's fall. He was originally from Norfolk and this demonstrates his complete plantation in Wiltshire. This was similar to Thynne's plantation in

¹¹⁹ PRO, SP 10/6/13, M. fos. 35v-37r; PRO, LC 2/2/3/1, fo. 109r.

¹²⁰ That is, £7500 for thirty days: PRO, SP 10/6/13, M. fos. 35v-37r.

¹²¹ Adams, 'Eliza enthroned?', pp. 63, 68-70, 72, 76; Hammer, *The polarisation of Elizabethan politics*, pp. 24, 100-102, 146, 160-161, 189, 192-198, 216-241, 246, 289-290, 341-388, 390-404; Adams, 'The English military clientele', pp. 225-227.

the same county.¹²³ Seymour tried to act as a patronage broker too. For example, Sir Thomas Heneage of Lincolnshire promised to help John Eton acquire the office of treasurer of Boulogne. Heneage asked Seymour for assistance and he, in turn, petitioned his brother.¹²⁴ Seymour had more important adherents. Dorset had agreed to offer a degree of support. Perhaps the presence of Jane in the Seymour household gave the admiral leverage. Seymour had certainly tried to make him an ally, telling the marquis through Harrington in January-February 1547 that he should seek his friendship in return for favour. Seymour also solicited Rutland, Southampton and Northampton. In September 1547 he wrote to his brother on Northampton's behalf to request offices for him that the marquis's father had held. Yet, none of them were willing to aid Seymour completely.¹²⁵ Dorset certainly remained close to Seymour. He received £500 as part of a £2000 loan without bond as soon as he sent Jane to Seymour, joined him in dissenting to the bill that confirmed Somerset's letters patent as lord protector in November-December 1547 (a provocative action), admitted that the lord admiral had 'seduced and aveugled' him with promises that only the king could fulfil, and promised in turn that, after Edward, 'he wold spend his lief and bloode in his the said Lorde Admiralles parte against all men'.¹²⁶ Despite this, Dorset was clear that he would take the part of those who served the king, rather than a private party. He still understood where political power lay. Harrington denied that Seymour had told him that he was attempting to band nobles together or that had persuaded Dorset to increase his 'aquayntance & frendship' in the early weeks of 1547, although he did advise the marquis to send Jane to Seymour.¹²⁷ Harrington was trying to diminish his responsibility and, in a society that did not have concrete ties of clientage like bonds of manrent, he was quibbling over terminology to a certain extent. The privy council feared potential danger. Harrington said that Seymour 'might peradventure say to hym he or he is my frend but to say that eny man were his assurid or that I haue this or this man assurid, or eni thyng soundyng to makyng a part/ [party] he never hard hym speke such thynges in his leif'. They recognised that 'makyng a part' was factional and did not admit that this is what was happening. Seymour was trying to build a powerful clientele and, consequently, disrupting the polity. However, this vagueness does make sense because Seymour was probably receiving goodwill, rather than strong commitments, from these men. Harrington claimed that although Seymour had said that during a minority one brother should be lord protector and the other

¹²² Berkshire, Devon, Essex, Gloucestershire, Hampshire, Herefordshire, Hertfordshire, Kent, Middlesex, Shropshire, Sussex, Wiltshire and Worcestershire: PRO, C 66/801, mm. 8d, 10d, 12d, 13d, 14d, 16d, 19d, 20d, 21d, 22d; *Calendar of patent rolls*, i, pp. 81-86, 88, 90-91.

¹²³ Bindoff, iii, pp. 302-303; James, *Kateryn Parr*, p. 146; PRO, C 66/801, m. 22d; *Calendar of patent rolls*, i, p. 91.

¹²⁴ PRO, SP 46/1, fos. 150r-150v; PRO, SP 10/14/52 (i), M. fos. 114r-114Av; Bindoff, ii, p. 335.

¹²⁵ PRO, SP 10/6/7, M. fos. 18r-21v; PRO, SP 10/6/12, M. fos. 33r-34v; PRO, SP 10/6/14, M. fos. 39r-40v; PRO, SP 10/6/15, M. fos. 41r-42v; Beer, *Northumberland*, pp. 73, 206, n. 4.

¹²⁶ PRO, SP 10/6/7, M. fos. 19v-20r; Hatfield, Cecil MS. 150, fo. 115r; Haynes, pp. 76-77; Hatfield, Cecil MS. 150, fo. 54v; Haynes, p. 83; Bernard, 'The downfall of Sir Thomas Seymour', pp. 223-224.

¹²⁷ Hatfield, Cecil MS. 150, fos. 54v-55v; Haynes, pp. 82-83.

governor, he also stated that if offered either position he would refuse. This seems highly improbable in the light of the other evidence.¹²⁸

Dr Bernard's belief that Seymour was not attempting to develop an affinity is difficult to maintain. Seymour asked Rutland about 'thestate of my lyving and also how I was frended in my country/ I declared to him suche frendes as I had and he lykewise declared to me a great number of his frendes & also how he was banded in their countrees'. Seymour also noted that Rutland was a match for Shrewsbury in his own country.¹²⁹ Similarly, while staying at Bradgate in Leicestershire at the end of September 1548, Seymour advised Dorset 'to make me stronge in my countrey, aduised me to kepe a good house'. The conversation and language was similar to that adopted in Seymour's discussion with Rutland. He cautioned the marquis not to rely on clients among the gentry, even if substantial individuals, 'for they haue sumwhat to loose'. This is an acute piece of analysis because it highlights the service relationship between the crown and the elite in the localities (including 'the speciall men'). Instead, Dorset should solicit the 'head yeomen and frankelyns of the cuntrey, specially those that be the Ringleaders, for they be the men that be best hable to perswade the multitude and may best bring the number'.¹³⁰ Presumably, men like Robert Kett and Humphrey Arundel. Was Seymour referring to the muster masters or the constables and bailiffs when he spoke of those who were 'best hable to perswade the multitude and may best bring the number'? If so, he seems to have had a peculiar view of factional power, employing one of the latest innovations in Tudor military administration in a particularly atavistic manner. It was a repetition of fifteenth century aristocratic disaffection being perpetrated by a court based noble. It was also inherently flawed because these were the very gentlemen Seymour had precluded from service. This use of the gentry muster commissioners was a technique suddenly and unsuccessfully adopted by Somerset in October 1549. Also, there is the suggestion that Seymour would court popularity to achieve his ends. Seymour also recommended that Dorset 'kepe my house in Warwike shire' (Astley Castle), 'because yt was a cuntrey full of men, but chiefly to matche *with* my lorde of Warwike; soo as he should not be hable to matche *with* me there'. Dorset explained that the castle was in disrepair and he needed his building material for vital work on his seat at Bradgate, sixteen miles away. Seymour replied that this was unimportant and that Dorset should settle in Warwickshire.¹³¹ Perhaps another factor was that Astley was more defensible than the manor house at Bradgate.¹³²

¹²⁸ Hatfield, Cecil MS. 150, fos. 54v-54v; Haynes, pp. 82-83; M.H. Merriman, 'The assured Scots: Scottish collaborators with England during the rough wooing', *Scottish Historical Review*, 47 (1968), pp. 10-34.

¹²⁹ PRO, SP 10/6/12, M. fo. 33r.

¹³⁰ PRO, SP 10/6/7, M. fo. 19r.

¹³¹ PRO, SP 10/6/7, M. fos. 19r-19v.

¹³² H.W. Chapman, *Lady Jane Grey* (London, 1962), pp. 17-18, 25.

Others thought in terms of local influence based on broad acres and access to local offices but, unlike Seymour, most did not perceive these as factional blocs facing off in county after county and most still acted within the parameters of service to the crown, even during a minority. The Venetian commentator, Giacomo Soranzo, noted that Huntingdon was also a match for Dorset in their locality.¹³³ William Horsley believed that Dorset and Huntingdon dominated Leicestershire, and the dowager duchess of Suffolk dominated Lincolnshire, which left only Nottinghamshire for Rutland. Rutland was one of the wealthiest landowners in all these shires, but Leicestershire and Lincolnshire were regarded as Grey, Hastings and Brandon countries, meaning he had to concentrate his local interests in Nottinghamshire.¹³⁴ His uncle, Sir Richard Manners, assisted him in this. Manners was one of the most prominent gentlemen in Leicestershire and had extensive military and civil experience.¹³⁵ He was also closely associated with the borough of Leicester itself.¹³⁶ He was steward of the honor of Leicester, part of the duchy of Lancaster, from 1541, reinforcing the familial ties with the city.¹³⁷ As an esquire of the body, Manners was in an intimate position at court and perfectly represents, through his offices at the centre and in the localities, the system used by Henry from the 1520s of building clientage connections with the localities by filling household offices with supernumeraries.¹³⁸ Rutland tried to acquire local offices to increase his worship in Nottinghamshire, including the bailiwick of Newark.¹³⁹ However, although this heightened competition between aristocratic neighbours, it rarely degenerated into faction and differed from Seymour's approach.

Rutland's most interesting statement about Seymour was that 'he counselled me to make moche of the gentilmen in my countrey, but more of suche honest & welthy yeomen as wer ringleaders in good townes', noting that 'as for the gentilmen ther is no great trust to be had of them'. Did Seymour recognise the strong link between the gentry and the crown? Rutland should entertain the lesser gentry and the yeomanry, be affable towards them and 'by that gentill enterteynment allure all their good willes to go with me whither I woold leade them'. The notion of allurement is

¹³³ *Calendar of state papers and manuscripts, relating to English affairs, existing in the archives and collections of Venice...*, eds. R. Brown *et al* (ix vols.; London, 1864-1898) v, pp. 457-458.

¹³⁴ *The manuscripts of... the duke of Rutland*, i, pp. 32-33.

¹³⁵ Manners had been a muster commissioner in 1546, justice of the peace for Leicestershire from 1547 and steward to Seymour in 1548. Apart from his offices pertaining to the honor of Leicester itself, the duchy of Lancaster was the source of a large portion of his estate as feodary of Nottinghamshire, Derbyshire, Staffordshire and Yorkshire. Somerset had appointed him deputy warden of the east and middle marches on 22 August 1548. He was also constable of Nottingham Castle and keeper of the park, having originally jointly held the office of keeper of the ordnance there with Thomas Skevington, a Leicestershire neighbour: PRO, E 179/69/51; PRO, SP 10/2/1, M. fo. 2v; PRO, SP 10/5/17, M. fo. 60r; Bindoff, i, pp. 687-688; ii, pp. 563-564; J. Bain (ed.), *The Hamilton papers. Letters and papers illustrating the political relations of England and Scotland in the XVIth century*, vol. ii, 1543-1590 (Edinburgh, 1892), pp. 620-623; LPL, MS. 3193, fo. 93; LPL, MS. 3193, fo. 95; APC, ii, pp. 74, 107, 458; iii, pp. 31, 200; PRO, SP 46/1, fo. 220v; PRO, C 66/801, m. 15d; *Calendar of patent rolls*, i, p. 85; *Somerville Duchy of Lancaster*, i, pp. 531, n. 4, 547, 564-565, 568, 570, 584; PRO, SP 10/5/17, M. fo. 60r.

¹³⁶ M. Bateson (ed.), *Records of the borough of Leicester...* (vii vols.; Cambridge, 1905), iii, pp. 55-56.

¹³⁷ *Somerville Duchy of Lancaster*, i, pp. 564-565.

¹³⁸ PRO, LC 2/2/3/2, fo. 5r; PRO, E 179/69/62; PRO, E 179/69/63; Guy, 'Thomas Wolsey, Thomas Cromwell and the reform of Henrician government', pp. 35, 38-39, 53-57.

interesting, suggesting Seymour could procure their support through affability, rather than proffering something more specific as a source of attraction. Seymour believed that Catherine's death had not significantly altered his power and demanded of Rutland what he thought if in a year or two the king 'shuld have the honour & rule of his own doinges'. At present 'that *which* now is doone the kinges highnes beareth the charges and my brother receyveth the honour'. He made the telling point about Somerset that 'I woold not desire my lord my brothers hurt mary I woold wisshe he shuld rule but as a cheve counsellour'.¹⁴⁰ Seymour expressed an opinion that, to a large extent, other privy councillors held. For example, Paget also felt that Somerset was ruling like a king but, unlike Henry, was often heedless of counsel. However, Seymour was less guarded with Dorset, telling him by about December 1548, while they spoke in the gallery at Seymour Place, that he disliked the activities of Somerset and the privy council. Later he told him 'that he loved not the lorde protectour and wold haue the king haue thonour of his owne thinges', something he hoped to achieve within three years.¹⁴¹ Perhaps the price for sparing Sherington, who was attainted in early March (2 and 3 Edward VI, c. 17), was that he provide the decisive evidence against Seymour but there were plenty of others who gave damning depositions.¹⁴² Sherington wrote to Shrewsbury and Southampton on 20 February 1549, asking them to intervene on his behalf.¹⁴³ Although their response is uncertain, this demonstrates their potential influence and may indicate a partial restoration of the former lord chancellor. At about the same time, Sherington wrote to Somerset himself, asking for mercy, 'as you be accompted to seeke no bloud'.¹⁴⁴

Seymour seemed to be unwilling to meet with his brother in January 1549. However, P.F. Tytler's assertion that he was not permitted to speak in his defence, blaming this on 'the law, as it was administered in these iron times', is incorrect.¹⁴⁵ Seymour refused to speak in his defence unless he could have an open hearing where he could set out all his arguments for his own position as the king's uncle. A very full privy council sat at Westminster on 17 January and decided after 'diverse conferences' that Seymour should be arrested 'for the staye and repressing' of his 'attemptates'.¹⁴⁶ Sherington and Fowler were arrested and sent to the Tower two days later. Other members of Seymour's clientele, including Wightman and Harrington, were also apprehended.¹⁴⁷ When news of the lord admiral's detention reached France, Henry II regarded civil war as a possibility because he believed Seymour had wide support and the English polity was unstable. He instructed his English agents to watch events closely so that he would be able to take full

¹³⁹ *The manuscripts of... the duke of Rutland*, i, pp. 32-33.

¹⁴⁰ PRO, SP 10/6/12, M. fos. 33r-33v.

¹⁴¹ PRO, SP 10/6/7, M. fo. 18v.

¹⁴² Bindoff, iii, p. 303; Braddock, 'The royal household', pp. 155-156; APC, ii, pp. 246-247; PRO, SP 10/6/29, M. fos. 74r-75v; Jordan, *The young king*, pp. 384-385.

¹⁴³ Hatfield, Cecil MS. 150, fo. 105r.

¹⁴⁴ Hatfield, Cecil MS. 198, fo. 33r; Haynes, p. 67.

¹⁴⁵ Tytler, i, pp. 136-137.

¹⁴⁶ APC, ii, pp. 236-238.

advantage of the situation. Nothing came of it.¹⁴⁸ The privy council had a clear enough sense of Seymour's intentions by then and charged him with treason. Seymour was uncooperative.¹⁴⁹ He was found guilty after the passage of a bill of attainder (2 and 3 Edward VI, c. 18), subject to 'quite a sophisticated juridical procedure', and executed on 20 March.¹⁵⁰

Seymour's household had to be dealt with too. In about March 1549, Sir Hugh Paulet and John Berwick wrote a memorandum of 'the names of such of my L. Admiralles seruauntes as were thought mete...to serue my Lordes grace'.¹⁵¹ Paulet and Berwick seem to have been assigned this specific task. Paulet was a Somerset gentleman and the duke's neighbour. Ties of vicinage probably made him a trusted adherent, one of the less formal but more valued members of Somerset's clientele.¹⁵² On 18 January 1549, he was instructed, with Chaloner and John Yernley, to go to Seymour's house at Bromham in Wiltshire. They were to inform the household of their master's committal, while inventorying his goods, searching for any documents, and entrusting the safeguarding of the house to one of Seymour's officers or one of the local gentry.¹⁵³ They had been specifically ordered to learn what they could about the members of the household: 'noting in ther ^the^ [sic] all such maters as they may by any meanes of them with whom they shall haue to do'.¹⁵⁴ Therefore, Paulet was in an ideal position to assess suitable members of Seymour's household who could be recruited into Somerset's. This amalgamation or appropriation of another's clients was common in mid-Tudor England, even when the former patron was still engaged in public life. Somerset probably hoped to assuage disaffection by an astute demonstration of good lordship. It was also important that particular attention be paid to the household at Bromham because Wiltshire was Somerset's 'country'. Berwick was Somerset's receiver-general, ranger of Savernake Forest and bailiff of Alderbury Hundred, having served since the 1530s.¹⁵⁵ He was a trusted member of Somerset's household and was sole commissioner in February 1549 to oversee the inventorying and transport of Sherington's plate, jewels, money and goods at Lacock.¹⁵⁶ Berwick was also one of Somerset's servants (the others included Thynne, Kelway, John Seymour, who had been taken into ducal service after Seymour's

¹⁴⁷ APC, ii, p. 239; Bindoff, iii, p. 611; PRO, SP 10/6/7, M. fos. 18r-18v; PRO, SP 10/9/48, M. fo. 90v.

¹⁴⁸ On 23 January, the privy council banned armed men from being within three miles of the court: Hatfield, Cecil MS. 150, fos. 62r-63v; Haynes, p. 135; Hughes and Larkin, i, p. 440.

¹⁴⁹ APC, ii, pp. 246-247; PRO, SP 10/6/27, M. fos. 69r-71v; APC, ii, pp. 258-259.

¹⁵⁰ Bellamy, *The Tudor law of treason*, p. 212.

¹⁵¹ Longleat, Seymour MS. 4, fos. 126r-126v.

¹⁵² PRO, SP 10/2/1, M. fo. 3r; PRO, SP 10/13/70, M. fo. 136v; PRO, SP 10/13/76, M. fos. 148r-148Av; PRO, SP 10/13/74, M. fos. 144r-145v; PRO, SP 10/14/14, M. fos. 23r-23v; PRO, SP 10/18/44, M. fo. 82r.

¹⁵³ PRO, SP 10/6/2, M. fos. 3r-4v.

¹⁵⁴ PRO, SP 10/6/2, M. fos. 3v-4r.

¹⁵⁵ *Report on the manuscripts of the...marquess of Bath*, ed. Blatcher, iv, pp. 331, 333; Longleat, Seymour MS. 10, fo. 168v.

¹⁵⁶ Similarly, another ducal servant, Fulmerston, and Peckham, lieutenant of the Tower, were assigned to the same task at Sherington's London residence on Tower Hill: PRO, SP 10/6/29, M. fos. 74r-75v.

execution, and Colthurst), entrusted to receive in trust property conveyed to the duke as a means of protecting land acquisitions.¹⁵⁷

Paulet and Berwick recommended eighteen men for service under Somerset, probably about fifteen per cent of Seymour's household.¹⁵⁸ These included, William Clerke, a Hertfordshire gentleman, who was probably searcher of the port of Bristol, John Perte, auditor of the court of augmentations, Richard Fynnymour and William Sturton. Fynnymour and Sturton should both be 'retayner[s]'. Clerke, Perte and Fynnymour 'be very mete men ffor my lordes Grace'. Perte was an MP, joint receiver of royal lands in south Wales with Wightman and joint bailiff of Hartbury, Gloucestershire, and had been involved in land transactions with Sharrington. He helped Anthony Bouchier to audit Catherine's accounts and may have been introduced into Seymour's service through her. Perte owed his election to either Catherine or her husband. Several of Seymour's other important household servants were put forward too, including Michael Apesley, clerk of the kitchen, William Cowche, Robert Cowche, who had declined £15 per annum and his diet in the hope of receiving spiritual preferment from Somerset, the brewer John Kyng and William Barrow, bailiff of Shoreham in Sussex. Equally, people were keen to find a new master: three who were 'vnprovyded' were James Turdrey, John Iland and Thomas Fytton.¹⁵⁹ It is not possible to know how many were retained. Paulet and Berwick were enthusiastic about the candidates. Clerke was employed in a position of trust, receiving a privy council order for payment of Somerset's provisions after his second arrest. Perte had been promoted to receiver of the court of augmentations, as had Wightman, by March 1553.¹⁶⁰ This suggests that at least some were taken and Somerset granted patronage to others.

Seymour's behaviour showed the hallmarks of faction and the development of an affinity.¹⁶¹ He sought to gain access to the king in the hope of exercising greater control, thereby circumventing Somerset's 'protection', and he attempted to build a following at court, in parliament and in the counties, while also controlling key offices and using them for his own gain.¹⁶² Despite his inventive cultivation of local men, Seymour remained essentially a court politician. He tried to increase his clientele as rapidly as possible by marrying Catherine, who gave him the necessary

¹⁵⁷ PRO, SP 10/9/53, M. fos. 102r-103v; Pocock, pp. 123-124; Longleat, Seymour MS. 9, fos. 234r, 235v, 236r, 237v-238v.

¹⁵⁸ Longleat, Seymour MS. 4, fos. 126r-126v.

¹⁵⁹ Cowche was probably not William Crowche, receiver of the duke's Somerset estates, although it is not impossible: Longleat, Seymour MS. 4, fos. 126r-126v; PRO, SP 10/6/3, M. fo. 10r; Bindoff, i, pp. 465-466, 656-658, 735-736; iii, pp. 88-89; PRO, SP 10/6/3, M. fo. 10r.

¹⁶⁰ APC, iii, p. 440; PRO, SP 46/1, fos. 144r-144v; PRO, SP 10/18/14, M. fos. 25r-26v.

¹⁶¹ Adams, 'Faction, clientage and party', pp. 33-39; 'Eliza enthroned?', pp. 55-77; 'The English military clientele', pp. 217-27; 'Favourites and factions at the Elizabethan court', in R.G. Asch and A.M. Birke (eds.), *Princes, patronage and the nobility. The court at the beginning of the modern age c. 1450-1650* (New York, 1991), pp. 265-287; 'Because I am of that Countrey & Mynde to Plant myself there', pp. 21-74.

¹⁶² Guy, *Tudor England*, p. 200.

wealth as well as her own large household. His actions, especially his agitation to be governor of the king's person and his attitude towards his clientele, created instability and undermined Somerset's authority. He did not have the necessary experience, ability or authority for the greater political role he wanted and attempted to use the king to increase his own position. Similarly, he used Jane to strengthen his ties with Dorset, and Elizabeth to enhance his prestige and influence and to give him a new source of potential wealth and power. Seymour's activities can be viewed in the round because of the full depositions, and life within the Seymour household can be vividly reconstructed to show something of the social dynamic of mid-Tudor political society. Seymour does not appear to have had a large core of fidelity clients but his clientele was beginning to develop along similar lines to Somerset's, especially as he encouraged and incorporated quite a wide circle in his following, and these men were acting as a mutual self-support group to some extent. However, Seymour's activities were an aberration of the normal attitude to clientage and usually only occurred in wider political society during crises.

5. *The 1549 rebellions*

With Seymour's fall and the failure of his Scottish policy, Somerset's position became shakier by the middle of 1549.¹ However, the great catastrophe of his political career was not caused by faction but by social upheaval and the consequent reaction. Paget had warned Somerset to be more careful in policy-making and avoid attempting too much too soon. Successive historians have followed contemporaries in saying that the rebellions of 1549 were caused to some degree by the lord protector's policies. These policies were tied to his concept of good lordship or the society of orders, which in turn he felt bolstered his popularity and strengthened his position. His style of government isolated him. He wanted confirmation of his policies by his colleagues and could not understand their diminishing support as the crises mounted. Because, in his eyes, his goals were synonymous with the common good, Somerset failed to see the divergence between himself and the privy council until they presented the political nation with a viable alternative that would regularise government and retrench policy. Somerset listened to divergent counsel and made critical errors, relying more heavily on his own clientele and alienating his colleagues. He widened his clientele in surprising ways by fostering ties with the English commons in 1548-1549. This was possible because he had acquired much of the king's authority. The commons acted as a bottom-up influence on him but were an adjunct to his clientele rather than a central component and complicated his relationship with his colleagues and the political nation. He cultivated a relationship with them based on his regental authority.² Somerset was unfortunate because his attempts to contain disorder in 1548 and early 1549 were highly successful and he could not have known the midsummer rebellions would be so severe and complex. The roles of Somerset's household, 'new' men, county clientele, the county elite itself, and the privy council during 1549 will be examined to assess the nature of mid-Tudor political power at court and in the country. How these people behaved during the collapse of Somerset's regime indicates their attitude towards the protectorate, particularly in its latter stages. It would be useful to examine this in some detail, especially pertaining to the county elite (the nobles, gentlemen, JPs, sheriffs, muster commissioners, bailiffs and constables), who were first utilised against the rebels and then by Somerset and the London council against each other during the October coup. This will be done over the next two chapters. The theoretical structure of power and the bases of Somerset's clientele have been partly examined in chapters two and three; it is now necessary to add to this by looking at how they operated in practice during crises.

¹ Robinson, *Original letters*, ii, no. ccci, p. 648; Bush, *Government policy*, pp. 32-39.

² See above, pp. 24, 36-42.

As well as his colleagues on the privy council and at court, his county clients and servants, Somerset relied on the county elite (including 'the speciall men') to support his regime, particularly the nobles, gentlemen, JPs, sheriffs, muster commissioners, bailiffs and constables. He began to lose this support as his regime's problems mounted because of failure in Scotland, mounting debt, inflation, growing unrest and uncertain religious and social policies. This was exacerbated by his ambivalent attitude towards the commons.³ The 'political nation' constituted the peerage, upper clergy, gentry and some other 'enfranchised persons'. Their power came through possession of broad acres, local influence through office and association with or control of clienteles made up of kinsmen, servants, friends and neighbours. The knights, esquires and some of the more prominent yeomanry served in their locality as magistrates, tax collectors and muster commissioners, fulfilling a variety of roles because of their local connections, landed income and expertise in several fields. Borough citizens could acquire the 'freedom' of their town by patrimony, apprenticeship or purchase, allowing them to participate in urban politics and government.⁴ The necessity of service meant that the gentry had to be engaged in the world, *negotium* over *otium*. The latter was not completely superseded by the former but public service in the locality and at court was central to the definition of gentility.⁵ The increased volume of directions from the centre forced the localities into a closer relationship with the court. Many county gentlemen welcomed this, especially if they were making their career at court. Local power itself was organised formally and informally. The sheriffs and JPs were the leading formal agents of local royal power but they were invariably selected largely on the basis of local consequence (they were county nobles and gentlemen), connections with their neighbours, possession of broad acres and experience in local politics. They were often men who performed more than one role. The JPs would act as muster and subsidy commissioners, what Professor Guy has described as them 'wearing other hats'. They were placed on commissions of coastal defence and oversaw the manning of the beacons. They dominated the commissions of sewers that supervised the drainage systems in Lincolnshire and East Anglia.⁶ These commissioners were appointed by the government and were responsible to the privy council. Somerset wanted to cultivate a closer relationship with these county leaders. The polity relied on crown agents and clienteles in the locality working together and it is not always easy to distinguish in what capacity a man was operating, as a royal officer or a member of a clientele. Usually this is because he was acting as both at the same time. People were chosen to perform tasks because of connection and convenience. The crown used every available member of the county elite in order to fulfil a

³ Bush, *Government policy*, pp. 1-126; see below, pp. 228-243, 255-257.

⁴ Guy, *Tudor England*, pp. 45-46; S. Alford, 'Politics and political history in the Tudor century', *Historical Journal*, 42 (1999), pp. 537-539.

⁵ F. Heal and C. Holmes, *The gentry in England and Wales, 1500-1700* (Basingstoke, 1994), pp. 166-201, 276-289.

⁶ New commissions of sewers were issued in March 1547 for Lincolnshire, Essex, Norfolk, Kent and Cambridgeshire and were dominated by the JPs: Guy, *Tudor England*, pp. 169-176; D. Loades, *Power in Tudor England* (Basingstoke, 1997), pp. 70-82; *Calendar of patent rolls*, i, pp. 78-79, 81, 83, 85-87.

variety of important duties and, although it is not possible to examine every aspect of this systematically, some of the more important activities will be looked at in investigating the events of 1549.

Disorder broke out in 1548 and 1549 because of inflationary pressure resulting from warfare and population increase. There was a riot in June 1548 in Great Livermere, Suffolk, and disorder in Buckinghamshire and Northamptonshire. There was an enclosure riot on Wroth's Enfield estate in August. However, the situation in the localities was quieter by autumn.⁷ Dr Shagan believes Somerset, because he did not have a king's authority, was forced to create a novel relationship with the commons based on popularity during the acute crises of the summer of 1549. He did this to secure the rebels' disbandment. This involved making extensive concessions, particularly to the Suffolk rebels, with both parties using rhetorical language to convey the impression that they had more common ground against the predations of the landlords than they really had. To Dr Shagan, this was popular politics.⁸ There may have been greater precedence for this than previously thought. Dr Watts detected the same dynamic relationship between political leaders and the commons during the mid-fifteenth century, with both parties articulating their ideas about the society of orders.⁹ Dr Shagan's important study has received strong criticism but he has opened up the debate.¹⁰ He does not see Somerset's special relationship with the commons as entirely conventional.¹¹ Somerset's style of government, while increasingly personal, dictatorial and independent of his colleagues, was also popular. Dr MacCulloch described Somerset's need to 'explain himself and win the approval of the wider population'. Somerset responded to bottom-up pressure from the commons and from men like John Hales, Paget, Smith and Cecil. Dr Shagan defined popularity as 'a conscious effort to appeal downward for support from those outside the political establishment, creating a power-base independent of either the court or local affinities'. This popularity was connected with the protests during the summer that were influenced in character by the movements for reform within the commonwealth going back to the 1530s. This made the dynamic of Somerset's populism curiously circular.¹² Paget would criticise Somerset over this popularity during the summer, writing in an almost mocking tone of 'your softenes, your opinion to be good to the pore. The opinion of suche as sayethe to your grace. O Syr, there was

⁷ B.L. Beer, *Rebellion and riot. Popular disorders in England during the reign of Edward VI* (Kent, Ohio, 1982), p. 142; BL Lansdowne MS. 238, fo. 320r; APC, ii, p. 219; Loach, *Edward VI*, pp. 58-66; see below, p. 113.

⁸ E.H. Shagan, 'Protector Somerset and the 1549 rebellions: new sources and new perspectives', *English Historical Review*, 114 (1999), pp. 34-63.

⁹ J.L. Watts, 'Ideas, principles and politics', in A.J. Pollard (ed.), *The Wars of the Roses* (Basingstoke and London, 1995), pp. 110-133.

¹⁰ Bush, 'Protector Somerset and the 1549 rebellions', pp. 103-112; G.W. Bernard, 'New perspectives or old complexities?', *English Historical Review*, 115 (2000), pp. 113-120; E.H. Shagan, 'Popularity' and the 1549 rebellions revisited', *English Historical Review*, 115 (2000), pp. 121-133.

¹¹ Shagan, 'Protector Somerset and the 1549 rebellions', pp. 34-63; MacCulloch, *Tudor church militant*, pp. 41-52, 147-152.

¹² Shagan, 'Protector Somerset and the 1549 rebellions', pp. 36-37, n. 1; MacCulloch, *Tudor church militant*, pp. 49-52, 119-126, 147-152; see above, pp. 54-57, 59-65.

never man that had the hartis of the pore as youe have'.¹³ Therefore, Somerset's clientele was bottom-up as well as top-down, an amorphous and changing structure, but any appeal he made to the commons was largely confined to 1548-1549 and did not mean that he had a huge following all the time or that he was even willing to use the general populace to their full potential, particularly during the October coup.

Somerset sought the good opinion of the commons and utilised them through political necessity, especially because of the rebellions and enclosure riots of 1549.¹⁴ One means of doing this was to send out commissions of enquiry into enclosures. These were issued partly as a response to petitions from the commons and partly as a response to conciliar discussion of depopulation and inflation.¹⁵ The lord protector turned to Hales, a clerk of the hanaper of chancery, who became interested in enclosure reform. Sadler probably introduced Hales to Somerset, his friend and close colleague in the exchequer. Somerset recruited Hales to his clientele, rewarding him by making him a member of the quorum for Middlesex and Warwickshire and increasingly listening to his advice. Hales was one of Somerset's 'new' men and described as 'lerner' in about 1547-1548. Sadler probably procured his return as MP for Preston in 1547, suggesting Hales was his client too and reinforcing the relationship between them and Somerset.¹⁶ The first commission of enquiry into enclosures was issued as early as 1 June 1548. The commissioners included Sir Francis Russell, Russell's heir, and Sir Fulk Greville of Alcester in Warwickshire. Hales chaired the commission because he was one of Somerset's men, giving the lord protector greater influence over its activities.¹⁷ He wrote to Somerset from Windsor on 24 July 1548 to inform him that the first circuit had been a success and the people, 'who wer suspected to be disobedient & inclyned to sedition, we fynde most tractable obedient & quyet'. He added that the regime would be secure against sedition and disorder if efficient and loyal JPs and preachers better served the localities. His letter was well pitched, and he gave the impression that he effaced all flattery towards the duke, while commending his policy nonetheless. Yet, Hales wrote that 'ther was neuer kyng that had somany faithfull and assured subiectes as his grace shalhaue, nor neuer gouernour vnder a kyng that had so many mens hart and good willes as your grace shalbe assured of', especially 'if ther be any waie or pollicie of man' to advance protestantism.¹⁸ This skilful use of rhetoric is reminiscent of the language and imagery Hales would employ in the 'defense' he later produced to

¹³ PRO, SP 10/8/4, M. fos. 8r-8v.

¹⁴ PRO, SP 10/8/56, M. fos. 103r-104v; F.W. Russell, *Kett's Rebellion in Norfolk* (London, 1859), pp. 202-203; PRO, SP 10/8/4, M. fos. 8r-11v.

¹⁵ BL Lansdowne MS. 238, fos. 293v-294r.

¹⁶ PRO, C 66/801, mm. 16d, 23d; *Calendar of patent rolls*, i, pp. 86, 90; PRO, SP 46/162, fo. 54r; Bindoff, ii, pp. 276-277; MacCulloch, *Tudor church militant*, pp. 46-47, 50, 122-123, 147.

¹⁷ *Calendar of patent rolls*, i, pp. 419-420; BL Lansdowne MS. 238, fos. 316v, 319r; Loach, *Edward VI*, pp. 63-64.

¹⁸ PRO, SP 10/4/33, M. fos. 64r-64v; Tytler, i, pp. 113-117.

refute criticism of his conduct on these enclosure commissions.¹⁹ Somerset appeared to respond to these ideas enthusiastically, particularly by supporting Hales's view of the society of orders.²⁰

Hales was certainly articulating a persuasive ideology. However, he wrote that his commissioners had to contend with attempts to corrupt the jurors and those who sued to be sheriffs the next year did so in order to affect the complexion of any future enquiries, while he felt hampered because this was not a commission of *oyer et terminer* (to hear and determine). There may be some truth in this. Several candidates for sheriffdoms were leading graziers. John Spencer, esquire, of Althorp in Northamptonshire, had one of the biggest flocks of sheep in England. John Cope, esquire, was also a Northamptonshire grazer. Generally, Somerset was content that the sheriffs be selected from the county elite, especially the substantial gentlemen. Hales wanted a commission of *oyer et terminer*. He also advised that the suspicions of the local gentry might be allayed somewhat if the commissions were extended to the country in general because they believed that certain counties (Bedfordshire, Berkshire, Buckinghamshire, Leicestershire, Northamptonshire, Oxfordshire and Warwickshire) were being singled out for some inexplicable reason. The waters were muddied even more by the presence of the local JPs in large numbers on the current commission of enquiry.²¹ Hales warned Somerset that if the commission was dealt with in the exchequer as previous ones had been, then the attorney-general and solicitor-general 'maye put in & p[ut] out, do & vndo what they liste your graces entent shalbe frustrat & our labours spent in vayne'.²² This advocacy was taking a dangerous course because Hales was counselling Somerset to circumvent the authority of the law officers to examine commissions of enquiry, and presumably the privy council too, if necessary. Here, a client was substantially influencing his patron. Yet, Somerset advised the commission to be more cautious and in August commanded its members to return to towns where disorder was growing as a consequence of misinterpretation of its work by the commons.²³

In sending out commissions of enquiry in 1548 and 1549, Somerset was trying to address what he took to be the causes of inflation; enclosure of common land and engrossing.²⁴ He hoped to carry these reforms through because of his sense of social duty but the enquiries contributed to popular unrest. The enquiries were tied to a renewed notion that society should be revived through a combination of religious, economic and social reformation, something Professor Bush now

¹⁹ BL Lansdowne MS. 238, fos. 291r-325v, in Hales's holograph. I am grateful to Mark Taviner for this information about Hales's holograph.

²⁰ PRO, SP 10/4/33, M. fo. 64v.

²¹ Strype (ed.), *Ecclesiastical memorials*, ii, II, p. 350; BL Lansdowne MS. 238, fos. 299v-300r; *Calendar of patent rolls*, i, p. 232; v, pp. 338-339; Bindoff, i, pp. 591-592, 693-694; ii, pp. 563-564; Jordan, *The young king*, p. 403; see below, pp. 239-241.

²² PRO, SP 10/4/33, M. fos. 64v-65r.

²³ BL Lansdowne MS. 238, fos. 316v, 319r.

²⁴ The second commission was issued on 11 April 1549: Hughes and Larkin, i, pp. 427-429, 451-453.

recognises was more radical and important than he previously thought.²⁵ However, the main causes of inflation were rising population, war and debasement. Smith recognised this but Hales's assertion that inflation was caused by enclosures was more palatable to Somerset.²⁶ Somerset issued a harsh proclamation on 11 April 1549 in response to Hales's claims that the landowners were hampering his work. This succeeded in alienating the goodwill of the political nation, the very people on whom Somerset depended. Warwick was furious when locals took matters into their own hands during the summer and ploughed up some of his lands, while Sir Anthony Aucher wrote to Cecil that 'to be playne [I] thyncke my Lords grace [Somerset] rather to will the decaye of the gentilmen then otherwyse'. Aucher believed that the activities of 'comen welthe' Latimer (not Hugh Latimer), who was obtaining pardons for others, prevented the people from dispersing, while Somerset's ambivalent response encouraged rather than precluded disorder. The lord protector did not give the local gentlemen enough support. Sir Thomas Cheyne, lord warden of the Cinque Ports and treasurer of the household, felt hampered in his efforts to restore order because Somerset had not replied to his letter concerning seditious activity among the commons.²⁷ Aucher wrote to Thynne on 15 September, telling him he had already written to Cecil about the problems in Kent and explaining that Latimer was taking petitions from the commons in order to send them to London, while describing himself as the duke's client. Aucher wished that he 'knewe a lytle of my lordes mynd and some parte of youre fancy'. This was natural because Thynne was one of the duke's principal counsellors. Aucher had connections with the steward because of his friendship with the late John Dering of Kent, a ducal servant, MP and JP.²⁸

Paget warned of the danger that the 'fote taketh vpon him the parte of the head, and comyns ys become a kinge, appointing condicions, and lawes to the governours saying grannt this and that, and we will go home', while worrying that the lord protector had 'some greater enterpryse in your hedde, that leaue so muche to the multitude'. When they had discussed the nature of the protectorate, especially concerning social and economic reform, on 2 February 1547, Paget told Somerset to avoid being too liberal. He knew that Somerset had genuine social concern but feared

²⁵ Bush, *Government policy*, pp. 43-48; 'Protector Somerset and the 1549 rebellions', pp. 109-110; Hughes and Larkin, i, pp. 427-429, 451-453.

²⁶ Bush, *Government policy*, pp. 1, 33, 40-83; Hoak, *The king's council*, pp. 168, 182, 186, 206; PRO, SP 10/2/21, M. fos. 69Ar-80v; PRO, SP 10/5/20, M. fos. 120r-125v; PRO, SP 10/5/22, M. fos. 128r-141v; PRO, SP 10/8/4, M. fos. 8r-11v; Sir Thomas Smith, *The common-welth of England, and maner of government thereof...* (STC 22859; London, 1589); E. Lamond (ed.) *A discourse of the common weal of this realm of England* (Cambridge, 1954 edn.); Dewar, *Smith*, pp. 49-55; J. Youings, 'The South-Western Rebellion of 1549', *Southern History*, 1 (1979), pp. 99-122.

²⁷ Hughes and Larkin, i, pp. 451-453; BL Lansdowne MS. 238, fos. 291r-325v; PRO, SP 10/7/35, M. fos. 91r-91v; Beer, *Northumberland*, pp. 70-71; PRO, SP 10/8/56, M. fos. 103r-104v; B.L. Beer and R.J. Nash, 'Hugh Latimer and the Lusty Knave of Kent: the commonwealth movement of 1549', *Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research*, 52 (1979), pp. 175-178.

²⁸ Longleat, Thynne MS. 2, fos. 145r-145v; PRO, C 66/801, m. 14d; *Calendar of patent rolls*, i, p. 85; Bindoff, ii, p. 39; PRO, SP 10/8/2, M. fo. 4v; PRO, SP 10/8/62, M. fos. 114r-114v; Tytler, i, p. 203; Longleat, Thynne MS. 2, fos. 136r-137v; PRO, SP 10/13/20, M. fos. 41r-42v; PRO, SP 10/13/21, M. fos. 43r-43v; PRO, SP 10/13/23, M. fos. 46r-47v.

the rapid nature of change under the protectorate.²⁹ It was not that the privy council was opposed to reform. In the new protestant polity it would be a necessary *quid pro quo* to induce the commons to embrace religious change but at least some of the councillors wanted to wait until the realm was in a quieter state.³⁰ Warwick was among the more cautious privy councillors and was certainly concerned about the growing disorder. He visited his midland estates in August 1548, where he heard rumours of sedition that made him question the efficacy of Hales's work on the commissions. He worried that the commissions would lead to disorder rather than social and economic improvement and may have been angry at what he regarded as dangerous consequences. Hales tried to assuage him and used his relationship with the earl and his clients. Warwick understood the importance of the manorial system and the society of orders, recognising the necessity of social justice in a balanced commonwealth. Consequently, he relented.³¹ Hales defended himself against charges that his activities had stirred trouble by pointing out that disorder broke out in places the commissioners had not visited.³² He told Somerset that Warwick had heard the same rumours when he passed through Buckinghamshire and intended to arrest the ringleaders, 'so moche he louethe quyetnes'.³³

Rebellions tended to spread from very isolated circumstances that had been insufficiently checked by the local officers. The need to contain them led to heavy reliance on these local officers, demonstrating their dual role in military and civil matters. One reason for the appointment of certain men, men of property and broad acres, as JPs was the necessity of raising large numbers of men to control the localities. Men who had many tenants were therefore ideal candidates. There were also special commissioners appointed to represent the government in the more volatile counties, who had full royal authority.³⁴ In July 1548 the commissioners for Kent, Sir Edward Wotton, Sir Anthony St Leger, Sir James Hales, Sir George Harper and Sir John Norton, produced a memorandum for Somerset concerning popular protests in the county. Wotton and Hales were of the quorum, Harper was a commissioner of the peace.³⁵ Wotton and St Leger were important courtiers and substantial gentlemen, the former was a privy councillor and twice sheriff, and the latter had been lord deputy of Ireland. Hales, Harper and Norton were among the local upper gentry and regarded as dependable.³⁶ Wotton, St Leger, Hales, Harper and Norton reported that the commons were dispersed with difficulty after they were given letters of assurance and £80 to £100 was provided for the poor to go home (effectively bribes). The commissioners advised that

²⁹ PRO, SP 10/8/4, M. fos. 8v-9r; Alnwick Castle, Northumberland, Syon MS. 467, fos. 106r-106v.

³⁰ Bush, 'Protector Somerset and the 1549 rebellions', pp. 103-112.

³¹ BL Lansdowne MS. 238, fos. 319v-320r, 321v-325v; Strype (ed.), *Ecclesiastical memorials*, ii, I, pp. 149-152; Beer, *Northumberland*, pp. 70-71; Bush, *Government policy*, pp. 44-45, n. 24, 63-64, 74-76; Loades, *Northumberland*, pp. 106-108, 120.

³² BL Lansdowne MS. 238, fos. 297r-297v.

³³ BL Lansdowne MS. 238, fos. 319v-320r.

³⁴ Jordan, *The young king*, pp. 355-356.

³⁵ Hatfield, Cecil MS. 150, fos. 117r-118v; PRO, C 66/801, m. 14d; *Calendar of patent rolls*, i, p. 85.

all offences committed prior to the present should be pardoned and requested a copy of the proclamation enforcing statutes on seditious rumours and authority to make proclamations at Maidstone and elsewhere.³⁷ They also received articles that a large number of the commons wished Somerset to look at, which were enclosed.³⁸ This was mirrored in 1549, when Somerset received articles from the western rebels, the Norfolk rebels, the Thetford rebels and others.³⁹ He was cultivating a direct relationship with the commons as early as 1548 and this proved successful. The riot on Wroth's estate in August 1548 was handled carefully by the privy council and, understanding that the court of duchy chamber had already settled the dispute by decree, four rioters were arrested and six bound over.⁴⁰ Therefore, Wroth's interests were protected. In general, the disturbances of 1548 were handled successfully by the privy council and the local officers.⁴¹ Professor Jordan noted that, with the exception of the 'always dour Paget', nobody could have expected rebellions to break out the following year.⁴² However, Wroth petitioned the court of duchy chamber again after another enclosure riot on 13 July 1549. Among its leaders were Thomas Cordle, Thomas Wilson and John Forster, who had been imprisoned for the previous riot, and Robert Whyte, marshal, a relative of John Whyte, who was bound over the first time. These men were 'accompened *with* a grete nombre of other Riottus sedicyous & trayterous people', whose names were as yet unknown to Wroth. In leaving his property 'to lye open as a waste', they were providing a bad example for 'other lyke malefactors evell disposed & sedycious people' to follow and if 'remydie & condigne & worthy punysshement' was not forthcoming the king's peace would be in doubt.⁴³ The situation had deteriorated.

Since May 1549 hopes of 'quyetnes' were diminishing, with serious unrest erupting in half a dozen counties, while Cornwall and Devon rebelled in June and Norfolk followed in July. These were the most serious rebellions but many other parts of England witnessed deep unrest. In most counties the local elite were able to restore order without too much assistance from the government. The earl of Arundel's role in keeping Surrey quiet and restoring order in Sussex without too much trouble is well known.⁴⁴ The similar situation in Somerset is worth looking at in more detail. Fulmerston wrote to the lord protector from Bath about it on 8 May.⁴⁵ Fulmerston was originally a Howard client from Norfolk but had acquired a landed interest in Wiltshire and

³⁶ Bindoff, ii, pp. 302-304; iii, pp. 26-27, 659-660; Brady, *The chief governors*, pp. 24-34, 37-44, 45-46, 48-50, 52-53.

³⁷ Hatfield, Cecil MS. 150, fo. 117r; Hughes and Larkin, i, pp. 387-389.

³⁸ The articles are no longer extant: Hatfield, Cecil MS. 150, fo. 117v; see above, pp. 108-109, 111-112.

³⁹ Rose-Troup, *The Western Rebellion*, pp. 492-494; BL Harley MS. 304, fos. 75r-78v; Russell, *Kett's Rebellion*, pp. 48-56, 203-204; Fletcher, *Tudor rebellions*, pp. 120-123; Bush, 'Protector Somerset and the 1549 rebellions', p. 112, n. 2; Shagan, 'Protector Somerset and the 1549 rebellions', pp. 57-58, 61, 63.

⁴⁰ APC, ii, p. 219.

⁴¹ PRO, SP 10/5/10, M. fos. 32r-33v; Jordan, *The young king*, p. 356.

⁴² Jordan, *The young king*, p. 356.

⁴³ PRO, DL 1/27, fo. 59r.

⁴⁴ PRO, SP 10/7/44, M. fos. 116r-116v; see also Pocock, p. 14; L. Stone, 'Patriarchy and paternalism in Tudor England: the earl of Arundel and the peasants' revolt of 1549', *Journal of British Studies*, 13, no. 2 (1974), pp. 19-23.

⁴⁵ Longleat, Seymour MS. 4, fos. 104r-105v.

Gloucestershire. With William Crowche, receiver of the duke's Somerset estates, bailiff of Monkton Farleigh and, through Seymour patronage, MP for Leominster in 1547, he attempted to quiet the protests in Frome, Somerset. They were assisted by the bishop of Bath and Wells (Barlow), Lord Stourton and John Horner, senior. Bath and Wells and Stourton were JPs for Somerset, as was Horner's son. Stourton was also Somerset's client. Barlow would be described as Somerset's agent in Hampshire in a tract produced during the October coup. He was a substantial Somerset landowner, one of the more enthusiastic reformers, and supported the religious reforms undertaken during the protectorate, but suffered no reversal of fortune for any Seymour association during Northumberland's ascendancy.⁴⁶ The lord protector's clients attempted to maintain order in his country. This was expected of members of a clientele.⁴⁷ Fulmerston told Somerset that an enclosure riot occurred on 5 May. The next day Fulmerston, Bath and Wells, Stourton, Horner and Crowche met to discuss this with the rioters and received the explanation that their behaviour was 'auvtorysed' by a recent proclamation. They were persuaded to disperse and bring their petitions to Stourton but a dangerous situation was developing, with other enclosure riots occurring in the county, despite the arrest of the ringleaders.⁴⁸ 'Lewde and vnfytyngge talke' was being spread, 'as in this sorte/ why shulde oone mane haue all and an other nothinge', and if the JPs imprisoned any more people 'yt shulde not be longe or they were fetched owte with a thowsand of them at the leste'.⁴⁹ Fulmerston, Horner and Crowche discussed the situation on 7 May, having carefully monitored local developments. They thought the gentry and 'the beste sorte' would be capable of maintaining order, if gathered, and decided to call the sessions together on 11 May, where JPs, other gentlemen, their servants, 'honest' yeomen and farmers could form a force to police the county. Fulmerston added that, as he was in the vicinity of the duke's Somerset estates, he should visit them to ensure they were secure. Frome was close to the ducal estate at Maiden Bradley in Wiltshire.⁵⁰

There was an enclosure riot on Herbert's Wilton estate in Wiltshire in late May. Again, the commons claimed to be protesting against enclosures while supporting the king and lord protector.⁵¹ The situation was made more delicate because the rebel leaders in East Anglia and the southeast were minor figures in county society and organised their protests as loyal demonstrations, while creating the image of co-operating with the government.⁵² The proclamations against enclosure were widely misconstrued, either wilfully or through ignorance,

⁴⁶ Bindoff, i, pp. 735-736; ii, pp. 176-177; *Report on the manuscripts of the...marquess of Bath*, ed. Blatcher, iv, pp. 116, 124-125, 127-129, 334, 140, 333; PRO, C 66/801, m. 20d; *Calendar of patent rolls*, i, p. 89; *The complete peerage*, eds. Gibbs *et al*, xii (part 1), pp. 307-308; BL Additional MS. 48126, fo. 3v; Jordan, *Threshold of power*, p. 320; MacCulloch, *Tudor church militant*, pp. 71-72, 82, 185; see below, pp. 215-216.

⁴⁷ Mertes, *The English noble household*, pp. 122-124.

⁴⁸ Longleat, Seymour MS. 4, fo. 104r.

⁴⁹ Longleat, Seymour MS. 4, fos. 104r-104v.

⁵⁰ Longleat, Seymour MS. 4, fos. 104v-105r.

⁵¹ *The manuscripts of...the duke of Rutland*, i, p. 36.

especially in Kent and Suffolk. This led to the issue of a proclamation on 23 May punishing enclosure rioters who used the earlier proclamations as a pretext to take the law into their own hands.⁵³ This proclamation ordered the rioters to desist, commanding JPs and sheriffs to use force against them, while all royal officers and subjects were to assist in restoring order. Information about the activities of rioters was to be given to the JPs. The local elite was to be galvanised into regaining authority.⁵⁴ These measures had some effect. Somerset wrote to Thynne on 15 June to congratulate him 'for appeasyng of the vnrule' of Odiham, Hampshire (another ducal estate), and recommended he use the proclamation of the king's free pardon issued the previous day as he thought best, 'that all thyngs might ones be at quiet'. St John's third son, Lord Chidiok Paulet, was bringing a copy.⁵⁵ Somerset's regime was now attempting to persuade the rioters to disband by offering free pardons. This countered the proclamation against them of 23 May. The government felt the rebels' behaviour, rather than attempting to restore the society of orders, was dangerously undermining it but wanted to mediate in order to restore calm as quickly as possible.⁵⁶

On 25 June, Somerset wrote to George Day, bishop of Chichester, having had communication with the mayor of Chichester and the local gentry. Somerset explained that his proclamation to the commons was intended to 'have exhortide them by mouth to be good subiectes'. Day was to tell the Sussex JPs not to pursue the rebels through the law. Again, Somerset was at pains to keep his word regarding pardons but he needed the compliance of the political elite. The earl of Arundel had been sent down to Surrey and Sussex in order to restore order there.⁵⁷ Similarly, Sir Nicholas Poyntes and Sir Anthony Kingston, kinsmen and MPs for Gloucestershire, commanded forces against the western rebels, suggesting local men were expected either to exert their influence to instil order or to do their duty against recalcitrant subjects.⁵⁸ The spring unrest appeared to be quelled relatively easily, especially in Oxfordshire and Buckinghamshire. Fortuitously, Lord Grey of Wilton, whose lands were principally in Buckinghamshire, was passing through these counties in early July with fifteen hundred soldiers to assist Russell, who had been dispatched to the west country.⁵⁹ Grey of Wilton's connections with Somerset were more substantial than most other members of the political nation because he had been lieutenant in Scotland (1547-1549) and benefited from Somerset's military patronage but he was not yet a fidelity client (if he ever

⁵² MacCulloch, *Tudor church militant*, pp. 140-141.

⁵³ Hughes and Larkin, i, pp. 427-429, 451-453, 461-462.

⁵⁴ The proclamation is variously dated 22 or 23 May: PRO, SP 10/7/18, M. fos. 55r-56v; Hughes and Larkin, i, pp. 461-462.

⁵⁵ Longleat, Seymour MS. 4, fos. 10r-10v; Bindoff, iii, pp. 70-71.

⁵⁶ Hughes and Larkin, i, pp. 461-464.

⁵⁷ Longleat, Seymour MS. 4, fos. 11r-11v; MacCulloch, *Tudor church militant*, pp. 45-47; Stone, 'Patriarchy and paternalism', pp. 19-23.

⁵⁸ In the aftermath of the Western Rebellion, Russell made Kingston his deputy and provost marshal, charged with hunting fugitives, executing rebels and restoring law and order: Rose-Troup, *The Western Rebellion*, pp. 300, 306-312; Bindoff, ii, pp. 468-471; iii, pp. 149.

⁵⁹ Pocock, pp. 26-27, 29.

became one). He relied on this financial support because he was perhaps the poorest member of the nobility, with a gross annual rental of less than £500, and he would become identified as part of Somerset's clientele in 1550-1551.⁶⁰ After pacifying Berkshire, Buckinghamshire, Northamptonshire and Oxfordshire, Grey of Wilton left it to the resident gentry to punish the rebels and maintain order because he had been ordered to repress the Western Rebellion. He directed them in 'deviding them selves *with* there forces' in order to orchestrate repression and instil control. Two thirds of the gentlemen listed for this task were commissioners of the peace (ten for Oxfordshire, one for Buckinghamshire and one for Norfolk and Oxfordshire) and five of these were on the quorum, with Sir William Farmer on the quorum for both Norfolk and Oxfordshire. This managerial role was still quite common for the aristocracy.⁶¹ Dorset and Huntingdon were to order the Leicestershire gentlemen to take control of the county, while ensuring that the sheriff, Sir Ambrose Cave, published the proclamation against rumours. Careful instructions were issued for Oxfordshire, Berkshire and Buckinghamshire in early July. Connection strengthened these working relationships. Grey of Wilton was related to Huntingdon by marriage and Cave was his military client.⁶² Dorset was effective and the privy council thanked him on 19 August for 'the good quietnes of the Shires of leicester and Rutlande/ throughe your good endeuer [^]diligence[^]'. He wanted his brother, Lord Thomas Grey, to assist him in his locality but the privy council preferred to send him with two hundred men to reinforce the marquis's other brother, Lord John Grey, at Ambleteuse, one of the outer forts of Boulogne then threatened by the French.⁶³ Where possible, the county elite, especially the gentry, were asked to quell disorder by relying on their own local authority and connections. Yet, even in a county like Somerset, over which control was being maintained, the situation was difficult and indeterminate.

On 1 July, large numbers of gentlemen were ordered to muster and come to Windsor. The elite were being used in their localities and to protect the king. A list was drawn up. The regime was in serious danger and many of the nobility and gentry of Essex, Hertfordshire, Middlesex, Sussex, Berkshire, Buckinghamshire, Oxfordshire and Kent were summoned. Other resident gentlemen were expected to maintain control over these counties. It was necessary to draw men from only the surrounding counties to protect the king. This was normal Tudor practice in time of war or insurrection. The northern counties were the recruiting ground for Scottish campaigns, the marches, Wales and the west country, provided men for Ireland and the southeast sent men to

⁶⁰ PRO, E 179/69/46; PRO, E 179/69/51; PRO, E 179/69/49; PRO, E 179/69/75; *The complete peerage*, eds. Gibbs *et al.*, vi, pp. 183-186; Stone, *Crisis of the aristocracy*, p. 760; Jordan, *The young king*, pp. 91-92; see below, pp. 205, 207-208, n. 54.

⁶¹ PRO, SP 10/8/32, M. fos. 55r-56r; PRO, C 66/801, mm. 8d, 17d-18d; *Calendar of patent rolls*, i, pp. 81, 87-88.

⁶² PRO, SP 10/7/31, M. fos. 85r-85v; Hughes and Larkin, i, pp. 455-456; R.C. Anderson, *Letters of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, from the archives of Southampton* (Southampton, 1921), pp. 66, 68-69; PRO, SP 10/8/9, M. fos. 27r-30v; Bush, *Government policy*, p. 89; Bindoff, i, pp. 594-595.

⁶³ PRO, SP 10/8/46, M. fo. 84r.

France. The nobility and gentry of Norfolk and Suffolk were obviously preoccupied.⁶⁴ Extensive corrections were made to this long list, suggesting that much consultation was done to ensure that a clear overview of the local elite was accurately produced.⁶⁵ The crown only tended to know of the peerage, knights and office holders in detail. The sheriff or *custos rotulorum* could be asked and the subsidy rolls or the general muster books consulted but an element of guesswork remained. Sometimes glaring omissions or mistakes were made.⁶⁶

The extent to which the men who dominated local commissions, especially of the peace, were being utilised is striking during the summer of 1549. For example, of the twenty-five men summoned to Windsor from Essex, eighteen were on the commission of the peace and seven of these were of the quorum. The endorsement makes clear the purpose of their summons: 'the names of suche as had *lettres* to come, or to send to windsour *primo* July 1549'. They were to bring their kinsmen, friends, servants and tenants; their clienteles. If they were incapable of coming themselves, they were to 'send' their clienteles. Peers featured prominently in the summons because of their local standing, military experience, large clienteles and traditional role as the king's guardians. This was accentuated because the king was a minor. The Essex nobility summoned to the king were Northampton, Oxford, Rich and Lord Morley, but not Somerset, St John, Russell or the earl of Sussex. Somerset and Russell were based in the west country, St John in Hampshire. Sussex may have been expected to remain in Essex, although his principal estates were in Norfolk and Somerset. Other notable men summoned were Darcy, Gates, Sir Thomas Josselyn, Sir Walter and Thomas Mildmay, Sir George Norton, Petre, Sir John Rainsford, Darcy's kinsman, and Sir Henry Tyrrell. Josselyn and Tyrrell were Oxford's clients.⁶⁷ The same pattern can be seen in, for example, Oxfordshire. Even within the political elite there was an inner-ring, which was relied on more heavily.⁶⁸ Signet letters were then issued from Richmond to summon these men. They were to levy and muster their clienteles, that is, their 'owne *tenantes servanntes* and others *within your* rules and offices and of *your* owne favorers'.⁶⁹ It is clear that the clientele was the body of kinsmen, servants, friends and tenants drawn from the patron's estates and or offices, including stewardships. It was a combination of private and public. These men had been selected to be royal stewards partly as a reward for service and partly because they were regarded

⁶⁴ PRO, SP 10/8/1, M. fos. 1Ar-1Av; PRO, SP 10/8/2, M. fos. 2r-5v; J.J. Goring, 'The military obligations of the English people, 1511-1558', unpublished University of London Ph.D. (1955), pp. 53-60, 110-137.

⁶⁵ PRO, SP 10/8/2, M. fos. 2r-5v.

⁶⁶ Goring, 'The military obligations of the English people', pp. 111-117.

⁶⁷ The members of the quorum were Sir Humphrey Brown, Sir Anthony Cooke, Sir Walter Mildmay, Northampton, Petre, Rich and Sir Clement Smith: PRO, SP 10/8/2, M. fos. 2r, 5v; PRO, SP 10/8/1, M. fos. 1Ar-1Av; PRO, C 66/801, m. 10d; *Calendar of patent rolls*, i, p. 83; PRO, E 179/69/46.

⁶⁸ Seven of the nine gentlemen summoned from Oxfordshire were commissioners of the peace but only one of these was on the quorum. Sir Thomas Pope, who was also on the quorum, was deleted from the list because he had already been listed for Surrey, where the core of his estates lay. The lack of members from the quorum might be explained because only nine men were summoned, less than from any other county: PRO, SP 10/8/2, M. fos. 2v, 4r; PRO, C 66/801, m. 18d; *Calendar of patent rolls*, i, p. 88.

⁶⁹ PRO, SP 10/8/1, M. fos. 1Ar-1Av, draft for the signet.

as competent enough to run the king's estates and organise his tenants for military service in time of war.⁷⁰ They were to bring their forces of cavalry and foot, suitably equipped, to Windsor by a set date in July, 'where at your commyng youe shall vnderstand ffurther of our pleasure'.⁷¹ In August, a circular from the privy council countermanded an order for the gentry to bring men to London and, although this seems too late to refer to the earlier instructions to gather at Windsor, a similar order must have been issued to disband those forces.⁷²

At the same time as nobles and gentlemen were being ordered to Windsor, the JPs were being sent to their counties, where they were to prepare themselves to serve the king. Another proclamation was issued on 22 July that reflected the government's greatest fear; that royal officers would participate in the disturbances. The government was especially concerned about the involvement of the parish officers, the bailiffs, constables and headboroughs, who lived in closest proximity to the commons and would be under the greatest pressure to join them. The performance of plays and interludes was banned because these involved the commons assembling and were often a prelude to the incitement to rise. In August, another proclamation was issued, ordering the gentlemen of Essex, Suffolk and Norfolk to return to their counties and await instructions from Warwick to serve against the rebels.⁷³ Clienteles were employed in this process. On 18 July, Somerset entrusted his steward with raising a force of men from their estates. These men must have served in the west country because Thynne was not listed among those summoned to Windsor. Somerset was turning to his most intimate clients, the men of his household.⁷⁴ Other substantial landowners were dispatched to their counties as a means of exercising control, while the local gentlemen were expected to assist under the direction of the peers: Rich was sent to Essex, Sir Thomas Wyatt was sent to Kent, where he lead the local gentry in suppressing disorder, and St John and Southampton were sent to Hampshire.⁷⁵ Somerset had adopted the traditional methods of pacifying rebellion with much success during the early summer. He attempted to nullify local revolts through the mediation of the landlords in order to prevent a general rising. Various methods, 'not mutually exclusive but complementary', would be adopted to procure this end cheaply and with minimal loss of life.⁷⁶ The methods usually adopted were agreeing to hear the commons' petitions, promising to repeal particularly unpopular policies, offering pardons and explaining that the unrest was seriously weakening the king's international security, before finally using armed force. Somerset did just this, adopting traditional methods, including offering

⁷⁰ Goring, 'The military obligations of the English people', pp. 20-26, 111-117.

⁷¹ PRO, SP 10/8/1, M. fo. 1Ar.

⁷² PRO, SP 10/8/39, M. fos. 73r-73v; PRO, SP 10/8/40, M. fos. 74r-74v.

⁷³ Hughes and Larkin, i, pp. 476-479, 481-482.

⁷⁴ Thynne held no royal stewardships, meaning the 'rule or iurisdicion' referred to by Somerset can only be over the ducal estates: Longleat, Seymour MS. 4, fos. 12r-13v; Bindoff, iii, p. 463.

⁷⁵ Jordan, *The young king*, pp. 446, 450-453; Wriothesley, *Chronicle*, ii, p. 15; Nichols (ed.), *Chronicle of the Grey Friars*, p. 60; PRO, SP 10/8/41, M. fos. 75r-76v; PRO, SP 10/8/61, M. fos. 112r-113v; Tytler, i, pp. 199-200; Anderson, *Letters of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries*, pp. 68-69; Bindoff, iii, p. 671.

pardons (14 June, 12 and 16 July) if the commons would disperse and agreeing to receive their petitions. The government used rhetoric that emphasised the consequences of disorder during a minority.⁷⁷

Somerset's attempts to placate the commons led him to articulate their grievances in rhetoric that mirrored their own. As regent, he would attempt to address their problems and listen to their counsel. Protestant clergy were sent out 'semi-officially' to preach at the rebels' camps in East Anglia. Somerset reacted cautiously to the camp movement and possibly gave them money and offered them rewards to disperse. He may have ordered a commission of *oyer et terminer* that was not agreed to by his colleagues, who claimed it increased disorder.⁷⁸ The most spectacular claims made by the privy council against him were that he praised the rebels, said at times during the crisis that 'the nobells and gentlemen were the only causes of the dearth of things whereby ye people rose and reformid things themselves', and pointed out that the commons could resolve their grievances if parliament would not. However, these assertions were made during and after the October coup. Somerset expressed similar populist sentiments to Hales in 1548, suggesting he really meant to build some kind of personal relationship with the commons, with him acting as patron and working in their interests to a certain extent. The enclosure commissions were the strongest example of this but in 1549 a clientage relationship of sorts was formed as a result of the rebellions.⁷⁹ This was because of the protestant elements to the rebellions and disorder in the southeast and East Anglia.⁸⁰ Letters sent to these rebels in July, although they stressed hierarchy and obedience, did allow for 'constructive dialogue between the Crown and its people'. Lists of grievances were sent from the rebel camps, including Kett's and the Suffolk rebels' at Thetford. This was done at Somerset's instigation. His emphasis on issuing free pardons reinforced the sincerity of his actions. He wished to resolve the unrest through dialogue and accommodation. Somerset agreed that many of the rebels' petitions were just and promised redress through parliament.⁸¹

Somerset took direct action on behalf of the commons. As their patron, having been obligated to safeguard them through his office of lord protector of the king's realms and dominions 'and of the

⁷⁶ Bush, 'Protector Somerset and the 1549 rebellions', pp. 104-108.

⁷⁷ Bush, 'Protector Somerset and the 1549 rebellions', pp. 104-108; Hughes and Larkin, i, pp. 461-464, 469-476; Pocock, pp. 141-193; Cheke, *The hurte of sedicion*; A. Fletcher, *Tudor rebellions* (Harlow, 1995 edn.), pp. 1, 4, 49-52, 97, 118.

⁷⁸ Shagan, 'Protector Somerset and the 1549 rebellions', pp. 34-63; MacCulloch, *Tudor church militant*, pp. 44-45; BL Additional MS. 9069, fos. 45r-49r.

⁷⁹ BL Additional MS. 9069, fo. 45r, 46r-46v. Somerset said to Hales, 'magre the deuyll pryuat profet self loue, moneye, & such like the deuylls instrumentes it shall go forwarde, and set such a staie in the bodye of the comen welthe, that all the members shall lyue in a due temperament & harmonye, without one hauyng tomoche and a great many nothyng at all, as at this present it appereth playnlye they have not': PRO, SP 10/4/33, M. fo. 64v.

⁸⁰ MacCulloch, *Tudor church militant*, pp. 44-45.

⁸¹ MacCulloch, *Tudor church militant*, pp. 45-47; Shagan, 'Protector Somerset and the 1549 rebellions', pp. 55-56, 59-61.

subiectes of the same', Somerset did this as an act of reciprocity.⁸² He issued a commission of *oyer et terminer* on 8 July in response to pressure from men like Hales and from the commons. This allowed for immediate and direct redress of enclosure problems by the commissioners. The Thetford rebels were even permitted to make recommendations about who should be on this commission. Kett's petitions must have been part of this process and suggested suitable commissioners for various hundreds.⁸³ These petitions made clear the new, and revolutionary, working relationship between the crown and the commons:

We pray your grace to gyve lycens and auctorite by your gracious comyssion vnder your grett seall to suche comyssioners as your pore comons hath chosyn or to as many of them as your maiestie & your connsell shall apoynt and thynke mete for to redresse & refourme all suche good lawes statutes proclamacions & all other your proceddyngs whiche hath byne hydden by your Justices of your peace shreues Escheatoras & other your officers from your pore comons synes the ffirst yere of ^the reign of^ your noble grandfather kyng Henry the seventh.⁸⁴

The Norfolk rebels were to send four to six delegates to Somerset with their petitions, which would be considered in a parliament to be summoned on 4 October rather than 4 November.⁸⁵ These conciliatory and popular methods nearly worked.⁸⁶ Having opened the way to direct popular participation, it was uncertain to his colleagues and to the political nation how, or even if, Somerset would restore the old relationship between rulers and ruled. They were appalled. This deepened the division between lord protector and privy council.⁸⁷

Somerset may have been disingenuous with the commons, articulating his true feelings on the situation when he wrote to Hoby, then ambassador to Charles, on 24 August.⁸⁸ Yet, this could reflect his frustration that Kett's supporters would not disband and his anxiety that the situation in East Anglia was becoming extreme. Dr MacCulloch has stressed the importance Somerset attached to the offers of free pardons, which he regarded as an act of good faith.⁸⁹ He told Hoby 'all hathe conceived a wonderfull hate against gentilmen, and taketh them all as their ennemyes', the gentry were coerced into assisting the rebelling commons and 'in Norfolke gentilmen and all seruing men for their sakes are as evell handeled as may be'.⁹⁰ The rebels wanted to break up the power of aristocratic and gentry households as a means of control. For example, the western

⁸² PRO, C 66/802, m. 1; MacCulloch, *Tudor church militant*, pp. 45-48.

⁸³ Hughes and Larkin, i, pp. 471-472; Guy, *Tudor England*, p. 175; MacCulloch, *Tudor church militant*, pp. 46-47; Shagan, 'Protector Somerset and the 1549 rebellions', pp. 42-47, 60; BL Harley MS. 304, fos. 75r-78v; Russell, *Kett's Rebellion*, pp. 48-56, 203-204; Fletcher, *Tudor rebellions*, pp. 120-123.

⁸⁴ BL Harley MS. 304, fo. 77r.

⁸⁵ MacCulloch, *Tudor church militant*, p. 48; Shagan, 'Protector Somerset and the 1549 rebellions', pp. 55-59.

⁸⁶ MacCulloch, *Tudor church militant*, p. 49.

⁸⁷ MacCulloch, *Tudor church militant*, p. 48.

⁸⁸ BL Harley MS. 523, fos. 52v-53r.

⁸⁹ MacCulloch, *Tudor church militant*, pp. 45-47.

⁹⁰ BL Harley MS. 523, fos. 52v-53r.

rebels demanded that gentry households have only one servant for every hundred marks of income. It was from these very households that the core of the gentry forces were being drawn for the suppression of the rebellions.⁹¹ Somerset's attitude towards society may have been made clear in his letter to Hoby, as Professor Bush believes, when he called the disorder and attempt to overrule the gentry by the commons 'no other thing but a plague and a furie amonge the vilest and worst sorte of men', but this does not completely rule out the possibility of Somerset courting popularity as a means of control. The duke told Hoby that it 'seemethe' to be the case.⁹²

Somerset fully utilised the local elite too. Communications were maintained between the king and the rebels through the gentry. For example, the Thetford rebels sent their grievances through the mediation of Thomas Gawdey of Norfolk and Sir Henry Doyle of Suffolk; Sir William Rainsford negotiated with the rebels in Oxfordshire on the government's behalf; John Thomas of London dealt with the St Albans rebels; while Darcy and Gates dealt with those in Essex.⁹³ Somerset was one of the greatest landowners in Hampshire, Wiltshire and Somerset, but remained in London and its environs in order to direct the government reaction. However, the Western Rebellion and Kett's Rebellion were too serious to quell easily. Somerset's letter to Thynne asking him to raise their clienteles was informal; but his letter to Paget was formal. The comptroller received a signet letter dated 6 August 1549. Others were issued, each having a blank space to be filled in with the required number of tenants. Paget was to raise five hundred men from his Staffordshire estates to fight against Kett.⁹⁴ Sir Edward North received a similar signet letter ordering him to raise one hundred men by 17 August.⁹⁵ The extent of these rebellions, the shades of extremism and their organisation, all alarmed the magisterial class. This fused with their suspicion of Somerset's intent and his handling of the situation was seen in a sinister light. He issued a proclamation on 23 May that relied on the gentry and JPs to enforce order. This they clearly could not do. Somerset also told Russell to offer pardons. At the same time other proclamations dealt harshly with the rebels and in July he ordered full action against them.⁹⁶ Historians have disagreed about how well Somerset now handled the situation.⁹⁷ The rebellions were put down with substantial loss of life and the idea that Somerset was somehow on the rebels' side was current even prior to his fall. Somerset's popular politics was about to rebound against him. Perception had always been

⁹¹ Rose-Troup, *The Western Rebellion*, p. 493.

⁹² BL Harley MS. 523, fos. 52v-53r; Bush, 'Protector Somerset and the 1549 rebellions', pp. 108-109.

⁹³ Bush, 'Protector Somerset and the 1549 rebellions', p. 112, n. 2; Shagan, 'Protector Somerset and the 1549 rebellions', pp. 57-58, 61, 63.

⁹⁴ StaffRO, (D (W) 1734/4/2/1); StaffRO, (D (W) 1734/4/2/5).

⁹⁵ BL Cotton MS. Vespasian F. iii, fos. 46r-46v.

⁹⁶ PRO, SP 10/7/18, M. fos. 55-56v; Hughes and Larkin, i, pp. 461-464, 469-476; Pocock, pp. 65-67.

⁹⁷ Jordan, *The young king*, pp. 439-493; Bush, *Government policy*, pp. 84-99; Hoak, *The king's council*, pp. 182-184, 187; Shagan, 'Protector Somerset and the 1549 rebellions', pp. 34-63; Bush, 'Protector Somerset and the 1549 rebellions', pp. 103-112; Bernard, 'New perspectives or old complexities?', pp. 113-120; Shagan, 'Popularity' and the 1549 rebellions revisited', pp. 121-133.

important and having alienated the political elite, Somerset could not retain power when an alternative council emerged in October.

Somerset was also subject to the top-down influence of his colleagues, particularly Paget, in policy making. Paget's counselling of the lord protector showed that the situation in 1549 had reached a critical point and illustrated the important role counsel played in politics. Somerset often ignored this counsel, instead taking advice from sources outside the privy council, and this became central to the breakdown in relations between the duke and his colleagues. They had been given a role in counsel by the protectorate provisions that they began to feel was being ignored during the summer of 1549. Humanist politicians believed that a ruler's actions could and should be circumscribed by the counsel of his active councillors in court and parliament. A councillor had a duty to persuade the ruler to listen to his advice, albeit the ruler did not have to accept it.⁹⁸ The ruler did have to listen attentively because good counsel was about friendship or *amicitia*. This friendship could be either a genuine bond or courtesy but, whether it was or not, the ruler had to receive the counsel 'in a spirit of "likeness and equality"'.⁹⁹ Somerset was becoming dictatorial. Paget expressed opinions that were partially shared by his colleagues. Warwick, despite his close association with Somerset during the protectorate, felt deep anxiety about the enclosure commissions in 1548-1549 and the county elite expressed grave concern about the latter's methods of pacifying disorder.¹⁰⁰ Somerset may have consulted the privy council more regularly than Professor Hoak thought. It is possible that he allowed the privy council to take the leading role against his brother but the evidence for conciliar activity is sparse and difficult to determine. Paget wrote that 'of late your grace ys grown into great Colericke facions whensoever youe are contraried in that *which* youe haue conceaved in your heade'. This suggests that, although the consultative process was increased in 1549, Somerset was becoming increasingly dictatorial by midsummer and this was a new development.¹⁰¹

Whether or not Somerset used the privy council more than is usually thought, he was losing its confidence by mid-1549. In July Paget pointed out to Somerset that 'societie in a realme dothe consiste, and ys maynteyned by meane of religion and lawe. And these two or one wanting farewell all just societie farewell kinge, government, justice, and all other virtue'.¹⁰² His most important analysis of the state of the protectorate was the remarkable letter he wrote on 7 July

⁹⁸ Alford, *Early Elizabethan polity*, pp. 7-8, 32-33; 'Reassessing William Cecil in the 1560s', in Guy (ed.), *The Tudor Monarchy*, pp. 233-234, 236-249.

⁹⁹ J.A. Guy, 'The rhetoric of counsel in early modern England,' in D.E. Hoak, (ed.), *Tudor political culture* (Cambridge, 1995), pp. 292, 294.

¹⁰⁰ Bush, *Government policy*, pp. 74-76, n. 185.

¹⁰¹ PRO, SP 10/7/5, M. fo. 8v; see below, pp. 128-129.

¹⁰² PRO, SP 10/8/4, M. fo. 8v; NRO, F. (M.) C. 21, fos. 11r-13r; Beer and Jack, p. 54.

1549. Paget 'truely and franckly' wrote what he thought.¹⁰³ This was more than mere form for what he said was both incisive and damning. Historians have agreed that Somerset was a stubborn man who would not easily take counsel.¹⁰⁴ Paget wrote a series of letters during the year warning him to moderate his policies. These reflect the attempts of a client to influence his patron and Paget thought Somerset had failed to reciprocate. Paget had his own agenda though, having expected a greater role in policy making. This means what he said must be treated cautiously.¹⁰⁵ He admitted that 'no man knoweth the sequele of his advise and counsayll certaynly' but advised a cautious course, especially regarding policy towards Scotland, France and the empire.¹⁰⁶ Paget equated Somerset with the state, as one would regard a king.¹⁰⁷ However, Somerset was stifling counsel and those who should be offering advice chose to or felt compelled to remain silent. The privy council and leading office holders had to be permitted to express their opinions and exercise an influence in government. Yet, as Paget pointed out, in contrast to Somerset's manner at the board, 'out of Counsaile youe here me speake very gentelly and graciously'. However, he rarely took the proffered advice and could be very sharp with Paget at council meetings. Paget then went on to severely criticise Somerset for his inability to manage people, citing his harsh reprimand of Sir Richard Alee. The lord protector should also accept that people, especially privy councillors, were entitled to their opinions.¹⁰⁸ Paget told him that 'a king which shall geve men occasion of discourage to say their opinions francklie [receives] therby great hurte and perill to his realme. But a subiect in great authoritie (as your grace ys) vsing suche facyon ys like to fall into great dannger and perill of his owne persone besides that to the common wealthe'.¹⁰⁹ Paget could hardly be more explicit. He also advised that when the weight of the whole privy council was behind a decision, Somerset should occasionally relent. This would increase his standing as 'your suertie shall be the more, and burthen the lesse', and went to the heart of the problem. He had consented to accept their advice in 1547 but now failed to do so.¹¹⁰ Somerset was becoming isolated by the pressure of office and was exercising power too autocratically. The implication was that Henry had had more acumen than to behave in this way and more leeway because he was a king. These protestations mainly fell on deaf ears and contributed to the growing differences between the two men, increasing Somerset's growing isolation.¹¹¹ Much of Paget's advice was informal counsel; he spoke with Somerset and addressed his concerns to him at opportune moments. The stream of letters counselling Somerset during the first half of the year is

¹⁰³ PRO, SP 10/8/4, M. fo. 11r.

¹⁰⁴ Pollard, *Protector Somerset*, pp. 242-244, 317-318; Bush, *Government policy*, pp. 79-80; Hoak, *The king's council*, pp. 189-190, 261-262; Guy, *Tudor England*, pp. 201, 210-215.

¹⁰⁵ PRO, SP 10/8/4, M. fo. 8r; NRO, F. (M.) C. 21, fos. 4v, 6r-6v, 5r-7r; Beer and Jack, pp. 14-15, 17-18, 19-25.

¹⁰⁶ NRO, F. (M.) C. 21, fo. 6v; Beer and Jack, pp. 22-24.

¹⁰⁷ PRO, SP 10/7/5, M. fos. 8r-8v.

¹⁰⁸ PRO, SP 10/7/5, M. fo. 8r.

¹⁰⁹ PRO, SP 10/7/5, M. fos. 8r-8v.

¹¹⁰ PRO, SP 10/7/5, M. fo. 8v.

¹¹¹ Gammon, *Statesman and schemer*, pp. 145-158.

remarkable because of its volume and persistence and suggests that Paget felt his role was to offer counsel.

Paget complained about the implications of Somerset's initial moderation towards unrest. He felt he should be listened to because this is what both men had agreed at the start of the reign. Paget wrote:

remembre what youe promysed me in the galerye at Westmynster, before the breathe was owt of the body of the kinge that dead ys. Remembre what youe promysed immediately after, devising with me concerning the place which youe now occupie...and that was to followe myne advise in all your proceedings more than any other mans. Which promyse I wyshe your grace had kept.¹¹²

He believed that his secretarial experience gave him a special role, a role that he accused Somerset of ignoring. He had offered his assistance in 1547 in the creation of the protectorate, clearly identifying himself as a fidelity client, because he expected to be Somerset's principal counsellor. He also felt the consequence of Somerset's actions was the current disorder. Paget wanted Somerset to retrench policy, especially military commitments in Scotland.¹¹³ Rebellion should be dealt with more harshly. Through 'your softenes, your opinion to be good to the pore', the commons had become emboldened in their demands and Somerset's vanity led him to attempt too much too soon without proper heed to the consequences.¹¹⁴ Paget advised:

and put no more so many yrons in the fyre at ones, as youe haue had within this twelmoneth, warre with Scotland, with ffrance (thoughe yt be not so termed) Commissions owt for that matter, newe lawes for this proclamation[s] for an other, one in an others necke, so thicke.¹¹⁵

He criticised Somerset's enclosure commissions because he thought other things were causing inflation. Smith was also advising Somerset to change this policy and, like Paget, seems to have angered the lord protector as a result. Cecil's role is more ambivalent but he was certainly discussing these issues with Smith. Unlike these 'new' men, Somerset's traditional household servants, including Thynne, Fulmerston and Whalley, do not seem to have contributed to this debate. Their role was more pragmatic, especially their activity in attempting to quell disorder. Paget also ominously noted, in something of a thinly veiled threat, that Somerset had discouraged

¹¹² PRO, SP 10/8/4, M. fo. 8r.

¹¹³ PRO, SP 10/8/4, M. fos. 8r-8v; NRO, F. (M.) C. 21, fos. 5r-5v; Beer and Jack, p. 15.

¹¹⁴ This popularity would enhance Somerset's posthumous reputation. As early as 1556 John Ponet, former Edwardian bishop of Rochester and Winchester, characterized Somerset as 'the good duke' and this reputation remained largely unchallenged for centuries. Ducal servants and clients, as well as admirers, including George Ferrers, Chaloner, Edward Whitechurch, Robert Crowley, Foxe and perhaps even Cecil, worked on Somerset's posthumous reputation: PRO, SP 10/8/4, M. fos. 8r-8v; Ponet, *A shorte treatise of politike power*, sig. I3r; Bradshaw, 'Protestant polemic', pp. 127-129; MacCulloch, *Tudor church militant*, pp. 42-43.

¹¹⁵ PRO, SP 10/8/4, M. fo. 9r.

open discussion of these commissions in council, 'this matter of the commons every man of the Counsaile hath myslyked', and that they too were answerable to the king for the situation because in creating the protectorate they did 'consent and accord to geve youe that aucthorytie'. Clients like Paget, Smith and Cecil clearly differed from ducal servants in certain aspects of their role and had strong ties with the privy council. The issues of counsel, autocracy, authority and power were all raised.¹¹⁶

Like several of the other 'new' men, Paget had advice to offer Somerset about what he thought should be done for the immediate security of the realm. This had been attempted in the past, as when on 2 January he sent Somerset a 'Schedule'. Then, among other things, he suggested Somerset 'delyberate maturely in all things. Execute quickly the delyberations' and 'ffolowe aduise in counsaile'.¹¹⁷ This was spoken as if Somerset had the power of a king. The problem was that other leading figures in government, including the earls of Southampton, Arundel and Warwick, had strong opinions about how to govern effectively. Paget, despite his experience and ability, perhaps hoped to be just as monopolistic as Somerset and had his advice been followed, it might have been no more successful. Minority government lent itself to debate on policy and Somerset feared that other parties would emerge to rival his own, backed by powerful clienteles. Paget stressed that the elite should be permitted to act forcefully to restore order. The lord protector should execute government sternly, as Henry had, using the necessary measure of force and send for the ablest councillors to assist him. Paget advised that Lord Ferrers of Chartley and Herbert bring as many cavalry from Wales as they could, while Shrewsbury was to draw men from the relatively quiet counties of Derbyshire, Shropshire, Staffordshire and Nottinghamshire, where his standing was high. Shrewsbury's successful control of his country was highly regarded and the inhabitants were praised and would be rewarded when they next sued the king for redress. Somerset and the privy council were using a direct, positive, relationship with the commons of these counties to maintain popular control.¹¹⁸ Paget advised that Somerset 'appoint the king to lye at Wyndsore accompanied *with* all his officers and servannts of [the] hushold, the pencyoners, the men at armes and the garde' because it afforded greater protection. Somerset himself ought to lead the expedition against the rebels, meeting the nobles with their companies and the gentry, with those 'trustie frendes and servaunts as they can make' in Berkshire, and appointing three or four JPs to commissions of *oyer et terminer*. These would mete out justice on 'twenty or xxx of the ranckest knaves of the shire', hanging some and imprisoning others. In this way, through a form of royal coercion, the country could be quieted, government continue and the king's standing

¹¹⁶ PRO, SP 10/8/4, M. fos. 9r-9v; see above, pp. 63-64, 111.

¹¹⁷ NRO, F. (M.) C. 21, fo. 4v, Beer and Jack, pp. 19-20.

¹¹⁸ PRO, SP 10/8/4, M. fos. 9v-11r; LPL, MS. 3193, fo. 115; Lodge (ed.), *Illustrations of British history*, i, p. 160.

abroad be revived.¹¹⁹ Paget now advised that force be used instead of mediation. Somerset followed Paget's advice from time to time but not as much as the comptroller would have liked. He did listen to him over aspects of Scottish policy, in which Paget had a direct clerical hand (including considering abandoning Haddington and sending Warwick to act as lieutenant), as well as involving the privy council. This means the privy council continued to be active in policy making but members became alarmed by Somerset's style of dealing with the rebels, especially his delay in using more force.¹²⁰

As Professor Bush demonstrated, Somerset had exhausted the more conciliatory means of controlling rebellion. He was unlucky because the major rebellions of 1549 were the most severe of the sixteenth century, involved intense class warfare, particularly in the west, and required the full resources of the state to counter. The opportunistic French king declared war on 8 August and the situation in Scotland deteriorated further.¹²¹ What had began as a reaction in the west country to the Edwardian reformation, developed political and social dimensions with the collapse in authority of the local elite. The Devon gentry were divided because there was no political or religious consensus among them and it took an army of eight thousand under Russell to suppress the Western Rebellion (June-August), relieving Exeter and defeating the rebel force at Sampford Courtenay in Devon. The reprisals by the gentry were savage, reflecting their almost hysterical reaction to the challenge to their authority.¹²² Kett's Rebellion (also June-August) was more orderly and less extreme, making it more difficult to combat. It was marked, as was the Suffolk rising, by encampments within the locality, rather than a march on London, and was a protest at enclosures, dearth and depopulation. Northampton was sent against it with other experienced commanders with strong local connections and their defeat on 1 August shocked the regime and panicked the local gentry, who finally abandoned the county.¹²³ Cheke's response is representative, especially his reaction to the death of Lord Sheffield, which was regarded as an attack on the social order.¹²⁴ Sheffield was portrayed as the epitome of the Tudor elite, set by God to rule the commonwealth under the king for the good of the community.¹²⁵ Somerset did not take decisive action until 15 August but his attitude had changed. Warwick was sent with several of the nobility and their clienteles, raising the levies as he marched. He offered a pardon, which was refused, defeated the rebels at Dusindale in Norfolk on 27 August, then risked his life to offer

¹¹⁹ PRO, SP 10/8/4, M. fos. 9v-11r.

¹²⁰ NRO, F. (M.) C. 21, fos. 5r-5v, 13v-14v; BL Additional MS. 5935, fos. 116r-123r; Beer and Jack, pp. 14-15, 38, 76-78; BL Cotton MS. Titus F iii, fo. 276r; Bush, *Government policy*, p. 38.

¹²¹ Beer, *Rebellion and riot*, pp. 69-73; APC, ii, p. 310; BL Harley MS. 523, fo. 47r; Jordan, *The young king*, pp. 295-304.

¹²² Beer, *Rebellion and riot*, pp. 38-81; Fletcher, *Tudor rebellions*, pp. 40-53.

¹²³ Beer, *Rebellion and riot*, pp. 82-124; Fletcher, *Tudor rebellions*, pp. 54-59.

¹²⁴ Cheke, *The hurte of sedicion*, sigs. C4r-C6v.

¹²⁵ Cheke, *The hurte of sedicion*, sig. C5v.

another pardon to the remnants, which they accepted.¹²⁶ There was widespread disturbance in many other counties and it was under these circumstances that Paget and others sought to advise Somerset.¹²⁷

Somerset used his clientele during the 1549 rebellions to mediate and to ameliorate the situation in the localities where his influence was strongest. They negotiated with the commons independently of him, using their own local connections and initiative to try to restore order. This shows the practical impact of clienteles in the localities. The other privy councillors and political leaders did the same in their localities and were able to assuage the disorder of the early summer. Somerset attempted to pacify the commons by promising economic reform and fostered a popular relationship with them that was a form of clientage during the more serious disorder of the late summer. He offered reform in return for compliance. This was a bold strategy that isolated him from political society. Somerset listened to different counsel and relied more heavily on his own clientele but he frequently ignored the advice of both the privy council and his 'new men'. His handling of the rebellions alienated political society and opened up the possibility of an alternative regime. If Somerset's methods had been more successful, the protectorate might have lasted longer.

¹²⁶ Beer, *Rebellion and riot*, pp. 124-139; Fletcher, *Tudor rebellions*, pp. 59-68.

¹²⁷ There were major disturbances in Cambridgeshire, Essex, Lincolnshire, Hertfordshire, Oxfordshire and Buckinghamshire and less serious disorder in Northamptonshire, Warwickshire, Leicestershire, Rutland, Derbyshire, Staffordshire, Herefordshire, Bedfordshire, Worcestershire, Somerset, Kent, Sussex, Middlesex, Surrey, Hampshire, Berkshire, Wiltshire, and Yorkshire: Beer, *Rebellion and riot*, pp. 140-163.

6. *The dissolution of the protectorate, 1549-1550*

The majority of the privy council, led by Southampton and Warwick, took action against Somerset in October 1549. Warwick has famously been described as 'the subtlest intriguer in English history' and Professor Pollard saw him as the chief orchestrator of Somerset's fall.¹ However, Professor Hoak argues that the main reason for Somerset's removal was 'the administrative incompetence of his regime'.² Somerset had lost the confidence of political society by the autumn but he failed to see this happening, nor did he appreciate the gulf separating him from his colleagues. The roles of Somerset's clientele, the county elite, and the privy council will be examined during the October coup to reassess the events surrounding the end of the protectorate from the perspective of clientage. The coup shows up the tensions within political society and how both parties employed their clienteles and attempted to win the support of the city and county elite. Again, Somerset tried to bolster his position through popular politics and both parties used the mechanics of government (like privy seal letters, proclamations and muster commissions) in an attempt to increase their support. Somerset's regental authority enabled him to raise a large force, especially among the commons, but the London council proved more adept at organising their force and at winning the war of words. The political nation did not back the lord protector. This final crisis of the protectorate provides some of the best sources for examining the regime between 1547-1549 in the round, at its most dynamic and factional. First, it is necessary to examine the events leading up to the coup to ascertain whether it was a long-term plan on the part of an opposing faction or a short-term reaction to pressure within the polity.

Somerset and the privy council rehabilitated Southampton after his deposition against Seymour. By April, Somerset wanted to appoint Southampton along with his own clients Smith and Thynne to investigate Sharington's debts. Public and private interests converged again but Somerset wanted the situation handled scrupulously.³ However, this did not mean the former lord chancellor was reconciled to Somerset's regime. Somerset may have been concerned about his security in late September, expecting Russell and Herbert to return to London by 8 October, but it cannot be said with certainty that he suspected anything. He planned to summon parliament earlier than intended and he may have wanted Russell and Herbert to return to London for this purpose.⁴ This summons may also have been a prelude to removing large numbers of soldiers in the London area to their commands, a proclamation being issued to this effect on 30 September.⁵

¹ Pollard, *Protector Somerset*, p. 244.

² Hoak, *The king's council*, pp. 100-103, 177.

³ PRO, SP 10/6/15, M. fos. 41r-42v; Jordan, *The young king*, p. 382; NRO, F. (M.) C. 21, fo. 8v; Beer and Jack, p. 27; Longleat, Thynne MS. 2, fos. 56r-57v; see above, p. 102.

⁴ Pocock, p. 76; Shagan, 'Protector Somerset and the 1549 rebellions', p. 55; MacCulloch, *Tudor church militant*, p. 48.

⁵ Hughes and Larkin, i, p. 483.

Prior to the coup, Seymour introduced faction into Edwardian politics. This made relations more tense within the political elite during the summer rebellions. The imperial ambassador informed Charles in late September of rumours that Warwick, Southampton, the earl of Arundel, St John, Sir Richard Southwell and Sir Thomas Arundel were planning Somerset's removal.⁶ They could have been reacting to rumours that Somerset intended to change the personnel of the privy council and acted before parliament met on 4 October to discuss the petitions of the commons for redress of enclosures.⁷ They claimed that they gathered to consider 'some other order for reformation of thinges' and Somerset's aggressive reaction triggered the coup.⁸

On 5 October, Somerset realised that a coup was being set in motion against him.⁹ He was at Hampton Court with the king, Smith, Petre, Cecil and much of his household. He seems to have been unaware of anything prior to 5 October and completely unprepared. This element of surprise severely hampered his ability to organise his defence. The court had removed there soon after 18 September but Somerset did not join it until 1 October, having spent time hunting with his wife at their house in Odiham.¹⁰ Somerset then told her to join him and she arrived on 5 October. It was only then that he learned of the two thousand horse raised by the councillors in London.¹¹ He reacted by using his control over the king's person to authorise commands in an attempt to raise support while utilising the services of those around him. He used the royal servants at court, including Honynges.¹² Somerset also armed his clientele (his servants and 'new' men) and put his forces under the command of Lord William Howard.¹³ Cranmer arrived with forty horse and the archbishop's servant, George Dunstall, carried one of the copies of Somerset's first signet letter requesting assistance.¹⁴ Cecil busied himself writing letters on the duke's behalf. Initially, Somerset planned to send him away. Perhaps he considered sending him (like Stanhope) to organise support on the ducal estates, including raising tenants and well disposed neighbours, but Cecil was not an estate officer and this decision seems strange. It does reflect Somerset's trust in him. However, Somerset concluded during a conversation with Smith that Cecil would be more valuable if he remained with him.¹⁵ On the same day he solicited the assistance of Russell and

⁶ *Simancas*, ix, pp. 445-448, 454, 457-458, 470; Ponet, *A shorte treatise of politike power*, sig. I3r.

⁷ *Simancas*, ix, pp. 445-448, 454; Shagan, 'Protector Somerset and the 1549 rebellions', p. 55; MacCulloch, *Tudor church militant*, p. 48.

⁸ BL Additional MS. 48018, fo. 404r.

⁹ PRO, SP 10/9/1, M. fos. 1r-2v.

¹⁰ Emmison, *Tudor secretary*, p. 75; Hatfield, Cecil MS. 150, fo. 38r; BL Additional MS. 48126, fo. 8v. St John may have been warned in advance, having been at court only the day before. He may even have been sent to court on 2 October to procure Somerset's signature to a warrant for payment of soldiers. These men were subsequently used against the duke: BL Harley MS. 284, fos. 46r-47v; Tytler, i, pp. 211-212; BL Additional MS. 48126, fos. 8v-9r; Malkiewicz, 'An eye-witness's account', pp. 604-605, ns. 6-7, 1-2; *APC*, ii, pp. 328-329.

¹¹ BL Additional MS. 48126, fos. 9r-9v.

¹² PRO, SP 10/9/24, M. fos. 32r-33v; PRO, SP 10/9/26, M. fos. 39r-40v.

¹³ PRO, SP 10/9/1, M. fos. 1r-2v; PRO, SP 10/9/3, M. fos. 4r-4v; PRO, SP 10/9/9, M. fos. 10r-10v; BL Additional MS. 48126, fos. 9v, 13v; Malkiewicz, 'An eye-witness's account', p. 608, n. 1.

¹⁴ BL Additional MS. 48126, fo. 10v; PRO, SP 10/9/1, M. fos. 1r; Tytler, i, p. 205; PRO, LR 2/118, fo. 45r.

¹⁵ NRO, F. (M.) C. 21, fo. 19v.

Herbert, who still had an army under their command.¹⁶ Somerset was trying to secure this force to maintain his position, while attempting to gather his clientele and raise wider support. He was entitled to summon these soldiers as the king's lieutenant and captain-general for the wars but this was also based on the ordinary clientage relationship he had attempted to build with the county elite and he was using the realm's military resources to maintain his party. Similarly, Somerset turned to the commons because of his popularity with them.¹⁷ He raised about four thousand men, mainly drawn from the commons, and possibly promoted his position through the distribution of handbills in and near London.¹⁸ The London council (the majority of the privy council) accused him of seizing the Tower with the national arsenal, attempting to overthrow the king, and of having 'raysed all the conntrey about hamptoncourte wher the kinges maieste then lay'.¹⁹ Somerset and his servants and closest supporters were hampered because they did not know how large the ducal retinue was. This was probably because of the extensive nature of the ducal estate and its largely recent acquisition.²⁰ Therefore, he attempted to utilise those around him, relied on his clientele, tried to use his regental authority and used his popularity to raise the commons.

Somerset tried to call on his fidelity clientele (servants, 'new' men, kinsmen), summoning his younger brother Sir Henry Seymour, of Marwell in Hampshire, and his servant Henry Golding, esquire, who was to seek Oxford's support. Somerset was advised to find out whether his younger son, Lord Henry Seymour, was in the capital or had already been taken by the London council. Golding was to 'sollicite and give order for our very good Lord therle of Oxfords things servants and ordynarie power that he hym selffe and the same also be in good redynes What so euer shall channce to require his service for the kyngs maiestie wherof if any occasion shall channce'.²¹ A lot of trust was placed in Golding, who does not seem to have been in the duke's service before 1548, but he may have been one of the few servants, with the necessary resolve and discretion, whose actions have been recorded.²² Somerset provided his brother with a warrant, signed with the wet stamp, to raise a force of horse and foot to protect him at Hampton Court. Sir Henry Seymour was also to raise men 'by anie other aucthoritie, Stewardshipp, office or libertye, what so euer it be'. He was keeper of Taunton Castle in Somerset and Marwell Park in Hampshire, bailiff of Hampstead Marshall in Berkshire and Romsey in Hampshire, and steward of Bierton with Broughton, Whaddon and Wendover in Buckinghamshire.²³ Again, Somerset was unwilling to be more specific, summoning his brother on the king's behalf because, 'we be giuen to vnderstande

¹⁶ PRO, SP 10/9/5, M. fos. 6r-6v.

¹⁷ MacCulloch, *Tudor church militant*, p. 51.

¹⁸ BL Additional MS. 48018, fos. 404r-404v; *Simancas*, ix, pp. 456-459.

¹⁹ PRO, SP 10/9/41, M. fos. 77r-77v.

²⁰ Longleat, Seymour MS. 4, fo. 127v.

²¹ PRO, SP 10/9/3, M. fos. 4r-4v; PRO, SP 10/9/4, M. fos. 5r-5v; PRO, SP 10/9/14, M. fo. 15r; see below, pp. 137-139, 142.

²² Longleat, Seymour MS. 10, fos. 166r-170r.

²³ PRO, SP 10/9/3, M. fo. 4r; Bindoff, iii, pp. 290-291.

by insinuation of rumors that a certain conspiracy is in achieving against vs'.²⁴ Perhaps the messenger was instructed to give more details. However, Seymour was unwilling to commit himself, even to his brother, and was subsequently rewarded by Warwick's party. He had chosen to avoid involving himself too heavily in court politics, preferring the role of country gentleman.²⁵ This shows that even the closest relationships within a clientele could be fragile under particular circumstances.

Somerset probably decided to remove the court to Windsor on 6 October because it was more defensible.²⁶ It must have been a hasty decision because he attempted to muster support earlier that day at Hampton Court and Windsor was unprepared for the arrival of the royal household, having insufficient provisions. The London council attacked his lack of consideration towards the king and sent the necessary provisions to maintain the royal household.²⁷ As the commons gathered, Somerset waited to hear whether or not he would receive support from the west. He appears to have been unwilling to take allegiance from the commons and this suggests that, having unleashed popular support, he was unprepared to completely overturn the traditional order. However, he did retain as many of them as could be provisioned and organised them into companies.²⁸ Somerset wrote again on 6 October from Hampton Court to Russell and Herbert, concluding that 'we requyre you to make no staye but immedyatlye repayre *with* such force as ye have' to Windsor.²⁹

At a time when their loyalty to their master was being tested, many of Somerset's servants were busy 'embeseling' his goods at Syon and Sheen. What did this mean and what did it involve? Some of Somerset's most important officers were removing items on the orders of his wife, perhaps as a prelude to flight, but more probably in order to sell them. These household servants were loyal and committed to the preservation of their patrons. The hardcore of any clientele was the household and in a crisis the more amorphous clients, especially those with an ordinary clientage relationship, would be less reliable. Whalley conveyed coffers to his house at Wimbledon on 7 October. The duchess of Somerset brought four caskets on the same day; Stanhope took goods to his house at Beddington in Surrey; and John Raves, Somerset's clerk comptroller, took goods to Roehampton in Surrey. Other ducal servants removing goods were: Richard Davy, porter; Walter

²⁴ PRO, SP 10/9/3, M. fo. 4r.

²⁵ PRO, SP 10/8/41, M. fos. 75r-76v; Loach, *Edward VI*, p. 89; Bindoff, iii, pp. 290-291; Jordan, *The young king*, pp. 35-36; *Calendar of patent rolls*, iv, pp. 151, 395; v, pp. 358, 415.

²⁶ PRO, SP 10/8/4, M. fo. 11v.

²⁷ PRO, SP 10/9/7, M. fos. 8r-8v; PRO, SP 10/9/9, M. fos. 10r-10v; APC, ii, pp. 333, 342. However, another source suggests Rich overturned attempts to procure provisions by countermanding signet letters using the great seal: BL Additional MS. 48126, fos. 11r, 13v; Malkiewicz, 'An eye-witness's account', pp. 607-608, ns. 1-3.

²⁸ C.L. Kingsford (ed.), 'Two London chronicles from the collections of John Stowe', *Camden Miscellany*, 4 (Camden Society 3rd ser. 18; London, 1910), pp. 19-21; BL Additional MS. 48018, fos. 404r-404v; BL Additional MS. 48126, fo. 10v.

²⁹ Pocock, p. 82-83.

Blackwell, footman; William Halfield, yeoman of the scullery; and Ruttur and William Smith, carters. Blackwell, Halfield, Ruttur and Smith all lived in Richmond, Surrey. More things were taken by boat to Kew, where Partridge, Turner, and Robert Jolly, a gentleman usher, lived. Simon Huddy, the surgeon, took two of Somerset's horses on 11 October from Sheen to Turner's house. Henry Helderhead or Wetheredd, surveyor of the works, 'conveyed by cartes owt of Syon certayne bedding Carpettes and hanginge to his howse at Thislewoorth and dyuerse other stuff'. Thomas Spring, the bailiff of Syon, sold 'as moche wood of the said Dukes as he could possible and receyued moche money therfore'. This was done between 6-11 October. James Lawrence of Ham in Surrey also sold beds and other things. All this activity was carefully organised; suggesting Somerset was behind it.³⁰ Thynne denied ever discussing the option of escaping with Somerset or anybody else but the activity of the ducal servants could suggest that this was considered.³¹ Naturally, the London council, who described it in pejorative terms, regarded this activity as unwelcome. The difference between the October coup and Somerset's second fall in 1551 was that, on the latter occasion, all the duke's leading clients were quickly captured, preventing this kind of organisation on his behalf, and the lesser ducal servants were 'embeseling' his goods in the modern sense of the word.³² Clients and servants were selling the duke's more valuable moveable goods during the October coup in order to provide him with the money to pay his retainers and the commons or for any other eventuality. Also, Somerset's desire to have servants 'ney vnto hyme' was proving invaluable, as many lived in the vicinity of his houses in Surrey and Middlesex.³³

Somerset appealed to powerful aristocrats, with broad acres and long established positions in their counties, who were not closely associated with the regime. Somerset's ambivalent appeal to Oxford, asking for limited assistance, is interesting. Even if he thought the situation could not deteriorate further his cautious request seems inappropriate, considering he knew that most of the privy council were opposed to him and the attitude of the city and of Russell and Herbert was uncertain. Perhaps this uncertainty weakened his confidence. During the evening of 5 October his attitude changed as his couriers were sent out and his understanding of the situation grew: the general tone of his letters gave way to more concrete appeals for assistance. It would have been imprudent to rely on one source of assistance and Somerset wrote in general terms on 5 October to request the support of Russell and Herbert (sending Hertford as courier), before writing more specifically and emphatically the next day, and again resorting to dispatching a letter purportedly from Edward. This letter from the king coloured the London coup by portraying it as a treasonable conspiracy against him. It also refuted rumours against Somerset and made the shrewd point 'that

³⁰ PRO, SP 10/9/52, M. fos. 100r-100v; Pocock, pp. 120-122; Longleat, Seymour MS. 10, fos. 167r-167v, 168v-169r, 170r; BL Egerton MS. 2815. A William Rutter was committed to the Marshalsea on 15 August 1553 for 'uttringe certen sediciouse words' against Gilbert Bourne, a preacher: *APC*, iv, pp. 320, 429.

³¹ Longleat, Seymour MS. 4, fo. 127v.

³² BL Harley MS. 249, fo. 40v; Longleat, Seymour MS. 10, fo. 169r.

by the reast of the Counsellis confession nothing to have ben done by our said uncle but that [the] reast of our Counsell did agree unto'.³⁴ This left the London council in a difficult position. They had agreed to the protectorate and Somerset did follow the terms of his patents fairly scrupulously. Understandably, leading gentlemen did heed the lord protector's summons. John Eason, son-in-law of Sir James Hales, sergeant-at-law for Kent and puisne justice of the common pleas, wrote to Cecil in July 1550 to complain that he was being victimised for coming to Windsor with armed men between 6-11 October.³⁵ Somerset attached importance to gaining the public support of leading councillors other than those unfortunate enough to be with him when the coup broke. If successful, he could crack the unity of the London council. He wanted Russell and Herbert to attend him as quickly as possible because of their 'privat good affections towards' him; their clienteles and the army were to follow later.³⁶ Somerset also turned to Shrewsbury. Isolated, he recognised the importance of gaining the support of as many of the nobility as possible because they were still powerful in the localities and frequent figures at court. Unlike Lord Seymour of Sudeley though, Somerset only cultivated the nobility in general terms as lord protector, although he did not interfere with their traditional roles in the military and the localities. On 6 October, he sent one of his servants, Francis Poole, esquire, with a letter to Shrewsbury, imploring 'that as ye tender the good preservation of the kynges maiesties royall person and our earnest and hartie acqueynted frendshipp to come hither to the kyng' at Hampton Court. The letter was terse concerning his predicament and Poole conveyed the details verbally.³⁷ Poole had been in Somerset's service since at least 1544 and was on close terms with Thynne and Fisher. He was a trusted servant.³⁸ Shrewsbury does not appear to have lent Somerset any support. He probably shrewdly assessed Poole's report, deciding it was politic to remain neutral. He was in close proximity and arrived in London on 7 October, in time to attend the meeting of the London councillors at the Mercers' Hall.³⁹

The London council first responded to Somerset's attempts to raise forces on 6 October. Their reaction was calm and measured: they believed Edward's safety was threatened by Somerset's treasonable behaviour and the duke spread rumours that they intended to harm the king. However, they hoped the recipients, the political community, would not be deceived and would persuade the commons of the truth. The London council claimed Somerset wanted to deceive the commons in

³³ PRO, SP 10/6/36, M. fo. 82r.

³⁴ PRO, SP 10/9/5, M. fos. 6r-6v; PRO, SP 10/9/7, M. fos. 8r-8v; PRO, SP 10/9/9, M. fos. 10r-10v; Jordan, *The young king*, pp. 301-304; Bush, *Government policy*, pp. 4, 10-11, 98.

³⁵ PRO, SP 10/10/18, M. fos. 48r-49v.

³⁶ PRO, SP 10/9/4, M. fos. 5r-5v.

³⁷ LPL, MS. 3193, fo. 117; Lodge (ed.), *Illustrations of British history*, i, p. 164.

³⁸ *Report on the manuscripts of the...marquess of Bath*, ed. Blatcher, iv, pp. 116, 118.

³⁹ *Simancas*, ix, p. 457; G.W. Bernard, *The power of the early Tudor nobility. A study of the fourth and fifth earls of Shrewsbury* (Brighton, 1985), pp. 61-62.

the hope that they would join him. This put before the elite the prospect of mass unrest.⁴⁰ The London council asked them 'to putt your selfe in order *with* all the power ye maye make presentlie to repaire vnto vs for the *service* and suertie of the kinges maiestie in this greate and weightie matter as to good and lovinge subiectes apperteyneth'.⁴¹ There was no ambiguity, no equivocation. First, the members of the elite must fulfil their role as a means of communication with the locality; then they must calm the commons; then they must raise their retinues to defend the king.

On 6 October, Somerset sent Petre with letters from the king. This was probably designed to open discussions with the London councillors in an attempt to discern their intentions. It is possible that he sought an accommodation with the London council because the following day he wrote expressing the desire 'tavoide the [e]ffusion of Christian bloode & to *preserve* the kynges maiesties persone/ his Realme and subiectes'. Somerset would be 'agrable to eny reasonable condicions that you will requiar'.⁴² Petre had only rejoined him on 4 October and was now detained in London, presumably not unwillingly. Somerset complained about this.⁴³ He involved the other councillors at Windsor, who wrote a second letter similar to his own to the London council on 6 October. They claimed the actions of the London council forced them to 'these extremities' and said they would defend the king to 'death' if the conspirators took a violent course. If not, they would be 'agreable to any reasonable condicion' and asked that Petre be used in continued negotiations.⁴⁴ In response, the London council implied that Somerset was isolated.⁴⁵ Even as he was attempting to open negotiations, proclamations were circulating in the vicinity of Hampton Court from 6 October, requesting 'in diuers townes nere the court for men to ayde the Kinge against the Lordes, and sent lettres likewise to divers townes, whereupon great assembly of people gathered to Hampton Courte'.⁴⁶ A letter was sent to the bailiffs and constables of certain parishes in Middlesex on 7 October, ordering them to raise the musters, 'especialle bringing as many archers as ye maye'.⁴⁷ Somerset also demonstrated to the commons gathered at Hampton Court that he had possession of the king. In an effective piece of theatre, he brought him through the base court to the gate to speak to the assembly: Edward was made to say 'I pray you be good to ^vs^ our vncle'. Somerset then spoke against the London council. Only certain parts of this biased account can be regarded as reliable. In a sinister way, the London council inverted Somerset's assertion that he would die defending the king by suggesting he concluded 'that er he

⁴⁰ PRO, SP 10/9/10, M. fos. 11r-11v; Pocock, pp. 80-81.

⁴¹ PRO, SP 10/9/10, M. fo. 11r.

⁴² PRO, SP 10/9/16, M. fo. 18r; ITL, Petyt MS. 538/46, fos. 469r-469v; NRO, F. (M.) C. 21, fo. 15r; Tytler, i, pp. 214-216; Pocock, pp. 88-90.

⁴³ Emmison, *Tudor secretary*, pp. 75-77; PRO, SP 10/9/16, M. fos. 18r-19v.

⁴⁴ BL Cotton MS. Caligula B vii, fos. 417r-417v.

⁴⁵ BL Cotton MS. Titus B. ii, fo. 36r.

⁴⁶ Wriothesley, *Chronicle*, ii, p. 25.

⁴⁷ PRO, SP 10/9/15, M. fos. 16r-17v.

woolde be distroyed the kinges maieste shuld dye before him *which* was to abomnable'.⁴⁸ Allegedly, on hearing this threat, the London councillors thought it best to remain in the city in order to ensure that the king came to no harm but 'resolved neither to rest so vn furnisshed as he [Somerset] might vse his will first vppon vs & after the more easely procede in his purpose'. Therefore, 'in quiet sort' they reoccupied the Tower 'and furnished ourselles of a sufficient number of hable men if nede be in suche sorte'. However, they hoped to 'delyver' the king shortly 'without any bloodshed...and after establishe a better order for his graces suertie then he [Somerset] hath vsed'.⁴⁹ A memorandum from the period recorded that St John had reoccupied the Tower on 6 October and appointed Peckham as lieutenant. Somerset's people were turning from him. Sir John Markham of Cotham in Nottinghamshire had shown his 'disobedyence' in not preventing the loss of the Tower to the London council, while Darcy, Somerset's client, 'is laide in the tower as a traytor [to Somerset]' and the duke's butler had been detained in London.⁵⁰

The London council in their meeting at the Mercers' Hall on 7 October discussed Somerset's removal of Edward to Windsor.⁵¹ They explained their actions in a letter to Edward, writing that they tried 'by all good & gentill meanes' to persuade Somerset to moderate his policies and govern with their advice but found him unreasonable 'and therwith doing sundry suche thinges as wer & be most danngerous' to the king and commonwealth. They 'thought yet agayn to have gently and quietly spoken *with* him [Somerset] in thies thinges had he not gathered force about him in suche sorte as we might easely perceyve hym earnestly bent to the maintenance of his olde wilfull and trobelous doinges/ for redresse wherof, and for none other cause we do presently remayne here redy to lyve and dye your true servanntes'.⁵² The London council was attempting to establish its credentials as the privy council trying to bring an errant lord protector to task. They reiterated this point repeatedly; they were 'almost the hole counsell'. This was reinforced by the presence of St John, who, as lord president, could decide which privy councillors attended meetings.⁵³ They utilised the available privy council staff, including Chaloner, and the instruments of government.⁵⁴ In contrast, Somerset acted under his authority as lord protector. The London council also objected to the way Somerset exercised his office of governor of the king's person. He knew from

⁴⁸ PRO, SP 10/9/41, M. fo. 77v. Another version of this speech was recorded by Fisher and its content suggests it is more reliable. It states that Somerset intended to be the first to die defending the king: BL Additional MS. 48126, fos. 9v-10v.

⁴⁹ PRO, SP 10/9/41, M. fos. 77v-78r.

⁵⁰ PRO, SP 10/9/14, M. fo. 15r. The comment about Markham is strange because he was appointed on 1 November by the privy council to replace Somerset's appointee, Sir Walter Stoner. Perhaps, he was an officer of the Tower already. He was also related to Somerset, while Stanhope was his wife's brother-in-law, and he owed his return for Nottinghamshire in 1547 to both men. Markham was also a protestant. Peckham's appointment was only temporary: APC, ii, pp. 353, 371; Bindoff, ii, pp. 568-570; see below, pp. 211-212.

⁵¹ APC, ii, pp. 333-336.

⁵² BL Cotton MS. Titus B. ii, fo. 36r. This was carefully drafted: PRO, SP 10/9/17, M. fos. 20r-20v; PRO, SP 10/9/18, M. fos. 21r-22v; PRO, SP 10/9/19, M. fos. 23r-24v; APC, ii, pp. 333-334. A contemporary copy is: NRO, F. (M.) C. 21, fos. 15v-16r.

⁵³ BL Cotton MS. Caligula B vii, fo. 415v; BL Additional MS. 34324, fo. 239v; see below, p. 138.

early in the coup that they ‘fynde them selves agreved in bryngeng vp of the kinges maiestie which they will otherwise ordre’.⁵⁵ The London council also wrote to the council at Windsor on 7 October. They had heard that ‘false untrue and slannderous bills rumours and reaports be spred’ by Somerset and justified themselves to Cranmer, Paget and Smith, writing of their ‘trouth and fidelities’ to God and the king, maintaining that they wished to preserve his honour, realms and good government, and opening the way to negotiations.⁵⁶ This led Somerset to enquire about terms the next day and elicited a letter from the council at Windsor.⁵⁷ The London council complained that Somerset had not taken their advice, had been too supercilious (perhaps because of his elevated sense of his office), regarded himself as above other subjects, over-reacted when they intended to have ‘quietly commended with him’ and gathered a large force against them.⁵⁸ Because the duke had summoned men to his defence, the London council was forced to do the same. They would be ‘conformable’ if he removed himself from the king, dispersed his force and laid himself open to justice but they threatened the councillors at Windsor for siding with him.⁵⁹ The London council did not wish to appear factious, explaining to the king that day that ‘ffor what soeuer is or shalbe said to your highnes no erthely thing could have moved vs to have seamed to stand as a partie but your only preservacion’. They promised to prove their continued loyalty.⁶⁰

The London council was also reacting to the summer rebellions, which had endangered the polity and, among other problems, ‘proceded of the yll gouvernement of the Lord Protectour’, who, ‘mynding to follow his owne fantasyes’, governed without them.⁶¹ Therefore, they had consulted together and intended to repair to Hampton Court to discuss ‘the reformation of the State’ with Somerset but he, ‘moved with the conscience of his yll gouvernement, wherof he would abyde no reformation’, raised the commons against them.⁶² Their careful statement of intent then quoted the handbill purportedly issued by Somerset to raise the commons. A copy of this handbill is extant in the state papers but it cannot be ascribed to the lord protector with absolute certainty.⁶³ The London council solicited the assistance of the mayor, Sir Henry Amcotes, and common council of London, who were summoned to Ely Place and told to keep the city secure. To obtain general compliance they now wrote to the leading nobility and gentry, using the threat of renewed unrest and ordering them not to obey Somerset’s commands, ‘but do what they cowlde eche one in his behalf for the stay and quiet of the realme’. Again, it was essential for the government, even when fracturing, to secure the assistance of the elite and certain nobles were ordered to bring their

⁵⁴ See below, p. 143.

⁵⁵ PRO, SP 10/9/14, M. fo. 15r.

⁵⁶ BL Cotton MS. Caligula B. vii, fo. 415r.

⁵⁷ PRO, SP 10/9/24, M. fos. 32r-33v; PRO, SP 10/9/24 (i), M. fos. 34r-34Bv; PRO, SP 10/9/26, M. fos. 39r-40v.

⁵⁸ BL Cotton MS. Caligula B. vii, fo. 415r.

⁵⁹ BL Cotton MS. Caligula B. vii, fos. 415r-415v.

⁶⁰ BL Cotton MS. Titus B. ii, fo. 36v.

⁶¹ APC, ii, p. 330.

⁶² APC, ii, pp. 330-331.

retinues to London while ignoring any directions from Somerset. Similarly, the Tower, repository of the national arsenal, was secured from the lord protector by Sir Edmund Peckham, the lieutenant, and Leonard Chamberlain, his deputy.⁶⁴ Chamberlain's position was uncertain because of his family's close connections with the Seymours and his catholicism. His brother Edward was probably returned as MP for Heytesbury, Wiltshire, in 1545 through Seymour patronage. Edward Chamberlain was also involved in Somerset's building programme and possibly part of his military clientele. He served during the Pinkie campaign and was master of the ordnance during the relief of Boulogne in 1549.⁶⁵ Somerset sent Wolf on 6 October to try to take the Tower but he retreated on seeing St John and Sir Richard Southwell enter it and joined Somerset and the king, who were heading to Windsor. Hoby may have helped the London council to take the Tower. The London council was growing in strength and gaining increasing support from courtiers, civic leaders and the county elite.⁶⁶

Somerset may have had several memoranda drawn up to examine how to garner support.⁶⁷ Sir John Bowes, treasurer of the mint at Durham Place, may have produced these. One was endorsed, 'a devise for *lettres* to be sent from the king to the nobilitie in the favour of the duke of Somerset'.⁶⁸ It was posited that the king should write to the nobility, attempting to persuade them to ignore reports against Somerset, and 'to trust to his *lettre* written *with* his owne hande'. The military leadership offered by the nobility was still very important, especially their ability to raise large numbers of men by the quasi-feudal system through signet letters. They derived much of their status from their military obligations and usually provided a third of any force raised by this system, either from their own retinues or from the royal stewardships they possessed.⁶⁹ Interestingly, Somerset wanted 'all suche of them that wilbe taken as his most true and loving subiectes shulde repaire to him from the rest that willeth the contrary not *with* ther powers but ther owne persons'. The uncertain attitude of the nobility would be treated not as a desire to overthrow Somerset but as attempted deposition unless 'they followe his [Edward's] *lettre* and ee commaundement'.⁷⁰ Why did Somerset consider summoning the nobility without their retinues? The explanation might lie in the concluding statement that the king 'is assuerdth that god will in this thing if he had no power at all see the destruction of them that seke to dannger him and all his realm so vngodly'.⁷¹ Somerset may have thought it undesirable for noble retinues to converge on

⁶³ PRO, SP 10/9/12, M. fos. 13r-13v.

⁶⁴ APC, ii, pp. 331-332, 356; Bindoff, i, pp. 613-614; PRO, SP 10/9/41, M. fos. 77v-78r; see above, p. 135.

⁶⁵ Longleat, Thynne MS. 2, fos. 48r-49v; Bindoff, i, pp. 613-614.

⁶⁶ Somerset may have intended to head to London, only turning back on learning that the Tower was lost: BL Additional MS. 48126, fo. 11r; Malkiewicz, 'An eye-witness's account', pp. 606-607, n. 2.

⁶⁷ PRO, SP 10/9/13, M. fos. 14r-14v; PRO, SP 10/9/14, M. fos. 15r-15v.

⁶⁸ PRO, SP 10/9/14, M. fo. 15v; PRO, SP 10/7/39, M. fos. 102r-102v; BL Additional MS. 9069, fo. 45r; PRO, SP 10/9/48, M. fo. 94r.

⁶⁹ PRO, SP 10/9/13, M. fo. 14r; Goring, 'The military obligations of the English people', pp. 3-13, 16, 111-137.

⁷⁰ PRO, SP 10/9/13, M. fo. 14r.

⁷¹ PRO, SP 10/9/13, M. fo. 14r.

Hampton Court, or even Windsor, because he could not be certain about the intentions of their leaders. This might explain his ambivalent attitude towards Oxford.⁷² Bowes may have initially advised Somerset to issue ‘alettre vnto the lordes wylling that asmany of them as are his treue honorable [friends] shulde repayre vnto him against his ennemys/ orels they sought his blode aswell as his vncles’.⁷³ Somerset was to use his control of the king to summon the nobility to his aid, utilising emotive language that may have alienated them, and equating armed opposition to him as armed opposition to the king. The implications were dangerous. He equated his own good with the good of the commonwealth as if he were king; what endangered him, endangered the polity. However, for some reason, Somerset’s clients had second thoughts: ‘also to send that ther maie be acontermaunde to the nobilitie that they shulde not l [sic] come to london nor nye the same’.⁷⁴ The nobility were the most conspicuous and powerful social class and symbolised traditional authority. It is possible Somerset still wanted them to come to him, although without their clienteles, in order to strengthen his position against the London council. He would have a larger and more legitimate constituency of support this way.⁷⁵

The London council was operating from the heart of municipal government, moving from Warwick’s city residence of Ely Place on 6 October to the Mercers’ Hall on the 7th, the Guild Hall the following day, and the town house of the sheriff, Sir John York, who was also under treasurer or master of Southwark mint, in Walbrook, the day after.⁷⁶ This underlined the relationship being forged between the city and the London council. Proximity accentuated influence. St John seems to have presided over this activity.⁷⁷ However, this was proper as he was lord president, as well as lord great master, having the direction of the privy council’s procedure and activity. It emphasised the intention of the London council to return to government according to the norms and practises that had been partially deviated from during the protectorate.⁷⁸

The London council was gaining the upper hand by 8 October as the resolve of the councillors at Windsor began to crack. In an attempt to avoid armed conflict, Cranmer, Paget and Smith wrote to them, offering to make terms if Somerset was allowed to surrender with guarantees of his safety.⁷⁹ They had discussed this with Somerset, who ‘is contented (if ye will again for your partes vse equitie)’. He ‘passeth litle for the place he now hath’ but thought it unreasonable to be

⁷² PRO, SP 10/9/4, M. fos. 5r-5v.

⁷³ PRO, SP 10/9/14, M. fo. 15r.

⁷⁴ PRO, SP 10/9/14, M. fo. 15r.

⁷⁵ C. Carpenter, *The wars of the roses. Politics and the constitution in England, c. 1437-1509* (Cambridge, 1997), pp. 47-66.

⁷⁶ APC, ii, pp. 330-342; Wriothesley, *Chronicle*, ii, pp. 24-26, 33.

⁷⁷ CLRO Repertory 12 (1), fo. 152v; Wriothesley, *Chronicle*, ii, p. 27; Emmison, *Tudor secretary*, p. 76.

⁷⁸ BL Additional MS. 34324, fo. 239r.

⁷⁹ PRO, SP 10/9/26, M. fos. 39r-40v; Tytler, i, pp. 223-227. This letter was written in reply to one delivered by Honynges; presumably: PRO, SP 10/9/22, M. fos. 28r-29v; BL Cotton MS. Caligula B. vii, fos. 415r-415v; NRO, F. (M.) C. 21, fos. 15r-15v; Pocock, pp. 86-88.

violently dismissed against his will.⁸⁰ Somerset pointed out through them that he had been made lord protector by agreement of the privy council and the house of lords. The conflict between the two councils had escalated because of rumour and Somerset wished only to secure terms that would allow him to 'live in quiet'. However, the prickly tone of the letter strained negotiations and Somerset's attitude remained truculent. He warned that if the London council sought his death, 'the bloode of him and others that shall die on both sides innocently shalbe by god iustly required at *your* handes, and when *peradventure* yow wolde haue him again vpon occasion of service, yow shall forthink to haue lost him'.⁸¹ The London council took particular umbrage at the comment that 'vndoubtedly we heare, and knowe more of this point (*with* your favours) than yow there do knowe yet'.⁸² The authors believed Somerset's actions had been caused by rumours that the London council sought his 'destruction': this 'enduced his grace to flye to the defence, *which* he hath assembled'. Equally, they thought that similar confusion caused the London council to do the same, leading to the extremism that threatened the polity. Cranmer, Paget and Smith asked for moderation between the two parties.⁸³ This letter was delivered by Hoby, whom Somerset presumably considered suitably discreet and reliable, and 'toke him to be faythefull and trustie and no partie'.⁸⁴ Hoby first visited Somerset as early as 6 October. He was an experienced diplomat, which probably recommended him to both parties, and engineered the lord protector's surrender and arrest after a week of negotiation. He may have been motivated by anger towards Somerset, despite relatively close professional relations, because the latter bestowed certain offices once belonging to Denny on his own clients that Hoby wanted.⁸⁵

According to John Stow, Somerset wrote to Warwick on the same day. He reminded the earl of their friendship since youth and hoped that Warwick meant him no harm, having never wronged him himself. He was also mindful of the danger of rumours escalating the situation.⁸⁶ Bowes may have suggested direct contact with Warwick 'only', although he wanted the letter to be written by the king.⁸⁷ This was because of the personal connection between Seymour and Dudley and the latter's substantial role in the coup. Through the medium of the king, Somerset also wrote to the London council on the same day as Cranmer, Paget and Smith, using similar terms.⁸⁸ However, the tone was less conciliatory and the letter claimed the king did 'lament our *present* estate being in soch *imminent* daunger' and wanted to castigate the London council for forgetting their duty.

⁸⁰ PRO, SP 10/9/26, M. fos. 39v-40r.

⁸¹ PRO, SP 10/9/26, M. fo. 40r.

⁸² PRO, SP 10/9/26, M. fo. 39v.

⁸³ PRO, SP 10/9/26, M. fos. 39r-39v.

⁸⁴ PRO, SP 10/9/26, M. fo. 40v; BL Additional MS. 48126, fos. 11v-15r; Bindoff, ii, pp. 366-368.

⁸⁵ Beer, *Northumberland*, pp. 89-90; Bindoff, ii, pp. 367-368; BL Additional MS. 48126, fos. 11v-15r; Bindoff, ii, pp. 367-368.

⁸⁶ Beer, *Northumberland*, pp. 89-90.

⁸⁷ PRO, SP 10/9/14, M. fo. 15r.

⁸⁸ PRO, SP 10/9/24, M. fos. 32r-33v; PRO, SP 10/9/25, M. fos. 35r-36v; BL Cotton MS. Caligula B. vii, fos. 416r-416v; BL Harley MS. 353, fos. 76r-77r; NRO, F. (M.) C. 21, fos. 16r-16v; Pocock, pp. 102-104.

There seemed to be a veiled reference to Somerset's largesse. Although charged by them with 'will fulnes', the king allegedly found his uncle 'so tractable' that he hoped a peaceful agreement could be reached. This is the central theme of the document, a settlement mediated by Hoby. Somerset was willing to admit his faults in government. He emphasised that he 'myndeth no hurt' to the king, suspecting that the London council really thought the same thing, and enclosed articles of submission for their consideration. These articles were offered to the king in the presence of the councillors at Windsor and others with the intention that they were made known to the London council.⁸⁹ First, the lord protector claimed that he did not mean nor had ever meant to harm the London council, his actions having been made purely for self-defence. He was reacting to rumours of 'metings & assemblis & gathering of horsemen and other power out of seuerall countries', not knowing what this purported but fearing for the king's safety. This was 'at the furste begynninge declared unto your highenes'. Second, the force at Windsor was provided for the king's defence and not to attack the London council. Somerset would submit himself to any reasonable terms, his submission to be ratified by parliament, 'or ether any other ordre that shalbe deuised'.⁹⁰ Both parties were using the same language now, both professed their desire to see things resolved 'for the preseruacion of your Maiestie and tranquillitie of the realme'.⁹¹

The duchess of Somerset was also involved in defending her husband's position. She wrote to Paget on 8 October. Her whereabouts were unknown after she left Hampton Court two days previously and the letter had no address.⁹² It is possible that she was at Whalley's house at Wimbledon, having delivered 'iiij square Caskettes' the previous morning. She was at Beddington on 11 October, staying at her brother's house.⁹³ The duchess was distraught by then and Whalley had been sent there by Somerset 'to recomfort her'. This underlined Whalley's intimacy with his master and mistress. It is possible he was related to Somerset too, further strengthening their fidelity clientage.⁹⁴ Dr Gammon believed that Somerset had 'communicated his distrust of Paget to his duchess' but there is no evidence of this from her letter, which he cites in evidence.⁹⁵ If anything, the opposite was true. The duchess wrote to Paget for comfort and reassurance. She had received word from him through Stanhope, who was organising Somerset's communications. She was completely bewildered by the situation and had lost much of her composure, while not

⁸⁹ PRO, SP 10/9/24, M. fos. 32r-33v; PRO, SP 10/9/24 (i), M. fos. 34r-34Bv; PRO, SP 10/9/25 (i), M. fos. 37r-38v; BL Cotton MS. Caligula B vii, fos. 418r-418v; NRO, F. (M.) C. 21, fo. 16v.

⁹⁰ NRO, F. (M.) C. 21, fo. 16v.

⁹¹ NRO, F. (M.) C. 21, fo. 16v.

⁹² NRO, F. (M.) C. 21, fos. 19v-20r; Beer and Jack, p. 135; *Simancas*, ix, p. 459.

⁹³ PRO, SP 10/9/52, M. fo. 100r; Pocock, pp. 120-122; PRO, SP 10/9/42, M. fos. 82r-83v; Tytler, i, pp. 241-243.

⁹⁴ PRO, SP 10/9/42, M. fo. 82r. Whalley had extensive experience, being a contemporary of the duke's and initially comptroller to the first earl of Rutland (1540-1541), then receiver of the court of augmentations for Yorkshire (1545-1552), esquire of the body by 1545, joint keeper of the castle and parks at Wressell, keeper of the bailiwick of the East Riding of Yorkshire, commissioner of the peace for the North (quorum) and East Ridings and for Nottinghamshire, and MP for Scarborough (1547). He disbursed royal money for Boulogne: PRO, C 66/801, mm. 11d-12d; *Calendar of patent rolls*, i, p. 92; *APC*, ii, pp. 303, 323; Bindoff, iii, pp. 594-596.

⁹⁵ Gammon, *Statesman and schemer*, p. 164.

understanding why the London council had instigated a coup against her husband.⁹⁶ The duchess appealed to Paget, reminding him of the bonds of affection between her husband and him:

*Master Comptroller I have ever loved and trusted youe, for that I have sene in yow a perfyte honest frende to my lorde, who hath always made the same accompt and assuredly bare yow his good will and frendship as yow your selfe hath had best tryall God hath geven yow great wisdom and a frendly nature/ A good Master Comptroller for Christes bloods sake spare not for payne study and wryting, as I here yow do, the lyving god will prosper yow and yours the better.*⁹⁷

The duchess suggested Paget might mediate but she could not bear the situation with patience. She asked him to remain loyal and to 'comefort' Somerset with his counsel and friendship. The duke was badly shaken, both because the king and realm were endangered and 'as greatly to se these lordes friendshippes so sclender to him as it doth appear and specially of some, albeit he hath pleased them all'. She believed, 'God will kepe and defende him from all his enemies, as he hath alwais done hitherto'.⁹⁸

Russell and Herbert also wrote to Somerset on 8 October to tell him that they could not offer him support because they had received word from the London council that 'this great extremyte procedith onely vpon priuat causes/ betwene your grace and them'. The polity was endangered 'whyles this contencion endureth by factions betwene your grace and them'. Again, faction was seen to be at the centre of the conflict but, with the exception of Southampton and Lord Seymour of Sudeley, Edwardian politics prior to the coup had not been factional. This was why the duke and duchess of Somerset, among others, were so surprised by its sudden appearance.⁹⁹ Russell and Herbert had assessed the situation and thought that, what they would describe the following day as the 'tyckelnesse of the cuntrey', meant that they could not support Somerset. His heir delivered this letter to the duke.¹⁰⁰ Herbert had suffered as a result of the actions of the Wiltshire commons and may have held Somerset responsible.¹⁰¹ Russell and Herbert thought it was 'moste convenient in the heate of this broyle to leavie as greate a power as we may' in order to ensure the king's safety. Somerset should submit himself to order so that the situation could be resolved peacefully and civil war avoided.¹⁰² Russell and Herbert utilised the forces they had raised to prevent the lord protector from receiving support from the west, particularly from localities where he had strong influence, like Hampshire, Wiltshire, Gloucestershire, Somerset and Wales. They also relied on

⁹⁶ NRO, F. (M.) C. 21, fo. 19v.

⁹⁷ NRO, F. (M.) C. 21, fos. 19v-20r.

⁹⁸ NRO, F. (M.) C. 21, fo. 20r.

⁹⁹ PRO, SP 10/9/23, M. fos. 30r-30v; Pocock, pp. 90-92.

¹⁰⁰ PRO, SP 10/9/31, M. fo. 47r.

¹⁰¹ *The manuscripts of...the duke of Rutland*, i, p. 36.

¹⁰² Presumably from the stewardships Herbert controlled in Wiltshire and the army under their command: PRO, SP 10/9/23, M. fos. 30r-31r; see above, pp. 74-75, n. 205.

the JPs to maintain order in Gloucestershire.¹⁰³ Their attitude was shaped by service to the crown and preservation of the polity from disorder, which they felt would be best preserved by the London council. They accepted the London council as the legitimate privy council.

The London council had the running of the conspiracy and Somerset was forced to react to their actions. They also possessed the tactical initiative. They met the common council of London on 8 October, who were gathered in the Guild Hall, and asked the city for military assistance.¹⁰⁴ Somerset had made the same request two days previously, asking for one thousand men to be sent to Hampton Court that evening, or by noon the next day at the latest.¹⁰⁵ Both parties needed the support of the London authorities because they could provide men, money and greater legitimacy as they represented the most important urban community in England. Somerset may have been acting on advice, a memorandum counselling 'that the kinges maiestie make a *lettre* vnto the ~~aldremen~~ a *Maieur* sherefes and aldremen of the Citie'. He probably made contact through Sir John Bowes, who would be arrested with the duke's other principal adherents. It is less likely that the 'Master Bowes' named in the top left corner of the memorandum was the alderman Sir Martin Bowes.¹⁰⁶ Sir Martin Bowes acted in unison with the other aldermen during the October coup.¹⁰⁷ One of the memoranda is torn at the top and the meaning of the first sentence is obscured. It refers to a meeting of the London council in the Mercers' Hall at nine in the morning of 8 October. It actually met in the Guild Hall but had gathered in the Mercers' Hall the previous day, suggesting that the document was produced at the time of these meetings (probably on the 9th or the 10th). Sir John Bowes may have been keeping Somerset informed of developments in London and its environs as well as advising him of the best actions to take. He was probably acting in a similar way to Bonham and Somerset's other county clients, except that he conducted the duke's London business.¹⁰⁸ Owen Claydon, a London salter, who was expected to elaborate, delivered Somerset's letter to Amcotes, Sir Rowland Hill, mayor-elect, the aldermen and common council.¹⁰⁹ However, on 7 October, the common council 'delyberatly debated & pondred' before agreeing to assist the London council 'with all spede & dyligence to the vttermoste of their wylls & powers' for the safeguard of the king and commonwealth and preservation of the city.¹¹⁰ They too, were having to

¹⁰³ PRO, SP 10/9/31, M. fos. 47r-48v; Tytler, i, pp. 231-235; PRO, SP 10/9/31 (i), M. fos. 49r-49v; PRO, SP 10/9/32, M. fos. 50r-51v.

¹⁰⁴ Wriothesley, *Chronicle*, ii, pp. 25-26.

¹⁰⁵ CLRO Letter Book R, fos. 39v-40v.

¹⁰⁶ PRO, SP 10/9/14, M. fo. 15r; PRO, SP 10/9/48, M. fo. 94r.

¹⁰⁷ CLRO Repertory 12 (1), fo. 149v; CLRO Repertory 12 (1), fo. 150v; CLRO Repertory 12 (1), fo. 151v; CLRO Repertory 12 (1), fo. 152v; CLRO Letter Book R, fo. 39v; CLRO Letter Book R, fos. 41v; Bindoff, ii, pp. 469-471.

¹⁰⁸ PRO, SP 10/9/14, M. fo. 15r; *APC*, ii, pp. 333, 336.

¹⁰⁹ CLRO Letter Book R, fo. 39v. Claydon was probably not in Somerset's household and his connection with him is uncertain. On 9 January 1550, he was bound by a recognizance with Thomas Bowes, grocer, perhaps a relative of Sir John Bowes, and John Macerves, haberdasher: Longleat, Seymour MS. 10, fos. 166r-170r; *APC*, ii, p. 369.

¹¹⁰ CLRO Letter Book R, fo. 40v; CLRO Journal 16, fos. 36r-37r.

react to the difficult situation, by involving themselves in a coup against the man who was effectively head of state, and shaping events as a consequence of their own actions.

The mayor and common council were still ambivalent though, and in their journal the common council recorded a more cautious stance. They declined to assist in the removal of the king from Somerset's custody at Windsor, agreeing only 'to ayde the said lordes therin *within* the said Cytie according to the tenour of their said *Lettres*'. This was an extension of the London council's request on 6 October that the city authorities keep good watch and quell rumours.¹¹¹ The common council did not make its decision known immediately, demurring for several days, but on hearing the London council's letters and or proclamation against Somerset to sheriffs and JPs on the 8th (read by Richard Turke, sheriff and member of the common council, and Chaloner), their position may have begun to alter. The sheriffs of London and Middlesex were clearly supporting the London council. The London council dined with York. Two days later they dined at Turke's house and held a council meeting there before going to Paulet House.¹¹² Somerset appeared to be overturning the social order and was accused in the proclamation of 'abusing the kinges maiestes hand, stamp, and signet' and, without the advice of the privy council, used these means 'to levye the kinges maiestes subgets and disturbe the commun peax of the Realme. for the maintenaunce of his oun ill and oultragious doinges only'.¹¹³ On the 7th and 8th, the London council enjoined the local officers not to levy men on Somerset's behalf but only under their instructions, while cautioning them to ignore the rumours he was spreading.¹¹⁴ Next day the common council agreed to consider the London council's request for one thousand men. It decided to provide half that number.¹¹⁵ York's role at this juncture was vital; it was he, not Rich (as the chronicler Wriothsesley believed), who 'opened' the request from the London council to the common council for one thousand men 'for thaccomplishement of their enterpryce for the spedye savegarde & conveying of the kinges maiestie out of the handes of the late protector'.¹¹⁶ The common council then consented to provide one thousand men, if necessary. As Professor Beer suggested, this was probably because Amcotes, Robert Brooke, recorder of London, and the aldermen applied the decisive pressure.¹¹⁷ This was a further concession to the London council. Yet, initially on 10 October, the common council 'fynally assentyd & agreed' to make preparations to raise five

¹¹¹ B.L. Beer, 'London and the rebellions of 1548-1549', *Journal of British Studies*, 12 (1972), pp. 35-36; CLRO Journal 16, fo. 37r; CLRO Journal 16, fos. 36r-36v.

¹¹² Wriothsesley, *Chronicle*, ii, pp. 25-26; CLRO Journal 15, fo. 365v. These letters were not proclamations but were to be publicized within the recipient's shrievalty: PRO, SP 10/9/20, M. fos. 25r-25v; PRO, SP 10/9/21, M. fos. 26r-27v. On 8 October letters were sent to the sheriffs, JPs, constables, headboroughs and others: PRO, SP 10/9/28, M. fos. 42r-43v; PRO, SP 10/9/29, M. fos. 44r-44v; Pocock, pp. 92-93.

¹¹³ PRO, SP 10/9/28, M. fo. 42r; Pocock, p. 92.

¹¹⁴ PRO, SP 10/9/20, M. fos. 25r-25v; PRO, SP 10/9/28, M. fos. 42r-43v; Pocock, pp. 92-93.

¹¹⁵ CLRO Repertory 12 (1), fos. 151v-152r; CLRO Repertory 12 (1), fo. 152v; Wriothsesley, *Chronicle*, ii, p. 26.

¹¹⁶ CLRO Repertory 12 (1), fo. 151v; Wriothsesley, *Chronicle*, ii, p. 26.

¹¹⁷ CLRO Repertory 12 (1), fo. 151v; Beer, 'London and the rebellions of 1548-1549', p. 37; CLRO Journal 16, fo. 37r; Bindoff, i, pp. 504-506.

hundred, as originally planned, with one hundred horsemen and drew up a list of the men to be raised by each of the livery companies.¹¹⁸ Again, the common council was trying to reduce its commitment, the London council having requested that two hundred horse be raised.¹¹⁹ Even with the active support of the most important figures in the city, the civic government was divided over its level of commitment. However, men like Amcotes, Brooke, York and Turke were treating the London council as the privy council.

At the same time, Somerset was failing to win the support of the home county elite, who were increasingly coming to accept the London council as the legitimate privy council. Morley wrote from Markshall on the 8th to offer his support to the latter and promised to raise his clientele.¹²⁰ He was a member of Mary's household and a catholic. Dr Loach believed this helped 'to support the theory that the coup was initially thought to be a Catholic one'.¹²¹ Yet, this was not necessarily the reason why he supported the London council. Morley was important at this juncture because of his proximity; he was one of the principal landowners in Essex and could raise large numbers of men for military service from his estates and through his stewardship of Hatfield Regis, Essex.¹²² Mary remained cautious and there is no evidence that Morley was acting on her behalf. Instead, like Shrewsbury, he may have believed Somerset's recent behaviour was dangerous and offered to join the coalition of interests against him.

Smith attempted to distance himself from the situation and wrote to Petre on the 8th, asking him to use his accustomed 'moderacion in all thynges' to persuade the London council to avoid extremity and informing him that they had persuaded Somerset to accept terms. Contact was maintained through Smith's brother George. Warwick and the earl of Arundel permitted his brother to visit Smith after receiving his first letter.¹²³ P.F. Tytler and Professor Read partially misinterpreted Smith's motives. P.F. Tytler regarded him as acting, with some bravery, out of conscience, when he advised the London council to avoid bloodshed and extremism, while Professor Read thought he was largely motivated by self-preservation.¹²⁴ His purpose seems to have been a mixture of both. He complained to Petre about his position, explaining that 'ffor my part I am in a most miserable case I can not leave the kynges maieste & hym [Somerset] who was my mastre of whom I haue best ^had^ all/ & I can not denye but I haue misliked also/ some ^thynges^ that you and the rest of my lordes there did mislike/ as ^ye know well no man better your self^'. Smith had

¹¹⁸ CLRO Journal 16, fo. 37v.

¹¹⁹ Wriothesley, *Chronicle*, ii, p. 26.

¹²⁰ PRO, SP 10/9/30, M. fos. 45r-46v.

¹²¹ Loach, *Edward VI*, p. 45, n. 36.

¹²² *The complete peerage*, eds. Gibbs *et al*, ix, pp. 221-224; PRO, E 179/69/46; PRO, E 179/69/51; PRO, E 179/69/49; PRO, E 179/69/75.

¹²³ PRO, SP 10/9/27, M. fo. 41r; PRO, SP 10/9/39, M. fos. 68r-69v; Tytler, i, pp. 228-230; Pocock, pp. 106-108; Dewar, *Smith*, pp. 59-60.

¹²⁴ Tytler, i, p. 228; Read, *Mr. Secretary Cecil*, pp. 56, 472, n. 40.

certainly been critical of Somerset but was now expressing his relationship with him in the past tense. Such a close adherent was in an extremely difficult position because it would be very hard to extricate himself from his patron. Like Paget, he was more independent because he was not under Somerset's command as a member of his household and this seems to have been a major distinction, with 'new' men and conciliar clients trying to mediate a solution, while servants carried out their master's instructions. This mediation and equivocation by some clients does not mean they felt no loyalty to Somerset but the situation was difficult and they sought a less extreme solution. Clients could be critical of patrons. Smith also informed the London council of developments at Windsor, allowing them valuable insights into Somerset's state of mind. He explained that Somerset would 'refuse no reasonable offer condicions/ office/ dignitie/ or what so ever els it be/ he will leave/ rather then it shull come to extreme poyntes'.¹²⁵ It seems likely that the secretary was writing about the discussions between the duke and his supporters. Whether this letter was sent with Somerset's knowledge is unknown but it is unlikely. Smith's final point explains his position. Despite the substantial disturbance to the polity (with both sides vying for legitimacy), fear of internecine faction, renewed popular unrest or external threat, made all parties desirous of a swift and bloodless conclusion to avoid the realm becoming the 'scornyng stock of all the worlde'.¹²⁶ Smith wrote a second letter to Petre, probably the following day, in which he was critical of Somerset's signet letter of the 5th raising the commons, and in which he was concerned about his own position, commenting that 'I trust my tarieng here can not be preiudiciall vnto me when I can not go away'. Like Somerset, he emphasised the importance of remaining with the king.¹²⁷

The London council replied to the Windsor council on the 9th, warning them not to remove the king from Windsor, and pointing out that 'it appereth very straunge vnto vs and a greatt [w]ndre to all true subiectes thatt yow will eyther assent or suffre his maiestes most royall ^{^person^} to remayn in the gard of the duke of Somersettes men sequestrid from his own old sworne servauntes'.¹²⁸ Somerset was having the king guarded by his household servants because they were the most loyal element of his clientele. The London council also questioned the supposed omniscience of the Windsor council.¹²⁹ Fifteen privy councillors signed the London council's letter, although not Warwick.¹³⁰ Despite the fractured state of the privy council, they still acted as if it were a collegiate body running the country and therefore all important news should be directed towards them. Significantly, the Windsor councillors were still regarded as part of this body and

¹²⁵ PRO, SP 10/9/27, M. fo. 41r.

¹²⁶ PRO, SP 10/9/27, M. fo. 41r.

¹²⁷ PRO, SP 10/9/39, M. fo. 68r; PRO, SP 10/9/1, M. fos. 1r-2v; PRO, SP 10/9/26, M. fo. 40r.

¹²⁸ PRO, SP 10/9/37, M. fos. 64r-64v; NRO, F. (M.) C. 21, fos. 17v-18r; Pocock, p. 105. The final version as sent is: BL Cotton MS. Caligula B. vii, fos. 419r-420v.

¹²⁹ PRO, SP 10/9/37, M. fo. 65r; Pocock, p. 105.

¹³⁰ BL Cotton MS. Caligula B. vii, fo. 420r.

obligated to serve the king with it. Mary Dewar thought that Smith was held responsible for the sentence that the London council found so offensive. He was well known for his political insensitivity and regarded as the author of the signet letter. Smith was treated as one of Somerset's adherents and would be imprisoned, heavily fined and removed from the secretaryship. He was not rehabilitated and spent the remainder of the reign at Eton.¹³¹ Smith was too closely associated with the former lord protector, was a close friend of Thynne and had benefited from patronage as a result.¹³² Hoby was able to successfully extricate himself from Somerset because he was not one of the duke's 'new' men, those members of the ducal household or clients who were seen as interfering heavily in government. These were mainly clients, not servants, though. Hoby was largely identified as having an important relationship with Somerset because he was a diplomat and because he favoured religious reform. Somerset maintained close contact with English diplomats, including Hoby, who handled the complex relations with the emperor, the French king and the German princes. Hoby did the London council the invaluable service of delaying his return to Somerset with their reply, 'by the waye faininge he had loste the Letter', and 'this excuse was made of purpose before devised by the Lords to the end they might winne tyme the better that they might doe their feates'.¹³³ He sent a messenger to court with copies of the articles against Somerset to be distributed to people whom he felt were losing faith in the lord protector, 'both of the Priuie chamber and of the household', including Howard. Presumably, he gauged this through conversations he had held with them on previous visits.¹³⁴ The London council was still uncertain how Russell and Herbert would react. Mary Dewar suggests that Warwick was precipitate and acted without certain support from the city or from them.¹³⁵ This implies he led the coup. The London council had not been in direct contact with Russell and Herbert. St John had written to them but they did not reply until 9 October and it is uncertain when this letter reached London.¹³⁶ However, although the city authorities delayed their response to the London council's request for men, if the latter could ensure the support of Russell and Herbert they could prevent the situation from escalating and force Somerset to capitulate.¹³⁷

¹³¹ Dewar, *Smith*, pp. 37-38, 56-57, 63-66, 67.

¹³² Dewar, *Smith*, pp. 26-36.

¹³³ BL Harley MS. 353, fo. 77r; Tytler, i, pp. 230-231; BL Additional MS. 48126, fos. 13r-13v; Malkiewicz, 'An eye-witness's account', pp. 607-608. Hoby was appointed JP for Middlesex and Worcestershire in 1547 but was more closely associated with Seymour and Catherine than Somerset, being a member of her council from 1543-1548 and steward of one of his properties in 1548: PRO, C 66/801, mm. 16d, 22d; *Calendar of patent rolls*, i, pp. 86, 91; Bindoff, ii, pp. 366-368.

¹³⁴ Howard was rewarded well by Warwick's party, receiving extensive lands in Surrey and being appointed lord deputy of Calais in October 1552: BL Additional MS. 48126, fos. 13v-14r; Malkiewicz, 'An eye-witness's account', p. 608, n. 1; NRO, F. (M.) C. 21, fo. 20r.

¹³⁵ Dewar, *Smith*, p. 64.

¹³⁶ PRO, SP 10/9/31, M. fos. 47r-48v.

¹³⁷ CLRO Repertory 12 (1), fos. 151v-152r; CLRO Journal 16, fo. 37r; CLRO Journal 16, fos. 37v; Wriothesley, *Chronicle*, ii, pp. 26-27; Beer, 'London and the rebellions of 1548-1549', pp. 35-37.

Realising he could not rely on the London authorities for support, Somerset's reaction was extremely incautious, if several handbills are to be credited. In these, hysterical and inflammatory language was used and his interests were identified with the rebellious commons. They attacked the nobility and gentry, especially for their handling of the rebellions and praised Somerset's issuing of pardons. One 'Henry A' of London distributed handbills through the city, the recipients being directed to 'rede it and gyue it fforth'.¹³⁸ This may have been spontaneous or, more probably, part of Somerset's orchestrated attempt to win over the citizens of London. If the handbills originate from Somerset's clientele, then he was attempting to distance himself from the privy council's activities during the unrest, although acknowledging that if he did 'any thing contrary to truthe and justice, without all doubte they were *partakers* and of counsell in the same'. The London council was accused of seeking to murder the king and restore catholicism and the commons were enjoined to ignore their proclamations.¹³⁹ Although Smith has been posited as the author of these handbills, Somerset's hand would have been in it because his dignity was impaired by the claims of the London council.¹⁴⁰ The other privy councillors 'be come vppe but late from the dunghill a sorte of them more mete to kepe swyne then occupye the offices which they do occupye and now serue to the vtter impoverishyng and vndoing of all the commons of this realme'.¹⁴¹ The author pointed out that without possession of the king their power had no legitimate foundation, a telling definition of the importance to Somerset of the office of governor. He attacked the London authorities, likening them to 'Troye vntrue', and 'Marlyne [Merlin] saieth that xxiiij aldermen of hyrs shall lose their heades on one daye which god grante to be shortly Amen'.¹⁴² If Somerset's party did not produce this, could it be the black propaganda that John Ponet accused Warwick and Southampton of using to undermine the duke's position?¹⁴³ It is possible. Equally, Somerset's party may have imploded, handling the situation with incredible ineptitude by using inflammatory methods that were extremely counterproductive. Russell and Herbert wrote to Somerset from Andover, Hampshire, on 8 October to tell him of their concern over the rupture within the polity, informing him of their 'greate lamentacion and sorowe to perceiue the ciuill dissencion which ys happened bitwene your grace and the nobilitie'. The consequences of Somerset's attempt to raise the commons by means of proclamations and bills could lead to serious disorder. The shire elite 'myslyke vearie muche' his behaviour because it impaired their control of the localities and damaged their reputations, which were so necessary to exercising authority. 'The wicked and euyll disposed persones ^shall^ sturre, aswell as the

¹³⁸ It has not been possible to identify the author: PRO, SP 10/9/11, M. fos. 12r-12v; PRO, SP 10/9/12, M. fos. 13r-13v; Tytler, i, pp. 208-211; MacCulloch, *Tudor church militant*, p. 51.

¹³⁹ PRO, SP 10/9/11, M. fo. 12r; Tytler, i, pp. 208-209.

¹⁴⁰ Bindoff, iii, p. 339.

¹⁴¹ PRO, SP 10/9/11, M. fo. 12r; Tytler, i, p. 209.

¹⁴² PRO, SP 10/9/11, M. fo. 12r; Tytler, i, pp. 209-210.

¹⁴³ Ponet, *A shorte treatise of politike power*, sig. I3r.

faithfull subiectes'.¹⁴⁴ Russell's and Herbert's concern reinforces the possibility that Somerset's clientele issued the handbills and that they were disseminated widely.

The London council issued another proclamation on 10 October. This one was against 'the moste vyle false & trayterous bylles papers & bokes' then circulating in and around London. The 'dyuers lewde & sedyicious persons' who sought to maintain Somerset by 'strawinge the same in the streats' were not identified.¹⁴⁵ This proclamation was an attempt to calm the city and its environs by offering a reward of one hundred crowns (originally forty) to informers if the perpetrators were successfully apprehended and their offences proved against them.¹⁴⁶ Interestingly, the draft version ended with a deleted postscript offering a similar reward for the apprehension of or information concerning any who '~~by ringe of any belles striking of dromme proclaiming bill or letter or any other wayes~~ shal labor to styrre the people and to make them rise', leading to '~~vprere and tumulte~~', endangering the king and the commonwealth or slandering the privy council.¹⁴⁷ It is uncertain why this passage should be deleted in the final version because these were effective means to raise support, not dissimilar to some of the techniques used by the muster commissioners, constables and bailiffs to levy and muster in time of insurrection or war and also adopted by protesters, rioters and rebels. These methods brought the commons to Hampton Court and Windsor in larger numbers than the quasi-feudal array or the militia.¹⁴⁸ Obviously, due to Somerset's extremely pressing need for men, the levies and musters would be held in quick succession, probably even at the same time. On 7 October, the king had written from Windsor to the bailiffs and constables of Uxbridge, Hillingdon and Colham Green, Middlesex, which lay about six miles to the north-east and close to Paget's West Drayton estate.¹⁴⁹ The bailiffs and constables were to raise the musters for the king's defence. Like the letter to Sir Henry Seymour, they were to do so 'by ony manner aucthorytie & power which ye have by our lawes vnder vs/ And if ye have no especiall aucthorytie, then by the warr[a]nnnte & aucthorytie of thes our lettres signed with our owne hande'.¹⁵⁰ Somerset was conscious that the enormity of the situation would make the local officers wary of getting involved without scrupulous documentation authorising them to do so. He had attempted to project his image among the commons as a virtuous governor and this left him open to criticism. On a more practical level, even securing support from the nobility, gentry, London authorities and key officials, like the officers of the Tower, would involve utilising these techniques and Somerset was doing just that, sending letters and messengers to a variety of potential supporters. Therefore, the London council

¹⁴⁴ PRO, SP 10/9/23, M. fos. 30r-31r; Pocock, pp. 90-92.

¹⁴⁵ PRO, SP 10/9/40, M. fos. 70r-71v, Petre's draft; Pocock, pp. 108-109. Manuscript copies of the proclamation are: CLRO Letter Book R, fo. 43r; CLRO Journal 16, fo. 38v.

¹⁴⁶ CLRO Letter Book R, fo. 43r; Pocock, pp. 108-109; Jordan, *The young king*, p. 520.

¹⁴⁷ PRO, SP 10/9/40, M. fo. 71r; CLRO Letter Book R, fo. 43r.

¹⁴⁸ Goring, 'The military obligations of the English people', pp. 26-36.

¹⁴⁹ PRO, SP 10/9/15, M. fos. 16r-17v.

was attempting to curb this activity with its proclamation, while condemning it as socially irresponsible. Yet, it used the same methods to recruit support, albeit more successfully. It was assisted in this by various figures outside the London council. York met the London council at his house on 8 and 9 October and co-ordinated activity between the common council and them as 'chief intermediary'. He was rewarded with a knighthood for his services a week after the proclamation. Warwick's new recruit would remain a prominent client.¹⁵¹

Dr Bernard thought that Shrewsbury's attitude at this juncture was vital, stressing the continued importance of the old nobility.¹⁵² Although both were regionally powerful, Oxford and Shrewsbury were not in the inner circle. Both men had very large landed estates that formed the core of their fortunes. This wealth enhanced their county status, especially because of their long pedigrees.¹⁵³ Oxford was not a privy councillor and Shrewsbury had only joined the board by 6 January 1549, although he had been serving in the Scottish war and was appointed lieutenant-general in 1548.¹⁵⁴ Shrewsbury had an ordinary clientage relationship with Somerset based on the latter's management of the war as the king's lieutenant and captain-general for the wars but because of his great wealth from broad acres he was not dependent on the duke in the way Grey of Wilton was. Somerset's relations with Shrewsbury and Oxford were not necessarily smooth. For example, he intervened in Oxford's relationship with an unsuitable woman in 1547 and was undermining his property rights.¹⁵⁵ Although Shrewsbury did not support Somerset in October 1549, R.R. Reid thought that along with Derby, Lord Dacre of Gilsland and the other northern constables, he intended to seize Warwick on Somerset's behalf in April 1551.¹⁵⁶ A friendship of necessity may have developed between the two men, disgruntled at their exclusion from the centre of power. They may have already been acquaintances from their service in Scotland and the borders in the 1540s but they were not regarded as close in the early part of the reign.¹⁵⁷ However, Dr Bernard believed that the reason Shrewsbury did not come to the lord protector's assistance might be because of their poor relations during the Haddington campaign of 1548 and because he held Somerset responsible for the summer rebellions. Shrewsbury might also have 'sympathised with the religious convictions' of Southampton and his supporters. Dr Bernard also characterises

¹⁵⁰ PRO, SP 10/9/15, M. fo. 16v.

¹⁵¹ Wriothesley, *Chronicle*, ii, p. 28; Beer, 'London and the rebellions of 1548-1549', p. 37. York was making payments for Somerset of £2500 on 2 October 1551, suggesting the duke had subsequently tried to make him a favourable client: BL Egerton MS. 2815.

¹⁵² Bernard, *The power of the early Tudor nobility*, pp. 59, 105-107.

¹⁵³ Stone, *Crisis of the aristocracy*, p. 760; Jordan, *The young king*, p. 92; PRO, E 179/69/51; PRO, E 179/69/46; PRO, E 179/69/49; PRO, E 179/69/75; see above, pp. 38-40, 45, 59, 75, 100, 102, 117, 125.

¹⁵⁴ PRO, SP 61/2/3, fo. 6r; APC, ii, pp. 236-238; LPL, MS. 3193, fos. 3-4; Lodge (ed.), *Illustrations of British history*, i, pp. 144-145; Bernard, *The power of the early Tudor nobility*, pp. 124-128; PRO, SP 50/4/16, fo. 409; PRO, SP 50/4/24, fo. 116; PRO, SP 50/4/41 (i), fo. 182; PRO, SP 50/4/98, fos. 347-348; PRO, SP 50/4/104, fos. 379-382; PRO, SP 50/4/106, fos. 393-394.

¹⁵⁵ PRO, SP 10/1/45, M. fos. 135r-135v; see below, pp. 252-254.

¹⁵⁶ R.R. Reid, 'The political influence of the 'north parts' under the later Tudors', in Seton-Watson (ed.), *Tudor studies*, p. 213.

him as a cautious man.¹⁵⁸ Somerset was probably appealing to Shrewsbury and Oxford because they had not been identified as siding with the coup and had traditional county based affinities. However, the political reality of the situation, that the great majority of the privy council opposed the duke, and the unwillingness of others to join him, meant that civil war was avoided.¹⁵⁹ Somerset may have hesitated about extending the struggle into the country, perhaps because insufficient assistance was forthcoming from the nobility and gentry and because of the recent unrest. Importantly, the conspirators based in London secured the support of the city. Control of and support within London had always been essential to Tudor power; the city was the focus of national politics and culture, the principal armoury, naval base and treasury, and the seat of government. Somerset's policies and personal building programme alienated the city fathers and the citizens.¹⁶⁰ The feuds of the fifteenth century went unrepeatd and the October coup remained, to use Professor Guy's term, a court '*putsch*'.¹⁶¹ This containment may have been a consequence of the development of the court as the focus of political power. The monarch was now greatly elevated above the peerage and court ceremonial may have been a means of containing violence because the solidified lines of demarcation and heightened importance given to various activities gave purpose and 'a semi-mystical significance' to the participants.¹⁶² However, Tudor society was still dominated by the great landowners, whose tenants gave them support in time of need.¹⁶³ Therefore, it was essential to prevent Somerset from leaving court or the Thames Valley, where he could be carefully monitored, while ensuring that his tenants in the west could not make contact with him, even though Stanhope had probably been sent there for this purpose.

The London council wrote to the king on 9 October in response to the letter brought by Hoby the previous day.¹⁶⁴ The London council based its argument on part of the patent of 24 December 1547. Somerset was to hold office '*durynge our [Edward's] pleasure*'.¹⁶⁵ Again, they went through the fiction that Somerset's letter was from the king, explaining that the lord protector was the source of the problems. They responded to his jibes about lacking responsibility and forgetting their duty by claiming to act in the interests of the commonwealth and reminded Somerset that Henry appointed certain of them executors in order to govern.¹⁶⁶ Somerset could prove his fidelity to the king by remembering his oath (31 January 1547) and Henry's will, by permitting them to see Edward and, in a deleted clause, '~~for the tyme withdraw hym self with his familie and~~

¹⁵⁷ Bernard, *The power of the early Tudor nobility*, pp. 120-124.

¹⁵⁸ Bernard, *The power of the early Tudor nobility*, pp. 62, 92-93.

¹⁵⁹ PRO, SP 10/9/22, M. fos. 28r-29v; PRO, SP 10/9/23, M. fos. 30r-31v.

¹⁶⁰ Davis, 'The transformation of London', pp. 287-288.

¹⁶¹ P. Williams, *The Tudor regime* (Oxford, 1979), pp. 237-238; Guy, *Tudor England*, p. 212.

¹⁶² Braddock, 'The royal household', pp. 43-49.

¹⁶³ Braddock, 'The royal household', pp. 52-53.

¹⁶⁴ PRO, SP 10/9/35, M. fos. 59r-61v; PRO, SP 10/9/36, M. fos. 62r-63v; APC, ii, pp. 337-340; PRO, SP 10/9/24, M. fos. 32r-33v.

¹⁶⁵ PRO, C 66/814, m. 4; Smith, *Dewar*, pp. 61-62.

¹⁶⁶ PRO, SP 10/9/35, M. fos. 59r-60r.

~~adherentes to any such place as may be thought convenient~~.¹⁶⁷ His forces should be disbanded and his servants should cease to guard the king. The protectorate was not granted by Henry's will 'butt only by agreement ^fyrst^ amonges vs thexecutours, and after of others those ~~name~~ titles and speciall trust ~~was~~ was committed to hym during your maiestes pleasure & vppon condition he shuld do ~~nothing~~ all thinges by advise of your consayll'.¹⁶⁸ They now felt the lord protector could not be trusted to continue in office and intended to discuss this more fully with the king in person.¹⁶⁹ This was the concrete reality of the London council's position.

The London council successfully undermined the unity of the privy councillors at Windsor. When Hoby arrived in mid-morning on 10 October the soldiers had left and only the household servants and Somerset's clientele remained. A proclamation was issued that only the household servants should be armed at court. This was the first move to neuter Somerset's clients and restore the king's servants under the direction of the London council.¹⁷⁰ Paget wrote to Warwick and Southampton from Windsor on the 10th. His servant, Bedell, esquire, had brought him word that the earls were protecting his interests but his letter says nothing definite about his activities. (Like the other participants, Paget's servants and clients were being employed during the crisis.) He stated his friendship towards patrons in the usual formulaic way.¹⁷¹ The letter written to him by the London council later that day reveals Paget's activities.¹⁷² He sent Bedell to tell them of his activities on their behalf, what they termed his 'wyse and stowt doings for the suertye of the kings maiesties person'.¹⁷³ Bedell had suggested it would be possible for Paget to apprehend Somerset and his clients. A servant was offering important advice on how the London council might act (presumably at his patron's behest). They agreed to this and told Paget to apprehend Somerset and his clientele, including Smith, Thynne, Whalley and Cecil. They would send Wingfield to convey further instructions.¹⁷⁴ Clienteles were of obvious political utility.

Cranmer, Paget and Smith also wrote to the London council on 10 October. They recounted their relief when Hoby read the London council's letter to the king in the presence of members of the chamber and household below stairs. They claimed to have had no choice regarding Somerset's

¹⁶⁷ PRO, SP 10/9/35, M. fos. 60v-61r.

¹⁶⁸ The second patent had changed the term of Somerset's appointment from the king's majority at eighteen, to 'durynge our pleasure': PRO, SP 10/9/35, M. fos. 61r-61v; PRO, C 66/814, m. 4.

¹⁶⁹ PRO, SP 10/9/35, M. fo. 61v.

¹⁷⁰ BL Additional MS. 48126, fos. 13v-14r; Malkiewicz, 'An eye-witness's account', p. 608, n. 1; NRO, F. (M.) C. 21, fo. 20r.

¹⁷¹ I am grateful to Rachel Watson, county archivist at Northamptonshire Record Office, for this reference. 'Master Bedell' was probably either Richard or James Bedell. Richard Bedell was a JP for Staffordshire and escheator from 1549-1550, while James Bedell was entrusted with part of Paget's estate in his 1560 will to the use of his heir, Sir Henry Paget: NRO, F. (M.) C. 21, fo. 19r; Beer and Jack, p. 80; PRO, C 66/801, m. 19d; *Calendar of patent rolls*, i, p. 89; v, p. 338; Bindoff, iii, p. 46.

¹⁷² BL Cotton MS. Caligula B. vii, fos. 421r-422v; NRO, F. (M.) C. 21, fo. 18v.

¹⁷³ BL Cotton MS. Caligula B. vii, fo. 421r.

¹⁷⁴ BL Cotton MS. Caligula B. vii, fos. 421r-421v.

clients guarding the king, nor over their involvement in producing the letters issued from 5 October, and wanted to know what arrangements they should make concerning Edward. This last point probably meant whether or not his normal servants were to attend him in the routine way. They requested that three privy councillors be sent to augment their authority. Paget would prepare three of the best chambers in the 'gret court', in close proximity to the privy lodgings. Rogers, one of the gentlemen of the privy chamber, was placed in charge of the king's person.¹⁷⁵ The cohesion of Somerset's clientele began to break down. While most of his servants remained committed to him, his colleagues at Windsor began to bicker and blame one another. This was perhaps assisted by Hoby's divisive methods.

Evidence for this division within Somerset's clientele comes from a letter sent by Smith to Paget during his imprisonment. Smith initially believed Paget would help him but learned through his wife that the latter was saying he 'conspired' his 'deathe'. Smith vehemently denied this and described his activities during the coup in order to defend himself, throwing light on aspects of how Somerset's clientele operated over these days. Somerset told Smith of the 'broile' against him either late on 5 or early on 6 October, the secretary having only just arrived at Hampton Court. Smith advised him that Paget would know what to do because he was well informed of developments but recognised Somerset was in a weak position because so few of the privy council were present. He counselled the lord protector to recall Paget and Petre, whom he had recently sent away.¹⁷⁶ The London council would be less willing to move aggressively against them if the privy council was more evenly divided.¹⁷⁷ In contrast, Smith thought Somerset's servants and the majority of his fidelity clients were of little political consequence ('all that remaunethe here ells hath no experience').¹⁷⁸ He was offering counsel to his patron and advised him to utilise Paget and Petre for the same reason. According to Smith, Somerset confessed that he thought Paget was 'as evill as the best of them'.¹⁷⁹ His meaning cannot be ascertained with complete certainty. Perhaps he regarded him as a lukewarm ally. Paget was concerned about the situation and probably wanted to reach a compromise, while Somerset was more belligerent at this early stage. Smith made the astute observation that, even if Paget was suspect, his skills were too invaluable. Besides, he seems to have recognised Paget's real intention was to seek mediation and compromise: 'yet I am sure he will invente somethinge for youe'.¹⁸⁰ Despite this intimacy, Smith claimed not to be 'previe' to the duke's counsels during the rest of coup.¹⁸¹ This seems disingenuous and Smith's

¹⁷⁵ BL Cotton MS. Caligula B. vii, fos. 423r-424v; NRO, F. (M.) C. 21, fos. 18r-18v; BL Additional MS. 48126, fo. 14r.

¹⁷⁶ NRO, F. (M.) C. 21, fos. 19r-19v; Beer and Jack, pp. 136-137.

¹⁷⁷ NRO, F. (M.) C. 21, fo. 19v.

¹⁷⁸ NRO, F. (M.) C. 21, fo. 19r.

¹⁷⁹ NRO, F. (M.) C. 21, fo. 19v.

¹⁸⁰ Smith meant 'invente' in the sense, 'to plan, plot, devise, contrive, find out how (to do something)': NRO, F. (M.) C. 21, fo. 19v; Simpson and Weiner (eds.), *The compact Oxford English dictionary*, p. 873.

¹⁸¹ NRO, F. (M.) C. 21, fo. 19v.

biographer detected his hand in Somerset's activities.¹⁸² Thynne was interrogated by the privy council on 28 November and was asked about the 'communication' between Somerset, Smith, Stanhope and himself in the duke's bedchamber on 7 October. Thynne claimed not to remember their discussion or even having been there. However, it is evident that Somerset planned his strategy with his most important and trusted clients. Smith was his conciliar servant, working closely on parliamentary business and, as secretary, had a central role in government; Stanhope exercised the vital function of protecting the king from external influence; and Thynne oversaw the ducal household, estates and business interests. They were central to Somerset's defence during the October coup.¹⁸³ Sir Richard Cotton, treasurer of Boulogne, was allegedly involved with Smith in the plans to kill Paget.¹⁸⁴ However, this is improbable considering the benefits he received at Warwick's hands.¹⁸⁵ Rumours led to extremity and Paget was probably attempting to distance himself from Somerset's clientele in the aftermath of the coup as much as possible. This would explain his improbable claims against Smith. Smith did admit having 'euer said (I can not deny)' to Somerset that Paget would know the intentions of the London council because of his political acumen and long experience as their colleague. He could not think that they would keep their intentions from him. Smith entreated Paget to assist him, for which he would show the gratitude of an indebted client. Elizabeth Smith had a vital role in her husband's suit, having spoken with Paget, who relented and 'promysed' to help.¹⁸⁶

Russell and Herbert wrote to Somerset again on 11 October. They wanted to explain their actions. They had raised a substantial force, which they intended to bring to London when it was large enough, in order to provide the means for them 'to be solysitors and a meanes for this good reformation on bothe parties'. They had passed Somerset's correspondence with them and 'messages of speciall credid', brought by Hertford and Stanhope, to the London council by the Somerset gentleman Sir Ralph Hopton. Hopton was knight marshal of the household. His later associations with Thynne may have originated in this period, when the latter was already on the quorum of the Somerset commission.¹⁸⁷ Therefore, he represented the interests of the county but was familiar with the court, while being associated with one of Somerset's principal clients. This

¹⁸² Dewar, *Smith*, pp. 57-64.

¹⁸³ Longleat, Seymour MS. 4, fo. 127v.

¹⁸⁴ NRO, F. (M.) C. 21, fo. 19v.

¹⁸⁵ Cotton was sent north to survey the defences on 18 October, was appointed a privy councillor in May 1552, and replaced Wingfield, at the latter's death, as comptroller in the following August. Mary removed him from office. He also held local office on the council in the marches of Wales and as chamberlain of Chester, having received generous grants of land in Cheshire, and was MP for Hampshire in March 1553. In May 1553 he was licenced to retain fifty retainers: *APC*, ii, p. 346; PRO, SP 15/3/55, fos. 117r-122v; *APC*, iv, p. 42; PRO, LC 2/4/1, fo. 11r; PRO, E 101/427/6, fos. 16r, 21r, 27r, 75r, 77r, 83r; PRO, LC 2/4/2; Loades, *The reign of Mary Tudor*, p. 42; BL Stowe MS. 571, fos. 19r, 29v, 76r; Bindoff, i, pp. 711-713.

¹⁸⁶ NRO, F. (M.) C. 21, fo. 19v.

¹⁸⁷ Pocock, pp. 112-113; PRO, SP 10/9/23, M. fos. 30r-31v; PRO, SP 10/15/55, M. fos. 114r-117v; PRO, C 66/801, m. 20d; *Calendar of patent rolls*, i, p. 89; Bindoff, ii, p. 389; PRO, SP 11/2/33, M. fos. 70r-71v; PRO, SP 11/5/6, M. fo. 50r.

made him something of a trusted neutral. Russell's and Herbert's letter was more conciliatory than earlier ones but the intention was the same; to support passively the London council as a means of precluding general disorder.¹⁸⁸

With his clientele becoming ineffectual and without any hope of support from his own tenants in the west country or from his colleagues Russell and Herbert, Somerset's position was untenable. Hoby had effectively ended his control of Windsor and restored the king's chamber servants to their duties. Somerset was arrested on 11 October and two days later the protectorate was ended.¹⁸⁹ He was committed to the custody of twelve yeomen of the guard.¹⁹⁰ The privy council told Peckham that Somerset and his adherents were to be confined with their servants in order to prevent 'secret pra[c]tizies and seeret intelligences as otherwise ma may be practized'. Similar orders were given to William Tanner and the other royal servants who were to attend Somerset.¹⁹¹ Somerset's clientele was to be carefully monitored. He had failed to win sufficient support from the local elite or among his colleagues. On 11 October, the privy council wrote to the nobles, gentry and others they had summoned to their assistance to thank them for their loyal service and to order them to 'stay them selves with their men at home takinge good heede to the Common peax quiet and good ordre of the shere accordinge to the kinges maiestes Lawes'. The recipients were also to inform those neighbours who had received similar orders to raise the militia and their clienteles to stand down. The privy council had succeeded in winning the support of the county elite by keeping them informed of developments during the coup and effectively justifying their stance against the lord protector.¹⁹²

The privy council also wrote to the English ambassadors on 11 October 1549. They needed to present their side of the coup in order to persuade Henry II, the emperor and the other European princes of the justness of their actions. The articles of Somerset's impeachment closely follow the charges in this letter.¹⁹³ It vividly portrays their interpretation of Somerset's attitude. He failed to consult them or give them a sufficient hand in government, summoned them only occasionally, 'for the names sake', to acknowledge policies and actions he had already taken '& in short tyme became so hault [haughty] & arrogant that he sticked not in open connsell to taunt suche of vs of

¹⁸⁸ Pocock, pp. 112-113.

¹⁸⁹ Wriothesley, *Chronicle*, ii, p. 27; Nichols (ed.), 'The second patent', p. 489.

¹⁹⁰ BL Additional MS. 48126, fo. 14r.

¹⁹¹ Tanner was a gentleman usher quarter waiter in the privy chamber and it is probable that he was entrusted with this important role: PRO, SP 10/9/45, M. fo. 86r; Pocock, p. 120; PRO, LC 2/4/1, fo. 18r; PRO, E 179/69/62; PRO, E 179/69/63; PRO, E 179/69/64.

¹⁹² BL Additional MS. 48018, fo. 405v; PRO, SP 10/9/44, M. fos. 85r-85v.

¹⁹³ PRO, SP 10/9/41, M. fos. 72r-81v, in Petre's holograph; Pocock, pp. 113-118; BL Additional MS. 9069, fos. 43v-51v; BL Additional MS. 48018, fos. 404r-404v; BL Additional MS. 48018, fos. 404v-405r. Professor Hoak has made the important observation that the privy council never once referred to Somerset as lord protector in this letter: PRO, SP 10/9/41, M. fos. 72r-81v; Hoak, *The king's council*, pp. 102-103, 304, n. 64.

the connsell as frankely spake our opinions'.¹⁹⁴ Somerset was also accused of 'gredy covetousnes & enriching of himself'.¹⁹⁵ He was said to have allied with the commons in order to undermine the polity, destroy the nobility and 'other honest personages', and 'aspired to his masters place'. The privy council claimed that Somerset's policies were one of the principal causes of the tumults and yet, despite this, he 'enteryetned' several of the leaders and rewarded some with gifts and annuities. They were furious with his handling of the rebellions. The ambassadors presented their case and, whether they believed it or not, Henry and Charles adapted themselves to the new situation.¹⁹⁶

Although Somerset's clientele gave him very substantial power, without the support of a wide base among the political elite, any single individual, even a regent, could not maintain himself against concerted attack from such a large coalition of interests. In one way this demonstrates the weakness of the arguments that factional politics was undermining the power of the crown. The strength of any one person was still tied to the support they could maintain in the government, at court, in the country and in the other matrices of political power. Somerset's ascendancy was based on the appearance of consensus but Edwardian politics became increasingly factional by mid-1548. The emergence of faction again was reminiscent of the previous reign and reflected the potential instability of minority rule, despite what Somerset told Cardinal Pole to the contrary in June 1549.¹⁹⁷ While Somerset retained the confidence of the other executors and of the political nation, he was able to rule as a full regent. He lost their support in 1549 because he had failed to govern effectively. When he was removed from Windsor to the Tower on 14 October he was 'accompanied with diuers Lordes, knights, and gentlemen with iii c horsemen, euey bande in their Masters' livery', to be met by the mayor, common council, sheriffs and aldermen of London with their officers and several leading politicians, including Sir John Baker, chancellor of the exchequer and treasurer of the court of first fruits and tenths, Sir Richard Southwell and Sir Thomas Pope, master of the royal woods south of the Trent and one of the wealthiest gentlemen in Surrey.¹⁹⁸ This was a demonstration of strength and a piece of political theatre by the men who now sought to 'protect' the king.

¹⁹⁴ PRO, SP 10/9/41, M. fo. 74r.

¹⁹⁵ PRO, SP 10/9/41, M. fos. 75r-75v.

¹⁹⁶ PRO, SP 10/9/41, M. fos. 75v-76r; BL Additional MS. 9069, fos. 45v-49r.

¹⁹⁷ PRO, SP 10/7/28, M. fos. 74r-80v; Pocock, vi-xiv.

¹⁹⁸ Wriothesley, *Chronicle*, ii, pp. 27-28; Bindoff, i, pp. 366-369; PRO, E 179/69/51; BL Additional MS. 48126, fo. 15r.

7. *The Dudley clientele, 1547-1553*

John Dudley duke of Northumberland has been notoriously characterised as 'the subtlest intriguer in English history'. Ponet, writing in Mary's reign, called him 'thambicious and subtil Alcibiades of England'. Lady Jane Grey, who suffered greatly as a consequence of Northumberland's actions, described him as a hated figure, whose life was 'full of dissimulation'.¹ Although certainly an ambiguous figure, these statements cannot do justice to either the man or his achievement in government between 1549-1553. He was controversial, even in his own lifetime, yet he could write openly to the privy council on 16 June 1551 that 'I have found so litle plesser for my parte as wolde wishe rather to be dede then lyve soche lyffe, as this too or iij yere we have byn in'.² His years of authority were marked by instability and one historian argues that the government 'confronted a permanent crisis of domestic security'.³ Professor Jordan thought that his regime was so unstable, and Northumberland himself so hated, especially for his part in Somerset's destruction, that he had no basis of support among the political nation.⁴ Yet, like Somerset before him, Northumberland's initial ascendancy was based on the consensus of the majority of the privy council and he exercised power with the support of the governing circles. The near breakdown of the political system in October 1549 was more than a new development in ongoing factional struggles. Somerset was regarded as a dangerous failure who had subverted Henry's will, governed unsuccessfully, and brought near-ruin through his policies. The course of policy was still to be determined after his removal and security was a priority. Northumberland recognised that Edward was technically the 'font of power' and maintained the powerful and compelling fiction that his actions were the will of the king. Although Edward's reign can be identified as among the most faction ridden periods in the sixteenth century, factionalism came in bursts at crisis points and the degree of consensus in government could be remarkable.⁵ Northumberland, for similar reasons to Somerset, sought to gain a personal ascendancy in order to guarantee stability and order. To this end, his objectives were administrative and financial efficiency, cautious diplomacy and retrenchment. Yet, he also embarked on the course of 'undiluted protestantism' that culminated in the Second Book of Common Prayer (1552). He probably believed sincerely that England was a providential protestant nation and the commonwealth had to be protected.⁶ The system did not break down because the regime

¹ Pollard, *Protector Somerset*, p. 244; Ponet, *A shorte treatise of politike power*, sig. I3r; J.G. Nichols (ed.), *The chronicle of Queen Jane and two years of Queen Mary, and especially of the rebellion of Sir Thomas Wyatt*, *Camden Miscellany* (Camden Society, 1st ser., 48; London, 1850), pp. 20, 25.

² Hatfield, Cecil MS. 151, fo. 8r.

³ Hoak, 'Rehabilitating the duke of Northumberland', p. 29.

⁴ Jordan, *Threshold of power*, pp. 45-115, 456-535.

⁵ Adams, 'Faction, clientage and party', pp. 33-35.

⁶ Guy, *Tudor England*, p. 219; P. Collinson, 'A chosen people? The English church and the reformation', *History Today*, 36 (1986), pp. 14-20.

maintained the compliance of the political nation and only Mary's successful counter-coup decisively turned these people against Northumberland. Interestingly, there are signs that the local elite did not rally unswervingly in Mary's favour. Support for either party wavered until the outcome became more certain.⁷

Northumberland's ascendancy was underpinned throughout this period by his clientele, which was one of the largest, strongest and most cohesive in the realm. This was composed of household servants, fidelity clients, particularly through kinship, and county clients. It differed from Somerset's clientele in one important respect: Northumberland did not attempt to create an ordinary clientage relationship with the political elite through regental authority. However, he perhaps employed his clientele more effectively than Somerset and attempted to cultivate his local connections by regularly visiting the core of his estates in the midlands. However, his clientele was essentially court-centred. It spanned the public and private domain. Northumberland enlarged it based on influence at court, in parliament and in the counties. He also benefited from his rising fortunes and recruited men from other clienteles. His career illustrates the impact of clienteles and the ongoing recruitment to the new court-centred protestant nobility. He was the epitome of the loyal royal servant and, like Somerset, rose through service under Henry. Northumberland continued to serve and support the regime during the protectorate, when his principal interest was advancing his clientele as well as himself, before emerging as one of the leaders of the October coup.

I: Northumberland's early career

Northumberland's own career illustrates how members of Henry's court rose through the ranks of government, gaining expertise in a variety of offices and building up their contacts in the localities. Like Somerset, he achieved initial prominence as a soldier and this military background characterised his career and the Dudley clientele, persisting into Elizabeth's reign under his sons, the earls of Leicester and Warwick.⁸ He was the son of Edmund Dudley, one of Henry VII's councillors and member of the council learned in the law, who was executed after what was essentially a show trial at the start of Henry VIII's reign. John Dudley campaigned in France under Suffolk in 1523 and was knighted for his services, alongside Edward Seymour.⁹ During the early 1520s he was frequently involved in the revelries at court, building up his relationship with Henry's intimates. Dudley's patrons were his stepfather, Viscount Lisle, Suffolk, Cromwell and

⁷ R. Tittler and S. Battley, 'The local community and the crown in 1553: the accession of Mary Tudor revisited', *Historical Research*, 57 (1984), pp. 131-139.

⁸ *DNB*, xvi, pp. 109-111; Beer, *Northumberland*, pp. 3-42; Loades, *Northumberland*, pp. 17-85; Adams, "Because I am of that Countrey & Mynde to Plant myself there", pp. 24-30; BL Additional MS. 48126, fo. 7r.

⁹ BL Additional MS. 48126, fo. 6r.

Seymour. He became master of the Tower armoury in 1533, sheriff of Staffordshire in 1536, chief of the king's henchmen in the following year and deputy governor of Calais in 1538. During the 1540s, Dudley was involved heavily in military affairs, being appointed vice-admiral (1537-1542), warden of the Scottish marches, and then lord admiral (1543-1547). He was extremely competent in these offices and was ennobled as Viscount Lisle at his stepfather's death. Lisle was admitted to the privy council in 1543 and, with Hertford, was a pivotal figure in the more evangelical party at court.¹⁰ During the late 1540s, the two were said by Fisher to be inseparable.¹¹ Their clienteles, while helping to sustain them, assisted one another too. Lisle's clientele coalesced round him during the Boulogne campaign of 1544 but its origins went back to the 1520s and 1530s. Its origins were military and this martial character persisted.¹² Lisle was among the closed circle around Henry during his final illness.¹³ With Henry's death and the accession of a minor, the clientele came into its own as the locus of power became more polymorphic and many Henrician courtiers sought to establish themselves as peers.¹⁴

Between 1547-1553, Dudley substantially augmented his power base in the midlands. Although a royal servant like his father, he was preoccupied with the trappings of aristocratic honour and wanted recognition of his descent from the Beauchamp earls of Warwick. He had always been on the periphery of the aristocracy and this preoccupation was characteristic of mid-Tudor gentlemen who aspired to promotion to the peerage. Dudley probably took the title of earl of Warwick, instead of the other possibilities of Leicester or Coventry, because of the Beauchamp connection.¹⁵ Dr Adams has called this descent 'one of the most complex in the history of the peerage, yet one central to the Dudley ambitions'.¹⁶ When Dudley was restored to blood and his father's attainder repealed in 1512 (3 Henry VIII, c. 15), he inherited Edmund Dudley's estates in the home counties, acquiring his mother's at her death in about 1530. He began to plant himself in the midlands in the 1530s, when he obtained extensive lands, principally at Drayton Bassett, Hales Owen and Dudley Priory. He became constable of Warwick Castle, high steward and master of the game, and secured Dudley Castle in Worcestershire from his kinsman the third Lord Dudley in 1537, after the mortgage was foreclosed. This increase in his landed estate had been made possible through the rewards of royal service.¹⁷

¹⁰ *DNB*, xvi, pp. 109-111; Beer, *Northumberland*, pp. 3-42; Loades, *Northumberland*, pp. 17-85; Adams, 'Dudley clientèle', pp. 241-247; 'Because I am of that Countrey & Mynde to Plant myself there', pp. 24-30.

¹¹ BL Additional MS. 48126, fo. 7r.

¹² Adams, 'Dudley clientèle', pp. 241-247.

¹³ Miller, 'Henry VIII's unwritten will', p. 96.

¹⁴ Adams, 'Dudley clientèle', pp. 241-247.

¹⁵ PRO, SP 10/18/4, M. fos. 7r-8v; Beer, *Northumberland*, pp. 3-5; Adams, 'Because I am of that Countrey & Mynde to Plant myself there', pp. 24-30; PRO, SP 10/1/11, M. fo. 28r.

¹⁶ Adams, 'Because I am of that Countrey & Mynde to Plant myself there', p. 26.

¹⁷ Beer, *Northumberland*, pp. 7-42; Loades, *Northumberland*, pp. 18, 26-30, 32, 74; Adams, 'Because I am of that Countrey & Mynde to Plant myself there', pp. 28-29, 57, n. 53.

II: Northumberland and the protectorate

Lisle was part of a 'hermetically sealed political system', intended to prevent faction, while giving the regency council the capacity to govern effectively.¹⁸ Somerset altered this arrangement with the creation of the protectorate and needed to reward his colleagues as a result. Lisle was promoted to the earldom of Warwick on 16 February 1547, which he claimed through his wife's descent, received lands worth £300 per annum, and was appointed lord great chamberlain the following day.¹⁹ He received the farm of the manor, castle and town of Warwick after suing Paget for them in March.²⁰ He also resigned as lord admiral in favour of Seymour (4 February 1547) in return for the lord great chamberlainship.²¹ His new office technically gave him overall control of the household above stairs but Somerset's adherents controlled the privy chamber, especially Stanhope after his appointments as groom of the stool and then first gentleman. The lord great chamberlain exercised little real control over the privy chamber.²² Instead, Warwick was in charge of the great chamber, second or presence chamber and the other ancillary rooms above stairs and those under him were subject to his discipline.²³ In this new environment it was important to have firm support—there was no strong monarch to arbitrate and the leading party could and did exclude critics and rivals. Southampton's outspoken nature, criticism of the protectorate and lack of firm support from any of the other privy councillors had made his position untenable in early 1547.²⁴ More organised and substantial opposition was necessary to alter the situation.

Warwick was one of the most powerful peers by 1547, with extensive land holdings (much of it of some years standing), offices, and patronage. He concentrated his lands even further in the midlands between 1547-1553 and much of the power of the Dudley clientele was centred there. For example, he sold lands in Kent to the crown and sued for lands in Worcestershire (at Aldington) in return.²⁵ This augmented the estates he had acquired during Henry's reign and contrasted with Somerset's attempts to appropriate land nearer London, especially from Oxford. Warwick frequently alienated his new lands very quickly but this was not unusual and he attempted to create, if possible, a more heterogeneous holding. In this, he was no different from the medieval aristocracy.²⁶ For example, in 1549 he exchanged lands with Nicholas Heath, bishop of Worcester, and four years later obtained Hartlebury Castle (Worcestershire), lying close to the Bromsgrove estate he had desired to possess, and increasing his influence and military

¹⁸ Ives, 'Henry VIII's will', pp. 799-802.

¹⁹ PRO, SP 10/1/11, M. fo. 28r; *APC*, ii, pp. 15-22; Miller, 'Henry VIII's unwritten will', pp. 88-91; PRO, SP 10/1/30, M. fo. 104r; *The complete peerage*, eds. Gibbs *et al*, ix, p. 724, n. e; *Calendar of patent rolls*, i, pp. 252-257.

²⁰ PRO, SP 10/1/30, M. fo. 104r; Tytler, i, p. 28.

²¹ PRO, SP 10/1/11, M. fo. 28r.

²² Loades, *The Tudor court*, p. 53.

²³ Loades, *The Tudor court*, pp. 42-45.

²⁴ *APC*, ii, pp. 48-59; Slavin, 'The fall of Lord Chancellor Wriothesley', pp. 265-286.

²⁵ Beer, *Northumberland*, pp. 189-190; Loades, *Northumberland*, pp. 122-123.

consequence in the west midlands.²⁷ Warwick used his relationship with Somerset to enhance his prospects. Although initially he wanted only the manor of Feckenham itself and not the lordships of Bromsgrove and Kings Norton attached to it, Somerset was uneasy. Warwick handled the situation well and, in his letters to Thynne in the spring and early summer of 1549, anticipated the lord protector's misgivings.²⁸ Believing Somerset had been informed that Feckenham 'ys so stately a thing that yt ys nat to ^be^ departyd *with* all', Warwick wanted Thynne to inform him that it had no castle, manor, borough or market town belonging to the lordship and only one park. The other lordships normally connected with it made the suit seem greater than it was, while Warwick pointed out the exchange was actually unfavourable to him: 'and yet I aske but oon parke for thre and never a house for a ffayer old castell and a goodly manor'.²⁹ The manors had been part of Catherine's dower and Somerset's main concern was over the large manred, which had been the 'principall thinges that the lorde admyrall desyred to haue yt for'. Warwick laid his mind to rest by assuring Thynne that 'I nether desyer bromsgrove the wiche nor ki[n]ges norton nor no parte of the manred but only the manor of feckname'. He wanted the land because it lay halfway between Warwick and Dudley, in the heart of his power base. Warwick's persistence paid off and he received the grant on 19 July of Feckenham, along with other land and property in Warwickshire, Caernarvonshire, Herefordshire, Devon and Denbighshire, to the value of £210 per annum. This grant included land at Kenilworth held in tenure by his client Sir Andrew Flammock, one of the gentlemen pensioners.³⁰ Warwick was also keen to procure Hatfield from Elizabeth by exchanging it for some of his estates in Kent and hoped she would be granted either Otford or Knole by the crown in recompense. He seems to have been looking for another agreeable residence within easy distance of London and the court and wanted Thynne to mediate on his behalf with Somerset. However, this exchange was not forthcoming, despite the good terms he was offering, and Warwick had to 'settill my mynde frome it'.³¹ By soliciting Thynne's assistance and acknowledging and addressing Somerset's concerns, Warwick was able to expand his holdings in the west midlands. However, influence at court and a voice among the regency council was vital.

III: Establishing Northumberland's party

²⁶ Given-Wilson, *The English nobility*, pp. 9-11.

²⁷ Beer, *Northumberland*, pp. 189-190.

²⁸ Longleat, Thynne MS. 1, fos. 10r-10v; Longleat, Thynne MS. 1, fos. 12r-13v; Longleat, Thynne MS. 1, fos. 14r-14v; Longleat, Thynne MS. 1, fos. 15r-15v; Longleat, Thynne MS. 1, fos. 16r-17v; Longleat, Thynne MS. 1, fos. 18r-18v; Longleat, Thynne MS. 1, fos. 19r-19v.

²⁹ Longleat, Thynne MS. 1, fos. 12r-12v.

³⁰ Longleat, Thynne MS. 1, fo. 14r; *Calendar of patent rolls*, iii, pp. 2-4; PRO, E 179/69/62. Northumberland acquired the wardship and marriage of William Flammock in June 1552: PRO, SP 46/1, fos. 216r; PRO, SP 38/1, fos. 16r-16v; BL Additional MS. 48126, fo. 7v; Malkiewicz, 'An eye-witness's account', pp. 602-603, n. 1.

³¹ Longleat, Thynne MS. 1, fo. 19r.

Somerset's policies alienated the political nation. Charges of incompetence have been levelled against his regime. Professor Hoak believed the duke increasingly administered without the rest of the privy council from 1548.³² His Scottish policy was prohibitively expensive and exacerbated inflationary pressures, while unrest caused by enclosure commissions, an apparently ambiguous religious policy and the political void created by the fall of the Courtenays and Howards caused the commons to rise through much of England in the summer of 1549.³³ Somerset's response seemed hesitant, although it was initially traditional in approach. Northampton led the first expedition against Kett and was driven out of Norwich by the rebels.³⁴ Warwick requested the opportunity to go to Worcestershire, probably to take control of the locality, and raise his clientele at Dudley Castle. He may not have had a longstanding affinity but he acted like he did.³⁵ He then returned to London and was described as being 'cume very lustely on to the curte' by John Paston, son of Sir William Paston, in a letter to Rutland of 25 May 1549.³⁶ Like other councillors, Warwick offered to put down unrest in Warwickshire and, while still at his London residence of Ely Place on 12 July, was asking all his friends and servants 'to repayer towardes me yf they possible may' and promising 'to lyve and dye in this quarell where my lordes grace shall comand me as knowith the Lorde to whom let vs all pray for the stayinge of the fury of this peple'. He had already sent one of his servants to command Warwick Castle, having heard that the rebels intended to 'spoyle the towne' because it would not yield. Warwick was very ill at the time and maintained contact with Somerset through the 'assurred frendschip' of Thynne by writing to and talking with him about patronage, and by discussing government policy and his own interests with Fisher.³⁷

After learning he would command the forces against Kett, Warwick sought a personal interview with Somerset and sent his secretary John Holmes to wait on the duke. However, Somerset preferred to send Warwick the necessary supplies for his expedition without meeting him. This angered the earl.³⁸ He was sent to Warwick to restore order there and commanded to lead the levies of Cambridgeshire, Bedfordshire, Huntingdon, Northamptonshire, Norfolk and Suffolk against Kett.³⁹ Warwick was well qualified for this role, having been lord-lieutenant in command of the vanguard during the Scottish campaign in 1547 and, according to William Patten, playing a major part in the English victory at Pinkie.⁴⁰ Realising that the regime had reached its time of testing, Warwick enjoined all to work together to preserve the realm and went as far as to request

³² Hoak, *The king's council*, pp. 100-103, 177.

³³ Bush, *Government policy*, pp. 1-39, 84-99; Guy, *Tudor England*, pp. 199-211.

³⁴ Russell, *Kett's Rebellion*, pp. 87-98; Nichols (ed.), *Chronicle of the Grey Friars*, p. 61; Kingsford (ed.), 'Two London chronicles', pp. 18-19.

³⁵ BL Additional MS. 48126, fo. 7r; see below, pp. 174-199.

³⁶ *The manuscripts of... the duke of Rutland*, i, p. 36; Bindoff, iii, pp. 67-68.

³⁷ Longleat, Thynne MS. 1, fo. 18r; Longleat, Thynne MS. 1, fos. 24r-25v.

³⁸ BL Additional MS. 48126, fos. 7r-7v; Malkiewicz, 'An eye-witness's account', p. 602, n. 1.

³⁹ PRO, SP 10/8/38, M. fos. 71r-72v.

⁴⁰ Patten, *The expedition into Scotlande*, sigs. D8v-L4r; Pollard (ed.), *Tudor tracts*, pp. 99-133.

that Northampton be allowed to retain his commission.⁴¹ The implication was that all members of the political elite should be made use of and Warwick was also assisting a valuable ally.⁴² He restored order in Warwickshire and gathered the leading gentry, including Henry Willoughby, Sir Marmaduke Constable, William Devereux, second son of Lord Ferrers of Chartley, Henry Wilby, Giles Foster, and Sir Thomas Lucy of Charlecote. At the head of his clientele, Warwick successfully put down Kett's Rebellion with a force of six thousand infantry and fifteen hundred cavalry. His sons Robert and Ambrose held commands under him, while his brother Andrew was serving in the west under Russell. Among Warwick's followers were Sir Thomas Palmer, Sir Thomas Gresham, Sir Edmund Knevet, a Norfolk gentleman, and Flammock. Lord Willoughby of Parham, Lord Powis and Lord Bray led their own clienteles, coming 'with grett nombre of Lords knights and Squiers and Gentylnen & others'.⁴³ Willoughby of Parham commanded a large contingent of one hundred and twenty light horse and fifteen hundred foot, including eleven hundred from Lincolnshire, 'and hys Retenewe'. He was appointed captain-general in Lincolnshire and Norfolk during the emergency by letters patent on 21 July 1549, having the authority of a lord lieutenant, and the local elite were expected to obey and assist him.⁴⁴

The traditional quasi-feudal system prevailed but only with the assistance of a core of foreign mercenaries, trained in the newest methods of warfare and bearing the latest equipment. These mercenaries had the necessary professional skills for the new warfare that characterised the mid-Tudor period (especially siege warfare and the use of arquebuses), as had the men who joined Dudley during the Boulogne campaign, when he headed the most modern English fighting force. This force included the professional soldiers Sir Henry Dudley, Sir Thomas Wyatt, Sir James Crofts, Sir George Harper, Sir Nicholas Arnold, Cuthbert Vaughan and Alexander Brett. Many would serve under Ambrose at Newhaven in 1562-1563.⁴⁵ When Warwick returned from Norfolk he petitioned for Ambrose to have two offices in reversion after Flammock's death (constable of Kenilworth Castle and bailiff of the liberty of Warwick). These were granted to Fisher instead, greatly increasing Warwick's sense of alienation. His clientele had done good service only to go

⁴¹ PRO, SP 10/8/38, M. fos. 71r-72v; Tytler, i, pp. 193-194; Russell, *Kett's Rebellion*, pp. 117-118.

⁴² BL Cotton MS. Nero C. x, fos. 15v-16r; Jordan (ed.), *Chronicle*, p. 15.

⁴³ BL Harley MS. 1576, fo. 257r; Beer, *Northumberland*, pp. 83-85; Loades, *Northumberland*, pp. 121-129; BL Cotton MS. Nero C. x, fos. 15v-16r; Jordan (ed.), *Chronicle*, pp. 15-16. Devereux would benefit from the Dudley connection, being returned as MP for Staffordshire in March 1553. Ferrers was closely associated with Northumberland and with his client, Sir George Blount, sheriff of Staffordshire. The Devereux were related to the Greys. Constable was a newcomer to Warwickshire and may have relied on Somerset and Sir George Throckmorton for support. Willoughby, Constable and Foster were expected to provide towards the cavalry for the wars and to play a role in county security against invasion and insurrection. Knevet's ties with the Dudleys were slight, although he was related to them and John Flowerdew was one of his executors: Bindoff, i, pp. 445-447, 686-687; ii, p. 42, 482-483; iii, pp. 450-455; PRO, PROB 11/37, fos. 194r-195r; PRO, SP 10/5/17, M. fos. 60v-61r; PRO, SP 10/18/44, M. fo. 80r; PRO, C 66/801, mm. 11d, 17d, 23d; *Calendar of patent rolls*, i, pp. 87, 90, 92.

⁴⁴ Russell, *Kett's Rebellion*, p. 120; PRO, E 351/217 (Duplicament); G.S. Thomson, *Lords lieutenants in the sixteenth century. A study in Tudor local administration* (London, 1923), p. 25-26; Hatfield, Cecil MS. 150, fo. 146r.

⁴⁵ BL Cotton MS. Nero C. x, fo. 16r; Jordan (ed.), *Chronicle*, p. 16; Jordan, *The young king*, pp. 488-490; Adams, 'The Dudley clientèle', p. 246; Adams, 'The English military clientèle', pp. 217-27.

unrewarded. He now turned to them for support. Fisher recognised that reconciliation was essential between Warwick and Somerset and attempted to achieve it through his friend John Walpole of Norfolk. He also tried to persuade Somerset to be more forthcoming but to little avail.⁴⁶

Once rebellion had been put down the privy councillors met in London to discuss how to curb Somerset's powers. The October coup was 'Byzantine but unplanned'.⁴⁷ However, when sprung it was meticulously organised and executed. This has led historians to conclude that it had a long gestation. Although Professor Pollard stressed that Warwick had organised it well in advance and had long been apathetic towards Somerset, there is little evidence to support this. Professor Pollard also saw Warwick as the driving force behind the coup.⁴⁸ Warwick seems to have generally assented to Somerset's governance until the summer of 1549. The Spanish commentator Antonio de Guaras described him in 1547 as Somerset's 'most intimate friend', counselling him 'in all things'.⁴⁹ This impression is reinforced by Fisher's account of the relationship between Somerset and Warwick. He described Warwick's intimacy with the Seymours, reporting that he 'was familiar with them both and loved of them bothe and trusted of them both'. He was said to have spent most of his time during 1547-1548 living in Somerset's house.⁵⁰ However, Warwick seems to have spent the majority of his time when in London in 1548-1549 at Ely Place not Somerset Place (when not at court). This does not mean he did not spend long periods staying with Somerset (he lived in Sir John York's house for a long period in 1549-1550) and should not diminish the importance of his desire to be seen to be close to the lord protector.⁵¹ Warwick frequently attended the privy council during the early months of the reign.⁵² Although de Guaras was in a position to observe his close proximity to Somerset, he was not well placed to know how large a role he played in advising the lord protector. Eustace Chapuys and Van der Delft had long associated Edward Seymour and John Dudley closely because of their shared religion. Their long military association reinforced this relationship.⁵³ Warwick's closeness to Somerset partly reflected the latter's pre-eminence as lord protector. Warwick continued to benefit from the association in material terms. However, this was more than self-interest.

⁴⁶ BL Additional MS. 48126, fos. 7v-8v; Malkiewicz, 'An eye-witness's account', pp. 602-604, n. 1; Somerville *Duchy of Lancaster*, i, pp. 561, 563; Bindoff, ii, p. 137; iii, pp. 464-465; PRO, SP 50/5/23, fos. 49r-50v.

⁴⁷ Guy, *Tudor England*, p. 212.

⁴⁸ Pollard, *Protector Somerset*, pp. 55-56, 111, 198-199, 242-251.

⁴⁹ Antonio de Guaras, *The accession of Queen Mary: being the contemporary narrative of a Spanish merchant resident in London*, trans. and ed. R. Garnett (London, 1892), p. 80.

⁵⁰ BL Additional MS. 48126, fos. 6r-7r.

⁵¹ PRO, SP 10/3/1, M. fos. 1r-2v; PRO, SP 10/3/6, M. fos. 13r-14v; PRO, SP 10/4/11, M. fos. 27r-27v; PRO, SP 10/4/17, M. fos. 39r-40v; PRO, SP 10/6/23, M. fos. 60r-61v; Longleat, Thynne MS. 1, fos. 22r-23v; Longleat, Thynne MS. 1, fos. 24r-25v.

⁵² Beer, *Northumberland*, p. 58.

⁵³ Beer, *Northumberland*, p. 39; Loades, *Northumberland*, pp. 20-21, 33-34, 61-65, 76-77, 79, 82-84.

Warwick was a substantial member of the regime. It is probable that prior to 1549, when Somerset felt increasingly vulnerable as a consequence of Seymour's activities, fellow privy councillors had a greater role in discussing policy, especially military affairs. This must raise doubts about the extent to which Somerset was unaccountable to his colleagues prior to 1549, except retrospectively. Warwick was heavily involved in the conduct of the Scottish campaign and built up relations with English officers and several of the Assured Scots, including Sir John Luttrell, the lairds of Ormiston and Longniddry and the abbot of Dryburgh. His good relations with his brother, Sir Andrew Dudley, captain of Broughty Craig, reinforced his connection with the English military clientele in Scotland.⁵⁴ In return for Warwick's assistance in November 1547, Ormiston and Longniddry promised 'your lordshipe yat ye will command vs with ony steid plesor or service'.⁵⁵ Warwick continued to be influential in the conduct of the war throughout 1548.⁵⁶ He also headed his own military clientele. Men like Henry Vane ('a gentleman of my lordes & one of his company'), Jean de Bertheville and Jean Ribaut accompanied him on the Pinkie campaign. Bertheville and Ribaut were not members of Warwick's household and may have accompanied him to Scotland because of their military expertise. Vane was probably a client but he may have been associated with Warwick purely for military reasons. Bertheville received a knighthood at Warwick's hands.⁵⁷ Another recipient of military patronage was Lord Thomas Neville.⁵⁸ His brother became fifth earl of Westmorland in 1549. The Nevilles had a limited role in southern politics. Instead, the fifth earl, who was also on the council of the north and regarded by Warwick as an ally against Derby and Shrewsbury, whose conservatism was a threat, was rewarded with estates, membership of the Order of the Garter and appointment as lord lieutenant of the bishopric of Durham, in order to preclude any potential catholic threat in the north.⁵⁹ Despite these rewards, Westmorland was an extremely erratic man and politically unreliable.⁶⁰

Warwick appears to have been motivated by the need to procure more offices and lands, in order to enhance his political importance, and by the desire to serve the crown, while the pressure of events changed his circumstances in unexpected ways. Professor Beer has even suggested

⁵⁴ PRO, SP 50/1/35, fos. 60r-63v; PRO, SP 50/1/35 (i), fos. 64r-67v; PRO, SP 50/1/59, fos. 128r-129v; PRO, SP 50/2/27, fos. 81r-82v; PRO, SP 50/2/33, fos. 92r-93v; PRO, SP 50/2/48, fos. 129r-130v; PRO, SP 50/2/53, fos. 136r-137v; PRO, SP 50/3/32, fo. 813; Bush, *Government policy*, pp. 14, n. 44, 17, n. 74, 21, 24-25, 28-30, 35, 38; Bindoff, ii, pp. 61-63; see above, p. 122.

⁵⁵ PRO, SP 50/2/33, fos. 92r-92v; Bush, *Government policy*, pp. 21, 35, n. 207; Merriman, 'The assured Scots', pp. 23-24.

⁵⁶ Beer, *Northumberland*, p. 66.

⁵⁷ Patten, *The expedition into Scotlande*, sigs. C2r-C2v, 5v-C7v, D1v-D2r, O8r; Pollard (ed.), *Tudor tracts*, pp. xix, n. 1, 90, 92-93, 95, 151; Loades, *Northumberland*, pp. 100, 174, 188.

⁵⁸ Patten, *The expedition into Scotlande*, sig. O8r; Pollard (ed.), *Tudor tracts*, p. 151.

⁵⁹ *The complete peerage*, eds. Gibbs et al, xii (part 2), pp. 553-558; Jordan, *Threshold of power*, p. 49; Hoak, *The king's council*, pp. 63-65; Loades, *Northumberland*, p. 174. In 1547 the fourth earl was assessed in his locality: PRO, E 179/69/46; PRO, E 179/69/51; PRO, E 179/69/49; PRO, E 179/69/75; PRO, E 101/426/8; APC, iv, p. 50.

⁶⁰ BL Cotton MS. Nero C. x, fo. 78r; Jordan (ed.), *Chronicle*, p. 149, ns. 180-182; PRO, SP 10/15/66, M. fos. 137r-137v; Jordan, *Threshold of power*, pp. 274, 384-385; Bradshaw, 'Protestant polemic', pp. 182-184, 192-193.

Warwick intervened on Somerset's behalf in the quarrel between the Seymour brothers. It is certainly possible to view the evidence this way.⁶¹ Warwick was relied on during the protectorate and received major office, as well as grants of land. Somerset appointed him lord president of the council in the marches of Wales in about March 1548, with an annuity of £1040. This gave him almost viceregal authority, including co-ordinating justice and maintaining law and order in Wales and the adjoining counties (Shropshire, Worcestershire, Herefordshire, Gloucestershire and Cheshire), and he was presumably selected because of previous experience controlling marches, military ability and possession of substantial estates in Worcestershire.⁶² Warwick continued to solicit favours, including assistance in a land exchange with the bishop of Worcester in early 1548, and remained on good terms with Thynne, Fisher and Cecil. He was active in parliament from November 1548, having recovered from serious illness, and participated in the debate on the communion. He preferred increased importance in military affairs to his position in Wales, no matter how remunerative or conducive to his local influence it was, and even offered in April 1549 to exchange his office of lord great chamberlain or lord president in return for the far less prestigious or important one of captain of the gentlemen pensioners. However, there was some confusion concerning his possible appointment and he did not wish to alienate the incumbent, his close friend Northampton.⁶³ This all suggests Warwick was an able and amenable supporter of the protectorate until 1549. This stance is understandable because the regime needed to maintain unity because of the minority. Warwick did voice serious concern about the enclosure commissions in 1548 but Hales temporarily allayed his fears. He also supported the government's initial handling of rebellion in 1549.⁶⁴ Although Warwick welcomed the outbreak of war with France on 8 August (having just learned that he was to command the army against Kett), believing it to be 'better for us then under theyr colloured frendship', he would have preferred 'that we had no more to deale with all at ones'.⁶⁵ He probably agreed with Paget's sentiment about Somerset putting too many 'yrons in the fyre'.⁶⁶

Professor Loades suggests there was probably increased strain between Warwick and Somerset, especially as the events of the summer unfolded.⁶⁷ Although this is probable, there is little contemporary evidence to support it. The correspondence between Warwick and Thynne ended in

Westmorland was removed from the lieutenancy in May 1553, being replaced by Northumberland, and offered his support to Mary relatively quickly: *APC*, iv, p. 277.

⁶¹ Beer, *Northumberland*, pp. 50, 53, 58-60; BL Additional MS. 48023, fo. 350r; *APC*, ii, p. 237; see above, pp. 82-83, 96.

⁶² Beer, *Northumberland*, pp. 66-67; *Calendar of patent rolls*, iii, p. 58; Guy, *Tudor England*, pp. 174-175, 354-355.

⁶³ Beer, *Northumberland*, pp. 66-70; PRO, SP 10/3/1, M. fos. 1r-2v; Longleat, Thynne MS. 1, fos. 18r-18v; Bindoff, i, pp. 513-516, 518-521; *The complete peerage*, eds. Gibbs *et al*, ix, pp. 669-674; see above, pp. 53, 60, 62, 79.

⁶⁴ Bush, *Government policy*, pp. 38, 74-76, 96-97.

⁶⁵ PRO, SP 10/8/38, M. fos. 71r-72v; Tytler, i, pp. 193-194.

⁶⁶ PRO, SP 10/8/4, M. fos. 8r-11v; Guy, *Tudor England*, pp. 203-207.

⁶⁷ Loades, *Northumberland*, p. 124.

mid-July but this did not necessarily mean that the former was distancing himself from Somerset.⁶⁸ Professor Beer wrote that the 'correspondence gives every impression that Warwick and Somerset shared each other's confidence'.⁶⁹ With much of England in turmoil, all but the earl's most pressing correspondence may have been overtaken by events. Almost all other business brought before the privy council in this period was left pending. There was tension though, between Warwick and Somerset. Warwick had visited the midlands in June 1549 and complained to Cecil about the sowing of oats in one of his pastures and the keeping of thirty or forty cattle in another by John Skynner, second clerk of the avenery, and Christopher Trington, a yeoman of the stud, and others. This was done with Somerset's consent and was probably intended to provide for the royal stable.⁷⁰ Van der Delft believed that the conspiracy against Somerset was being planned from the end of July and Warwick was among the conspirators. This may have been a response to rumoured changes to the personnel of the privy council. Mary told him that Warwick, Southampton, the earl of Arundel and St John objected to any changes and they possibly precipitated the October coup by meeting to discuss the situation. The atmosphere was tense in the aftermath of the rebellions. They may have turned to Mary for support but she would not get involved. Warwick visited Van der Delft between 15-23 September to discuss discontent with Somerset's government, blaming the duchess of Somerset for the tense atmosphere, and might have hinted at an impending coup.⁷¹ Warwick could have used discussions at Greenwich from 27 September about the possibility of Mary being appointed regent as a pretext for drawing his clientele to him to gauge their support.⁷² When the privy council met to discuss the situation, Somerset's reaction forced them into a more threatening stance. Since 'almost the hole counsell' then turned against Somerset, controlling London and the armed forces, and having general assent among the gentry, they were able to arrest him and dissolve the protectorate (13 October).⁷³ Because Somerset did not have enough support at the critical moment, even possession of the king could not prevent his fall.

Initially, Warwick sought to secure greater control of patronage for his clientele and to play a more prominent part in government for the benefit of the king and commonwealth, rather than to create his own party to dominate government.⁷⁴ He did not even have the initiative at this point, having allied with Southampton, the earl of Arundel, Sir Edward Peckham (Southampton's brother-in-law) and Sir Richard Southwell. Dr MacCulloch has recently argued that it was the second,

⁶⁸ Longleat, Thynne MS. 1, fos. 24r-25v.

⁶⁹ Beer, *Northumberland*, p. 76.

⁷⁰ PRO, SP 10/7/35, M. fos. 91r-91v; PRO, E 179/69/58; PRO, E 179/69/59; PRO, E 179/69/60; PRO, E 179/69/61; PRO, LC 2/2, fos. 34r, 35r; PRO, LC 2/2/3/1, fos. 91r, 92r; PRO, LC 2/4/1, fo. 21r; Pollard, *Protector Somerset*, p. 232.

⁷¹ *Simancas*, ix, pp. 445-448, 454; Loades, *Northumberland*, pp. 124, 129-130.

⁷² BL Additional MS. 48126, fos. 8v, 10r; Malkiewicz, 'An eye-witness's account', p. 604, n. 2; *The manuscripts of... the duke of Rutland*, i, p. 44; *Simancas*, ix, pp. 456-459.

⁷³ BL Cotton MS. Caligula B. vii, fo. 415v; Nichols (ed.), 'The second patent', p. 489; Hoak, 'Rehabilitating the duke of Northumberland', pp. 29-30, 36-37.

evangelical, coup in 1549 that was vitally important for the protestant polity because it allowed the early stages of religious reform to be carried further along projected lines. Warwick took advantage of the situation.⁷⁵ Ponet asked concerning Southampton, Sir Thomas Arundel and Sir Richard Southwell in the aftermath of the October coup, 'who than for a while, but they three?'⁷⁶ Although he must be used with care, Ponet is the best source for these developments. He described how Southampton lodged at court next to the king with his wife and his son and said that 'euery man repaireth to Wriothsley, honoureth Wriothsley, sueth vnto Wriothsley (as the Assirianes did to Ammon) and all thinges be done by his aduise: and who but Wriothsley?'⁷⁷ Southampton wanted to place Arundel in close proximity to the king as either groom of the stool or comptroller.⁷⁸ Arundel would then fulfil the same role as Stanhope. Professor Jordan incorrectly assumed that this reference was to the earl of Arundel.⁷⁹ A great peer would be unlikely to fill such an office, vital though it was, and Ponet made it clear whom he was referring to, by pointing out that at Northumberland's 'sute Arundel hathe his head with the axe diuided from his shoulders'.⁸⁰ The imperial ambassador thought Sir Thomas Arundel was a major figure in the October coup, describing him as Warwick's 'chief counsellor'. Van der Delft may have misinterpreted Arundel's relationship with Warwick but his assessment of Arundel's role is valuable.⁸¹

According to Ponet, Southwell was to be a key figure in the privy council, 'for his whisking and double diligence'.⁸² Although Ponet did not make clear whether he was referring to Sir Richard or Sir Robert Southwell, the former was more prominent, took a more active part in politics and was the more important during the power struggle between Warwick and Southampton, while the latter was a leading administrative figure. Sir Richard Southwell was also a very tough individual, who had been implicated in a vicious murder in the Westminster sanctuary in 1532, from which he still bore the scars. He would be committed to the Tower in February 1550 and fined £500 for his role in the struggle between Southampton's and Warwick's parties. Although Edward's journal must be used with caution, because Warwick was probably feeding the king doctored information, perhaps there is some truth in his comments that Southampton's party resorted to the same technique utilised by Somerset during the October coup in circulating bills attacking their opponents: Southwell was committed for 'certaine billes of sedicion written *with* his hand'.⁸³

⁷⁴ Hatfield, Cecil MS. 150, fo. 137r.

⁷⁵ MacCulloch, *Tudor church militant*, pp. 93-99.

⁷⁶ Ponet, *A shorte treatise of politike power*, sig. I3r.

⁷⁷ Ponet, *A shorte treatise of politike power*, sigs. I3r-I3v.

⁷⁸ Ponet, *A shorte treatise of politike power*, sig. I3v.

⁷⁹ Jordan, *Threshold of power*, p. 28.

⁸⁰ Ponet, *A shorte treatise of politike power*, sig. I3v.

⁸¹ *Simancas*, ix, p. 470.

⁸² Ponet, *A shorte treatise of politike power*, sig. I3v.

⁸³ BL Cotton MS. Nero C. x, fo. 18r; Jordan (ed.), *Chronicle*, p. 19; Ponet, *A shorte treatise of politike power*, sig. I3v; S.J. Gunn, *Early Tudor government, 1485-1558* (London, 1995), p. 31. Surprisingly, the Southwells retained most of

Ponet accused Warwick's and Southampton's party of either using black propaganda against Somerset or circumventing his authority, writing that they were 'forging a great many of false lettres and lies to make the Protectour hated'.⁸⁴ The privy council had a strong element that might support Southampton's party. Professor Hoak has suggested that ten of the twenty four privy councillors were likely to support him: the earls of Arundel and Shrewsbury, Durham, Sir Richard Southwell, Peckham, Dr Nicholas Wotton, dean of Canterbury and dean of York, Gage, Cheyne, Baker and Sir Thomas Bromley, a puisne justice of the king's bench and privy councillor.⁸⁵

It had been important to move quickly against Somerset while the political situation was still fluid and the London council initially presented a united front. Warwick himself wrote to Clinton on 15 October, informing him that 'the man that ruled all by wyfulnes ys restrayned and now things ys like to passe otherwys then of long tyme yt hathe done. more for the kyngs honor and the welth and surty of his realms and subiects'.⁸⁶ Warwick attempted to gain the political initiative by rapidly informing potential allies. He employed the language successfully adopted by the London council during the October coup. It was the language of good councillors and of good governance. Clinton was deputy of Boulogne and married to Warwick's niece, Ursula, daughter of William Lord Stourton.⁸⁷ Despite the dark motives that have been attributed to him, Warwick's principal concerns in government were those set out in his letter to Clinton. Between October 1549 and February 1550, he carefully built up his support. Several letters were sent to Lord Cobham at the same time (essentially Northampton's brother-in-law), who was lieutenant of Calais.⁸⁸ The French were pressuring Cobham and Clinton and the news from England must have been reassuring. On 12 October, St John had informed Cobham that 'the duke is now staied & his troblus hedd wherby gret questions shall folow by gods helpe'. St John had written about victuals for the garrison, a council matter and well suited to his financial expertise, but he had been a leading figure in the cabal against Somerset and it was vital to maintain contact with the commanders of the strategic garrisons.⁸⁹ Four days later Petre wrote to Cobham from Hampton Court about the latter's need for munitions and men, informing him that Hoby had been unable to examine his ordnance books because he was away from court, but the privy council would handle his requests 'now things

their offices. Sir Richard Southwell remained general surveyor of crown lands and Sir Robert Southwell remained master of the rolls until his resignation on 13 December 1550. Northumberland saw that Sir Robert Southwell was elected for Westminster in March 1553. Both men sat on a formidable number of commissions. Among others, Sir Richard Southwell was *custos rotulorum* for Norfolk from 1537, while his brother was on the quorum for Kent, Norfolk, Surrey, Suffolk, Sussex and Essex, having been appointed to most of these commissions under Henry. Their brother, Francis Southwell, an auditor of the exchequer and receiver of the court of augmentations, was less prominent but he was on the quorum for Hertfordshire from 1547: Bindoff, iii, pp. 351-356; PRO, C 66/801, mm. 10d, 13d-14d, 17d-18d, 20d-21d; *Calendar of patent rolls*, i, pp. 83, 84-85, 87, 89-90.

⁸⁴ Ponet, *A shorte treatise of politike power*, sig. I3r.

⁸⁵ Hoak, *The king's council*, pp. 83-84, 251-252.

⁸⁶ Hatfield, Cecil MS. 150, fo. 137r.

⁸⁷ *The complete peerage*, eds. Gibbs *et al*, iii, pp. 690-692; PRO, SP 10/4/30, M. fos. 60r-60v.

⁸⁸ BL Harley MS. 284, fos. 16r-17v; PRO, SP 10/2/32, M. fos. 106r-113v; *Calendar of patent rolls*, i, pp. 137, 261; James, *Kateryn Parr*, pp. 324-326; MacCulloch, *Tudor church militant*, pp. 128-132.

begynnyng to be settled'. He kept him informed of the most recent developments, which Cobham had already heard about.⁹⁰ In the confusion of the October coup, Calais was vulnerable, especially because of war with France, and consideration of its military needs was important to the regime's security. It was also one of the largest garrisons and gave its commander substantial authority and influence. Cobham's close associations with Northampton would bind him to the Dudley interest. In the mean time, he did a service to the regime by detaining Wolfgang Bacheman and another man. Bacheman was interrogated and Cobham was expected to exercise his 'wisdom and dexterity'.⁹¹ He was probably a German mercenary working for the English whom the privy council suspected was about to join the French and use his military knowledge of the defences of Calais to their advantage, perhaps even by spying for them.⁹²

Clinton and Cobham would become two of Warwick's closest adherents but relations between them might not have been good. Paget had been smoothing over possible tensions between them just before the October coup, including obtaining Cobham's licence from Somerset to return from Calais on his own business. The comptroller had been Cobham's patron since Edward's accession, or earlier, and at one point the latter described his heir, Sir William Brooke, as Paget's servant.⁹³ Paget also succeeded in procuring Brooke's discharge from service in Boulogne, Cobham having requested it 'because he hath a good while served an evel Master, and one that could not do so much for him as his desire was, I have put him to a better that is to the king's majesty' by getting him the more valuable position of esquire of the body. Brooke was serving at Calais during this period and the reason for his reassignment to Boulogne is uncertain but he was captain of one hundred men during the hostilities with France and may have been sent to reinforce the besieged city. Paget ended his letter in friendly terms, underlining the importance of amicability and intimacy in handling patronage.⁹⁴ Clinton was deputy of Boulogne and, if he was the 'evel Master' referred to, it would make the situation delicate between the Fiennes and Brooke families under Warwick. Professor Jordan suggested that both men were his 'personal followers or adherents'. It was more complicated than this. Cobham had ties with Somerset that were not severed by the October coup. Friendship cut across clienteles as well as underpinning them.⁹⁵ Paget and Clinton had very difficult relations. The animosity between them probably stemmed from Paget's role in Clinton's appointment as deputy of Boulogne in 1548, an office he

⁸⁹ BL Harley MS. 284, fo. 48r.

⁹⁰ BL Harley MS. 284, fo. 49r.

⁹¹ BL Harley MS. 284, fo. 53r.

⁹² APC, ii, p. 273.

⁹³ BL Harley MS. 284, fo. 44r; Beer and Jack, p. 79; Bindoff, i, p. 512. Paget and Cobham had been close since the closing years of Henry's reign. Two of Cobham's children were in Paget's household in 1546; I am grateful to Andrew Johnston for discussing this with me: PRO, SP 1/225, M. fos. 171r-172v.

⁹⁴ BL Harley MS. 284, fo. 44r; Beer and Jack, p. 79; Bindoff, i, p. 512.

⁹⁵ Jordan, *Threshold of power*, p. 49; see above, pp. 9-10.

did not want.⁹⁶ Warwick attained Clinton's and Cobham's support through appointment to office and financial reward. Clinton, in particular, received very large grants of land. Professor Loades found that sixty per cent of all patronage to the Dudley clientele was granted to him. He was clearly a fidelity client. Clinton was appointed to the privy council on 4 May 1550 by virtue of his office as lord admiral, which Warwick yielded in his favour. Cobham joined him on the board on 23 May.⁹⁷ As Professor Hoak pointed out, this solved the problem of Clinton's unemployment at the return of Boulogne to the French, while Warwick trusted him implicitly ever since they served in the Henrician navy together. Clinton was received at court by the king with the other captains of Boulogne on 4 May. They were thanked for their services and 'promised rewardes' (in his case 'farther reward'). Clinton was also appointed a gentleman of the privy chamber in 1551 and nominated to the Order of the Garter on 23 April 1551 (installed 30 June), appointed ambassador to Paris in December of that year and made lord lieutenant of Lincolnshire in 1552.⁹⁸ Northumberland's confidence in him was sufficient for him to place Clinton in charge of the Tower when he went out to face Mary, appointing him constable on 7 July 1553. He had been rewarded the previous day with Sandgate Castle in Kent. However, Clinton quickly reconciled himself to Mary's accession, recovering some of his influence.⁹⁹

Warwick allied with Cranmer, who had a close personal relationship with the young king, in order to place some of his people in the privy chamber. This may have been an attempt to increase his influence, rather than a move against Southampton. However, the possibility that Southampton and his supporters intended to reverse Somerset's religious policy and obtain more complete control of government forced Warwick to take decisive action against them. One party intended to exclude another from power. Therefore, identifying himself with the reformers, Warwick secured the appointment to the privy council of the protestants, Thomas Goodrich, bishop of Ely, and Dorset, while blocking that of Sir Thomas Arundel. Paget probably brought over Rich, the lord chancellor, and Warwick had secured the support of St John and Russell.¹⁰⁰ According to Fisher, Southampton was 'very busye to followe him [Somerset] to deathe' for removing him from his office and solicited the support of the earl of Arundel and other adherents. Therefore, he joined Arundel and St John early in December in a commission to examine Somerset in the Tower,

⁹⁶ Beer and Jack, pp. 130-132.

⁹⁷ *APC*, iii, pp. 24, 36; *Calendar of the patent rolls*, iii, pp. 252, 312, 341-342, 425-426; iv, pp. 56-57, 115, 187-188, 190-192, 199-200, 364-368, 370-374, 405; v, pp. 167-171, 252, 285; Loades, *Northumberland*, p. 276. Warwick had been reappointed lord admiral on 28 October 1549: PRO, C 66/804, mm. 32-33; PRO, C 66/805, mm. 4-6; PRO, C 66/816, mm. 40-41; *Calendar of patent rolls*, i, pp. 181, 189; ii, p. 245; Rymer and Sanderson (eds.), *Fœdera*, xv, pp. 157-163, 194-200; PRO, SP 10/9/50, M. fo. 97v; PRO, SP 10/9/51, M. fos. 99r-99v; Bindoff, ii, p. 63.

⁹⁸ Hatfield, Cecil MS. 150, fo. 137r; BL Cotton MS. Nero C. x, fo. 32r; Jordan (ed.), *Chronicle*, p. 59; *The complete peerage*, eds. Gibbs et al, iii, pp. 690-693; *APC*, iii, p. 24.

⁹⁹ Hoak, *The king's council*, pp. 61-62; BL Cotton MS. Nero C. x, fo. 21r; Jordan (ed.), *Chronicle*, p. 29; BL Royal MS. 18 C xxiv, fo. 375r.

¹⁰⁰ BL Lansdowne MS. 160, fos. 264r-267r; BL Additional MS. 48126, fos. 15r-16r; BL Additional MS. 11042, fos. *53r-*53v; Hoak, *The king's council*, pp. 241-258; Hoak, 'Rehabilitating the duke of Northumberland', pp. 36-39.

putting articles to him 'concerning his treasons in his government'.¹⁰¹ Somerset answered carefully, explaining that each article against him had been endorsed 'by the advice and connsell of the earle of Warwick'.¹⁰² Professor Hoak thought that Somerset's partisans, including Fisher, wanted to believe this 'exaggeration'. He suggested that whatever Somerset said convinced Southampton of Warwick's complicity.¹⁰³ However, Somerset and Warwick had long been close associates. Professor Bush is surely correct to see Somerset and the privy council working in accord over most policies and having similar social attitudes and policy objectives prior to 1549. Their differences were over policy detail and as a result of the lord protector's brusque personality.¹⁰⁴ Southampton's motivation was personal animosity and a desire to exercise authority again. He argued that Somerset and Warwick were 'worthie to dye'.¹⁰⁵ Arundel concurred. St John dissembled with them and that evening visited Warwick at Holborn, informing him of the situation and advising him to 'beward howe he did prosecute the lord protectors deathe; for he sholde suffer him self for the same'.¹⁰⁶ St John seems to have been acting independently but his close involvement in the October coup may have made him wary, knowing it could leave him vulnerable too. Warwick was persuaded to do all he could to protect Somerset and, according to Fisher, 'procuered by the meanes of the archebusshoppe of Canterbury greate frendes aboute the king to presERVE the lord protector'.¹⁰⁷ Ponet wished to show the outcome of factional politics and, for him, the result of Southampton's intrigues was to be outmanoeuvred by Warwick.¹⁰⁸ Although he believed that a mixed polity was the best system of government and was using the example of recent politics to illustrate this, Ponet's analysis is useful in illustrating what was occurring during the power struggle between these parties, although he painted with lurid colours.¹⁰⁹ Dorset and Ely were appointed to counter the catholic councillors and calls for Mary to be made regent.¹¹⁰

Again, as during the October coup, Warwick now sought to control events by summoning the privy council to him at his house in Holborn. The imperial ambassador thought this confirmed and increased his power, while around 5 November arrangements were being made for a proclamation of further religious reform. By 26 November, Paget was supporting Warwick. The political climate was now 'running against' Southampton's party.¹¹¹ Therefore, the strength of Southampton's personality would be vital if control of the privy council was to be wrested from

¹⁰¹ BL Additional MS. 48126, fo. 15r; *Simancas*, ix, p. 489.

¹⁰² BL Additional MS. 48126, fos. 15r-15v. These articles may have been: BL Additional MS. 9069, fos. 43v-51v.

¹⁰³ Hoak, *The king's council*, p. 255.

¹⁰⁴ Bush, *Government policy*, pp. 3-6, 31-32, 37-38, 74-79, 96, 117, 125-126, 158.

¹⁰⁵ BL Additional MS. 48126, fo. 15v.

¹⁰⁶ BL Additional MS. 48126, fo. 15v.

¹⁰⁷ BL Additional MS. 48126, fo. 15v.

¹⁰⁸ Ponet, *A shorte treatise of politike power*, sig. 13v.

¹⁰⁹ Ponet, *A shorte treatise of politike power*, sig. A5r.

¹¹⁰ BL Additional MS. 48126, fos. 15v-16r.

¹¹¹ *Simancas*, ix, pp. 476-478; Robinson, *Original letters*, i, no. clxxiii, pp. 353-354; Hoak, *The king's council*, p. 254.

Warwick's party. His continued illness complicated the situation.¹¹² Somerset signed the thirty-three articles of submission on 13 December and six days later it was rumoured that he would be released.¹¹³ When Southampton pressed that Somerset be charged with treason, Warwick, 'hearing his owne condemnation to approche', took decisive action by accusing the former lord chancellor of seeking his fall too and persuaded the other privy councillors to support him. Warwick's actions against Southampton's party probably occurred in the second half of December, prior to the submission of the bill for Somerset's fine and ransom.¹¹⁴ Somerset was to be released, while Southampton and Arundel were placed under house arrest on 14 January 1550.¹¹⁵ Arundel was fined £12,000 and lost his offices of lord chamberlain, steward of Petworth and master of the game there, on 21 February 1550.¹¹⁶ Sir Thomas Arundel was sent to the Tower with his brother on 30 January, nullifying any vestige of support for Southampton. He was to remain there until 4 October 1551.¹¹⁷

Southampton was not necessarily spent as a political force. The earl of Arundel would come back to haunt Warwick. However, Southampton's death from tuberculosis on 30 July removed one of Warwick's most formidable opponents. Interestingly, the supposedly catholic earl had Hooper preach at his funeral and the preamble to his will was a protestant formula. Again, this makes the idea of monolithic blocs untenable. It is possible that, like Norfolk, he hoped to ingratiate himself with Warwick's regime by interesting himself in protestantism. There is sufficient ambiguity, though. The king's protestantism may have been a factor in Southampton's changing outlook or the latter may have had sincere protestant leanings.¹¹⁸ His exclusion from power and conflict over control during the minority caused his opposition to Somerset and Warwick, not religion. However, some of his supporters were clearly catholic, like the earl of Arundel and the Southwells, and religious affiliation did play a vital role. It is not possible to reliably discern the religious inclination of all his supporters. One of Southampton's colleagues, Paget, who is often dubbed a *politique* or Henrician catholic, employed a protestant formula in his own will.¹¹⁹ The desire to put Mary forward as regent meant that Southampton was heading a party intent on

¹¹² *Simancas*, ix, p. 477.

¹¹³ *Simancas*, ix, p. 489; Hoak, *The king's council*, pp. 255-256; BL Additional MS. 9069, fos. 43v-51v.

¹¹⁴ Hoak, *The king's council*, pp. 256-257.

¹¹⁵ BL Additional MS. 48126, fo. 16r; Ponet, *A shorte treatise of politike power*, sig. I3v; BL Cotton MS. Nero C. x, fo. 17r; Jordan (ed.), *Chronicle*, p. 18.

¹¹⁶ On 8 July, Arundel and Southampton were ordered to serve in their counties. Arundel was to remain on his Sussex estates until 29 September, 'and to be in a readinesse to serve whan so ever he shulde be called upon by the Kinges Majesties Lieutenant or his deputie'. His fine was 'remitted' to £8000 on 6 January 1551 and was to be paid within twelve years: *APC*, ii, p. 398; iii, pp. 64-65, 258; iv, pp. 49-50, 276-278; BL Cotton MS. Nero C. x, fos. 17r, 29r; Jordan (ed.), *Chronicle*, pp. 18, 51; Somerville, *Duchy of Lancaster*, i, p. 617; Jordan, *Threshold of power*, pp. 30-31.

¹¹⁷ *APC*, ii, p. 376.

¹¹⁸ Wriothesley, *Chronicle*, ii, p. 41; Rowse, 'Thomas Wriothesley', pp. 124-127; *Windsor Castle*, p. 57; J.P. Collier (ed.), *Trevelyan papers prior to A.D. 1558, Camden Miscellany* (ii vols.; Camden Society, 1st ser., 67; London, 1857), i, p. 206.

¹¹⁹ PRO, PROB 11/46, fo. 210r.

conservative reaction against a Dudley ascendancy and not necessarily a catholic party. The rump of Somerset's party would support Mary in 1553 for the same reason.

At the same time, the dowager duchess of Richmond was soliciting the privy council for Norfolk's release, 'so that ther be many aferde lest at length she shall obteyne'.¹²⁰ Richard Scudamore, Sir Thomas Hoby's servant, was well placed to notice this. She had the protestant bishops of Lincoln, Rochester and St Davids sent as confessors to her father on Christmas Eve because of the indeterminate political situation.¹²¹ If a catholic revival was a certainty at this stage, then the dowager duchess was being very impolitic in attempting to portray her father as interested in becoming protestant. The addition of Ely and Dorset to the privy council by 28 November, while intended to balance the recent appointments of Southampton's supporters, Peckham and Sir Richard Southwell, especially because of the removal of the reformers Somerset and Smith, was also partially to allay anxiety over Norfolk, who was by no means regarded as harmless. Scudamore noted that their appointment 'putteth all honest harts yn good conmfort for the good hope that they haue of the perseuerance of godds word'.¹²² Peckham and Southwell were both appointed very early in the coup (6 October) and to further counter their influence Ferrers and Darcy (both reformers and supporters of Warwick) were admitted. They were sitting as privy councillors by 26 January 1550, although the latter had been attending meetings for at least ten days.¹²³ As Professor Hoak points out, these appointments were a sign of Warwick's strength and a consequence of his ascendancy over Southampton's party. He probably used his influence over the king to get Darcy and Ferrers appointed.¹²⁴ One near-contemporary source stated that he used this approach to gain the appointments of Ely and Dorset and it is likely that this was also the case for the other changes in conciliar personnel at this time.¹²⁵ Preaching had been suspended in the immediate aftermath of Somerset's fall, lest it incite unrest, but it was promptly renewed, reinforcing the perception among reformers, catholics and the populace, that the situation was indeterminate.¹²⁶ Concern for public order was vitally important, especially in the light of the strange alliance between Somerset and the commons.¹²⁷ The regime's attitude was an ambivalent mix of stasis and dynamism, with Warwick apparently at first eager to prove his conservative credentials. He was certainly conservative with regard to social policy and wished to secure the good will of the gentry. Therefore, a bill was passed in the 'styll parlyament' making it treason for

¹²⁰ Brigden (ed.), 'Scudamore letters', p. 103.

¹²¹ Brigden (ed.), 'Scudamore letters', p. 104.

¹²² APC, ii, pp. 330, 354, 362; Hoak, *The king's council*, pp. 54-57; BL Additional MS. 11042, fos. *53r-*53v.

¹²³ APC, ii, p. 370. Ferrers was promoted to Viscount Hereford on 2 February 1550: *The complete peerage*, eds. Gibbs et al, vi, pp. 478-479.

¹²⁴ Hoak, *The king's council*, p. 56.

¹²⁵ BL Additional MS. 48126, fos. 15r-15v.

¹²⁶ Robinson, *Original letters*, i, no. xxxv, p. 70.

¹²⁷ Shagan, 'Protector Somerset and the 1549 rebellions', pp. 34-63.

twelve or more people to assemble (3 & 4 Edward VI, c. 5).¹²⁸ These disorders were to be put down by 'the rulers with the gentlemen ther to levey the power of the contrey and to subdue them by vyolence'.¹²⁹ As a precautionary measure against renewed unrest, the gentry were to return to their localities with the prorogation of parliament.¹³⁰

Warwick realised that in order to secure his own position he would have to ensure that Somerset was spared. Explicit conciliatory feelers were being sent out to the duke. Although the recent political turmoil meant that Scudamore used the pejorative 'faccyon' when referring to Somerset's followers, the former lord protector was 'sett at ffree prysoner', the king's servants no longer watched him and it was believed that both the duke and his clients would be released soon as a New Year's gift from the king. The duchess of Somerset was permitted to visit her husband on Christmas Day, 'to his no litle coumfort'. Somerset's release was conditional on his continued good behaviour and Hooper was sent to preach none too subtly on the psalm of King David 'ageynst gouernours that mysordred theyr vocacyons', warning that God punished them for their sins and for any attempted revenge. Scudamore believed that this activity was intended to strengthen decisively Warwick's position against Southampton's party, writing 'but whate a corrozye this wilbe to the Erle of Southampton who is contynually syck and thought to be yn a consumpsyon I referr that to the iudgement of doctor ffryor, his physyan'.¹³¹ With the removal of his rivals, Warwick now solidified his control. Paget was ennobled as Lord Paget of Beaudesert, while St John and Russell were promoted (becoming earls of Wiltshire and Bedford respectively).¹³² Warwick was appointed lord president of the council and lord great master of the household on 2 February.¹³³ Therefore, he controlled both government and court. Arundel and Southampton had been 'banished from the Counsell and commaunded to keep their houses in London and not departe thence' on the same day.¹³⁴ This extreme factionalism was a product of the unstable environment engendered at court by oppositional politics created by the reformation, the legacy of Henry's reign and the implications of a minority. Generally, government continued to run smoothly. This was partly because of Warwick's dominance but also because of the working relationships he built up.

IV: The Dudley clientele

¹²⁸ Brigden (ed.), 'Scudamore letters', p. 102.

¹²⁹ Brigden (ed.), 'Scudamore letters', p. 102.

¹³⁰ Brigden (ed.), 'Scudamore letters', p. 114.

¹³¹ Either Psalm 2 or 118. I am grateful to Professor Pettegree for this information: Brigden (ed.), 'Scudamore letters', pp. 103-104.

¹³² BL Cotton MS. Nero C. x, fos. 17r, 18r; Jordan (ed.), *Chronicle*, pp. 19-20.

¹³³ *Calendar of patent rolls*, iii, pp. 189-190.

¹³⁴ Wriothesley, *Chronicle*, ii, p. 33.

One of Warwick's first concerns was to gain control of the court. The personnel of the household did not change substantially but in the privy chamber Warwick's people replaced Somerset's appointees. However, it is striking that many members of the privy chamber who would be closely identified with Warwick had already been appointed by either Henry or Somerset: Sir William Sidney; Rogers; Sir Andrew Dudley; Darcy; Cawarden, Warwick's brother-in-law; Gates; Sir Anthony Cooke and his heir, Richard Cooke.¹³⁵ This circle was protestant. Professor Loades believed Rogers was a conservative, making him a strange bedfellow of so many reformers. However, Rogers was an unlikely choice if he was a conservative because Edward preferred reformers. Also, Rogers was among Thynne's protestant circle during Mary's reign, suggesting he was a committed protestant himself.¹³⁶ This continuity of personnel under Henry, Somerset and Warwick reinforces the idea that these were substantial men, already firmly entrenched in court and central and local government, and that Warwick forged or strengthened his ties with them and they, in turn, identified with him for ideological and political reasons. These men were not only Warwick's supporters, they were often members of his clientele. Darcy and Gates had risen through the court in the 1540s, a time when Dudley was growing in influence. He even placed his brother in the chamber. Although it could be argued that he was rewarding his family out of self-interest, Sir Andrew Dudley had served faithfully in the difficult position of captain of Broughty Craig during the Scottish campaign (1547-1548) and at Guînes (1551-1552).¹³⁷

After the fall of Somerset, Wingfield 'seuered the Lord Protector from his grace [Edward], and caused the Guard to watch him till the lordes cominge', in the process removing his clientele.¹³⁸ Warwick and five other peers (Northampton, the earl of Arundel, Wentworth, St John and Russell) took lodgings near to the king in the privy chamber 'to give order for the good gouvernement of his most royall person'. They would act as governors of the king's person.¹³⁹ Four principal gentlemen (Rogers, Darcy, Sir Andrew Dudley and Wroth) were appointed to have constant attendance in the privy chamber and guards were placed around it with the justification that Edward had to be safeguarded against the possibility of the former lord protector attempting to

¹³⁵ PRO, E 179/69/62; PRO, E 179/69/63; PRO, E 179/69/59; PRO, E 179/69/63; Bindoff, i, pp. 599-602, 689-691; Adams, 'The Dudley clientèle', p. 245.

¹³⁶ Loades, *Northumberland*, pp. 140-141; see above, pp. 22, 54.

¹³⁷ Dudley had extensive experience in military and civil matters, being an officer of the exchequer by 1540 and member of the household by 1544. He was appointed a vice-admiral in February 1547, commanding the naval ships based at Harwich in Essex, and captured one of the most important Scottish warships shortly after. He solicited patronage on behalf of the mariners under him and was an able naval officer. Northumberland made him keeper of Westminster from 1549-1553, keeper of the jewels and robes there from 1551-1553 and ambassador to the emperor in 1553. He was MP for Oxfordshire in March 1553. He also received extensive patronage and had an annual income, not including land grants from the bishop of Winchester, of £160 by August 1553: Bindoff, ii, pp. 61-63; PRO, SP 10/1/23, M. fos. 84r-90v; BL Cotton MS. Nero C. x, fo. 12v; Jordan (ed.), *Chronicle*, pp. 5-6; PRO, SP 10/1/29, M. fos. 102r-103v; PRO, LR 2/118, fos. 9r, 13r, 15v-16r, 17r, 83v-85r, 131r; PRO, E 154/2/39, fos. 50r-57r.

¹³⁸ Wriothesley, *Chronicle*, ii, p. 27. Wingfield had arrived at Windsor on 11 October with five hundred horse: BL Additional MS. 48126, fos. 14v-15r.

¹³⁹ APC, ii, pp. 344-345; BL Cotton MS. Nero C. x, fo. 17r; Jordan (ed.), *Chronicle*, p. 18; Hoak, 'The king's privy chamber', pp. 91, 93-94, 98-102.

regain the 'protection' of the king.¹⁴⁰ The significant additions to the privy chamber under Warwick were Cheke, Sir Henry Sidney, Sadler, Hoby, Sir Robert Dudley, Sir Henry Neville, Sir Nicholas Throckmorton, Sir Richard Blount, kinsman of Warwick's comptroller, Thomas Blount of Kidderminster, and Sir Henry Gates. The omissions, Stanhope and Wolf, are equally telling.¹⁴¹ By 1552-1553 the privy chamber had become even fuller, numbering thirty seven, many of whom would not have had to serve as royal body servants, including Cranmer, Ely, Suffolk (Dorset), Arundel, Shrewsbury, Cobham, Petre, Cecil, North, Mason, Baker, Bowes, Worcester and Lord Thomas Grey (Suffolk's brother).¹⁴² The implications are clear. Warwick used these men to close off the privy chamber, sheltering the king from outside influence, while rewarding them with the close proximity he denied to others. Sir John Gates held the king's dry stamp, which was used to issue privy seal warrants and other documents authorising government actions. This enhanced Northumberland's control by circumventing any other means of gaining the royal signature, especially by the secretaries.¹⁴³

This close control of the privy chamber was even more apparent when Somerset was released from the Tower on 6 February 1550 and eventually allowed back to court. He dined at Sir John York's house, underlining the continuing close relationship between Warwick and the city (the earl was still residing there), before being escorted by Wentworth and Herbert to an awaiting barge, which took him to Somerset Place, where he slept that night. He was to remain within four miles of either Sheen or Syon during a probationary period and 'in case yt shall chaunce the Kinges Majeste at any tyme during this the said Duke's restraincte to repare or comme within thaforsaide lymyte of fowre myles nere to eyther of the said howses, that in that behalf the said Duke shall not prese nor attempte to have accesse to his Majestes presence', withdrawing himself unless Edward wished to see him. Somerset was bound by a recognisance of £10,000, pardoned some days later, and had his estates restored virtually intact. He was also restored to several of his offices, including earl marshal and governor of Jersey and Guernsey.¹⁴⁴ First, Somerset had to sign thirty-three articles of impeachment on 27 January. Professor Jordan characterised these as 'vague and inchoate', suggesting they were put before him in a rather casual manner during negotiations for his release. Several of the charges against Somerset were legally groundless because the protectorate provisions gave him the necessary authority to act independently. Ten attacked his policies regarding enclosures or his handling of the rebellions and condemned his popularity. He was also accused of failing to fulfil his oath to listen to the counsel of the privy council, interfering

¹⁴⁰ BL Cotton MS. Nero C. x, fo. 17r; Jordan (ed.), *Chronicle*, p. 18; Hoak, *The king's council*, p. 150.

¹⁴¹ PRO, E 179/69/62; PRO, E 179/69/63; PRO, E 179/69/64; Bindoff, i, pp. 449-450.

¹⁴² BL Stowe MS. 571, fos. 30r-30v; PRO, LC 2/4/1, fos. 18r-19v; Braddock, 'The royal household', p. 75.

¹⁴³ Hoak, *The king's council*, pp. 142-143.

¹⁴⁴ APC, ii, pp. 384-385; Wriothesley, *Chronicle*, ii, p. 33, n. c; Nichols (ed.), *Chronicle of the Grey Friars*, p. 66; Rymer and Sanderson (eds.), *Fædera*, xv, pp. 205-207; *Simancas*, x, pp. 72, 86-87; PRO, SP 10/10/38, M. fos. 82r-82v; Jordan, *Threshold of power*, pp. 70-71.

in the law, setting up a court of requests in his own house, appointing lieutenants for the army by 'your own wryting & Seale', meeting ambassadors alone, rebuking his colleagues at the board and other charges that had been made against him during the coup, some of which, though not all, were probably fabrications. The privy council was angry with him for his prolonged caution during the rebellions, when he delayed allowing the nobility and gentry to suppress the rebels, and they claimed he had declared 'the nobells and gentlemen were the only cause of the dearth of thinges whereby ye people rose & reformed things themselves'. Somerset 'consyderid the said artycles before specyfied and doe acknowlidge my said offences faults and crymes done and conteynid in ye Same'.¹⁴⁵ On 22 February, Stanhope, Smith, Fisher, Grey and Thynne were released and bound by a recognisance for £3000 each (Thynne was bound for double this amount, presumably because he was wealthier). Stanhope, Fisher and Grey had their recognisances discharged on 18 May 1551.¹⁴⁶ Somerset spent two months in this condition before being readmitted to the privy council in early April, after dining with the king. By 11 May his rehabilitation was complete when he was readmitted to the privy chamber.¹⁴⁷ This was probably in order to keep him at court but councillors, including Warwick, would have preferred rehabilitation and reconciliation anyway.¹⁴⁸ Somerset's clients assisted this process. Cecil wrote to the dowager duchess of Suffolk in March to warn her of the malicious gossip spoken against the duke, which would harm his reputation with the privy council. She held off from trying to give more direct support and then received news from friends that Somerset was to be restored to the privy council. She clearly had Somerset's interests at heart and said she might have counselled him to be patient with those who continued to intrigue against him.¹⁴⁹

Somerset wrote to Cobham on 15 April, concluding:

towchinge the latter *parte* of *your* Letter mencynong the reuocation of vs to the connsell we *perceiue* therby *your* good affeccion and although this same cannot be so beneficyall to the *commen* welth as you remember yet in good will yt shalnot ffaile but answer thexspectacion of the best and for that you nombre *your* selfe amongst our ffrendes thinke you so assuredlye and wherin we maye by any dede confirme *your* opynion ye shall not ffaile.¹⁵⁰

This suggested they had a warm relationship, strengthened by Cobham's regard for Hertford, then sent to France as a hostage for the Treaty of Boulogne.¹⁵¹ Somerset's rehabilitation was cemented by the marriage on 3 June between his daughter Lady Anne Seymour and Warwick's heir,

¹⁴⁵ BL Additional MS. 9069, fos. 43v-51v; Jordan, *The young king*, pp. 522-523, n. 1; *Threshold of power*, p. 71.

¹⁴⁶ *APC*, ii, p. 398; iii, p. 274.

¹⁴⁷ *APC*, ii, p. 427; iii, pp. 19, 27-28, 29; Wriothesley, *Chronicle*, ii, p. 36.

¹⁴⁸ Jordan, *Threshold of power*, pp. 71-73.

¹⁴⁹ PRO, SP 10/10/2, M. fos. 3r-4v.

¹⁵⁰ BL Harley MS. 284, fo. 86r.

¹⁵¹ BL Harley MS. 284, fos. 86r-87v.

Viscount Lisle. Warwick avoided attending, although it is unlikely that this was because he 'suspecteth he should haue ben betraied there and therefore cam not thither'. Sir Robert Dudley married the daughter of Sir John Robsart, a substantial Norfolk gentleman, the following day. The imperial ambassador described how Somerset and Warwick were 'in close communication, visiting one another every day'. Van der Delft thought that Warwick, having allied with the catholics to bring Somerset down, now allied with the duke to protect himself from the catholics, promoting protestantism in the process.¹⁵²

The close proximity of Northumberland's adherents to the king had a more subtle function too. Professor Pollard argued that Northumberland sought to dominate Edward's mind, while giving the appearance of releasing him from the 'trammels of minority'.¹⁵³ For Professor Hoak, this made the king 'an articulate puppet'.¹⁵⁴ An anonymous contemporary French account demonstrated how this system worked, suggesting that Edward respected Northumberland's opinion implicitly. Northumberland 'placed' Gates ('his intimate friend and principal instrument' when he wanted something done) in the privy chamber, where he recorded all conversation with the king. Gates 'was continually in the chamber' and believed to be one of those who persuaded Edward to alter the succession.¹⁵⁵ The new imperial ambassador, Jehan Scheyve, also thought Northumberland exercised compelling influence over the king and reported on this in January 1552.¹⁵⁶ Professor Hoak has noted that the king 'took his cue literally and directly' from Northumberland, citing the ambassador's observation, and this level of control was certainly evident.¹⁵⁷ It is more difficult to ascertain why. Although Northumberland monitored Edward's behaviour, it is possible that he wanted to ensure the king did not become prey to inexperience when meeting ambassadors. Also, the court was particularly tense because of Somerset's second fall. The French commentator offered his own explanation. Northumberland:

had given such an opinion of himself to the young king that he [the king] revered him as if he were himself one of his subjects—so much so that the things which he knew to be desired by Northumberland he himself decreed in order to please the Duke.¹⁵⁸

Northumberland secretly worked through the principal officers of the privy chamber in order 'to prevent the envy which would have been produced had it been known that it was he who had

¹⁵² BL Cotton MS. Nero C. x, fos. 22r-22v; Jordan (ed.), *Chronicle*, pp. 32-33; Wriothesley, *Chronicle*, ii, p. 41; BL Additional MS. 48023, fo. 350r; *Simancas*, x, p. 87; PRO, SP 10/10/6, M. fos. 10r-11v; Jordan, *Threshold of power*, pp. 74, 466-471.

¹⁵³ Pollard, *Political history*, vi, p. 59.

¹⁵⁴ Hoak, 'Rehabilitating the duke of Northumberland', p. 43; *The king's council*, pp. 118-124.

¹⁵⁵ Hoak, *The king's council*, p. 123.

¹⁵⁶ *Simancas*, x, pp. 234-237, 437-438.

¹⁵⁷ Hoak, *The king's council*, p. 129.

¹⁵⁸ Hoak, *The king's council*, p. 123.

suggested these things to the king'. In this way he was able to control Edward, enforcing policy through him by suggesting it was the will of the king.¹⁵⁹

Intimacy and trust characterised this policy: people whom Northumberland and Edward mutually trusted acted as conduits. During the reshuffle of February 1550, Darcy was appointed vice-chamberlain and captain of the guard, then in April 1551 Gates replaced him in his former offices when he became lord chamberlain. Darcy received a grant of one hundred marks to his general heirs and three hundred marks to his heirs male, to maintain his elevation. These grants probably came in the form of land worth over £266 per annum. At the same time, he was appointed keeper of the manor of Pleasance in East Greenwich, Kent, and master of the buckhounds. Gates received land worth £120 per annum.¹⁶⁰ Cheke, Edward's tutor, Henry Sidney (Northumberland's future son-in-law) and Henry Neville were placed in the privy chamber. Cheke and Sidney were particularly close to the king.¹⁶¹

Gates controlled the privy chamber. Dr Sil did not find much evidence that he was particularly close to Edward or, until comparatively late in the reign, to Northumberland, viewing him as an able household officer who was incapable of exercising political judgement. Gates was an example of the Henrician royal servant recruited into Northumberland's clientele. He got his *entrée* at court through his brother-in-law, Denny, but advanced through his own abilities. Gates gained wide experience in the household and the localities, becoming something of a *factotum* at court. Like many others, he fulfilled a variety of roles as part of the political community. He was JP for Essex from 1532, a member of the court by 1537 and groom of the privy chamber from 1542. Again, like most of the prominent Edwardian politicians, Henry had relied on him, making him a royal agent in the localities and rewarding him for good service in the process by appointing him feodary of the duchy of Lancaster for Essex, Hertfordshire, London, Middlesex and Surrey, keeper of the site and possessions of Syon Abbey in Middlesex, and St Thomas's Hospital in Southwark, bailiff of Southwark and butler of the port of Poole in Dorset. This reinforced Gates's local position, especially as he bought ex-monastic land in Essex and Suffolk. Somerset also favoured Gates, making him a knight of the Bath and mediating in his dispute with the London authorities in June 1548 over his office of bailiff (this quarrel was exacerbated by his return as MP for Southwark). Dr Sil's work has partially resurrected Gates's reputation. Importantly, he has emphasised that Gates was a protestant, who identified the wellbeing of the commonwealth with a

¹⁵⁹ Hoak, *The king's council*, p. 123.

¹⁶⁰ BL Cotton MS. Nero C. x, fos. 18r, 31v; Jordan (ed.), *Chronicle*, pp. 20, 57-58; *Calendar of patent rolls*, iii, pp. 418-420; see below, pp. 250-254.

¹⁶¹ PRO, E 179/69/63; PRO, E 179/69/64; BL Cotton MS. Nero C. x, fo. 20r; Jordan (ed.), *Chronicle*, p. 25; Robinson, *Original letters*, i, no. lxxi, pp. 140-142.

protestant nation and polity.¹⁶² Gates was explicit about his faith in his 'Confession' before execution.¹⁶³ Although he warned the gathered crowd during his scaffold speech to be careful in contesting with the clergy when reading scripture, he concluded 'stande not to myche yn yower owne conceptys...except yow humble submytte yower selfys to god, & charitable rede the same to thetent to be edyfiyd ther by'.¹⁶⁴ Dr Sil has interpreted this as a confession of reformed faith, partly explaining why Mary selected Gates for execution.¹⁶⁵ This is convincing. Like Northumberland's own scaffold speech, Gates's 'Confession' was cloaked in a profession of having sinned against the rightful heir to the throne (Mary) because of his protestantism—that his religion somehow deceived him into supporting Jane. However, unlike Northumberland, he did strongly affirm his protestant beliefs.¹⁶⁶ Similarly, Palmer stated before his own execution that although he had turned from God he would be redeemed by his faith. Again, he spoke in language similar to that of Northumberland and Gates, and like the latter he affirmed his protestantism.¹⁶⁷ These men shared a similar outlook because of their faith and were members of Northumberland's protestant clientele. However, it was not until after the October coup, in which Gates played no real part, that he became definitely associated with the duke.¹⁶⁸

Sir Henry Gates, Sir John Gates's brother, was a substantial gentleman too. He also received favour from Somerset, being appointed to the commission of the peace for Suffolk and receiving a knighthood for his services during the Pinkie campaign. He probably owed his return for Bridport in 1547 to Somerset and was closer to the lord protector than his brother. He was a protestant and this may have recommended him to Somerset, who needed reliable men to pass reform legislation through parliament. Despite this, Gates did not become a fidelity client and found greater reward as Northumberland's client. This was because of his brother's growing relationship with Northumberland and it was probably through him that he became a Dudley client too.¹⁶⁹ As vice-chamberlain, Sir John Gates acted as the contact between the king and the privy council.¹⁷⁰ However, Dr Sil believes that Gates was not on as intimate terms with the king as Sir Nicholas Throckmorton, and did not instigate the devise to alter the succession.¹⁷¹ It is a question of what evidence is privileged. Dr Sil relies on the manuscript poem of Throckmorton's life. This is

¹⁶² N.P. Sil, 'The rise and fall of Sir John Gates', *Historical Journal*, 24 (1981), pp. 929-943; Braddock, 'The royal household', p. 155; Guy, *Tudor England*, p. 171; PRO, C 66/801, m. 10d; *Calendar of patent rolls*, i, p. 83; CLRO Journal 15, fos. 365v-367r; Somerville, *Duchy of Lancaster*, i, p. 611; Bindoff, ii, pp. 198-199.

¹⁶³ BL Harley MS. 284, fo. 127v.

¹⁶⁴ BL Harley MS. 284, fos. 127v-128r; see below, pp. 287-288.

¹⁶⁵ Sil, 'The rise and fall of Sir John Gates', pp. 930, 941-943.

¹⁶⁶ BL Cotton MS. Titus B. ii, fos. 144v-145r; BL Harley MS. 284, fos. 127v-128r.

¹⁶⁷ BL Harley MS. 284, fos. 128r-128v.

¹⁶⁸ Sil, 'The rise and fall of Sir John Gates', pp. 934-938.

¹⁶⁹ PRO, C 66/801, m. 20d; *Calendar of patent rolls*, i, p. 89; Bindoff, ii, pp. 197-198; MacCulloch, *Tudor church militant*, pp. 76-82.

¹⁷⁰ APC, iii, pp. 328-329.

¹⁷¹ Sil, 'The rise and fall of Sir John Gates', pp. 938-943.

useful but of questionable veracity.¹⁷² Professor Hoak believed that Gates was a strong influence on both Northumberland and the king, especially pertaining to the succession. Professor Elton felt that no final conclusion could be made about the instigator of the alteration to the succession.¹⁷³ Darcy and Gates were assiduous privy councillors.¹⁷⁴ They worked closely with Cecil. For example, on 4 June 1552 Northumberland wrote to tell Cecil to work with ‘my lorde chamberlein, & master vice chamberleyn my speciall frendes for theyre helpe and funderaunce toptayne me A warrante ffrom the borde’.¹⁷⁵ Friendship was an extremely important component of clienteles.

Cecil might have been in Somerset’s and Warwick’s clienteles at the same time for a brief period. In mid-1550 Warwick began to build a relationship with him through Whalley.¹⁷⁶ The role of aristocratic households in political society facilitated recruitment between clienteles, especially if the old patron was losing influence or had fallen from power.¹⁷⁷ Cecil does not seem to have been arrested and sent to the Tower with Somerset’s other adherents, Smith, Stanhope, Thynne, Wolf and Grey, although he had been among those listed on 10 October to be ‘apprehended’ with Somerset (including Smith, Thynne and Whalley).¹⁷⁸ The plan was probably altered. Initially, Wingfield placed Cecil under house arrest at Windsor, along with Smith, Stanhope, Thynne and Wolf, ‘to be kept severally in their chambers untill their [the London council’s] cummyng’. He was not present when Smith was removed from the secretaryship on 13 October.¹⁷⁹ Conyers Read was probably correct in thinking that at first Cecil was not sent to the Tower because he was not equated with Smith or the most important ducal officers and fidelity clients, despite his actual importance to Somerset. Instead, Cecil may have been placed in Rich’s custody.¹⁸⁰ By 26 November, he seems to have been put in the Tower along with Whalley, thereby securing all of Somerset’s important clients.¹⁸¹

Cecil’s close friend the dowager duchess of Suffolk, a Lincolnshire neighbour, wrote to him during his imprisonment and her letters are revealing.¹⁸² The statement written below the address of the first (dated 16 November) is very interesting: ‘declaring her concern for him in some troubles hee now was in being discharged the Place in the Duke of Somersets Family, or it seems

¹⁷² BL Additional MS. 5841, fos. 127v-146r.

¹⁷³ Hoak, ‘Rehabilitating the duke of Northumberland’, pp. 123-124; G.R. Elton, *Reform and reformation. England 1509-1558* (London, 1977), pp. 374-375.

¹⁷⁴ Hoak, *The king’s council*, p. 111.

¹⁷⁵ PRO, SP 15/4, fo. 14r.

¹⁷⁶ PRO, SP 10/10/9, M. fos. 21r-22v; see above, pp. 8-10.

¹⁷⁷ Mertes, *The English noble household*, pp. 136-137.

¹⁷⁸ Wriothesley, *Chronicle*, ii, pp. 27-28; PRO, SP 10/9/48, M. fo. 94r; Tytler, i, pp. 272-273; BL Cotton MS. Titus B. ii, fos. 50r-50v.

¹⁷⁹ APC, ii, pp. 343-344.

¹⁸⁰ Read, *Mr. Secretary Cecil*, pp. 57-58, 472, ns. 49-53. The date on which Cecil was placed ‘in custotia’ (27 September) is improbable: Hatfield, Cecil MS. 140, fo. 13r.

¹⁸¹ *Simancas*, ix, p. 478.

¹⁸² BL Lansdowne MS. 2, fos. 58r-59v; PRO, SP 10/9/58, M. fos. 115r-116v.

Mr of Requests'.¹⁸³ Cecil then, was a major client, held a substantial ducal office and was on close terms with his patron. The dowager duchess clearly demonstrated her friendship, sympathising with him in his present circumstances. This was an extraordinary course to take and demonstrated the powerful ties that bound the emerging protestant elite.¹⁸⁴ She thought Cecil was 'better armed agenste the assawlt of froward fortune than I am ably to geve yow consely for yowr byetter dyfensy' but wanted 'to clery my selffe from the commen enfeosion of feyned frendship' and promised 'I shal never fayl yowr case'. His good service in her varied requests bound her to him and she was 'sore [sorry] conntrary fortuen dothe present you to the tryal of your frends'. She felt frustrated by her powerlessness to assist 'but you shal have al that I can do'.¹⁸⁵ As well as boosting his morale, the dowager duchess provided real assistance. Cecil was able to reply at some point between 16 November and 28 December, perhaps before being moved to the Tower.¹⁸⁶ The first postscript of the dowager duchess's second letter is enlightening. She wrote 'but fye cyssel of won of my beste frendes to geve suche sentens it is amost not pardenably/ you myght rather haue sayd ~~werdes~~ ^dedes^ ~~with~~ out dedes wordes & for my nowen experyns I cannot say to muche of him'.¹⁸⁷ The 'beste frende' referred to was probably Northampton, although it is not possible to be certain, and the subject could be Cobham. Somerset thanked Cobham after his rehabilitation but there is little evidence to support Professor Jordan's belief that the latter helped procure the duke's 'reuocacion' to the privy council.¹⁸⁸

The dowager duchess was closely associated with the Parrs, especially because of their interest in reform since the last years of Henry's reign. This circle included the Seymours, and the reformers and educators it favoured solidified its identity. Thomas Wilson, who would become Northumberland's secretary, educated the dowager duchess's sons, Lords Henry and Charles Brandon. Bartholomew Traheron was tutor to Lord Henry Brandon, having been appointed by the privy council, and exercised his own patronage, securing a position for John ab Ulmis as tutor to Lady Jane Grey. The dowager duchess patronised Bernardino Ochino, as did Northampton.¹⁸⁹

Sir Richard Morison's letter to the marquis at the time of Somerset's second fall reinforces the view that the dowager duchess was referring to Northampton when writing to Cecil in November and December 1549. Morison pointed out that Northampton had asked for mercy on the duke's behalf because he was the only man who could counter Southampton effectively. Again, this

¹⁸³ BL Lansdowne MS. 2, fo. 59v.

¹⁸⁴ PRO, SP 10/9/58, M. fo. 115r.

¹⁸⁵ BL Lansdowne MS. 2, fo. 58r.

¹⁸⁶ PRO, SP 10/9/58, M. fo. 115r.

¹⁸⁷ PRO, SP 10/9/58, M. fo. 115r.

¹⁸⁸ Read, *Mr. Secretary Cecil*, pp. 57-58, 473, n. 55; BL Harley MS. 284, fos. 86r-87v; Tytler, i, pp. 279-280; Jordan, *Threshold of power*, p. 72.

demonstrates that Warwick was only one of a party during the October coup and the subsequent evangelical coup.¹⁹⁰ In the first postscript of her second letter, the dowager duchess referred to Somerset's predicament, hoping that her ally would assist him too: '& for your masters cawse I am suer he hathe yoused dedes & not wordes & for yours to'.¹⁹¹ Her confidence in Northampton, or whomever, viewing him as actively promoting rehabilitation, may not have been felt by Cecil, who replied on the dorse of this letter at some point in December or January. However, he did inform her that 'our hoope commeth slowlie forward having the hynderance of hevie aduersaries/ but I trust in god, the streynghth of our frendes shall within theis fewe dayes drawe it to his place'.¹⁹² Were his 'hevie aduersaries' Southampton and his supporters, while his 'frendes' included Northampton and even Warwick? Cecil was among the first to be released (25 January 1550), having given security to appear before the privy council on call and being fined one thousand marks. Whalley, Wolf and Palady were released at the same time and on the same condition, suggesting they did not quite constitute Somerset's closest adherents in Warwick's eyes.¹⁹³

Cecil eventually became one of Elizabeth's clients in 1550, either by incorporation or active recruitment on her part. Although he probably headed her household, there is little evidence of Tyrwhitt directing and controlling Elizabeth's affairs after February 1549 (as Sir Henry Bedingfield would in Mary's reign), and Northumberland had removed him by 14 October 1552.¹⁹⁴ Somerset did not maintain as close a relationship with Elizabeth as he did with Mary. Elizabeth's income of £3000 was paid irregularly in cash during the protectorate, while her sister received the patent for her lands as early as May 1548, being granted nearly a third more than stipulated in Henry's will (£3819.18.6 rather than £3000). Elizabeth had received some land but not all she was entitled to.¹⁹⁵ On 17 February 1550, the privy council ordered North 'to assigne to the Lady Elizabethes Grace the supplement of the landes assigned unto her'. However, unlike Mary, she was to receive no part of any honor.¹⁹⁶ The government moved rapidly and on 17 March the patent was issued granting her lands concentrated in Buckinghamshire, Hertfordshire, Huntingdon, Northamptonshire, Lincolnshire and Berkshire, worth £3106.13.1 per annum.¹⁹⁷

¹⁸⁹ Swensen, 'Noble hunters of the romish fox', pp. 8-10, 259-272; MacCulloch, *Tudor church militant*, p. 127; Thomas Wilson, *The art of rhetoric (1560)*, ed. P.E. Medine (Pennsylvania, 1994), pp. 5, 29, n. 11; Robinson (ed.), *Original letters*, i, no. xxxviii, p. 84; ii, no. ccxxii, p. 465.

¹⁹⁰ Jordan, *Threshold of power*, p. 104.

¹⁹¹ PRO, SP 10/9/58, M. fo. 115r.

¹⁹² PRO, SP 10/9/58 (i), M. fo. 115v.

¹⁹³ APC, ii, p. 372.

¹⁹⁴ PRO, E 179/69/57; PRO, E 101 424/12 (part 1), fos. 1r, 9r, 10r, 48r; PRO, E 101 424/12 (part 2), fos. 157r, 161r, 164r, 165r, 190r; PRO, E 179/69/68; PRO, E 179/69/69; Neale, *Queen Elizabeth*, pp. 49-53; Bindoff, i, pp. 408-409.

¹⁹⁵ PRO, E 23/4/1, fo. 15r; Rymer and Sanderson (eds.), *Fœdera*, xv, p. 116; *Calendar of patent rolls*, ii, pp. 20-23; Hatfield, Cecil MS. 150, fos. 79r-82v; Haynes, pp. 95-97; D.R. Starkey, *Elizabeth: apprenticeship* (London, 2000), pp. 92-94.

¹⁹⁶ APC, ii, p. 393.

¹⁹⁷ *Calendar of patent rolls*, iii, pp. 238-242.

Elizabeth acquired the stewards attached to these lands, including the Cecils, whose estate at Stamford in Lincolnshire was very close to her own at Collyweston in Northamptonshire. David Cecil, William Cecil's grandfather, had been keeper of King's Cliff Park, bailiff of Uppingham, and steward of Collyweston, all in Northamptonshire. His son, Richard Cecil, was joint keeper of King's Cliff from 1517 and steward of Nassington, Upton and Yarwell, Northamptonshire, from 1542. These were granted to Elizabeth in 1550. Elizabeth requested assistance from Cecil during the protectorate probably because he was Somerset's secretary. In an undated letter from Ashley of about 1548 she asked for his help in procuring the release of a poor man imprisoned in Scotland. Elizabeth added a postscript: 'I pray you farder this pore mans sute. Your frende, Elizabeth'. Ashley noted the conventional relationship developing between her mistress and the secretary but this was strengthened by their protestantism: 'beyng so moche asured of your wellyng mynde to set forthe hyr cawses to my lord protectors grace', especially as the matter was 'so godly'.¹⁹⁸

When Elizabeth appointed Cecil surveyor of her estates, it was probably more because of his father's role on these estates and because of his connection with Parry than because she knew he would be a useful client.¹⁹⁹ It was quite common for substantial figures in government to be appointed to offices by queens or other members of the royal family. For example, Cromwell had been Jane Seymour's high steward. Paget had served as secretary to Jane Seymour, Anne of Cleves and Catherine Howard and had been steward of several of Catherine Parr's estates from 1547.²⁰⁰ This also happened between clienteles. In late 1547 or late 1548 the countess of Shrewsbury agreed to Somerset's petition that Thynne should be steward of her manor of Brampton in Oxfordshire, rather than one of her council.²⁰¹ In 1555 Elizabeth chose Thynne to be comptroller of her estates; a provocative move in Marian England.²⁰² Cecil was out of favour and regarded with suspicion in early 1550, suggesting Elizabeth's selection of him, like that of Thynne five years later, was also partly based on merit and risk. Perhaps, religion was also a factor. Dr Starkey suggests the appointment was a reward and sign of favour in return for Cecil's role as intermediary with Somerset after the Seymour affair, the secretary having ensured her letters reached the lord protector.²⁰³ All these factors may have motivated her choice.

Cecil's rehabilitation came quickly under Warwick, probably because of his immense ability. He has been described as Warwick's 'conciliar "man of business"' and was already advising him on

¹⁹⁸ BL Lansdowne MS. 1236, fos. 41r-41v; MacCulloch, *Tudor church militant*, pp. 185-189.

¹⁹⁹ *Calendar of patent rolls*, iii, pp. 238-242; PRO, SP 10/10/12, M. fos. 26r-27v; PRO, SP 10/18/15, M. fos. 27r-28v; BL Cotton MS. Titus B. iv, fos. 111r-112v; Bindoff, i, pp. 602-606.

²⁰⁰ BL Cotton MS. Nero C. x, fos. 2r-2v; Bindoff, iii, pp. 42-43.

²⁰¹ Longleat, Seymour MS. 4, fos. 119r-120v.

²⁰² Bindoff, i, pp. 461-462; iii, pp. 465-467; Starkey, *Elizabeth*, pp. 222-225; Longleat, Thynne MS. 3, fos. 21r-21v; Longleat, Thynne MS. 3, fos. 23r-23v; Longleat, Thynne MS. 3, fo. 24r; see below, pp. 236-237, n. 47.

important subjects by the summer of 1550. For example, he helped to draft the articles of Gardiner's submission. Cecil was a committed reformer, who viewed Britain as part of a providential protestant community. In this, his experiences were shaped by Somerset's Scottish policy. Dr Alford has described Cecil's early political and religious work as 'active, reforming, and moderately Calvinist'.²⁰⁴ Cecil became estranged from Somerset, who had started to solicit for the release of Gardiner and Sir Thomas and Sir John Arundel, and who opposed further limitations on Mary's hearing of mass. This last point was practical in the face of the emperor's mounting hostility but unpalatable to the evangelical party at court. Somerset was becoming identified with the oppositional elements in the Tudor elite.²⁰⁵ However, Cecil was ambivalent and maintained close contact with him almost up to his execution. This suggests he still felt regard for Somerset and that clients did maintain contact with more than one clientele or with their former clientele.

Cecil remained on friendly terms with Paget, who regarded him as still well disposed towards Somerset.²⁰⁶ Turner wrote to Cecil in October to congratulate him on his rehabilitation and on avoiding danger at court.²⁰⁷ Other Somerset clients were deeply uneasy. Fisher, despite his central role in Somerset's household, wrote an anxious letter to Cecil in August, asking him to intercede on his behalf with the duke and duchess because he felt out of favour. Fisher's wife was ill and he wanted to take her to their house in Warwick to convalesce. He was concerned this would upset the duchess because Winifred Fisher was one of her ladies-in-waiting. Fisher had other reasons that 'moveth me not to be ouerhastie in gyving attendance for my parte', which he wanted to discuss with Cecil in person, and wanted to retire to Warwick. He was upset by his treatment by the duke and duchess and felt slighted in the eyes of the rest of the household, although he would not elaborate. He asked Cecil 'tanswer for me as for one of your pore assured frenndes', if the duke or duchess spoke of him. Cecil had been a psychological prop for Somerset since the fall of Seymour and, although his advice concerning Fisher may have been initially unwelcome, he was regarded as more able to counsel the duke than almost anybody else. Cecil seems to have been a conciliatory figure to many people within his circle and Fisher remained in service.²⁰⁸ Thynne wrote to Cecil from Somerset's house at Reading on 13 September to congratulate him on his appointment as principal secretary. (Dr Wotton was replaced by Cecil on 5 September 1550.)

²⁰³ Starkey, *Elizabeth*, pp. 93, 236-237.

²⁰⁴ Alford, *The early Elizabethan polity*, p. 26.

²⁰⁵ Alford, *The early Elizabethan polity*, pp. 14, 24-26, 44-45; PRO, SP 10/10/9, M. fos. 21r-22v; Jordan, *Threshold of power*, pp. 50-51, 82, 84; Bindoff, i, pp. 604-606; M.H. Merriman, 'War and propaganda during the 'Rough Wooing'', *Scottish Tradition*, 9-10 (1980), pp. 20-30; R.A. Mason, 'Scotching the Brut: politics, history and national myth in sixteenth-century Britain', in his *Scotland and England, 1286-1815* (Edinburgh, 1987), pp. 60-84; Jordan, *Threshold of power*, pp. 137-138, 143, 256-264; MacCulloch, *Tudor church militant*, pp. 36-39.

²⁰⁶ Bradshaw, 'Protestant polemic', pp. 127-128; Gammon, *Statesman and schemer*, p. 178.

²⁰⁷ BL Lansdowne MS. 2, fos. 101r-101v.

²⁰⁸ PRO, SP 10/10/23, M. fos. 58r-59v; Bindoff, ii, pp. 136-138; Swensen, 'Noble hunters of the romish fox', pp. 256-259; see above, pp. 63-65.

Cecil was still Somerset's client at this point, despite the secretarial appointment and growing ties with Warwick, and Thynne asked him to persuade the duke to discharge him from the office of steward because he found it too vexatious. The implication was that the nature of the office forced Thynne into conflict with powerful men and Somerset was less able to protect him. Thynne felt vulnerable. This must have been a blow to Somerset because Thynne was one of his oldest and most trusted clients and there was a close bond between them. He did not discharge him from his service, although the two men may have become more distant.²⁰⁹ The ducal household was under strain in the summer of 1550. Whalley had been ordered to pay Somerset's household wages and Raves complained he had embezzled £60 owed to him. Warwick may have been concerned about the consequences of the restoration of Somerset's estates in June, causing him to make overtures to certain ducal clients.

Somerset was alienating friends too. Although she never lost affection for him, the dowager duchess of Suffolk complained to Cecil about Somerset's behaviour on a number of occasions in 1550-1551, including his cool reaction to her caution over marriage between their families and over one of her suits. Cecil smoothed matters between them. Somerset was probably anxious for a Seymour-Brandon marriage because it would enhance his standing and security by tying his family to the future head of the peerage. Warwick, who suggested the match in May, probably hoped it would bind the protestant aristocracy closer and propitiate Somerset.²¹⁰ Having lost his dignity as lord protector, Somerset felt vulnerable and had difficulty with his new role. Dukes, with their near royal status, found it hard to avoid heavy political commitments and Somerset still believed his party should guide government during the minority. This expectation of his important role in political society, which was held by the entire political nation as well as by his own clientele, was heightened because he was the only adult duke between 1547-1551 and became head of the peerage with the extinction of the Brandon dukedom of Suffolk in July 1551. Also, his wife was pushing him to be more assertive, while clients like Whalley, Sir Ralph Vane and Stanhope were soliciting practical support. Somerset's situation was not dissimilar to that of the fourth duke of Norfolk between 1569-1572. It was in this environment that Whalley wrote to Cecil on 26 June 1550.²¹¹

Warwick had discussed Somerset's behaviour with Whalley, who took the earl to be his master's 'most deare and faiethffull ffrende'. Warwick was 'vehemently troblyde and that *with* soche carefullness and deape consyderacion of his graces proceadings I-deede of late'. Somerset had

²⁰⁹ Tytler, i, pp. 318-319; Bindoff, iii, p. 465; *APC*, iii, p. 118.

²¹⁰ PRO, SP 10/10/6, M. fos. 10r-11v; PRO, SP 10/11/9, M. fos. 14r-15v; Read, *Mr. Secretary Cecil*, pp. 43-44, 66-67, 72.

²¹¹ *APC*, ii, p. 372; iii, p. 59; Bindoff, iii, pp. 594-596; W.T. MacCaffrey, *The shaping of the Elizabethan regime* (Princeton, N.J., 1968), pp. 360-364, 420-422, 426-428; see below, pp. 204-218.

‘vnadvyssydlike attemptyde’ to procure the release of Gardiner and the Arundels, while building his relationship with the earl of Arundel through ‘late conferens’. ‘Thoole councell dothe so motche myslyke his late attemptes herin’, as well as his behaviour at the board, which seemed no different from his attitude as lord protector.²¹² They suspected ‘^he^ take the and aspyre the to haue the selfe and same ouerdue and auctoryte to the dyspathe and dyrecton of the *proceedinges* therin as his grace hadde beinge protector’.²¹³ Warwick was blunt. Somerset’s actions would ‘dyscreadyte hym selfe’ and lead to ‘his owne decaie’. The protectorate was ‘yett myslykydd’, Warwick’s regime being the antithesis, while the duke deluded himself in thinking he was strengthened by a personal relationship with Edward, as ‘some fondlie *perswadyde*’ him. Warwick was explicit about the dangerous consequences of the bad counsel Somerset was receiving from his clientele. Instead, Somerset should serve the king and commonwealth as an active and able privy councillor and win the king’s good lordship again as a consequence. This had been his role under Henry. If he persisted in ‘takinge private causes by hym selfe...he wyll so farre ouerthrow hym selfe as shalt passe the power of his ffrendes to Recover’. The implication was that Somerset should not rely on his clientele but rather on his colleagues in the privy council, who were amenable to Warwick’s regime.²¹⁴

Warwick now used Whalley to initiate closer ties with Cecil: he ‘declaryde In thende hys goode opynion of you/ in soche sorte as I maye well saye he as [*sic*] your veare synguler goode lorde/ and Resollvyde that he woulde wryte att length lenth his opynion vnto you in the premysses’. Warwick thought Cecil would be a good royal servant, by which he meant one of his own people.²¹⁵ He also wanted Somerset to return to court as soon as possible from his journey through Reading and on to his western estates. In a postscript Whalley asked to be informed if the duke’s journey was ‘staiede’.²¹⁶ Warwick preferred Somerset to remain at court, where he could be monitored. By 1 July, Whalley had heard through ‘frendes commynge frome my lorde of shreuesberye’ that Somerset’s journey was postponed, perhaps until the following year.²¹⁷ Whalley expressed his loyalty to his patron, despite the difficulty of service under the present conditions, and asked Cecil to be Somerset’s good servant and good counsellor: ‘and never leave hym vntyll ye so Th[o]roghly *perswade* hym To some better Consyderacion of his *proceedinges* and that he wyttelie and ffrendlie concurre and Contynewe with my Lord of warwyck who as I perceyve wilbe verie playne with hym in the premysses att hys comminge to the Courte/ otherweys to be pleyne mesemes perell greatt wyll ensewe’.²¹⁸ Warwick was Whalley’s ‘veare

²¹² PRO, SP 10/10/9, M. fo. 21r; Tytler, ii, pp. 21-24; Bindoff, i, p. 338.

²¹³ PRO, SP 10/10/9, M. fo. 21r.

²¹⁴ PRO, SP 10/10/9, M. fo. 21v.

²¹⁵ PRO, SP 10/10/9, M. fo. 21v.

²¹⁶ PRO, SP 10/10/9, M. fo. 22r.

²¹⁷ PRO, SP 10/10/11, M. fos. 25r-25v.

²¹⁸ PRO, SP 10/10/9, M. fo. 22r.

goode lorde' and assisted him with a pending suit. Cecil had sufficient independent standing for Whalley to petition him too, especially to procure Paget's good will.²¹⁹ The privy council allowed Whalley to purchase crown lands worth £50 per annum, probably on favourable terms.²²⁰ Conyers Read saw 'nothing sinister' about Whalley's letter, regarding it as a warning to Somerset not to aspire to the protectorate again.²²¹ He was acting out of more than financial self-interest because a client would be expected to counsel his patron into following a prudent course. Unlike Cecil, he remained one of Somerset's closest adherents and was imprisoned twice more as a result.

Cecil's rehabilitation was part of a wider pattern during 1550-1551. Warwick sought to incorporate more of the political elite in governance. For example, Sharrington's political career revived after Somerset fell from power. Still in the Tower on 20 January 1550, by March he was appointed to the commission to receive the first instalment from the French for the return of Boulogne, and Hugh Latimer described him at his Lenten sermon to the king as among the elect.²²² This approbation would recommend him to the increasingly protestant regime. It seems extraordinary that Sharrington should be entrusted together with Sir Maurice Denys, treasurer of Calais, to handle such a large amount of money but he fulfilled his task successfully and it demonstrates the regime's need to employ men of experience and ability, especially if they were of consequence in their locality. Sharrington continued as a JP. Having lost his seat, which went to Lord Chidioc Paulet, Sharrington was provided with the Wiltshire seat newly vacated by the elevated Herbert in January 1552. His rehabilitation continued when he was pricked as sheriff of Wiltshire on 2 November, his account commencing eight days later.²²³

Northumberland's clientele occupied important positions in the regime: one cousin, Lord Edward Dudley, served at Hume Castle in Scotland and then on the council in Boulogne, another, Sir Henry Dudley, who induced Palmer to become Northumberland's adherent, was captain of the guard there, while Sir Andrew Dudley held various posts. Northumberland helped these men to rewards of fees, annuities and lands.²²⁴ He used them as his deputies in regional offices and relied on their expertise in government. For example, when he appointed himself master forester and master of the game of Enfield Chase within the duchy of Lancaster for life in November 1549, he granted his supporter Wroth the same offices in reversion and made him bailiff of Enfield for life the following January. Paget had surrendered the offices of master forester and master of the game. Wroth was bailiff of Ware in Hertfordshire from 1551-1553 and would acquire a

²¹⁹ PRO, SP 10/10/9, M. fo. 22r.

²²⁰ Bindoff, iii, p. 595.

²²¹ Read, *Mr. Secretary Cecil*, pp. 60-61.

²²² APC, ii, p. 371; Bindoff, iii, pp. 303-304; *Calendar of patent rolls*, iii, pp. 335-336.

²²³ Bindoff, ii, pp. 31-33; iii, pp. 303-304; *Calendar of patent rolls*, v, p. 387.

substantial number of stewardships and other offices pertaining to the royal estate. He had been educated at St John's College, Cambridge, and Gray's Inn, was MP for Middlesex in 1545, 1547 and 1553, and was a gentleman and then a principal gentleman of the privy chamber. Between January and November 1549, he had been standard bearer of England during Brown's minority. Surprisingly, he was not appointed to the commissions of the peace until Elizabeth's reign. Wroth's familiarity with the king probably explains why this one time client of Rich, who was his father-in-law and provided his first *entrée* at court, continued to be favoured by Northumberland. He was sufficiently close to the duke to be imprisoned for his involvement against Mary in July 1553 and fled England as a consequence of Wyatt's Revolt.²²⁵ Yet, Wroth was to participate in Edward's funeral, along with Sir Anthony Cooke and Sir Richard Blount, which shows that loyalties and the lines between clients were blurred, especially as Mary sought a degree of reconciliation.²²⁶ Cooke and Blount had prospered during Edward's reign. Cooke was a substantial Essex gentleman, JP, member of the quorum for the county from 1537-1554, and again from 1559, and groom and then gentleman of the privy chamber. He was elected MP for Lewes in 1547. Cooke was supported by the privy council as a good candidate to serve parliament but seems to have been quite retiring. However, he was a prominent protestant and supported Northumberland in 1553, for which he was briefly sent to the Tower.²²⁷ Blount was a gentleman usher of the privy chamber, JP for Oxford from 1537 and steward and keeper of several royal estates. By at least May 1549 he was a gentleman of the privy chamber. He was elected as MP for Steyning in March 1553, which was associated with the honor of Petworth in Sussex, of which the earl of Arundel was steward, and appointed steward of Dedisham by 1553 (a part of that honor). Arundel may have yielded to pressure from Northumberland over this appointment because he was already in a vulnerable position. Blount's cousin, Thomas Blount, facilitated the connections between Blount and Northumberland.²²⁸ Both Cooke and Blount lost favour during Mary's reign and were removed from influential positions where possible. Cooke even joined Cheke in exile.²²⁹

The most important change within the duchy of Lancaster was the appointment of Gates as chancellor, replacing Paget on 7 July 1552. Gates also replaced him as surveyor of the honor of

²²⁴ LPL, MS. 3193, fo. 103; PRO, SP 68/13/6, fos. 11r-13v; PRO, SP 68/13/41, fos. 89r-90v; PRO, SP 68/13/42, fos. 91r-92v; PRO, SP 68/13/47, fos. 100r-101v; PRO, SP 68/13/47 (i), fos. 102r-103v; PRO, SP 68/13/59, fos. 133r-134v; APC, ii, p. 44; PRO, SP 10/1/29, M. fos. 102r-103v; Bindoff, ii, pp. 61-63.

²²⁵ Somerville, *Duchy of Lancaster*, i, pp. 612-613; Bindoff, iii, pp. 667-668; Braddock, 'The royal household', p. 154.

²²⁶ This conciliatory attitude did not extend to all of Northumberland's supporters, Cheke's name was deleted from the list of those to receive mourning black for the funeral: PRO, E 101/427/6, fo. 77r.

²²⁷ PRO, LC 2/2/3/1, fo. 109r; PRO, E 179/69/62; PRO, E 179/69/63; PRO, E 179/69/64; PRO, LC 2/4/1, fo. 19v; PRO, C 66/801, m. 10d; *Calendar of patent rolls*, i, p. 83; Bindoff, i, pp. 689-691.

²²⁸ PRO, LC 2/2/3/1, fo. 86r; E 179/69/62; PRO, E 179/69/64; PRO, LC 2/4/1, fo. 19v; PRO, C 66/801, m. 18d; *Calendar of patent rolls*, i, p. 88; Bindoff, i, pp. 449-450.

²²⁹ PRO, LC 2/4/2, fos. 25v-26r; Bindoff, i, pp. 449-450, 691.

Tutbury in early December.²³⁰ Removing Paget from the chancellorship was part of Northumberland's attack on the former secretary, who would also be fined heavily and rusticated.²³¹ Control of the duchy provided vital patronage for Northumberland, which he dispensed in offices and favourable leases. However, this was more than exploiting it purely for personal gain. Edward IV and Richard III had used it to augment their authority and enlarge their patronage base, as well as providing an alternative means to fund the royal household. Therefore, it is important to examine the extent to which Northumberland's activities were motivated entirely by personal gain.²³² Substantial political figures, especially allies and clients, were given office as it became available. Control substantially increased Northumberland's political power but there was no purge of the senior officers. The receiver-general, George Owen (who had been appointed for life on 24 June 1547) remained in office until his death in 1558. John Caryl, the attorney-general, George Heydon, clerk of the council, Sir Thomas Heneage, chief steward of the north parts, John Pollard, deputy steward of the south parts, and Sir Walter Mildmay and John Purvey, the auditors of the north and south, all retained their positions. These men had a wide range of experience, reflecting the varied roles they would be expected to play in political society. It would not be expedient to alienate too many of them. For example, Pollard attended the Middle Temple, where he was autumn reader in 1535 and sergeant by 1547, was vice-president of the council in the marches of Wales from October 1550, and MP for Oxfordshire in 1553.²³³

Northumberland did use the available patronage to good effect but the changes were made in the officers of the duchy estates. However, there was no pattern creating power bases to bolster his regime. Instead, stewardships and other offices seem to have been granted according to the suitors' requests, which were motivated by the desire to increase their existing holdings. For example, Wroth was from Enfield and consequently desired duchy offices in the vicinity.²³⁴ However, the successful suitors were often Dudley clients. Others were powerfully connected and Northumberland may have wished to procure their support. Beneficiaries receiving stewardships in the north included: Talbot and Sir Henry Saville, stewards of Pontefract honor and constables of the castle; Strange became steward of the former possessions of Burscough Priory; Clinton became steward of Long Bennington; Dorset was appointed steward, feodary, constable and porter of Leicester honor; and Wharton became steward of the former possessions of Furness Abbey.²³⁵ Sir Ambrose Dudley, Warwick's second son, was constable of Kenilworth, as well as keeper of the

²³⁰ Somerville, *Duchy of Lancaster*, i, pp. 394-395, 545, 547.

²³¹ Hatfield, Cecil MS. 1, fos. 85r-85v; Lodge (ed.), *Illustrations of British history*, i, pp. 170-175; see below, pp. 222-226.

²³² R. Horrox, *Richard III. A study in service* (Cambridge, 1989), pp. 42-43; BL Additional MS. 48023, fos. 351v.

²³³ Willoughby of Parham was granted for life the reversion of Heneage's office on 5 February 1553, probably as a reward for his service as lieutenant governor of Calais (1550-1553): Somerville, *Duchy of Lancaster*, i, pp. 403-404, 408-409, 413, 424, 427, 432, 437, 443, 445-447, 452, 455, 457, 459-460.

²³⁴ Somerville, *Duchy of Lancaster*, i, pp. 612-613.

²³⁵ Somerville, *Duchy of Lancaster*, i, pp. 505, 509-510, 515-516, 523, 565, 570, 575.

park and bailiff of the liberty from 20 December 1549; Sir Thomas Grey was appointed constable and receiver of Dunstanburgh on 18 June 1550; Huntingdon was master forester of Leicester honor from 20 March 1551; Clinton was made constable of Lincoln Castle on the same day; while Sir Francis Leke was made feodary of Nottinghamshire and Derbyshire. These were localities where the appointees were already important individuals with landed estates.²³⁶ Clinton was given the reversion of Bolingbroke honor or the duchy lands in Lincolnshire (the office was occupied by William Husey) on the same day he was appointed for Long Bennington.²³⁷ Incumbents were not removed and the changes in personnel were not pronounced, suggesting that Northumberland wanted to be cautious.

This pattern was repeated among Northumberland's supporters whose interests lay in southern England and in Wales. Appointees to stewardships included: Herbert, on 2 December 1549, in reversion after Worcester for Monmouth; Sadler was made steward of Hertford and constable of the castle on 12 December (replacing Seymour); John Paston, esquire, was steward of Norfolk, Suffolk and Cambridgeshire; Sir John Mordaunt, for the manor of Olney; and Sir Nicholas Throckmorton, for Higham Ferrers or duchy lands in Northamptonshire in reversion after Tyrwhitt from 26 June 1553.²³⁸ Northampton became constable of Windsor Castle in 1550.²³⁹ Lord St John, Wiltshire's heir, was made steward of Canford and constable of Corfe Castle, Dorset, in March 1550.²⁴⁰ Northumberland had great confidence in Herbert and continued Henry's policy of granting him extensive local offices, particularly control of royal castles in Wales and the marches. Herbert was appointed constable of ten castles in Gloucestershire, Brecon, Denbighshire, Glamorgan and Monmouthshire between 1550-1552 and steward of Bristol and vice-admiral of Dorset by 1550. This extensive local influence was also partly due to his appointment as lord president of the council in the marches of Wales in 1550 (including the large annuity). This was understandable because of Herbert's huge acreage in Wales, where he acquired fifty-three manors between 1547-1553.²⁴¹ Sir Richard Sackville was appointed master forester of Ashdown Forest on 27 November 1549, forced to surrender his office in 1553 and reinstated with his son in 1561.²⁴² Not every nominee was a client. For example, William Biskeham was named bailiff of the hundreds of North and South Erpingham during pleasure on 20 October 1550 and Mary renewed his office in 1554. He was not unique in having no discernible Dudley connection. Another example was Edward Darrell, clerk of the poultry, who was appointed receiver of Pevensey or Eagle honor and lands in Sussex on 6 July 1553, despite slight associations with Somerset. He did

²³⁶ Somerville, *Duchy of Lancaster*, i, pp. 538-539, 561, 568, 583, 585.

²³⁷ Somerville, *Duchy of Lancaster*, i, p. 577.

²³⁸ Somerville, *Duchy of Lancaster*, i, pp. 587, 589, 593, 595, 604, 649; Bindoff, iii, pp. 67-69.

²³⁹ *The complete peerage*, eds. Gibbs *et al*, ix, p. 670.

²⁴⁰ *The complete peerage*, eds. Gibbs *et al*, xii (part 2), p. 763.

²⁴¹ Bindoff, ii, pp. 341-344; Jordan, *The young king*, pp. 100-101, 116.

not lose favour under Mary and was promoted to second clerk of the kitchen by 1558.²⁴³ These men were also chosen because of their extensive local connections.

Another example of Warwick's reliance on clients was his lieutenancy of Warwickshire. In July 1550, he appointed the leading local gentlemen Sir George Throckmorton, Sir Richard Catesby and Sir Fulk Greville to exercise his office as deputies, because 'I cannot presently repaier in person my self into those parties for other his highneses waightie affayres'. These men were his clients in that county; a process that occurred elsewhere concerning other local offices.²⁴⁴ This adds another dimension to the system of clienteles because it shows how a patron's agents, men holding local offices and having strong ties to their county, while often spending most of their time there, acted as the local governors on behalf of the crown. Although this close identification between client as agent of the crown and adherent of the patron could lead to the diminution of royal power, it depended on how it was handled. Importantly, the principal representatives of local government and of military recruitment, the JPs, sheriffs and muster masters, were predominantly the leading gentry, not the officers of the royal household (unless, as was very often the case, they were both). This was part of the new development in relations between the crown and its agents, the nobility, gentry, privy councillors and courtiers. Throckmorton, Catesby and Greville were on the quorum for Warwickshire, while Catesby (who was Lucy's stepson) also sat on the quorum for Northamptonshire, was twice sheriff of Warwickshire, Leicestershire and Northamptonshire, and twice MP for Warwickshire. He may have been a protestant too. Throckmorton and Catesby were muster commissioners in 1546 (of Warwickshire and Northamptonshire respectively).²⁴⁵ However, a stronger inducement than any clientage connections, as far as Warwick was concerned, was their proven record as active figures in local government who commanded respect. When Mary came to the throne she found that she had to rely on the same people, appointing Throckmorton's son, Robert, constable of Warwick Castle in September 1553. Robert Throckmorton, like his father, was catholic and supported her in July 1553 but the family was divided over religion. However, they continued to serve in parliament and on the commissions of the peace (with the exception of Sir Nicholas Throckmorton). Clement was appointed constable of Kenilworth Castle in September 1553, despite his protestantism, and apprehended Suffolk during Wyatt's Rebellion.²⁴⁶

²⁴² Sackville was steward to the earl of Arundel, which makes it surprising that he should lose office under Mary: Somerville, *Duchy of Lancaster*, i, p. 621.

²⁴³ Somerville, *Duchy of Lancaster*, i, pp. 600, 609, 614-615, 618, 627, 640; PRO, LC 2/4/1, fo. 14r, PRO, LC 2/4/2, fo. 21v; Bindoff, ii, pp. 17-18.

²⁴⁴ WRO, CR 1998/Box 72/15; see below, pp. 245-246, 274-275.

²⁴⁵ PRO, C 66/801, mm. 16d, 23d; *Calendar of patent rolls*, i, pp. 87, 90; Bindoff, i, pp. 591-592, ii, pp. 250-251; iii, pp. 450-455; *Calendar of state papers, domestic series, 1601-1609; with addenda, 1547-1565*, ed. M.A.E. Green (London, 1870), p. 324.

²⁴⁶ I am grateful to G.M.D. Booth, senior archivist, and Richard Anderson, archives assistant, at Warwickshire Record Office, for assistance with this reference: WRO, CR 1998/Box 72/14; Bindoff, iii, pp. 449-450, 455-461; BL Additional MS. 5841, fo. 137v.

The pooling of expertise through holding more than one office (both civil and military) at court, in government and in the counties, was a central characteristic of clienteles—of this conjunction of public and private interests. Boulogne was a stamping ground for the Dudley affinity. Sir James Crofts and Sir Henry Palmer were also on the council there. Crofts came from one of the principal families of Herefordshire. His relationship with Northumberland originated when they both served in the parliament of 1542 and because he was related to Northumberland's wife he 'found great favour'. Crofts became Northumberland's client in order to gain military training and was rapidly promoted to the rank of captain and then provost marshal of Boulogne. His recruitment to Northumberland's military clientele was very similar to that of Roland Bracebridge by Somerset. He was appointed general of Haddington in March 1549 and, after it was abandoned to the Scots in September, commanded the army under Huntingdon intended for the relief of Boulogne. These promotions were made during the protectorate but Crofts clearly identified himself as a Dudley client at this time.²⁴⁷ He was sent to Ireland in February 1551 to secure the southern coastal defences against the French.²⁴⁸ This was probably also in order to allow Crofts to familiarise himself with the country and Northumberland made him lord deputy in April.²⁴⁹ Even before his return from Ireland, Crofts was made a gentleman of the privy chamber and through his intimacy with both Northumberland and Edward became deputy constable of the Tower just before the king's death.²⁵⁰ The key to Crofts's rise was a combination of ability and a close relationship with Northumberland, or, as he modestly put it, he was appointed 'more for Confidence of my true dealings then for any skill'. He was trusted.²⁵¹ Because Crofts recorded his career in an 'autobiography' in the early 1580s, we have an unusually full account of a client's relationship with his patron and of how the private world intruded into the public one when that patron exercised his patronage to procure offices, lands and fees from the monarch. However, this relationship was generally beneficial to all parties.

An important component of the dynamic of the clienteles was rewards. Northumberland appropriated church lands as part of a policy of reducing the wealth of the episcopate in keeping with the traditions of the early church but also in order to reward his allies, including members of his affinity. This was often done by advantageous exchanges. For example, when the diocese of Westminster was dissolved and its lands reabsorbed into the see of London in April 1550,

²⁴⁷ R.E. Ham (ed.), 'The autobiography of Sir James Croft', *Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research*, 50 (1977), pp. 50-52; see above, pp. 68-69.

²⁴⁸ Ham (ed.), 'The Autobiography', pp. 52-53; PRO, SP 61/3/12, fo. 30v; PRO, SP 61/3/14, fos. 32r-35v; PRO, SP 61/3/16, fos. 38r-39v.

²⁴⁹ PRO, SP 61/3/24, fos. 54r-55v; APC, iii, pp. 256, 260; *Calendar of patent rolls*, iv, p. 100.

²⁵⁰ Ham (ed.), 'The autobiography', p. 53; APC, iii, p. 426; PRO, SP 61/3/80, fos. 241r-242v; J.G. Nichols (ed.), *The diary of Henry Machyn, citizen and merchant-taylor of London, from 1550-1563, Camden Miscellany* (Camden Society, 1st ser., 42; London, 1848), p. 35.

²⁵¹ Ham (ed.), 'The autobiography', p. 51.

Nicholas Ridley was forced to exchange lands worth £526.19.9 per annum for less valuable property and much of this former church land was then granted to Darcy, Rich and Wentworth. Darcy received yet more lands formerly belonging to the bishop of Exeter.²⁵² Wentworth was rewarded with the manors of Stepney and Hackney, Middlesex, in April, and Cheyney Gate, a property formerly pertaining the dissolved bishopric, which he made his London residence.²⁵³ When Ponet became bishop of Winchester (which was valued at £3885.3.4 per annum in lands) in April 1551 he accepted what amounted to a salary of two thousand marks and granted his lands to the crown.²⁵⁴

Northumberland also distributed the patronage of the crown, although on a less lavish scale than Somerset. Royal servants were entitled to patronage but when the king was a minor and incapable of exercising control the system was open to abuse. This was one of the main reasons for the factional struggles of the reign as people became anxious about procuring rewards.²⁵⁵ Between 1547-1553 Northumberland acquired lands worth at least £2000 per annum, having at Edward's death a landed estate of £4300 per annum and income from offices and annuities of roughly £2500.²⁵⁶ He held land in twenty six English counties, as well as in Wales, a country in which, as Seymour had noted, 'ther was goodly landes neuer apprewed/ moche therof for lytell money and goodly ^and that also^ he hadd londes that way well tymbred & wooddid & of goodly manredde and there was all thinges good thervpon'.²⁵⁷ It had perhaps been the possession of these Welsh estates that allowed the great marcher lords to raise the necessary soldiers to fight the Wars of the Roses. Certainly, Seymour thought Wales and the marches had potential as recruiting grounds and many of the levies for war were raised from these regions.²⁵⁸ Until he received Warwick Castle, Dudley Castle in the Welsh marches was Northumberland's principal seat. Ideal country from which to recruit, making him one 'of power and substance to make men'.²⁵⁹ He also assisted his clientele and granted out much of the land he received in 1547 in Warwickshire to close adherents before regaining it by exchange.²⁶⁰

One reason for these sales may have been the constant need to raise money, especially after he effectively became head of state and spent a great deal on royal service. On 4 June 1552,

²⁵² *Calendar of patent rolls*, iii, pp. 171-172, 404, 423-424; Rymer and Sanderson (eds.), *Fædera*, xv, pp. 226-227; PRO, SP 10/4/18, fos. 41r-41v.

²⁵³ *Calendar of patent rolls*, iii, pp. 331-332, 404; *The complete peerage*, eds. Gibbs *et al*, xii (part 2), pp. 498-499, n. m.

²⁵⁴ BL Cotton MS. Nero C. x, fo. 31v; Jordan (ed.), *Chronicle*, p. 58; PRO, SP 10/15/78, fo. 163r.

²⁵⁵ Neale, 'The Elizabethan political scene', pp. 59-84.

²⁵⁶ PRO, LR 2/118, fos. 12v-13r; Beer, *Northumberland*, pp. 182-186.

²⁵⁷ Hatfield, Cecil MS. 150, fos. 82r, 84r; Haynes, pp. 97-99.

²⁵⁸ Carpenter, *The wars of the roses*, pp. 36, 42-43, 55, 151-152; PRO, SP 10/3/9, M. fos. 25r-44v; PRO, SP 10/4/1, M. fos. 1r-2v; Bernard, 'The downfall of Sir Thomas Seymour', pp. 225-226.

²⁵⁹ Summerson, *Architecture in Britain*, pp. 42-43; Beer, *Northumberland*, pp. 8, 189; Loades, *Northumberland*, ix; Goring, 'The military obligations of the English people', pp. 111-117.

²⁶⁰ *Calendar of patent rolls*, iii, p. 71-74, 364-366.

Northumberland requested a warrant be made out by Sir John Williams, treasurer of the court of augmentations, for £1000 as part of his fees as warden-general of the marches against Scotland. He wished Cecil to work through his 'speciall frendes' Darcy and Gates to obtain it from the privy council because he had been unable to sell land in London that would have meant he 'wolde not haue requiered this ayde at thys tyme'.²⁶¹ Despite enormous wealth, Somerset had chronic financial problems for the same reason.²⁶² There was a practical and not altogether welcome side to Northumberland's desire for more money. On 31 May, he informed Cecil that, although he would stop briefly at the secretary's father's house in Stamford to partake of hospitality and show his continued friendship, he would 'nat trouble no frendes house of myne otherwys in this journey, my trayne ys so great & wilbe whether I wyll or nat'.²⁶³ Northumberland's action seems very considerate, especially because a gentleman was expected to entertain his friends, neighbours, clients and patrons, and this was reinforced by the court connection between the Cecils and him. Provision of hospitality went to the core of gentry identity and was a demonstration of open service and entertainment. It also confirmed ties of clientage in a very public and concrete way.²⁶⁴

Northumberland's midland properties became the nucleus of his estate, representing his psychological and lineal link with his aristocratic forebears. This 'planting' was taking place throughout England and Wales and was intended to engender greater stability by strengthening the links between the centre and the localities. Northumberland also supported the suits of followers, including Darcy, Palmer, George Harper, Thomas Culpepper, Henry Broke, his steward, Flammock, Sir Francis Jobson, York, Owen Whorwood, a relative of Ambrose's wife and general surveyor of the ducal estates with Holmes (Northumberland's secretary) and William Kynyat, Henry Sidney and Sir Andrew Dudley. He also assisted government officials and courtiers like Sackville, North, John Horneolde, Richard Tavener, Peckham, John Beaumont, Denny, Cawarden and Sir Thomas and Sir Edward Mildmay.²⁶⁵ Although written during the protectorate, a good example of Warwick's methods to procure patronage was his letter to Thynne on behalf of Peckham in March 1549. He wrote of 'being instantly desyeryd by my frend *Master* Peckham this berer to regure you to shew him your lawfull fauor in soche sutes and busynes as he hath *with* you' because 'I take him to be so honest a man'.²⁶⁶ It might seem unusual for Somerset's principal ally to be soliciting patronage for Southampton's brother-in-law but it was important for patrons to assist as wide a number of clients as possible, either in return for favours and services rendered or to increase their well-willers. The recipients were usually substantial men, rather than

²⁶¹ PRO, SP 15/4, fo. 14r; *Calendar of patent rolls*, iii, p. 404; iv, pp. 195-196.

²⁶² Longleat, Seymour MS. 4, fos. 127r, 128r.

²⁶³ PRO, SP 10/14/34, M. fo. 81r; Tytler, ii, pp. 110-111.

²⁶⁴ Heal and Holmes, *The gentry*, pp. 282-289.

²⁶⁵ Bindoff, i, pp. 501-502, 737-738; ii, pp. 302-304, 444-445; Beer, *Northumberland*, pp. 172, 182-183; Adams, 'The Dudley clientèle', pp. 242, 245, 247; Loades, *Northumberland*, pp. 97, 225, 274, 276.

²⁶⁶ Longleat, Thynne MS. 1, fo. 11r.

Northumberland's creatures. Jobson, of Monkwick in Essex, was a JP for the county, MP for Colchester in March 1553, and master of the jewel house from about February 1553 (being replaced at Mary's accession before returning to public life under Elizabeth). His career improved dramatically when he married Lady Elizabeth Plantagenet in about 1544, Northumberland's half-sister, and he received very extensive estates. This kinship connection made him an important client and he served with Northumberland against Mary, for which he was indicted for treason but pardoned.²⁶⁷ Another Dudley client, the protestant Henry Killigrew, a military man and member of Northumberland's household, received substantial rewards after Somerset's execution, including election as MP for Launceston, under the aegis of either Northumberland or Gates (now receiver-general of the duchy of Cornwall). Although Killigrew remained antipathetic towards the Marian regime and became a pirate with his brother Peter, he was more than just an unruly military gentleman, being an extremely cultured man who must have adorned Northumberland's household.²⁶⁸

Connections between clienteles persisted throughout Edward's reign, suggesting factional differences did not destroy all existing ties. Cecil wrote to Thynne after Somerset's execution on behalf of a kinsman from Lincolnshire. Cecil asked Thynne to sound out Sir Nicholas Poyntes ('known your frendshipp grete') concerning the possibility of marriage between his relative and Poyntes's daughter, Elizabeth. The tone of the letter was still familiar and friendly despite the rupture between Cecil and Somerset immediately prior to the duke's second arrest, with the secretary enquiring whether Thynne had yet recovered from his recent illness and suggesting 'that we maye now and then mete in good libertye as we haue done in trooblesome seruice'.²⁶⁹ Thynne's friendship with Poyntes stemmed from their ties to the Seymours, which were solidified when Somerset's brother, John Seymour, married Poyntes's daughter.²⁷⁰ Similarly, the earl of Pembroke (Herbert) wrote to Thynne in warm terms concerning patronage in September 1552. Religion and vicinage probably reinforced their relationship.²⁷¹

Northumberland's activities as a patronage broker were intended to strengthen his position within his clientele. However, his use of access to patronage to maintain the favour of fellow councillors and leading peers was perhaps the most important aspect of this process. Northumberland's power was predicated on his offices and his influence with the king. A tension at the heart of Professor Loades's recent biography of the duke is the issue of his status as a new noble without a long-standing affinity. While arguing that Northumberland never really succeeded in building up an

²⁶⁷ C 66/801, m. 10d; *Calendar of patent rolls*, i, p. 83; Bindoff, ii, pp. 444-445; Beer, *Northumberland*, pp. 182-183; Adams, 'The Dudley clientèle', pp. 242, 245; Loades, *Northumberland*, p. 97.

²⁶⁸ PRO, LR 2/118, fo. 36r; Bindoff, ii, pp. 466-467; Loades, *Northumberland*, pp. 274, 277.

²⁶⁹ Longleat, Thynne MS. 2, fo. 173r; BL Stowe MS. 571, fos. 56v-57r; Bindoff, iii, pp. 148-149; *DNB*, lvi, p. 366.

²⁷⁰ Bindoff, iii, pp. 148-149.

affinity based on his landed estate, and yet demonstrating how he did so in a haphazard manner, he defines this process as an organised and coherent activity, while reducing the importance of a court-centred clientele.²⁷² In December 1549, Northumberland exchanged the lordship of Warwick he had been so eager to acquire in 1547 with the king for lands in Oxfordshire, Nottinghamshire and Yorkshire. However, he got it back again in exchange for other lands on 25 July, and through Warwick Castle, extended his military influence and local consequence over the county. He frequently sold land. These sales were often to his clients, men like Darcy, Jobson, Palmer, Harper and Culpepper. However, in 1553 his Warwickshire estates alone were worth £1700 per annum.²⁷³ Even Professor Loades conceded that Northumberland regarded the west midlands as his 'country', with the corrective that he 'made no particular effort to build up a power base there, either for himself or his clients'.²⁷⁴ The latter point is not fully supported by the evidence. Northumberland was a court-centred noble but his land concentrations were substantial and, in some places, of many years' standing. He had planted himself in the midlands (and was attempting to do the same in the north) as a means of exercising influence in the localities. He acquired substantial estates in the north during the period 1550-1553, drawn principally from the former Percy estates and the dissolved diocese of Durham.²⁷⁵ Professor Beer has shown the extensiveness of Northumberland's holdings in the southeast too, particularly in Surrey. Much of this land was inherited from his father with Dudley's restoration to blood in 1512, from the Guildford inheritance, or was obtained during the dissolution of the monasteries. While recognising how recent Northumberland's northern acquisitions were, Professor Beer points out that 'elsewhere his interests were continuous'.²⁷⁶ There was a coherency to Northumberland's activities but lack of time and perceptions of old and new nobility distort the picture. Although Northumberland did not have the kind of long-standing local connections Shrewsbury had, the role of noble affinities had changed during the early sixteenth century and service to the crown as an agent at court and in the counties was the key to a successful career. The important point, however, was to be based at court.

Northumberland's family was at the core of his clientele; men like Sir Andrew Dudley, Jobson and the Dudleys serving at Boulogne. Northumberland's immediate family was becoming increasingly important, especially as his sons came of age. However, like his clients, a patron's family could and did pursue their own aims. For example, Elizabeth does not appear to have had a particularly good relationship with Northumberland, having clashed with him over Durham Place. He

²⁷¹ Longleat, Thynne MS. 2, fos. 165r-166v.

²⁷² Loades, *Northumberland*, pp. 120-121, 178-179.

²⁷³ *Calendar of patent rolls*, iii, pp. 71-74, 364-366; Beer, *Northumberland*, pp. 189-190; Loades, *Northumberland*, pp. 96-97.

²⁷⁴ Loades, *Northumberland*, p. 178.

²⁷⁵ Beer, *Northumberland*, pp. 181-182, 187.

²⁷⁶ Beer, *Northumberland*, pp. 187-189.

attempted to build a close relationship between Edward and his younger sons by having them either brought up with the king (Lisle) or acting as his constant companions (Lisle, Ambrose and Robert). Robert seems to have built up an intimate friendship with Elizabeth.²⁷⁷ This was probably independent of his father. The relationship between Elizabeth and Robert grew during Mary's reign and he may also have provided her with much needed financial support. Dudley had known Elizabeth since she was eight and believed he understood her better than any of her other close acquaintances.²⁷⁸ Northumberland's wife played an important role in the Dudley clientele too, although it has been suggested that poor health and physical modesty ('I haue not loved to be very bold afore women') meant she did not participate as fully in the court's social affairs as had the duchess of Somerset. That role was carried out instead by the marchioness of Northampton, formerly Lady Elizabeth Brooke.²⁷⁹ Nevertheless, the duchess of Northumberland had a lively interest in the court between 1550-1553. Her role was central in smoothing relations within the Dudley clientele. In April 1553 Morison, the English ambassador in Brussels, wrote to Northumberland to thank the duchess for her continued friendship towards his wife. He wrote with more than formal affection and the duchess contributed to Northumberland's growing ties with various people.²⁸⁰ At the same time, Gresham, asked Northumberland 'to do my most humble commendacions to [my] Ladyes ^grace^ as allso to my singgular good lorde my lord of Pendbroke'.²⁸¹ It was considered necessary to attain her regard in order to remain on favourable terms with Northumberland. The duchess remembered several Dudley clients in her will. Some of them were her kinsmen, including her cousin Sir John Guildford, Cawarden, Jobson, and Sir Edward Bray. She made other Dudley clients (Sidney, Sir George Blount of Worcester, another cousin, John Somerfield, esquire, and Thomas Marrow of Warwickshire, esquire) her executors and enjoined them to do all they could to procure pardons for her sons and her brother-in-law, Sir Andrew Dudley.²⁸²

Northumberland's relations with his wife and family were close and intimate friendship was characteristic of his circle. He wrote to his heir, now earl of Warwick, in either 1552 or 1553, asking him to be open about the nature of his debts, which he intended to pay for him, because 'I wolde be lothe but you shold kepe your credyte with all men'. Northumberland wanted his son to ensure that his associates were reliable men and not mere parasites, underlining the importance of clienteles as responsible entities that served the king and not a means of providing for the feckless.

²⁷⁷ Hatfield, Cecil MS. 150, fos. 79r, 82r-82v; Haynes, pp. 95, 97; PRO, SP 10/6/19, M. fo. 51v. Elizabeth was granted Durham Place in the aftermath of the October coup. In 1552 she relinquished it, being given Somerset Place instead. Sir Robert Dudley was keeper of Somerset Place: Beer, *Northumberland*, pp. 127-128; Starkey, *Elizabeth*, pp. 93, 105-108.

²⁷⁸ Adams, 'Dudley clientèle', pp. 241-265; Starkey, *Elizabeth*, p. 87.

²⁷⁹ I am grateful to Dr Adams for discussing the duchess of Northumberland's will with me: James, *Kateryn Parr*, p. 361; PRO, PROB 11/37, fos. 194r, 195r.

²⁸⁰ Hatfield, Cecil MS. 1, fos. 114r-115v; Lodge (ed.), *Illustrations of British history*, i, pp. 213-214.

²⁸¹ Hatfield, Cecil MS. 1, fo. 119r; Lodge (ed.), *Illustrations of British history*, i, p. 220.

Northumberland spoke from experience, while hoping his son would do good service. The duchess wrote a postscript from 'your lovyge mothere that wyshes you helthe dayli Jane Northumberland'. Warwick was a fairly slight individual, more of a courtier than a soldier. His first post was as master of the buckhounds from April 1551, which had been surrendered by Darcy on his behalf.²⁸³ Like Sir Robert Dudley, the duchess cultivated the friendship of those with whom Northumberland had difficult relationships. For example, she assisted her husband in his reconciliation with Somerset prior to the latter's release in February 1550 by organising daily banquets with the duchess of Somerset.²⁸⁴ She even maintained ties with Paget's family, despite Northumberland engineering his disgrace in 1552, and remained on friendly terms with him.²⁸⁵

Northumberland was undoubtedly ambitious and wanted to increase both his own wealth and power and the wealth and power of his friends, clients and supporters, but he also attempted to improve government. He tried to exercise more effective control over the administration and the court in order to increase his security against potential rivals. He was firmly supported by his clientele, which was well established and grew stronger during 1549-1553. At first he attempted to be more inclusive and succeeded in rehabilitating Somerset in order to protect his own party and to safeguard the reformation. He initially exercised authority with the support of the privy council because he meant to regularise government and prevent a return to popular disorder. However, Northumberland's regime did become increasingly factional, particularly as factors beyond his control created instability. He began to narrow his support base in 1551-1552, while exercising greater control through the king and enhancing his police powers. His colleagues became increasingly uneasy as a result. These issues will now be examined more fully.

²⁸² PRO, PROB 11/37, fos. 194r-195r; Bindoff, i, pp. 445-447, 490-492, 599-602; ii, pp. 265-266, 444-446; iii, pp. 573-574.

²⁸³ Royal Commission on Historical Manuscripts, *Report on the Pepys manuscripts preserved at Magdalene College, Cambridge*, ed. E.K. Purnell (London, 1911), vol. lxx, pp. 1-2; Loades, *Northumberland*, pp. 224-225; *Calendar of the patent rolls*, iv, p. 104.

²⁸⁴ *Simancas*, x, p. 13; Beer, *Northumberland*, pp. 95-96.

²⁸⁵ Adams, 'Dudley clientèle', pp. 248, 261, n. 45.

8. *The ascendancy of the duke of Northumberland, 1550-1553*

Northumberland's ascendancy was based on the appearance of consensus between 1550-1553. He promised to restore stability and to preserve the protestant polity. Initially, he tried to work with the former lord protector and attempted to engender a stronger collegiate identity in the political elite. He drew some of Somerset's most important men into his clientele and tried to identify his own interests with the crown's. This limited the scope for legitimate debate over policies and during 1551-1553 Northumberland tightened his control and alienated his colleagues. He narrowed his support and removed Somerset through judicial execution. Somerset's second fall will be re-examined to establish the extent of his complicity in any conspiracies against the regime, the role of clienteles and the atmosphere within the polity. Northumberland did continue to tour the localities to maintain stability and worked hard to establish greater administrative efficiency. He was increasingly wary of his more powerful colleagues and persisted in attacking the remnants of Somerset's clientele. This was probably counter-productive because it alarmed the elite and created a paranoid atmosphere at court and in the localities. This behaviour tended to isolate him in 1553 and he depended more heavily on his clientele and misinterpreted the degree of support among his colleagues. Certain patterns in Somerset's life were repeating themselves in Northumberland's.

I: Northumberland's ascendancy, 1549-1551

The protestant humanist circle at court was strongly conciliarist and this would create friction with Warwick. Paget had laid out systematically his concept of government in a letter of 23 March 1550.¹ Professor Hoak believes this advice could have been partly intended to guide Dr Nicholas Wotton, second secretary, who had been appointed on 15 October 1549 to replace Smith.² It is probable that the disruptions of 1549 and the fall of Somerset reinforced Paget's belief that conciliar government should be implemented more fully. The initial mood suggested Warwick was not about to reinforce government by his own clientele. Some of Paget's proposals restated already well established practices and others attempted to meet the needs of the minority or were meant to prevent faction. However, the system he envisaged took into account Warwick's (who was now lord president) ascendancy. Paget stated that faction should be banished from the privy council, and by implication from the court. He suggested the establishment of a quorum of six

¹ BL Egerton MS. 2603, fos. 33r-34v.

² Hoak, *The king's council*, p. 299, n. 14; APC, ii, p. 345; BL Harley MS. 284, fo. 49r.

privy councillors, with at least two being drawn from among the lord chancellor, lord treasurer, lord great master (Warwick), lord privy seal, lord great chamberlain and lord chamberlain, and a third to be one of the two secretaries. These would 'be eē contynually attendant in the courte' and could govern in the absence of the other councillors. He also wanted regular meetings of the privy council.³ If this system was adopted and the quorum was selected more heavily from these officers, Rich, St John, Russell, Northampton, Wentworth, Petre and Dr Wotton would dominate government.⁴

The quorum had developed as an aspect of the commissions of the peace. Those on the quorum were legal experts and any clause in the commission to hear and determine included the proviso that one of the quorum participate. From this came the expression 'of the *Quorum*', and any act that specified certain powers to some of the commissioners, with one to be of the quorum, meant that such powers could not be exercised without the attendance of this legal expert.⁵ The quorum came to mean the core of any commission, council or committee, usually made up of senior officers or experts, without whom it could not properly or validly transact business. Essentially, the quorum numbered those eminent and expert commissioners needed to constitute the bench, or in the case of the privy council, the board. William Lambarde, the late Elizabethan antiquarian, in his study of the office of JP, described why the quorum was chosen: 'so that the one of those two [JPs] be of that select number, which is commonly tearmed of the *Quorum*'. 'For these of the *Quorum* were wont (and that not without iust cause) to bee chosen, specially for their knowledge in the Lawes of the lande'.⁶ The quorum Paget envisaged, however, was more like an inner-ring, a core to the privy council that controlled politics. Open counsel was to be encouraged 'with out reprove/ checke, or displeashur for the same of any parson'; business was to be regularised under the direction of the lord great master; patronage was to be granted in the king's interests by the privy council through a system of ballot and was to be controlled by the councillors and officers of the court not by the privy chamber; while the secretary was to control the clerical side of council business (as had always been the case). Paget stressed that councillors should not interfere in legal proceedings, 'for that the request of a counsailor is in a maner a *commaundement*'.⁷ In his quorum Paget actually replicated Warwick's changes in conciliar personnel in the sense that five of the attendant lords at court were of it.⁸ Government was more efficient under Warwick but this reflects his competence more than Paget's directions, although there was a restoration of many

³ BL Egerton MS. 2603, fo. 33r.

⁴ Hoak, *The king's council*, p. 82.

⁵ Beard, *The office of justice of the peace*, p. 146; see below, pp. 230-233.

⁶ W. Lambarde, *Eirenarcha, or of the office of the justice of peace, in four books* (STC 15170; London, 1602), i, ix, p. 46.

⁷ BL Egerton MS. 2603, fo. 33v.

⁸ Hoak, *The king's council*, pp. 100-101.

long-established conciliar practices. However, Warwick was as clearly in control as Somerset had been; he achieved success largely through winning and maintaining the assent of his colleagues.⁹

Warwick had already ended Somerset's governorship of the king's person and any vestigial power to regulate the residence of privy councillors at court by a system implemented in October 1549, whereby six lords (all privy councillors) were appointed to be attendant on the king. Two of them were to be attendant at all times.¹⁰ Warwick made sure his supporters acquired these positions, as well as the vital offices of state. St John resigned his offices to Warwick but replaced Somerset as lord treasurer on 2 February 1550.¹¹ Northampton replaced Warwick as lord great chamberlain, while Wentworth was appointed lord chamberlain, Wingfield became comptroller, with Darcy succeeding him as vice-chamberlain and captain of the guard. Replacement by Wingfield should have made Paget uneasy.¹² Warwick was appointed lord president on 2 February and lord great master on 20 February.¹³ Professor Hoak thinks that in October 1549 Edward had been persuaded to appoint Warwick to both offices: the earl admitted on 1 February, while discussing in a letter (possibly to Paget) the changes in government, 'and as I am advertised the kinges maieste...wold I shulde be great Master of his hignes house', while the offices of 'the erle marshal and the Presydentship of the counsell remayneth sty[ll in the] kynges handes vndetermined or disposed'.¹⁴ Warwick was already manipulating Edward. Paget would stress the need to have the business of government regularised under the direction of the lord president.¹⁵

Warwick controlled the business of the privy council and altered its character by increasing its size. He appointed twelve councillors during the period of Somerset's revival. They were often experienced soldiers and four were substantial peers. They were also conspicuous protestants. Northumberland had the ability to pick able men and then to delegate effectively. For example, he appointed Cecil, Sir Francis Knollys and Sir Walter Mildmay, general surveyor of the court of augmentations, to key offices and the character and composition of his government, as well as many of its policies, had a powerful impact on Mary's and Elizabeth's privy councils.¹⁶ Gates and Mildmay were on the commission of 1552 to examine ways to reduce expenditure and rationalise the revenue courts (Mildmay was appointed to a financial commission on 2 January 1552).¹⁷ Interestingly, it was Somerset who originally advanced Cecil and Knollys, while Mildmay had received patronage from Seymour. In about 1547 Knollys was described as fit to serve 'for the

⁹ Hoak, *The king's council*, pp. 163-164, 262-268; PRO, SP 10/1/15, M. fos. 56r-57v.

¹⁰ BL Egerton MS. 2603, fo. 33r; BL Cotton MS. Nero C. x, fo. 17r; Jordan (ed.), *Chronicle*, p. 18; Wriothesley, *Chronicle*, ii, pp. 32-33; Hoak, *The king's council*, p. 100; see above, pp. 19-22.

¹¹ *Calendar of patent rolls*, iii, p. 178.

¹² Wriothesley, *Chronicle*, ii, pp. 32-33; BL Cotton MS. Nero C. x, fos. 18r; Jordan (ed.), *Chronicle*, pp. 18-19.

¹³ *Calendar of patent rolls*, iii, pp. 189-190; Wriothesley, *Chronicle*, ii, pp. 32-33.

¹⁴ Hoak, *The king's council*, pp. 301-302, n. 34; BL Cotton MS. Caligula E. iv, fo. 206r; Beer and Jack, p. 137.

¹⁵ BL Egerton MS. 2603, fo. 33v.

¹⁶ Hoak, *The king's council*, p. 208; 'Rehabilitating the duke of Northumberland', pp. 40-41; Bindoff, ii, pp. 479-481.

warres'.¹⁸ Northumberland handled council procedure as lord president. Illness and absence often forced him to work through the secretaries and they prepared agendas of council business and mediated with the board. Cecil, in particular, became close to Northumberland through his work.¹⁹

Cecil became Northumberland's principal agent in government, acting as the conduit between him and the rest of the privy council, and as the channel of communication between them and the king. The importance of this system is clearly shown in a letter Northumberland wrote to Cecil in December 1552 telling him to inform the privy council of a decision the two of them had already taken that morning concerning Dr Hans Bruno. He also sent Cecil a letter from Morrison, '*which yf it pleas you & shall so thinke yt worthy to let yt be seen to the kings maiestie.*'²⁰ This was remarkably similar to the way Wolsey dealt with the council. He would consult them after deciding policy in conversation with Henry. The privy council meeting at the board was largely an administrative body controlled by the king and his inner-ring (usually a select group of privy councillors), who formulated policy. This inner-ring was not a fixed institution or even an unchanging body of people.²¹ Northumberland and Cecil became intimate friends. He described his relationship with Cecil as one of him '*layinge parte of my burden upon your sholders.*'²² He discussed his concerns with Cecil and Darcy, including the danger of subjects who did not serve the king and commonwealth disinterestedly. In the same letter, he related to Cecil how '*I remember well your consyderations, consherning whatsoever might be Judged by evyll people of me.*'²³ Similarly, when concluding by describing John Knox's changed attitude towards him, the duke told Cecil '*to bere with my folly and to let my lorde chamberlein be partaker of the same, to whome when tyme seruithe I vse the like talke with wordes.*'²⁴ Scheyve described Cecil as '*the duke of Northumberland's man.*'²⁵ Northumberland used Cecil, Darcy and Gates to foster a direct relationship with the king, allowing him to easily procure the royal signature and operate independently of the privy council.²⁶ The duke's principal supporters also built up their relationships with the secretary, who reciprocated. Pembroke wrote to Cecil from his Wiltshire seat at Wilton on 8 December 1552, stating that '*ye haue, by so sondre meanes, made declaracion of your good will, to me ward, that I must of force accompt my self mucche bounden vnto you therfor, But what wold you more like as I haue alwais found you so mucche myne assured and dere*

¹⁷ J.D. Alsop, 'The revenue commission of 1552', *Historical Journal*, 22 (1979), pp. 511-533.

¹⁸ Bindoff, ii, pp. 601-602; PRO, SP 46/162, fo. 53r.

¹⁹ PRO, SP 10/10/31, M. fos. 71r-71v; PRO, SP 10/14/1, M. fos. 1r-1v; PRO, SP 10/14/5, M. fos. 10r-10v; PRO, SP 10/13/79, M. fos. 152r-152v; PRO, SP 10/14/25, M. fos. 69r-69v; PRO, SP 10/14/26, M. fos. 70r-70v; PRO, SP 10/14/36, M. fos. 84r-84v.

²⁰ PRO, SP 10/15/63, M. fo. 131r; Tytler, ii, pp. 148-150.

²¹ Guy, 'Wolsey and the Tudor polity', pp. 309-316.

²² PRO, SP 10/15/66, M. fo. 138r.

²³ PRO, SP 10/15/66, M. fo. 137r.

²⁴ PRO, SP 10/15/66, M. fo. 138r; Bradshaw, 'Protestant polemic', pp. 182-184, 192-193.

²⁵ *Simancas*, x, pp. 610-611.

²⁶ Hoak, *The king's council*, pp. 142-143.

friend/ so shall you (for my part) find me the like man when so euer occasion of triall shall happen'.²⁷ Conyers Read suggested that Cecil's knighthood meant he was closely associated with Northumberland's circle but pointed out that this was the normal reward made to a secretary.²⁸ Intimacy and trust mingled with pragmatic governance.

II: The fall of Somerset

Somerset and Warwick tried to work together on the privy council but their attitudes towards political and religious policies diverged; the duke favoured a less radical approach to religious reform, while the earl was concerned that an oppositional party would form round the former lord protector. The situation was exacerbated by the poor harvests, dearth and disease which marked the period of Warwick's ascendancy, while there was endemic fear of renewed popular unrest. Religious tension mounted, especially as controversy grew between the more cautious protestants and the radicals. Unlike Somerset, Warwick could not rely on the widely recognised authority of a king's uncle to maintain his position but the former was isolated and confounded in any expectation that he could resume his previous status. In March 1551 the two men argued at the board but after mediation they temporarily set their differences aside.²⁹ Somerset was probably developing stronger ties with the earls of Arundel, Derby and Shrewsbury. He wrote to Thynne in July to ask him to come to Syon in order to discuss the full value of the ducal estates because he wanted to make a new will. There had been extensive exchanges and an increase in acreage and Somerset wanted to be briefed on the situation so that he could 'cume to the perfecte knowledge of the state of our hole inheritaunce'.³⁰ Warwick must have been uneasy at Somerset's wealth and influence, fearing the extent of his following and regarding him, as Henry had the Howards, as an unknown quantity. Somerset spent August making preparations to go to his house at Wells, Somerset.³¹ Again, Warwick might have had misgivings about Somerset's intentions, especially because his west country estates were so extensive and because his relationship with the commons made him a potential threat. Dr Loach viewed the alienation between Somerset and Warwick as largely the former's fault.³² However, it seems to have been more complicated.

Warwick strengthened his position in October 1551 with an elevation to the peerage and a series of promotions. He became duke of Northumberland, Dorset became duke of Suffolk, Wiltshire was made marquis of Winchester and Herbert became earl of Pembroke, while Cecil, Cheke, Sidney

²⁷ PRO, SP 10/15/67, M. fo. 139r, Pembroke's holograph; Bindoff, ii, pp. 341-344.

²⁸ Read, *Mr. Secretary Cecil*, p. 74.

²⁹ *Simancas*, x, p. 262.

³⁰ Longleat, Seymour MS. 4, fo. 14r.

³¹ Longleat, Seymour MS. 4, fos. 15r-15v.

³² *Simancas*, x, p. 262; BL Additional MS. 48023, fo. 351v; PRO, SP 10/13/65, M. fo. 126v; Jordan, *Threshold of power*, pp. 71-84; J. Loach, *Protector Somerset: a reassessment* (Bangor, 1994), pp. 46-53; *Edward VI*, pp. 101-105.

and Henry Neville were knighted.³³ Grey of Wilton complained about Northumberland's patent, which claimed that he, not Somerset, won at Pinkie. Conyers Read pointed out that Cecil was the recipient of large grants of land the following month. He regarded this as a reward for Cecil changing loyalty.³⁴ This crown land, some of it formerly belonging to Seymour, lay principally in Lincolnshire and Northamptonshire, the heart of the Cecil holdings, and amounted to £152.3.3¼ per annum. Cecil paid a low rent in return. This arrangement had become pretty standard during Edward's reign. Cecil's wealth had grown substantially through service between 1547-1553, allowing him to retain fifty-seven domestics between 1544-1553 (forty were recruited under Northumberland).³⁵ Somerset played a leading part in the ennoblement ceremony because he was the only duke and head of the peerage. He must have felt vulnerable because his opponents and several former clients were being advanced, while he had been demoted. Northumberland had been appointed to Somerset's former principal office of earl marshal on 20 April. This was one of the five great offices of state and second in order of precedence after the lord great chamberlain. The earl marshal had the power to regulate aristocratic honour and even, theoretically, to arrest the monarch. Along with the lord admiral, masters of the horse, ordnance and armoury, the earl marshal possessed a degree of military authority. There might be a baronial context to mid-Tudor politics, especially in terms of the right of senior officers to view politics in terms of *negotia regni*, or 'great affairs', in which they were involved.³⁶ Northumberland's acquisition of this office has gone largely without comment. Professor Loades thought it was part of his scramble for 'worship' and politically unimportant, though prestigious.³⁷ Such elevations and promotions presaged important shifts in policy or the structure of power. The new dukedoms were also a source of division because they were 'a very rare distinction, and not to be conferred lightly' and might make Somerset more vulnerable.³⁸ Northumberland may also have become master of the horse, replacing Pembroke. This would have given him, albeit briefly, three of the great offices of state.³⁹ As in early 1547, the reasons given for these honours were to augment the recipients' dignity, to reward loyal servants and to replenish the 'much decayed' nobility.⁴⁰ They also reinforced Northumberland's ties with important supporters.

³³ APC, iii, pp. 379-380; PRO, SP 11/4/21, M. fos. 54r-55r; BL Additional MS. 6113, fos. 129r-131r; BL Cotton MS. Nero C. x, fo. 44r; Jordan (ed.), *Chronicle*, p. 86.

³⁴ Gammon, *Statesman and schemer*, p. 179; Read, *Mr. Secretary Cecil*, p. 74.

³⁵ *Calendar of Patent Rolls*, iv, pp. 197-199; Read, *Mr. Secretary Cecil*, pp. 87-89; BL Lansdowne MS. 118, fo. 40v.

³⁶ *Calendar of Patent Rolls*, iv, p. 126; PRO, SP 11/4/21, M. fos. 55r-54v; BL Additional MS. 6113, fo. 130r; M.E. James, 'At a crossroads of the political culture: the Essex revolt, 1601', in his *Society, politics and culture. Studies in early modern England* (Cambridge, 1988), pp. 416-65; J.S.A. Adamson, 'The baronial context of the English civil war', *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, fifth ser., 40 (1990), p. 99; Alford, *The early Elizabethan polity*, pp. 117-119, 176-179, 206-207; Adams, 'The English military clientele', pp. 222, 225-227; Hammer, *The polarisation of Elizabethan politics*, p. 386.

³⁷ Beer, *Northumberland*, p. 119; Loades, *Northumberland*, pp. 179, 180-183; Jordan, *Threshold of power*, p. 53.

³⁸ Loades, *Northumberland*, pp. 180-181.

³⁹ PRO, SP 11/4/21, M. fo. 55v; BL Additional MS. 6113, fo. 131r.

⁴⁰ APC, ii, p. 16; iii, p. 379.

Herbert's elevation would have been partly in reward for supporting Northumberland in October 1549 and partly in recognition of his consequence and military service. He was one of the most important political figures, especially during the latter part of the reign. In January 1551 Scheyve noted that, with Warwick and Northampton, he was the most important man in government.⁴¹ He continued to be prominent in Northumberland's regime and was relied on heavily to fulfil a variety of roles in central and local government. Among other things, he was rewarded with some of Somerset's lands in Wiltshire after the latter's execution. There was discussion about sending him to Sheffield in June 1552 as part of Northumberland's policy of monitoring the north. The prospect must have rankled Shrewsbury because Sheffield was the heart of his patrimony, the earl having been born there, and Herbert was both a capable politician and administrator and one of the most experienced English military commanders. Interestingly, rather than using Herbert as a check on Shrewsbury, Northumberland may have taken him as far north as Lincolnshire in order to watch him. Rumours were spreading that the friendship between the two men was cooling. However, this tension seems to have been temporary.⁴²

Somerset was apprehended at Whitehall after dinner on 16 October 1551, having attended a council meeting earlier that day, while some of the most important members of his clientele were arrested there at the same time. He had had misgivings two days prior to his arrest, and 'sent for the secretary Cicel to tell him he suspected some ill'. Somerset was staying at Somerset Place at the time. Whether Cecil knew anything or not, his equivocal stance rankled his former patron, who 'sent him a lettre of defiaunce'. The duke summoned Palmer, perhaps having heard something, 'who after denial mad of his declaracion was let goe'. However, Somerset seemed resigned to the situation and made no attempt to avoid capture.⁴³ The court had moved to Whitehall on 15 October because the apprehension of the Somerset clientele would the 'easier, and surelier be dispachid there'.⁴⁴ Palmer was detained while 'on the tarrase walking there'. Several others were lured by means of messages purporting to be from Somerset himself. For example, John Newdigate, brother of Somerset's second steward, and John and David Seymour were taken in this way. John Seymour was Somerset's illegitimate brother and Poyntes's son-in-law.⁴⁵ Sir Ralph Vane, lieutenant of the gentlemen pensioners, was not taken in by this and 'upon two sendings of my Lord in the morning flodd at the first sending. He said my lord was not stout, and if he could get home he cared for non of them all he was so strong'. John Peers, clerk of the exchequer to the yeomen of the guard, found him hiding in the stable of the Lambeth house of one

⁴¹ *Simancas*, x, p. 216.

⁴² LPL, MS. 3206, fos. 255-256; *The complete peerage*, eds. Gibbs *et al*, xi, pp. 710-712; Bindoff, ii, pp. 341-344.

⁴³ BL Cotton MS. Nero C. x, fo. 44v; Jordan (ed.), *Chronicle*, p. 88; APC, iii, pp. 388-389; Wriothesley, *Chronicle*, ii, pp. 56-57; Longleat, Seymour MS. 4, fos. 16r-16v.

⁴⁴ BL Cotton MS. Nero C. x, fo. 44v; Jordan (ed.), *Chronicle*, p. 88.

⁴⁵ BL Cotton MS. Nero C. x, fo. 44v; Jordan (ed.), *Chronicle*, p. 88; Jordan, *Threshold of power*, p. 85; Bindoff, iii, p. 12.

of his servants.⁴⁶ Lawrence Hammond, probably a yeoman of the guard, was 'taken' by Peers while he was passing Gates's room.⁴⁷ The earl of Arundel and Grey of Wilton were arrested too.⁴⁸ The duchess of Somerset, John Crane and his wife, 'with the chaumber keaper were sent to the towr for deuising thies tresins' on 18 October, while James Wingfield was apprehended 'for casting out of billes sediciouse'.⁴⁹ It is uncertain whether these bills were produced because no other evidence for them survives and many of the charges against Somerset were fabricated but bills had been circulating during the October coup.⁵⁰ Partridge, Sir Thomas Holcroft, John Banister, George Vaughan and Stanhope were also arrested (between 19 and 26 October).⁵¹

Holcroft was an able soldier, given command of three hundred men mustered from the county palatine of Lancaster in March 1548 and a member of the quorum for Cheshire, before being made *custos rotulorum* in 1548. He became more closely associated with Somerset through his military service, especially because of his advice on how to conduct the Scottish campaign. In return, Somerset would have been expected to procure patronage for him during his absence to try to offset the expenses incurred on campaign. On 1 January 1549, Holcroft was paid £200 for his services.⁵² Their association, like that with Grey of Wilton and John Brende, master of the musters of the north during the Scottish campaign, solidified during 1550-1551. Brende was a close friend of Paget and was returned for Thetford in 1547 (a duchy of Lancaster borough), probably at the behest of Somerset and with Fulmerston's assistance. In 1548 Brende was sent to discuss with Argyle the prospect of marriage between Edward and Mary, before being appointed secretary to Shrewsbury, lieutenant in the north. His continued association with Paget was probably reason

⁴⁶ BL Cotton MS. Nero C. x, fo. 44v; PRO, LC 2/2/3/1, fo. 110r. Vane's association with Somerset may have begun because of his office of lieutenant. He was chief governor of Cage and Postern parks in Kent and Tonbridge warrens from 1542, keeper of North Leigh Park in Kent from 1546, and appointed JP for the county the following year. Vane quarreled with Warwick over the pasture rights of Postern Park in March 1551. Sir Henry Isley, a local gentleman and colleague on the Kent bench, represented the earl but was forcibly evicted by Vane and his servants. Vane was imprisoned with five servants as a result. He was released on 8 June on a recognizance of £1000 and ordered to appear again before the privy council on 1 November: PRO, C 66/801, m. 14d; *Calendar of patent rolls*, i, p. 85; Hatfield, Cecil MS. 231, fos. 69r-69v; Bindoff, iii, p. 513; APC, iii, pp. 244-246, 279, 296; Jordan, *Threshold of power*, pp. 64-65, 80; see above, pp. 69-70.

⁴⁷ BL Cotton MS. Nero C. x, fo. 44v; Jordan (ed.), *Chronicle*, p. 88; PRO, LC 2/2/3/1, fos. 87r, 119r; PRO, E 101/426/7; PRO, LC 2/4/1, fo. 18v.

⁴⁸ BL Cotton MS. Nero C. x, fo. 44v; Jordan (ed.), *Chronicle*, p. 88.

⁴⁹ Crane and his wife were servants of some duration and importance. Barbara Crane was entrusted with the family plate: BL Cotton MS. Nero C. x, fo. 44v; Jordan (ed.), *Chronicle*, p. 89, n. 146; Jordan, *Threshold of power*, pp. 88-89; Wriothesley, *Chronicle*, ii, p. 57; BL Harley MS. 249, fo. 40v; Longleat, Seymour MS. 10, fo. 167r; BL Egerton MS. 2815; *Report on the manuscripts of the...marquess of Bath*, ed. Blatcher, iv, pp. 16, 336.

⁵⁰ See above, pp. 130, 136, 147-148.

⁵¹ BL Cotton MS. Nero C. x, fos. 44v-45r; Jordan (ed.), *Chronicle*, p. 89, n. 148; BL Harley MS. 249, fo. 40v; Wriothesley, *Chronicle*, ii, p. 58.

⁵² PRO, SP 50/4/19, fo. 81; PRO, SP 50/4/24, fo. 116; PRO, SP 50/4/52, fos. 563-566; PRO, SP 50/4/53, fos. 559-562; PRO, SP 50/4/55, fos. 537-542; PRO, SP 50/4/57, fos. 641-644; PRO, SP 50/4/64, fos. 575-580; PRO, SP 50/4/64, fos. 571-574; PRO, SP 50/4/66, fos. 531-534; PRO, SP 50/4/73, fos. 655-658; PRO, SP 50/5/14, fos. 27r-28v; PRO, C 66/801, m. 23d; *Calendar of patent rolls*, i, p. 81; ii, pp. 57, 134; APC, ii, p. 175, 234; Bush, *Government policy*, pp. 10, 17, 30.

enough to mark him out as Somerset's client.⁵³ Banister, esquire, was a member of Somerset's household and James Wingfield's brother-in-law. This kinship may explain why Wingfield supported Somerset too.⁵⁴

Caution and discretion were used in order to secure Somerset's party quickly and with the minimum of disturbance. Northumberland also sought to keep the local officers apprised of his version of events at court. On 16 October, a letter was drafted to the JPs informing them that Somerset, 'with a gret confederacy of his adherentes', including Grey of Wilton and Vane, had been arrested for conspiring against the king and government and intending 'the destruction of diuerse of the nobilite'. The JPs were referred to as 'gouue[r]nours of that portion of the common welth comytted to ~~you~~ ^your chardge^' and the privy council informed them of these important developments in order to 'study and labour by all the meanes we can possibly tavoyde the same'. This is a rare example of the designation 'gouue[r]nours'. The JPs were the vital link between the centre and the localities and the bench was dominated by men who represented the interests of the crown (through offices in central government or at court) and the local landed elite. However, to describe them as governors was to make explicit their role as leaders of the local community and agents of the crown and to emphasise that they were vital figures in the polity, including 'the speciall men'. As county leaders, the JPs were to ensure that the country at large remained quiet and court faction did not erupt in the localities. This point was made explicitly: 'so you for your partes also may also endeuour yourselfes to see good ordre and quiet observed within the limites of your presin[c]t accordingly'.⁵⁵ Similar care was taken in London to prevent any of Somerset's clientele escaping arrest and raising his adherents in the localities. On 20 October, the Mercers' Company ordered its members not to discuss Somerset's imprisonment.⁵⁶ The Dudley regime was being as cautious as possible.

A paper drawn up on 2 February 1552 listed the prisoners in the Tower. Those of Somerset's clientele were: his wife, Arundel, Paget, Grey of Wilton, Stanhope, Vane, Sir Thomas Arundel, Holcroft, Poyntes, Partridge, Sir Thomas Stradling, Thynne, Whalley, John Seymour, Banister,

⁵³ For Grey of Wilton, see: PRO, SP 50/3/26, fos. 777-782; PRO, SP 50/3/59, fos. 949-952; PRO, SP 50/3/87, fos. 15-16; PRO, SP 50/4/22, fos. 107-110; *Calendar of state papers, relating to Scotland and Mary, queen of Scots, 1547-1603*, eds. J. Bain *et al* (xxii vols.; Edinburgh, 1898-1952), p. 121; Bush, *Government policy*, pp. 24-26, 29-30, 33, 36, 38, 129. For Brende, see: PRO, SP 50/3/60, fos. 171-194; PRO, SP 50/3/75, fos. 609-620; PRO, SP 50/4/13, fos. 73-76; PRO, SP 50/4/16, fos. 409-412; PRO, SP 50/5/14, fos. 27r-28v; Bindoff, i, pp. 492-493.

⁵⁴ Longleat, Seymour MS. 10, fo. 167r; PRO, SP 10/14/53, M. fo. 116r; PRO, LR 2/118, fo. 35v; PRO, SP 10/5/18, M. fo. 77r. Banister was described as the king's servant but was not in the royal household. He may have been in more than one clientele. Banister may have worked for Grey of Wilton, with whom he was involved in a series of exchanges, including one with Honynges, culminating in grants to them of lands worth £172.3.11 per annum, minus rent, which had been purchased for only £1015.10.0, without fine or fee. Grey of Wilton was being rewarded for his service in the Scottish war. Banister was the recipient of substantial patronage, including a patent on 3 November 1548 for the office of master and keeper of 'le pale of canvas', with an annuity of one hundred marks: *Calendar of patent rolls*, i, pp. 217, 331-332, 339; ii, p. 86; iii, pp. 57-58, 60-61, 69-71.

⁵⁵ PRO, SP 10/13/57, M. fo. 113r, Petre's draft; Tytler, ii, pp. 33-34.

Brende, Francis Newdigate, Crane, his wife Barbara, Hammond, Thomas David and John Dymmock.⁵⁷ A second, longer list, of the ‘prisonars for the conspyracye of the d. of Somerset. and his adherants’ was also drawn up. In addition to those listed previously, this included: Palmer, David Seymour, Vaughan, Richard Tracy, esquire, of Gloucestershire, Bertheville, Raves, and Alexander Seymour.⁵⁸ David Seymour, promoted from gentleman usher to gentleman-at-arms in February 1547, was probably the son of Somerset’s uncle, Robert Seymour of Ivy Church in Wiltshire. He was returned for Wareham through Seymour patronage in 1547. David Seymour maintained contact with Poyntes’s wife Joan, daughter of the *de jure* fifth Lord Berkeley, while they were imprisoned, and was under suspicion for being Somerset’s client, rather than for active associations with a Seymour party. The implications of kinship to clientage relations probably led to his arrest.⁵⁹ Poyntes had been arrested on 26 October and was kept in the Tower until 4 March 1552. He returned to parliament shortly after his release.⁶⁰ His loose association with Somerset was probably not enough to ensure his apprehension but his friendship with Thynne, military expertise and extensive local connections, made him a threat. Alexander Seymour may also have been Somerset’s kinsman. He was a member of the ducal household and may have acted on Somerset’s behalf in public business. For example, in September 1549 he was awarded £5 for apprehending Dr Weston in Leicestershire and taking him to the Fleet.⁶¹ Tracy was a substantial Gloucestershire gentleman, active on local commissions, JP for Worcestershire and member of the quorum for Gloucestershire, and was involved in land transactions with Lord Seymour of Sudeley. He suffered losses during incarceration but was compensated in April 1551 for a Gloucestershire manor granted to Northumberland’s client Thomas Culpepper.⁶² Raves, of Roehampton in Surrey had served Somerset since at least 1542.⁶³ David may have been a longstanding member of the household, still serving Somerset’s son in 1582. It is possible that he was the duke’s porter, although this could be Richard Davy.⁶⁴

Some other adherents were members of the royal household: Sergeant Evans may have been a retired gentleman pensioner, Evan Lloyd, or one of the porters of the gate, Evan Gough. There was also a David Evans in Somerset’s household. Richard Fisher was a yeoman of the wood yard, having been placed there after May 1550. He served under Richard Whalley, marshal of the hall.

⁵⁶ S. Brigden, *London and the Reformation* (Oxford, 1994 edn.), pp. 515-516.

⁵⁷ BL Harley MS. 249, fo. 40v.

⁵⁸ BL Harley MS. 249, fos. 42r-43v; Tytler, ii, p. 37.

⁵⁹ BL Cotton MS. Nero C. x, fo. 45v; Jordan (ed.), *Chronicle*, pp. 88, n. 145, 91; PRO, LC 2/2, fo. 43r; Bindoff, iii, pp. 148-150, 290, 294-295.

⁶⁰ Bindoff, iii, pp. 148-149.

⁶¹ BL Harley MS. 249, fo. 42r; Longleat, Seymour MS. 10, fo. 168v; APC, ii, p. 324; iii, p. 428; iv, p. 141; PRO, SP 10/15/20, M. fos. 42r-42v.

⁶² PRO, SP 10/4/12 (i), M. fo. 32r; PRO, SP 10/4/19, M. fos. 42r-43v; PRO, C 66/801, mm. 12d, 22d; *Calendar of patent rolls*, i, pp. 48, 84, 91; ii, p. 136; iv, pp. 55-56; v, pp. 315, 354, 359.

⁶³ *Report on the manuscripts of the...marquess of Bath*, ed. Blatcher, iv, p. 338; Longleat, Seymour MS. 10, fo. 167r; PRO, SP 10/9/52, M. fos. 100r-101v; Pocock, pp. 120-122.

⁶⁴ *Report on the manuscripts of the...marquess of Bath*, ed. Blatcher, iv, p. 194; Longleat, Seymour MS. 10, fo. 169r.

Somerset's comptroller was an esquire of the body by 1545 but the duke may have wished him to have a more direct role in overseeing the royal household. It is possible that there were two Richard Whalleys, although this would make Fisher's removal odd. Fisher was dismissed and replaced by Henry Fisher. While Henry Fisher was replacing Richard Fisher, John Fisher, one of the gentlemen pensioners, was being granted Whalley's lucrative receivership of Yorkshire, which he held in reversion. A relatively minor figure, Richard Fisher probably came under suspicion because of his association with Whalley. He was presumably related to the other Fisher arrested for alleged complicity with Somerset, who was described as a merchant, but who may also have served in the royal household as this was not that uncommon. The best candidate is Thomas Fisher, who worked in the bakehouse but had an income of £50 per annum in 1549. If it was him, he retained his office. Neither man was likely to be Somerset's secretary, Thomas Fisher, who does not appear to have been apprehended at this stage although he must have been subsequently imprisoned. It is not possible to identify 'Herbert man of armes' but he was probably also a member of the royal household.⁶⁵ Others were servants and kinsmen of Somerset's principal clients: 'Myles the *Lord* Greys man', 'Clerk Vanes son in lawe' and one of Holcroft's servants. Stradling and St Albin were committed to the Tower with the earl of Arundel on 8 November and described by the king as 'his [Arundel's] men'. They were arrested because Crane was questioned and implicated them. Clerk's identity is also unknown and he is unlikely to be either John Clerke of Wookey in Somerset or William Clerke of Ponsbourne in Hertfordshire, even though both men had Seymour connections. A more detailed examination of Vane's career should reveal his identity.⁶⁶

A total of thirty-nine people were listed, including the duke himself.⁶⁷ Alexander Brett was regarded as particularly difficult. Northumberland explained to Darcy in May 1552, when Brett was considered for release along with one of the Fishers, that 'by the dukes owne confession to me, he declared Brette to be of a verrey evell nature, he sought all the wayes he coulde to eyrytate the saide duke against me, wherby yt sholde seme; he carred not to haue hadd a Rufflinge worlde'. Nevertheless, Northumberland thought 'thys ponyshement wylbe a warnyng to hym for [ever]'. According to Northumberland, then, Brett advocated extremism, 'a Rufflinge worlde'. Despite the source, it is likely that some elements of Somerset's clientele favoured more extreme measures than others members. A clientele was not of one mind. It is also interesting that Northumberland

⁶⁵ Evan Lloyd of Bodidris was a military officer and steward of Chirk for the earl of Leicester. Somerset may have recruited him from his brother's household because Seymour was joint master steward of Chirk Castle: BL Harley MS. 249, fo. 42r; PRO, E 179/69/58; PRO, LC 2/2, fos. 28v, 32r; PRO, LC 2/2/3/1, fos. 74r, 81r, 82r, 123r; PRO, E 179/69/59; PRO, LC 2/4/1, fos. 11v, 16v; Longleat, Seymour MS. 10, fo. 168v; PRO, SP 10/14/37, M. fos. 85r-86v; Bindoff, iii, pp. 594-596; Adams, 'Baronial contexts?', pp. 170-171, n. 80.

⁶⁶ BL Harley MS. 249, fo. 42r. Stradling was sheriff for Glamorgan from 1547-1548: BL Cotton MS. Nero C. x, fo. 47v; Jordan (ed.), *Chronicle*, pp. 94-95, ns. 167-168; Bindoff, i, pp. 655-658; iii, p. 513.

⁶⁷ BL Harley MS. 249, fo. 42r.

interrogated Somerset personally.⁶⁸ Brett was quickly rehabilitated because of his military experience. He was appointed porter of the new fortification at Berwick on 6 October 1552, having already been considered for the office of controller of Calais. He then served at Boulogne and was implicated in Wyatt's rebellion.⁶⁹ Opportunistic ducal servants took advantage of their master's fall. Christopher Dunne was arrested 'for suspicion of imbecillynge of certeyn iewells and money of the duches of Somersetts'.⁷⁰

A new lieutenant of the Tower, Sir Arthur Darcy, was installed under Sir Philip Hoby shortly after Somerset's arrest. Hoby, as master of the ordnance, had overall command. This appointment was intended to augment the Tower's strength and Darcy appears to have been placed in command of fifty-five men, while handling the day-to-day running. His office was particularly sensitive because so many important prisoners were being held there at this time. With his deputies, Sir Ralph Hopton and Leonard Chamberlain (who had been appointed the day after Somerset's arrest), Darcy should 'to ye best of your power kepe self and sure for vs, our sayd Tower', observe all the ancient rules for watching it and maintain the king's ordnance, munitions and treasure. He had been an officer there prior to his new appointment.⁷¹ Darcy was one of the principal gentlemen of Middlesex, providing horses for the musters and attending court, and appears to have been attached to the privy chamber in some capacity because he was listed in a muster book of July 1548 as among 'the privie chamber & certen of the connsell at large'. He may have been a supernumerary, holding no particular office and attending court only occasionally or for special events. For example, he was one of the attendant knights in Westminster Abbey for Edward's funeral.⁷² The immediate reason for his appointment was the liberality of the incumbent. Darcy replaced Sir John Markham on 31 October, because the previous lieutenant 'suffered the duke to walke abroad, and certain lettres to be sent, and answerid, between ~~Dan~~ Dauy Seymour, and Mrs Poings. [Poyntes] with other diuers suspicions'. This was done without the privy council's knowledge.⁷³ They reacted swiftly.⁷⁴ There is no evidence that Markham was in any way partial to Somerset, despite being related to him, having been appointed by the privy council on 1 November 1549 to replace Somerset's own appointee, Sir Walter Stoner.⁷⁵ Markham had been regarded as a trusted officer, having proceeded cautiously in his duties. It may be that the privy council was nervous and annoyed by Markham's subsequent irregular proceedings. For example,

⁶⁸ PRO, SP 10/14/33, M. fo. 80r; Tytler, ii, pp. 108-109; BL Harley MS. 249, fo. 42r.

⁶⁹ PRO, SP 10/14/66, M. fos. 147r-148r; PRO, SP 10/15/14, M. fo. 33r; BL Cotton MS. Nero C. x, fo. 77r; Jordan (ed.), *Chronicle*, p. 147; Adams, 'The Dudley clientèle', p. 246; Loades, *Northumberland*, p. 276.

⁷⁰ BL Harley MS. 249, fo. 40v; Longleat, Seymour MS. 10, fo. 169r.

⁷¹ BL Harley MS. 284, fos. 96r-99v; BL Harley MS. 284, fos. 94r-95v; APC, iii, pp. 389-390, 401-403; Bindoff, ii, p. 389.

⁷² PRO, SP 10/2/1, M. fo. 1v; PRO, SP 10/5/17, M. fo. 55v; PRO, LC 2/4/1, fo. 24v; Guy, 'Thomas Wolsey, Thomas Cromwell and the reform of Henrician government', pp. 53-57.

⁷³ BL Cotton MS. Nero C. x, fo. 45v; Jordan (ed.), *Chronicle*, p. 91.

⁷⁴ APC, iii, p. 401.

⁷⁵ APC, ii, pp. 43, 113, 154, 353, 371; see above, p. 135, n. 50.

Sir John Arundel was only granted the liberty of the Tower when the privy council instructed Markham to permit it on 7 May 1550, while Hoby and Thomas Brydges, the new lieutenant, requested permission from Mary on 9 September 1553 for Northampton '(for helthes sake) to have one houers walke dayly in the gardein'.⁷⁶ Sir Anthony Knevet (whom Stoner seems to have replaced as lieutenant by 9 August 1547), Stoner, Markham and Darcy were all substantial gentlemen, with estates and military obligations. Markham was MP for Nottinghamshire and Nottingham frequently between 1529 and his death. He was on many commissions, sheriff of Nottinghamshire and Derbyshire, and Lincolnshire, on several occasions and JP for Nottinghamshire. Their varied duties and interests make them representative of the mid-Tudor elite.⁷⁷ Darcy was more reliable than Markham was. In August 1552, while soliciting Cecil for leave from his duty, Hoby stated that Darcy, 'a man of greate fidelitie and trust, is sufficient ynough to looke vnto this place of charge'.⁷⁸

Somerset was indicted on charges of treason and felony on 21 November.⁷⁹ He was charged with having met at Somerset Place on 20 April, with Stanhope, Partridge, Holcroft, Newdigate, Vane, Sir Thomas Arundel, John Seymour and other members of his clientele, to 'compass and imagine' to deprive the king of his royal dignity and on seizing him 'at the will of the same duke to rule and treat'.⁸⁰ This was patently nonsense in the case of Arundel because he was still in the Tower at the time of the alleged treason but his relationship with the Southwells and Howards, as well as his military ability and local connections, made him dangerous to Northumberland's regime.⁸¹ Control of the king meant control of the realm, as Somerset and Northumberland were both well aware. Edward wrote to the lord chancellor on 24 November, explaining his determination 'to administer *our* lawes vnto them as we be bound by *our* duetye to god'.⁸² Control of the king allowed Northumberland to try to remove permanently any nascent threat from Somerset's clientele. Somerset had been closely watched since his release from the Tower in February 1550 and his ability to act had been carefully circumscribed by this surveillance. Yet, Northumberland was still anxious about the potential danger of Somerset's clientele as much as any real danger the duke posed. Removing Somerset would be a means of bringing his clientele to order. The king's draft instructions to Rich were closely followed during the trial and reflect an attempt to ensure procedural correctness.⁸³ The London jury found that the conspiracy occurred in St Andrew,

⁷⁶ APC, iii, pp. 27, 254; PRO, E 101/631/44; APC, iii, pp. 54-55, 88, 365, 395.

⁷⁷ APC, ii, pp. 113, 137, 318; PRO, SP 10/8/50, M. fos. 90r-91v; PRO, C 66/801, m. 17d; *Calendar of patent rolls*, i, pp. 88, 212; iii, pp. 115-116; APC, ii, p. 137; Bindoff, ii, pp. 568-570.

⁷⁸ Hatfield, Cecil MS. 151, fos. 43r-43v; Haynes, p. 125; PRO, SP 10/14/71, M. fo. 160v.

⁷⁹ PRO, KB 8/19, mm. 18-19; *Fourth report*, App. ii, p. 229.

⁸⁰ PRO, KB 8/19, mm. 24, 27; *Fourth report*, App. ii, pp. 228-229. I am grateful to Dr Mercer of the Public Record Office for his assistance in reading several documents from the 'Baga de secretis'.

⁸¹ Arundel was released on 4 October, only to be re-arrested on 18 October, having allegedly told Somerset the Tower could be taken: Bindoff, i, p. 338.

⁸² PRO, SP 10/13/64, M. fo. 124r.

⁸³ PRO, SP 10/13/64, M. fos. 124r-125v.

Holborn, while that of Kent thought that it took place at Greenwich. None of the indictments agreed as to where it happened.⁸⁴ All these accounts accord closely with Palmer's disclosures to Northumberland on 7 October, suggesting that the trial was carefully managed or even rigged. The entry in Edward's journal detailing Palmer's disclosure of the conspiracy to Northumberland must be regarded with suspicion, not because it was recorded out of sequence or because he waited until the 11th before finishing his account, but because he was partisan, antagonised Somerset over the Scottish campaign and subsequently benefited enormously from Northumberland's favour. Palmer did not explain how he knew of the conspiracy and it seems inconceivable that Herbert, a close adherent of the earl, should tell Palmer and not Northumberland.⁸⁵ Palmer explained to Northumberland that on 23 April Somerset decided to go north for his protection but was dissuaded by Herbert, who 'ashuorid him on his honour ^that he shuld haue no hurt^'.⁸⁶

Was there any truth to this? Although the evidence is taken from the imperial ambassador, Dr Bernard's examination of events in April is convincing. He believes the earls of Shrewsbury, Derby and Arundel had reached an accommodation with Somerset by the spring of 1551, caused by their exclusion from power and concern for their safety. Scheyve's speculation about pending civil war should be regarded with scepticism but there was unease within the elite.⁸⁷ R.R. Reid also used the evidence presented at Somerset's trial and other sources to argue that civil war was a real possibility.⁸⁸ However, the records of the period, the ambassador's reports excluded, do not demonstrate anything more than substantial tension. R.R. Reid's claim that Somerset became head of a catholic party, constituting 'a powerful faction which soon had behind it nearly the whole strength of the North', is unconvincing, especially considering Northumberland's growing efforts to increase his own power there.⁸⁹ The nature of northern society, distance from the south-east, religion and alienation of its elite, made the situation volatile but Tudor politics had moved beyond fifteenth century aristocratic warfare and to argue that a coup was planned for April 1551 is to take the evidence of Somerset's enemies at face value. Shrewsbury claimed, when writing to his kinsman Huntingdon in February 1551, that his ties of friendship were still strong towards him, despite the latter's close association with Warwick. Kinship ties were strong. Somebody approached Shrewsbury and 'practised with me to fele my disposition in frendship towards the Duke of Somerset and the Erle of Warwick'. This led to rumours that Shrewsbury 'hathe offred myself to be a parte and to set variance and discorde betwene my said lords'. Shrewsbury wanted

⁸⁴ PRO, KB 8/19, mm. 12, 19; *Fourth report*, App. ii, p. 229; Brigden, *London and the Reformation*, p. 514, ns. 153-154.

⁸⁵ BL Cotton MS. Nero C. x, fos. 44r, 45r; Jordan (ed.), *Chronicle*, pp. 86-89; Jordan, *The young king*, pp. 285-287; *Threshold of power*, pp. 52-53, 83-88.

⁸⁶ BL Cotton MS. Nero C. x, fo. 44r; Jordan (ed.), *Chronicle*, pp. 86-87.

⁸⁷ Bernard, *The power of the early Tudor nobility*, pp. 64-70.

⁸⁸ R.R. Reid, *The king's council in the north* (London, 1921), pp. 173-175; 'The political influence of the 'north parts'', pp. 212-216.

⁸⁹ Reid, 'The political influence of the 'north parts'', p. 212; see below, pp. 256-261.

Huntingdon to put an end to this gossip, which should set Warwick at ease. He desired amity to continue among the elite, a conventional but important notion, because it maintained 'quietnes...and concorde of the Realme'.⁹⁰ A faction was an aberration in the polity, something to be avoided if possible, even though Warwick tried to identify royal service closely with his own party.⁹¹

Shrewsbury's account is important. Somerset might have attempted to find out who would support him, if not directly, then tacitly. This was an attempt to reduce his dangerous isolation. He probably sent his clients to find out the situation among the elite. Palmer told Warwick that if Herbert had not discouraged him, the duke intended 'to rayse the peple, and the L Grey [of Wilton], before to know t who were his frendes'.⁹² Although this account is drawn from the king's journal, it is perhaps the most plausible part of Palmer's story. Whalley may have been sent to the Fleet in February 1551 for having spoken with various lords, including Rutland, about the prospect of restoring Somerset to the protectorate at the next parliament. Rutland was one of the wealthiest peers and had extensive holdings in the midlands. He was not yet too closely associated with Warwick's regime, and had been associated with Seymour. The privy council questioned Sir Francis Leke, Rutland's uncle, about Whalley's activities. Leke had connections with Somerset. He received military patronage from him in the 1540s and was closely associated with Holcroft in military service in Scotland. Somerset seems to have assisted in his return as MP for Newcastle in 1547. In 1551 Clinton and Rutland, Lincolnshire neighbours, were reported to have discussed whether the latter 'was a Somerset, or a Warwike, or a Lyncolneshire, or Nottingehamshire'.⁹³ Although they were being obscure, their meaning appears to be whether or not they supported Somerset or Warwick at court or were concerned with local politics instead. Leke denied telling Whalley of any 'communicacion' between Clinton and Rutland. Whalley had been sent to talk with Rutland at Belvoir Castle, Lincolnshire, and the earl told Leke, 'he [Whalley] hathe been here with me and pratled very muche, whiche I like not'.⁹⁴ Whalley was then interrogated 'for perswading diuers nobles of the Realme to make the duke of Somerset protectour at the next parleament'. He denied it but Rutland affirmed it 'manifestly'.⁹⁵ Professor Jordan viewed Whalley as a reckless admirer of the duke, whose actions may not have been fully known to

⁹⁰ BL Cotton MS. Titus B. ii, fos. 29r-29v; Jordan, *Threshold of power*, p. 79, n. 2.

⁹¹ Adams, 'Faction, clientage and party', pp. 33-34.

⁹² BL Cotton MS. Nero C. x, fo. 44r; Jordan (ed.), *Chronicle*, p. 87.

⁹³ Leke was a kinsman of Rutland's steward, John Leke, *custos rotulorum* of Derbyshire and of the quorum for Northumberland, sheriff of Nottinghamshire and Derbyshire in 1547-1548, and a member of Rutland's council as warden of the east and middle marches: BL Cotton MS. Nero C. x, fo. 29v; Jordan (ed.), *Chronicle*, pp. 52-53; *APC*, iii, pp. 215, 217, 248, 295; *The manuscripts of... the duke of Rutland*, iv, pp. 201, 362; PRO, C 66/801, mm. 9d, 17d; *Calendar of patent rolls*, i, pp. 82, 87-88; LPL, MS. 3193, fos. 51-52; Lodge (ed.), *Illustrations of British history*, i, pp. 151-154, n. *; PRO, SP 15/3, fos. 61r-64v; LPL, MS. 3206, fo. 129; LPL, MS. 3206, fo. 161; Bindoff, ii, pp. 518-520.

⁹⁴ *APC*, iii, p. 217; Bindoff, ii, pp. 519-520.

⁹⁵ Whalley was released under a bond of £1000 on 2 April: BL Cotton MS. Nero C. x, fo. 29v; Jordan (ed.), *Chronicle*, pp. 52-53, n. 1; *APC*, iii, pp. 248, 295.

Somerset. However, he was a trusted servant and a sensible and pragmatic man. He is more likely to have been soliciting support than trying to restore the protectorate, and doing so in the full knowledge of his master.⁹⁶ Rumours that Somerset was trying to find supporters even reached the imperial ambassador by the autumn, who also heard persistent stories that the former lord protector sought to renew his alliance with the commons. Somerset may have hoped to gain parliamentary backing to contest Northumberland's policies but it is likely that he was trying to widen his support rather than challenge the regime. Derby and Shrewsbury were both quarrelling with Warwick at this time over their lands and local offices and this gave them common interest with Somerset. Warwick was openly antagonising Shrewsbury, including sending one of the latter's servants, James Clarke, to the Fleet and ordering searches of Clarke's possessions in June 1550.⁹⁷ However, these tensions towards Shrewsbury were not evident among all Warwick's allies. The marchioness of Dorset was writing to the earl at the same time to request a stag from him, a sign of continued contact and friendship between the Greys and Talbots, and promised to return the favour.⁹⁸

Somerset also turned to the west country nobility, too. He was grateful towards Stourton in the summer and autumn of 1551 'in consideracion of certeyn frendshippe he hath done vnto vs of late'. Stourton seems to have been his client since April 1547 and was knighted for his services during the Pinkie campaign. He was one of the principal nobles in Somerset, although he was generally assessed at court for the subsidy (suggesting he was frequently attendant). He was also Northumberland's nephew, which complicated the situation. Stourton had taken advantage of the October coup by ransacking Thynne's house at Longleat but this may have reflected animosity towards Somerset's steward rather than the duke himself. Again, there were tensions within clienteles. By August 1551 Somerset was attempting to strengthen his relationship with Stourton into an even closer fidelity clientage than it already was. He mediated in a local dispute Stourton was involved in with the father of Thynne's servant, John Hartgill, acting as good lord, appointed him master of the game at Holt and Bradley woods and promised to make him high steward of various estates (even though Thynne felt this encroached on his interests). Thynne had also tried to mediate in the dispute between Stourton and William Hartgill. Somerset attempted to reassure Thynne, who was keeper of the game at Holt and Bradley Woods, but it was essential to increase his ties with powerful neighbours, even if it disrupted his clientele. Stourton was not apprehended

⁹⁶ Jordan, *Threshold of power*, pp. 79-80; PRO, SP 10/10/9, M. fos. 21r-22v.

⁹⁷ *Simancas*, x, pp. 168, 186; LPL, MS. 3206, fo. 185; Jordan, *Threshold of power*, pp. 78-81.

⁹⁸ LPL, MS. 3206, fo. 189.

with Somerset's other clients in October. Perhaps he was not considered too close to Somerset, perhaps he was lucky. Kinship with Northumberland was probably a factor too.⁹⁹

What was happening in April 1551? On the day of the conspiracy (23 April) the king recorded that Henry II and Clinton had been elected to the Order of the Garter and Somerset, Northampton, Wiltshire and Warwick 'should peruse and amend th'ordre'. Scheyve heard Somerset planned to go north to raise support. Although this was probably only a rumour, it was widespread enough for Palmer to use it in his accusations in October.¹⁰⁰ There had been rumours of disturbances on 15-16 April in London and at Chelmsford, Essex. The privy council issued a general letter to the JPs on 15 April ordering them to enforce the laws against vagabonds, unlawful games, sedition and rumours, while four days later the recorder of London and members of the court of aldermen or the common council informed the board of slanderous books and bills circulating in the city.¹⁰¹ However, in an attempt to discourage rumours of dissension in their numbers, the privy councillors banqueted together for three days between 24-26 April.¹⁰² The city authorities recorded nothing remarkable during these days. The court of aldermen carried out business pertaining to city affairs as usual. The exception was that certain people of Portsoken Ward were regarded with suspicion and a double watch was ordered on 28 April. This was to be kept on 'May evyn' and was in response to the rumours of a potential riot on 1 May.¹⁰³ What the incidents in Essex and London were not, were gatherings on behalf of Somerset. The duke's activities were subtler, better organised and probably amounted to an attempt to find out who among the elite were favourably disposed towards him. The incident in Essex looks like a potential enclosure riot, while that in London is reminiscent of the 'yell [evil] May day' riots of 1517, when the inhabitants vented their frustrations against foreigners and wealthy merchants on this day traditionally associated with the inversion of the social order.¹⁰⁴ Palmer went on to make more remarkable claims. 'Afterward a deuse was made to call th'eryl of warwike to the towre a banket with th'e Marquis of Northampton and diuers other, and to cutte of there heades. Also if he [Somerset] found a bare company about them by by the way to set upon them'.¹⁰⁵ Perhaps this was meant to take place during the banqueting held between 24-26 April, possibly at Paget Place? The likelihood is that any understanding between the earls of Derby, Shrewsbury and Arundel and Somerset was about

⁹⁹ Longleat, Seymour MS. 4, fo. 15r; PRO, E 179/69/46; PRO, E 179/69/51; PRO, E 179/69/49; PRO, E 179/69/75; *The complete peerage*, eds. Gibbs *et al.*, xii (part 1), pp. 307-308, n. h; Bindoff, ii, pp. 309-310; iii, pp. 465-466; Mertes, *The English noble household*, pp. 56-74.

¹⁰⁰ *Simancas*, x, pp. 262, 290-291; *Calendar of state papers, Venetian*, v, p. 339.

¹⁰¹ BL Cotton MS. Nero C. x, fo. 32r; Jordan (ed.), *Chronicle*, p. 59; APC, iii, pp. 260, 262; *Simancas*, x, p. 262.

¹⁰² BL Cotton MS. Nero C. x, fo. 33r; Jordan (ed.), *Chronicle*, p. 60.

¹⁰³ I am grateful to James Sewell, city archivist of the Corporation of London, for this information: CLRO Repertory 12 (2), fos. 327v-332r.

¹⁰⁴ J.J. Scarisbrick, *Henry VIII* (London, 1990 edn.), pp. 67, 104; R.B. Manning, 'Patterns of violence in early Tudor enclosure riots', *Albion*, 6 (1974), pp. 120-133; 'Violence and social conflict in mid-Tudor rebellions', *Journal of British Studies*, 16 (1977), pp. 18-40; Nichols (ed.), *Chronicle of the Grey Friars*, p. 30; J. Walter, 'The commons and their mental worlds', in J. Morrill (ed.), *The Oxford illustrated history of Tudor and Stuart Britain* (Oxford and New York, 1996), pp. 199-200.

¹⁰⁵ BL Cotton MS. Nero C. x, fo. 44r; Jordan (ed.), *Chronicle*, pp. 86-87.

mutual protection through good lordship. If none of them looked isolated it would make it harder for their enemies to attack them, even through the king. A prospected marriage was arranged between Strange, Derby's heir, and Lady Jane Seymour, Somerset's daughter, and Strange became the duke's client at court, watching developments and reporting gossip.¹⁰⁶ Warwick succeeded in isolating Somerset during the summer by diminishing the antagonism felt by Derby, Shrewsbury and Arundel, including admitting Derby and Arundel to the privy council (albeit only permitting them to sit when summoned), but they continued to be accompanied by very large retinues whenever in London.¹⁰⁷ Shrewsbury did not sit on the jury that tried Somerset, although he was initially listed to do so.¹⁰⁸ On 3 January 1552, he was summoned to attend parliament but he had already explained that his 'helth' might not be good enough.¹⁰⁹ Dr Bernard sees this as a politic delay. Shrewsbury did not get to London until 28 January, six days after the duke's execution.¹¹⁰

Depositions were taken from Crane, Palmer and the earl of Arundel, probably in November, and shed light on the complex interaction within the Somerset clientele.¹¹¹ The privy council ordered the use of torture if necessary, while ensuring that the prisoners were more closely guarded.¹¹² According to the depositions, before he went on a tour of the west country (perhaps in late July 1550), Somerset discussed with his wife the prospect of contacting Arundel about the possibility of apprehending Northumberland, Northampton and Pembroke at a privy council meeting. Arundel seems to have been uneasy about Pembroke's seizure, regarding him as 'an honest man & wolde be confyrmable enoughe yf the other were taken'.¹¹³ Arundel and the duke spent four or five days discussing their plans in the garden at Somerset Place. Arundel wanted parliament to be summoned in order to give their actions legal sanction by acquiring the support of the elite and both men agreed that religious reform should be carried no further. The prisoners would be sent to the Tower 'to be vsyd there as they were when they were there'. This was to be done for 'the reformation of the estate of the Realme'. The prisoners would have to agree to reform.¹¹⁴ It is interesting how far Somerset's wife and clients advanced these negotiations, while the duke himself seemed more apprehensive. Stanhope had opened the negotiations but Crane was subsequently sent to tell the duchess of Somerset to break them off. Arundel preferred Stanhope to act as messenger rather than Crane or Cecil and agreed to Pembroke's arrest, while suggesting Sir John York (who had replaced Sir John Bowes as treasurer of the mint at Durham Place) should

¹⁰⁶ APC, iii, p. 398; Bernard, *The power of the early Tudor nobility*, pp. 67-68.

¹⁰⁷ Bernard, *The power of the early Tudor nobility*, pp. 68-70; Nichols (ed.), *The diary of Henry Machyn*, p. 6; *Simancas*, x, pp. 290-291.

¹⁰⁸ PRO, KB 8/19, mm. 6-8; BL Harley MS. 249, fo. 44r.

¹⁰⁹ LPL, MS. 3193, fo. 219; Bernard, *The power of the early Tudor nobility*, p. 70.

¹¹⁰ LPL, MS. 3193, fo. 219.

¹¹¹ PRO, SP 10/13/65, M. fos. 126r-127v; PRO, SP 10/13/66, M. fos. 128r-129v; PRO, SP 10/13/67, M. fos. 130r-131v; Tytler, ii, pp. 38-41, 43-47.

¹¹² APC, iii, pp. 401-403, 407.

¹¹³ PRO, SP 10/13/65, M. fo. 126r; BL Cotton MS. Nero C. x, fo. 25r; Jordan (ed.), *Chronicle*, p. 41.

¹¹⁴ PRO, SP 10/13/65, M. fos. 126r-126v.

also be taken because he could inform them of any embezzlement of the king's money.¹¹⁵ Further depositions were taken from Arundel in the presence of Northumberland, Northampton, Bedford, Pembroke and Hoby. He confirmed speaking with Somerset about forcing Northumberland, Northampton and Pembroke 'to annswer, and reforme thinges', although he 'ment no hurt to your bodies'. He had also warned Somerset 'to take good heede whom he trusted for his counsayle and secreties were comne abrode'.¹¹⁶ If Somerset spoke with Cecil it is likely that Warwick would be informed, unless these conversations took place in mid-1550. If they occurred in 1550, it could provide another explanation for why Warwick approached some ducal servants at the time.¹¹⁷ Arundel was pressured into confirming his deposition again, although he wanted to retract parts of it, especially that he had sent Stanhope to warn the duke and duchess to be more cautious after having visited Pembroke at Baynard's Castle (when he 'dyd perceve by his [Pembroke's] talke, that he had summe intelligence of theis matters').¹¹⁸ What is clear from the depositions, even if it was Palmer who said it, was that Somerset 'desyeryd mucche to haue assuryd vnto hym the Erle of arundell & others'. He was attempting to build a party, either in order to make him feel more secure or to oppose certain policies, especially religious changes and conservative social policy.¹¹⁹

Security in London was carefully controlled. On 8 October a letter was issued for the *gendarmes* to muster on 8 November. This was also a diplomatic exercise because on 6 November Northumberland, Pembroke and the earl of Wiltshire (Winchester's heir), 'with 58 of his fathers band', the gentlemen pensioners and met-at-arms, conveyed Mary of Guise through London on her way from France.¹²⁰ However, it had been decided by 26 October, 'bicause of thies busines, to differ [defer], the matter ^mustars^ of the gend'armery' until December.¹²¹

According to Somerset's indictment, on 21 April, while at Greenwich with the court, he conspired against the king and planned to seize Northumberland, Northampton and Pembroke.¹²² The desire to control the king was an accurate description of Somerset's outlook as lord protector. However, the charge had to be more substantial and it was claimed that with his clientele he intended to apprehend and imprison Northumberland. It was alleged that Somerset also planned to obtain the great seal and take the Tower, acquiring the ordnance and treasure there, in order to make himself strong enough to dominate the government and re-establish the protectorate. The charge went on

¹¹⁵ PRO, SP 10/13/65, M. fos. 126r-126v; *Simancas*, x, p. 262.

¹¹⁶ PRO, SP 10/13/66, M. fo. 128r.

¹¹⁷ PRO, SP 10/10/9, M. fos. 21r-22v.

¹¹⁸ PRO, SP 10/13/67, M. fos. 130r-130v.

¹¹⁹ PRO, SP 10/13/65, M. fo. 126v.

¹²⁰ BL Cotton MS. Nero C. x, fos. 43v, 47r-47v; Jordan (ed.), *Chronicle*, pp. 86, 94; BL Royal MS. 18 C xxiv, fo. 138r; Wriothesley, *Chronicle*, ii, pp. 60-62; Hoak, *The king's council*, pp. 200-201.

¹²¹ BL Cotton MS. Nero C. x, fo. 46r; Jordan (ed.), *Chronicle*, p. 92; see below, pp. 226-227.

¹²² PRO, KB 8/19, m. 12; *Fourth report*, App. ii, p. 229. The privy council met at Greenwich between 30 March and 28 April and were issuing warrants for the great seal there on 20-21 April: *APC*, iii, pp. 245-267; PRO, C 82/932, fos. 3r, 5r, 11r.

to claim that he ordered his supporters to attempt to incite the citizens of London into rebellion. Somerset was directly involved in this and ‘with cries and exclamations, he shouted these English words, “liberty, liberty”’. The method adopted, drums and trumpets, was often used by the muster masters. It was hoped those citizens unwilling to offer support would be robbed and attacked by the rest. These claims suggest Somerset would try to rely on his popularity and dynamic military leadership to incite the citizens into joining him.¹²³ The normally fastidious mayor and common council did not record either the alleged events of 20 April at Somerset Place or those said to have occurred at Greenwich and in the city the following day.¹²⁴ A second indictment was made against the duke. It was alleged that on 20 May Somerset feloniously ‘procured, moved and instigated’ Partridge and other clients to rebel against the king. They planned to imprison Northumberland, Northampton and Pembroke, Somerset’s leading enemies.¹²⁵ Hayward described Partridge and Stanhope as ‘consociates’. This is an apt description of clients. To consociate is to associate together, bring into association, companionship, and partnership; to conjoin in action. Both men were close to Somerset and advised him to defend his interests but neither fact makes the charges more probable.¹²⁶ On 30 November, Winchester, as lord high steward, ordered the sergeant-at-arms, John Rychebelle, to empanel a jury of Somerset’s peers for the duke’s trial. Among them were supporters of the ascendant party: Suffolk, Northumberland, Northampton, Huntingdon, Bedford, Pembroke, Hereford, Cobham and Darcy.¹²⁷ The process of empanelling the jury is recorded in an extant document that lists the peers. It is possible that the reason why some men were not selected was because they were likely to be sympathetic, either because of client associations or because they were conservatives precluded from influence by the regime. This could explain why Oxford, Shrewsbury, Morley and Dacre of Gilsland were not chosen from the list. Arundel was not even listed. However, Oxford and Morley were unlikely to show support for Somerset and conservatives like Derby and Lord Stafford were selected. Westmorland, who might have been regarded as a Dudley client, was not empanelled.¹²⁸ Selection may also have been based on availability. Westmorland was serving in Durham, Shrewsbury was sitting on the council of the north.

Winchester then organised the trial, which took place on 1 December. Somerset pleaded not guilty to the charges and was, rather surprisingly, acquitted of treason but found guilty of felony. He was

¹²³ PRO, KB 8/19, m. 27; *Fourth report*, App. ii, pp. 228-229.

¹²⁴ CLRO Journal 16, fos. 114r-115r; CLRO Repertory 12 (2), fos. 327v-328v; CLRO Repertory 12 (2), fos. 339v-340r.

¹²⁵ PRO, KB 8/19, m. 26; *Fourth report*, App. ii, p. 229.

¹²⁶ Hayward, *The life and reign of King Edward the Sixth*, p. 148; Simpson and Weiner (eds.), *The compact Oxford English dictionary*, p. 320.

¹²⁷ PRO, KB 8/19, mm. 6-8; *Fourth report*, App. ii, p. 230. However, the twenty six-were representative of the peerage: BL Harley MS. 249, fos. 44r-44v.

¹²⁸ BL Harley MS. 249, fos. 44r-44v.

sentenced to death.¹²⁹ The king was kept informed of proceedings.¹³⁰ As witnesses were produced, Somerset made his intentions clear at his trial: he never intended to raise the north 'but he was aferd for brutes [rumours] and that moued him to send to Sir William Harbert'; Palmer was mainly lying, his story about the banquet being untrue; 'for London ~~næh~~ he ment nothing for hurte of any Lord but for his owne defence'; while pointing out the ludicrousness of the charge that he would attack nine hundred *gendarmes* with his company of one hundred ('it were but a made [mad] matter'). He denied Strange's confession, as well as refusing to recognise the confessions of his servants Newdigate, Hammond and Alexander Seymour, 'because they were his men'. It seemed normal to him to have members of his household with him when at Greenwich (although Palmer claimed he had sinister intentions), especially as 'when he could haue done harme he did it not'. Realising that he could not win, Somerset did the conventional thing in treason trials and admitted his guilt.¹³¹ If the jury was packed, then it is unlikely to have acquitted Somerset of treason. When Northumberland, through the king, determined on punishing and reducing the Somerset clientele to order, the machinery of the law was set in motion and the peers were expected to be compliant. Even though Edward was still a minor, nobody would be able to question him if he stated that Somerset was a threat and had committed treason, even though Northumberland was manipulating him. Edward's journal is useful here because it reflected what he was being told and demonstrates the means by which the isolated king was controlled through information.

The *gendarmes* finally mustered in St James's Park on 7 December, probably to demonstrate unity within the privy council and as a means of overawing the citizens, who had been so dismayed at Somerset's conviction. The lord of misrule and his revels were renewed over Christmas to divert the court and distract the Londoners. Yet, a large crowd gathered for Somerset's execution on 22 January 1552.¹³² The duke prepared himself for death. He told the crowd to obey the king and the privy council before dying in the manner of a protestant martyr or a Christian stoic.¹³³ The privy council feared the popular response and monitored the situation in the localities carefully. Matthew Colthurst, Somerset's auditor, initially heard that his master had been acquitted of felony and organised a popular celebration in Bath on 3 December, which was a borough heavily influenced by the Seymours because of their landed connection. He had the city bells rung, lit bonfires and dispensed money to the poor. The implication of these activities, which often

¹²⁹ PRO, KB 8/19, mm. 1-5; *Fourth report*, App. ii, p. 230; BL Harley MS. 249, fo. 44r; Wriothsley, *Chronicle*, ii, pp. 62-63.

¹³⁰ BL Cotton MS. Nero C. x, fos. 49r-50r; Jordan (ed.), *Chronicle*, pp. 97-100; PRO, KB 8/19, m. 7; *Fourth report*, App. ii, p. 230.

¹³¹ BL Cotton MS. Nero C. x, fos. 49r-50r; Jordan (ed.), *Chronicle*, pp. 97-100.

¹³² Wriothsley, *Chronicle*, ii, pp. 63-65; BL Cotton MS. Nero C. x, fos. 50r-52v; Jordan (ed.), *Chronicle*, pp. 100-107; Foxe, *The acts and monuments*, vi, pp. 293-297; A.J. Kempe (ed.), *Loseley manuscripts* (London, 1835), pp. 23-36, 57-59, 65; *Simancas*, x, pp. 408, 437-438, 444; Jordan, *Threshold of power*, pp. 97-105.

presaged rebellion and, at least, showed that the Somerset clientele continued to court popularity as a means of enhancing political status, cannot have been lost on the privy council.¹³⁴

Vane, Partridge, Stanhope and Sir Thomas Arundel were now tried, found guilty and executed. They had also been accused of plotting to murder Northumberland.¹³⁵ Vane was said to have had the improbable number of '2000 men in readines', Arundel was to take the Tower and Partridge 'shuld raise London, and take the great seale with the [ap]printe[ce]s of London. Seymour and Hammon should wayt upon him and al the hors of the gend'armery shuld be slayne'.¹³⁶ On 19 October, Palmer claimed the *gendarmes* were to have been assaulted by Somerset's clientele in April: 'his frendes wich stood by...and the idle peple wich toke his parte'.¹³⁷ Again, Somerset's relationship with the commons was used against him. If Vane 'were ouerthrowen he wold set apen rune through London, and crie liberty, liberty, to raise the prentises, and if he could, he wold goe to thisle of wight, or to Poole'.¹³⁸ This was fantasy. Somerset had been indicted for assembling men to overthrow Northumberland (1 Edward VI, c. 12) and planning to imprison privy councillors (3 & 4 Edward VI, c. 5).¹³⁹ Dr Loach believed he 'may not have been totally innocent of an intention to do Warwick harm, and to regain his own position'.¹⁴⁰ Although his trial had the trappings of legality, the case against Somerset was extremely flimsy. He was the victim of Northumberland's insecurity. Cranmer, Paget and Rich may have attempted to mitigate on Somerset's behalf, leaving them vulnerable as a consequence.¹⁴¹

Palmer was well rewarded. He received an annuity of forty marks for life on 8 January 1552 and was granted substantial estates between 1552-1553. His largest grant was made on 22 June 1552 and was worth £113.14.0 per annum. His brother, Sir Henry Palmer had already benefited. The brothers were rewarded with Partridge's extensive estates at Kew, while Sir John Gates received Vane's Middlesex estate and the goods from his house at Westminster, along with furs and goods belonging to Somerset. Darcy got Stanhope's household goods from Beddington, Clinton got much of Sir Thomas Arundel's estates, giving him new standing in the southwest, and Sir William Sidney got Vane's large estate at Enfield and his properties in Kent.¹⁴² Lord Bray, Shrewsbury's

¹³³ BL Stowe MS. 1066; Foxe, *The acts and monuments*, vi, pp. 293-297; Bradshaw, 'Protestant polemic', pp. 128, 196; Loach, *Protector Somerset*, pp. 51-52.

¹³⁴ APC, iii, pp. 462, 465; Jordan, *Threshold of power*, pp. 104-105.

¹³⁵ The case against Arundel was particularly weak: PRO, KB 8/20, mm. 1-22; *Fourth report*, App. ii, pp. 230-232; Wriothesley, *Chronicle*, ii, pp. 66-67; Hayward, *The life and raigne of King Edward the Sixth*, p. 148.

¹³⁶ Either John or Alexander Seymour: BL Cotton MS. Nero C. x, fo. 44r; Jordan (ed.), *Chronicle*, pp. 87-88.

¹³⁷ BL Cotton MS. Nero C. x, fo. 45r; Jordan (ed.), *Chronicle*, p. 89.

¹³⁸ BL Cotton MS. Nero C. x, fo. 45r; Jordan (ed.), *Chronicle*, p. 89.

¹³⁹ BL Cotton MS. Nero C. x, fos. 49r-50r; Jordan (ed.), *Chronicle*, pp. 97-100; Loach, *Protector Somerset*, pp. 46-48.

¹⁴⁰ Loach, *Protector Somerset*, pp. 48-51.

¹⁴¹ BL Additional MS. 48018, fos. 406r-406v; *Simancas*, x, pp. 452-453.

¹⁴² Strype (ed.), *Ecclesiastical memorials*, ii, I, pp. 541-542; J.G. Nichols (ed.), *The literary remains of King Edward VI* (Roxburghe Club, ii vols.; 1857), ii, p. 431; *Calendar of patent rolls*, iv, pp. 50, 109, 220-221, 236, 293-294, 320; PRO, E 179/69/45; Bindoff, ii, p. 199; Jordan, *Threshold of power*, p. 110.

brother-in-law, replaced Vane as lieutenant of the gentlemen pensioners.¹⁴³ By August 1553 Palmer had money and goods to the value of £897.4.5, was owed £276.13.4 and had an income of £309.2.10. Gates had money and goods to the value of £962.7.0 and an income of £796.4.9 (including an annuity of £100 out of the duchy of Lancaster over and above his fee as chancellor). He had £469.7.8 with him when he was arrested at Cambridge. Palmer and Gates had fine houses in London and their counties, Bedfordshire and Essex, and many other fine perquisites. Gates had a large household, numbering seventy-seven servants. Palmer's household was probably about forty per cent of this size, comparing the two mens' incomes.¹⁴⁴ Both men did well out of adherence to the Dudley clientele.

III: Northumberland's ascendancy, 1552-1553

After Somerset's second fall, Northumberland narrowed his support base by dislodging from power Paget, Rich (who was replaced as lord chancellor by Ely), and Tunstall, the conservative bishop of Durham. Other Henrician prelates were deprived or forced out, including Gardiner, and the complexion of the episcopate was altered when reformers replaced them. Paget was committed to the Fleet on 21 October 1551, accused by Palmer of plotting Northumberland's death; the assassination was to have taken place during a banquet at Paget Place. He was removed to the Tower and surrendered the seals of the duchy of Lancaster on 19 November (being replaced by Gates in this office).¹⁴⁵ In April 1552 Paget was degraded from the Order of the Garter 'chiefly because he was no gentleman of blood neither of fathers side nor mothers side', a severe humiliation.¹⁴⁶ Northumberland was dissatisfied with two drafts of Paget's submission made in late May and he was expected to make another before the privy council.¹⁴⁷ He was demoted from his offices on 20 June, fined £8000 and rusticated to his Staffordshire estates.¹⁴⁸ Northumberland was eager to distribute land and property confiscated from Paget and John Beaumont (the disgraced master of the rolls) as patronage among his friends and clients. The privy council was to further Huntingdon's suit to have some of Beaumont's land and property and to consider granting him Paget's house at West Drayton, Middlesex, and to give Paget Place on the Strand to Darcy, 'whereof your good lordships well knowe there lack'.¹⁴⁹ Proximity to court and government was

¹⁴³ Nichols (ed.), *The diary of Henry Machyn*, pp. 11-12, 19; PRO, E 179/69/49; PRO, E 179/69/51; PRO, E 179/69/63; PRO, E 179/69/64; PRO, E 179/69/75; *The complete peerage*, eds. Gibbs *et al*, ii, pp. 287-288.

¹⁴⁴ PRO, LR 2/118, fos. 10v, 11r, 13r, 16r, 17r, 29r, 42v-43v, 82r-83r, 85r-85v; PRO, E 154/2/39, fos. 42r-48r, 57v-61r; Bindoff, ii, pp. 198-199.

¹⁴⁵ Jordan, *Threshold of power*, pp. 84, 93, 110-115; BL Cotton MS. Nero C. x, fo. 46r; Jordan (ed.), *Chronicle*, pp. 92-93; APC, iii, p. 419; Loach, *Protector Somerset*, p. 47; APC, iv, pp. 27-28; Somerville, *Duchy of Lancaster*, i, pp. 394-395. For the consequences of similar action by Richard III, see: Horrox, *Richard III*, pp. 273-323.

¹⁴⁶ BL Cotton MS. Nero C. x, fo. 59v; Jordan (ed.), *Chronicle*, p. 119; Wriothesley, *Chronicle*, ii, p. 69.

¹⁴⁷ PRO, SP 10/14/33, M. fos. 80r-80v; PRO, SP 10/14/34, M. fos. 81r-81Av.

¹⁴⁸ Hatfield, Cecil MS. 1, fos. 85r-85v; PRO, SP 10/15/58, M. fos. 122r-123v; Beer and Jack, p. 139.

¹⁴⁹ BL Lansdowne MS. 2, fos. 165r-167v; J. Hurstfield, 'Corruption and reform under Edward VI and Mary: the example of wardship', *English Historical Review*, 68 (1953), pp. 24-27; Jordan, *Threshold of power*, pp. 442-444, 448; Bindoff, i, pp. 405-406; Gammon, *Statesman and schemer*, pp. 180-184. An inventory of Paget Place was drawn up in

invaluable and Darcy, as lord chamberlain, was expected to be in constant attendance. A substantial urban residence would be desirable to suit his new dignity as Lord Darcy of Chiche (created in 1551). Thynne seems to have acquired the Savoy during the protectorate for the same purpose. Darcy also felt he deserved compensation for property he had a claim to that was now parcel of the duchy of Lancaster.¹⁵⁰

Paget did not want to be excluded from London and attempted to mitigate his harsh treatment by writing to Cecil and Darcy, while his wife pleaded directly with the privy council. Paget was using his own personal relationship with Northumberland's clients. He pleaded that his accommodation in Staffordshire was unfit for habitation and both his wife's and his own poor health meant they needed to remain in London. He submitted in star chamber on 16 June and the order of rustication was finally rescinded on 27 September. By November a remission of £2000 had been granted, leaving a still swingeing £6000 fine. He was keen to pay off as much as possible in cash in order to preserve his estates from Northumberland, especially Cannock Chase in Staffordshire. A second remission of £2000 was made.¹⁵¹ Paget wished to prevent the reduction of his estates because he would be unable to live as a baron 'in sorte as that place requyrethe' and requested instead that he make four annual cash payments at Christmas of £1000 each or, if the king desired some of his land, that he convey lands in Derbyshire, Leicestershire and Warwickshire worth £100 per annum and make two annual payments.¹⁵² This would prevent Northumberland distributing the land to his supporters as patronage because it was less easy to justify giving the king's money away than it was to grant royal land. This process of negotiation and reduction was repeated with other people who were initially fined heavily, including the earl of Arundel.

Why did Northumberland turn on Paget? On returning from negotiating the treaty of Boulogne (January-February, 1550), Paget expected to hold a position of authority on the privy council and the following month wrote his policy paper on reorganising conciliar government. He did not return to London until 29 March and the advise was endorsed on the 23rd as 'the remembrance gyven to my Master by my Lorde Paget'. This suggests it was written while Paget was still in France or in transit and intended for his companion Petre, rather than specifically for Warwick. This makes sense because Petre was the most experienced figure in the privy council's day-to-day

1552, probably in preparation for its appropriation: GLRO, Acc. 446/H 1. I am grateful to Andrew Johnston for allowing me to use his transcription of this document.

¹⁵⁰ Hatfield, Cecil MS. 1, fo. 85r; *The complete peerage*, eds. Gibbs *et al*, iv, p. 78; Hatfield, Cecil MS. 151, fo. 94r; Haynes, p. 147.

¹⁵¹ Hatfield, Cecil MS. 1, fos. 85r-85v; BL Cotton MS. Nero C. x, fo. 67v; Jordan (ed.), *Chronicle*, pp. 133, 156; BL Lansdowne MS. 2, fos. 165r-165v; *APC*, iv, pp. 131, 176-177; PRO, SP 10/15/58, M. fos. 122r-123v; Beer and Jack, pp. 103-105; Gammon, *Statesman and schemer*, pp. 183-184.

¹⁵² PRO, SP 10/15/58, M. fos. 122r-122v; Beer and Jack, pp. 103-105.

administration. It could have been for Dr Wotton, though.¹⁵³ Warwick had recognised Petre's importance from the outset, rewarding him for his support during the October coup by making him treasurer of the court of first fruits and tenths on 20 October 1549. This involved him even more closely in the affairs of the court because he had to provide money towards its costs.¹⁵⁴ Professor Hoak argues that Paget and Petre may have attempted to regularise the privy council's practises partially to improve government efficiency in the current difficult times and partially to 'strengthen its collective authority' against an ambitious Warwick. Paget's advice could have been part of this process.¹⁵⁵ His influence waned and, like Somerset, he turned increasingly to the management of his estates. Paget still attempted to ingratiate himself with Warwick, though with mixed success.¹⁵⁶ Their differences began to emerge in January 1551, if not earlier. The privy council appears to have been divided over the draft of a commission securing its legal authority on a firmer basis. On 22 January, Warwick wrote warning Paget to be 'vigilant and sircumspect in the matter whiche now yow haue in hand'. Paget, Rich, Wiltshire (Winchester) and Bedford, had misgivings about these changes. Warwick hoped Rich and Wiltshire might be compliant and 'it may be wrappyd upp in silens'. He felt secrecy was necessary to prevent the privy council from being seen as divided, which would undermine the regime. Those who obstructed the necessary changes would be regarded as 'disceyvers of the hole body of the realme'. Warwick orchestrated his activities to gain the support of the king, with Baker possibly presenting the case for reform to Edward on 21 January. His stated aim was the preservation of the king's safety, which to him necessitated greater authority and 'as for the truth of the matter that men shold nat be against the perfytt reforming of it now, specially seing it hath byn thus farr debatyd'. Warwick wanted this letter to be made known to Bedford.¹⁵⁷ The exhortatory tone of many of Warwick's letters could give the impression that he was badgering the other councillors or attempting to stifle dissenting opinions but the dynamic of conciliar debate appears to have been intact. Warwick wanted to persuade the dissenters that reform was necessary in the face of instability. However, he was adopting methods that alienated his colleagues and may have tried to compel them by claiming the good of the commonwealth was at stake, when he was keener to increase his power.

In the strained atmosphere of late 1550-1551, when tensions rose between Somerset and Warwick, a powerful and articulate figure like Paget, with questionable connections to the former lord protector, was likely to come under suspicion. Certainly, Somerset appeared to be reconstructing his support. There may have been tension between Warwick and Paget over land too. Warwick had acquired Bromsgrove and Feckenham in Worcestershire. Paget was closely associated with

¹⁵³ BL Egerton MS. 2603, fo. 34v; Gammon, *Statesman and schemer*, p. 172; Hoak, *The king's council*, pp. 93-94.

¹⁵⁴ Emmison, *Tudor secretary*, pp. 86-87.

¹⁵⁵ Hoak, *The king's council*, p. 94.

¹⁵⁶ BL Cotton MS. Nero C. x, fo. 66v; Jordan (ed.), *Chronicle*, p. 131; BL Egerton MS. 2603, fos. 33r-34v; Gammon, *Statesman and schemer*, pp. 173-176; Longleat, Seymour MS. 4, fos. 14r-14v.

Bromsgrove and had been steward of several of Catherine Parr's dower estates in Worcestershire, including Bromsgrove and Feckenham. Warwick and Paget may have competed even more because they both had the bulk of their estates in the midlands.¹⁵⁸ Paget was accused of defrauding the duchy when his fall was orchestrated. Dr Gammon could find no evidence to support this charge.¹⁵⁹ However, Paget recognised that he must accept complicity as part of a ritual of compliance, it being the only means of extricating himself from Somerset's fall. The duchy officers most closely associated with Somerset were removed on 19 June 1552. Holcroft and Whalley relinquished their receiverships and gave bonds, while Thynne surrendered his lease of the Savoy (which was restored to the duchy of Lancaster), a minor London office and gave a bond for 1000 marks.¹⁶⁰ Sir John Arundel was released from the Tower at the same time and bound by a recognisance not to absent himself from court and to remain within two or three miles of London.¹⁶¹ Holcroft, Whalley and Thynne were also released from the Tower, to be joined later by Fisher and Brende, then Banister and Crane were freed, 'th'one for his ^large^ confession th'other bicause litle matter appered against him'. Grey of Wilton was granted a full pardon on 10 June and three months later was appointed commander at Guînes, while the earl of Arundel made his submission on 3 December, was fined six thousand marks and gave bonds for ten thousand marks before being released.¹⁶² Thynne retired to the west country but his ties with the Seymours were still strong and he risked much by petitioning, with Berwick and Colthurst, for a partial restoration of Somerset's estates to his widow on behalf of Sir Edward Seymour (demoted from his earldom of Hertford in the aftermath of his father's execution). Thynne's successful petition was probably indirectly assisted by his brother-in-law, Gresham, and directly by Winchester.¹⁶³ This process of rehabilitation continued under Mary and Elizabeth. The dowager duchess of Somerset informed Thynne in November 1553 that Mary was prepared to restore the earldom of Hertford to her son and the lands held by Somerset at Henry's death, especially those now in royal hands. She asked for his 'ernest help' because none of the other former ducal officers knew the extent of Somerset's estate as well as him. She also wrote to Berwick, Hanay, Colthurst and John Seymour to get their 'accomptes'. She expressed concern for Thynne's wellbeing too. Mary restored Seymour to blood but it was left to Elizabeth to make him earl of Hertford again in

¹⁵⁷ BL Cotton MS. Titus B. ii, fo. 38r; Jordan, *Threshold of power*, p. 51.

¹⁵⁸ See above, pp. 94, n. 102, 159-160.

¹⁵⁹ Gammon, *Statesman and schemer*, pp. 176-183; Jordan, *Threshold of power*, pp. 113-115.

¹⁶⁰ Hatfield, Cecil MS. 1, fos. 85r-85v; PRO, SP 10/14/53, M. fos. 116v-117r; Bindoff, iii, pp. 464-465.

¹⁶¹ Hatfield, Cecil MS. 1, fo. 86r.

¹⁶² APC, iii, pp. 405, 476-477; iv, pp. 185-186; PRO, SP 10/14/33, M. fos. 80r-80v; BL Cotton MS. Nero C. x, fo. 66r; Jordan (ed.), *Chronicle*, p. 131.

¹⁶³ Longleat, Thynne MS. 2, fos. 171r-172v; Longleat, Thynne MS. 2, fos. 180r-181v; Bindoff, i, pp. 679-680; iii, pp. 465-466; T.E. Howell (ed.), *Cobbett's complete collection of state trials...* (xxxiv vols.; London, 1809), i, pp. 526-528; Greengrass, 'Noble affinities', pp. 275-311.

1559.¹⁶⁴ Thynne remained close to the dowager duchess and her son. This demonstrates the continuing service ties within clienteles.

Northumberland refined a variety of techniques to maintain power and stabilise his regime. In November 1551 he gained even greater authority over his fellow councillors by removing them directly from the process of administration. They were no longer required to countersign royal letters. Again, this was achieved through his intimate relationship with the king. The councillors would sign lists of the documents stamped by Gates.¹⁶⁵ This was a potential power, probably for use in emergencies, and was never fully realised. The privy councillors were still the principal officers of state and the substantial figures at court. The systems of licensed *gendarmes* and lieutenancies were designed to bolster Northumberland's regime. He had increased the retinues of his leading supporters in 1550 to deal with any prospective disorder over the summer and to counter Somerset's clientele.¹⁶⁶ In February 1551 twelve bands of cavalry were established numbering eight hundred and fifty men, commanded by leading councillors and supporters and paid for by the king. This rapid reaction force was established to decisively put down any serious unrest, yet it never left the London area. Instead, it was a royal guard, meant to overawe the citizens of London, while being part of a wider programme of display intended to assert the stability and normality of the regime. It gave Northumberland more patronage, being a source of prestige and additional income for the leading councillors. The crown was paying for the nobility to maintain their clienteles on an unprecedented scale. For example, Suffolk was paid £2000 for his band of one hundred horsemen. The military competence of the *gendarmes* was questionable but its ability to maintain internal control was sufficient and more desirable than its potential as a modern fighting force capable of defeating imperial or French forces. However, the *gendarmes* had to be disbanded in October 1552 to save money and if maintained might have prevented Mary's accession the following summer—precisely the kind of emergency they were created for.¹⁶⁷ Although Dr Loach regarded their main purpose as countering domestic instability rather than protecting the king, the *gendarmes* were a powerful visual symbol of the privy councillors' special role as Edward's custodians.¹⁶⁸ Edward wrote in his journal on 23 May 1552, 'it was appointed that theis bandes of men of armis shuld go *with* me [on] this progresse'. Of the total force of three hundred and forty five listed, Pembroke was to bring the largest number, fifty men, Darcy thirty, Suffolk twenty five, the earl of Warwick (Northumberland's heir) twenty five, Gates

¹⁶⁴ I have been unable to find out more about Hanay at this stage. He is not listed with Somerset's household in 1547: Longleat, Thynne MS. 2, fos. 146r-147v; *The complete peerage*, eds. Gibbs *et al*, vi, pp. 505-506; Longleat, Seymour MS. 10, fos. 166r-170r.

¹⁶⁵ APC, iii, p. 411; PRO, SP 38/1 fos. 9r-17r.

¹⁶⁶ See below, p. 244.

¹⁶⁷ Hoak, *The king's council*, pp. 199-202; BL Cotton MS. Nero C. x, fos. 28v, 50r, 61v; Jordan (ed.), *Chronicle*, pp. 50, 100, 123; Nichols (ed.), *Chronicle of the Grey Friars*, pp. 72-73; Nichols (ed.), *The diary of Henry Machyn*, pp. 12-13, 18-20; APC, iii, p. 225; PRO, E 101/546/19, fos. 2r-9r; *Simancas*, x, p. 408; see below, pp. 263-289.

¹⁶⁸ Loach, *Edward VI*, p. 96.

fifteen, and Sir Henry Sidney ten. The other bands were to be under Winchester, Northumberland, Bedford, Rutland, Huntingdon, Clinton, Cobham, Cheyne and Sadler. This encapsulates the extent to which Northumberland's party and the leading supporters of the October coup were used to surround the king.¹⁶⁹ The *gendarmes* were an impressive sight and Henry Machyn described in loving detail the splendour of the musters in the various royal parks. However, their impact was limited because of the brevity of their existence.¹⁷⁰

Northumberland's ascendancy was based on the appearance of consensus, which disguised the tensions within the political elite and within clienteles. Edwardian politics remained unstable and prone to factionalism. This was a legacy of the previous reign and the result of minority rule. Northumberland was able to rule successfully while he retained the confidence of the other councillors and of the political nation. This contained faction. His clientele was more substantial and coherent than has traditionally been thought, being part of a pattern of vital relationships between the centre and the localities. The need to control court and government, as well as maintaining stability, meant that power had to be distributed fairly widely. However, Northumberland's ambivalent treatment of his peers, first widening the basis of his support and then narrowing it, engendered instability and distrust, instead of increasing his grip on power. His orchestration of Somerset's second fall intensified anxiety within the polity but did temporarily bring the former lord protector's clientele to order. Although distrustful of him, Northumberland essentially followed Paget's advice on conciliar government, even if unintentionally. He narrowed his support by relying more heavily on his own clientele and rewarded them lavishly to maintain cohesion and loyalty. However, this had a detrimental effect on his relations with his colleagues and their assent to his government was less forthcoming.

¹⁶⁹ BL Cotton MS. Nero C. x, fo. 62r; Jordan (ed.), *Chronicle*, p. 124.

¹⁷⁰ Nichols (ed.), *The diary of Henry Machyn*, pp. 12-13, 18-20.

9. *The clientele and the localities, 1547-1553*

Before examining the succession crisis of 1553, it is important to investigate more fully Somerset's and Northumberland's impact on the localities. As noted, they used the offices available in the localities, like stewardships, bailiffships, constabularies, and keeperships on the royal estates, to reward their political allies and their clienteles. Northumberland was more systematic in this but neither man sought to intrude their own clients into the localities to the detriment of the established county elite, who were the principal beneficiaries of local patronage between 1547-1553. Most local officers, particularly the sheriffs and JPs, were local men who succeeded in gaining recognition of their status through employment in county government. Somerset had the greatest opportunity for creating an affinity based on local office like Henry's because at Edward's accession he was able to issue new commissions of the peace. However, although he appointed clients to the commissions, he generally maintained the *status quo ante*. Besides, even in localities where his landed wealth and influence was pronounced, the county elite and the legal officers dominated the vital quorums of the peace. Somerset and Northumberland sought to exercise control over the localities by increasing the connections with the centre through a greater volume of correspondence and increased direction from the privy council. This was intended to create stability.¹ The locality and polity were meant to work in partnership. The system relied on crown agents working in tandem with clienteles, public and private interests operating at the same time, and it can be difficult to distinguish which is which or why particular people were chosen for various offices or specific tasks. The distinction was perhaps only made at times of crisis, as during the October coup. The regime was usually reactive rather than proactive and used everyone and everything that came to hand. It is important to examine aspects of how the various local commissions operated and who sat on them as well as considering whether aristocratic clienteles, particularly Somerset's and Northumberland's, remained pervasive in the localities. It will be seen that Northumberland's attitude to the localities was more innovative. He played a more active role in the north and attempted to exercise greater control there through increased personal authority and he enhanced the role of the lords lieutenant to make them the principal agents of military authority in England and Wales. The latter innovation had great implications on local civil and military government and was arguably Northumberland's greatest legacy.

I: The JPs, sheriffs and lords lieutenant and the local elite

¹ Guy, 'Thomas Wolsey, Thomas Cromwell and the reform of Henrician government', pp. 53-57.

One method adopted by Wolsey and Cromwell to create a royal affinity was the establishment of a system of supernumeraries at court drawn largely from the county elite. The Henrician affinity was centred on the chamber but most of the 493 chamber officials between 1530-1540 were supernumeraries (perhaps seventy to eighty five per cent), called on to do service to their monarch for only short periods as a means of bringing men in from the locality to the court to instil in them good service.² Wolsey and Cromwell would 'swear-in' landowners and local 'men of worship' and gain their allegiance to the crown. By 1535 there were 263 supernumeraries but only about five per cent would eventually join the household as full-time members. However, this was a two-way process. There was bilateral agreement that courtiers be placed on the commissions of the peace as a means of extending the king's influence into the localities.³

The system of supernumeraries was meant to foster closer ties between centre and localities. This would be advantageous.⁴ According to Foxe, Edward knew the names and religion of all his JPs, gentlemen and magistrates, as well as their social standing and wealth.⁵ Although several of Somerset's clients were appointed to the commissions of the peace, the evidence suggests that the number of supernumeraries was reduced under Edward. Somerset was not attempting to fill the court with his own people, although this charge has been made against him, nor was he continuing the system of bringing county gentlemen into the household to create an affinity. The main reason for this change was financial.⁶ In 1547 there were thirty 'extra Ordinaries whiche have yerely liveries of the Howshold', as well as fifty-one household servants paid a pension at the king's coronation and twenty-two old pensioners of the household. However, these were menial workers below stairs who could not be placed in the royal household because of the addition of many servants from Edward's household as prince of Wales.⁷ The supernumeraries are more difficult to trace. Large numbers of them (133) were discharged in order to save money. Even expenditure on bouche of court, livery and accommodation had to be curtailed—although most had not received this. However, as many were retained as possible. Among the gentlemen usher quarter waiters, Robert Hodgekins and Robert Chester were initially deleted but then 'appointed again to remain'. Of those listed as not placed in 1547, 113 supernumeraries (including double the original number of yeomen) were retained.⁸ It is difficult to say comprehensively how many supernumeraries there were in 1547 because the list for the king's coronation only recorded those chamber servants present at court, who may have constituted the fifteen to thirty per cent who were ordinary. Using Professor Guy's criteria, these numbered 168 (no knights or esquires of the body were listed).

² Guy, 'Thomas Wolsey, Thomas Cromwell and the reform of Henrician government', pp. 53-54, 258, n. 70.

³ Guy, 'Thomas Wolsey, Thomas Cromwell and the reform of Henrician government', pp. 54-55.

⁴ Guy, 'Thomas Wolsey, Thomas Cromwell and the reform of Henrician government', pp. 53-54.

⁵ Foxe, *The acts and monuments*, v, p. 700.

⁶ Hawkyard, 'Uncles to the king and protectors of the throne', p. 123; see above, pp. 10-19.

⁷ PRO, LC 2/2/3/1, fos. 83r, 106r; PRO, E 179/69/58; Guy, 'Thomas Wolsey, Thomas Cromwell and the reform of Henrician government', p. 54.

That these were the ordinary is confirmed by the livery list for Edward's funeral, where many of the posts are occupied by the same men.⁹ The lists for those 'nott plased' in 1547 sometimes note whether the individual was ordinary or extraordinary.¹⁰ These recorded thirty-nine extraordinary and twenty-seven ordinary. These men were gentlemen ushers, sewers, gentlemen waiters, yeomen ushers, yeomen of the chamber and grooms of the chamber, positions normally given to supernumeraries. This does not mean that they were all supernumeraries, though. Several extraordinary servants were drawn from gentry families, including Thomas Walsingham and John Tyrrell. Equally, ordinary servants were also recruited from the gentry (Thomas Ennis, Edward Walgrave and John Seymour, senior). This suggests that some of these gentlemen were actively making their careers at court, while others were not. To provide the monarch with good service, county gentlemen or sons of court gentlemen normally filled these positions.¹¹ Professor Guy has found at least three lists of supernumeraries drawn up under Wolsey and Cromwell but this seems to reflect their highly organised and personal approach to the creation of the king's affinity.¹² So far, no such list has been found for Edward's reign, although there is evidence of the continued use of the system. A list of 'officers appoynted to attend in the greate hawle of Westminster the day of Coronacion' was drawn up, numbering thirty-nine gentlemen. These were supernumeraries. Unsurprisingly, none were closely connected with Somerset. Instead, they were gentlemen co-opted into the court under Henry; men like Richard Day, Thomas Carter and Thomas Crofts. Carter was probably an obscure Wiltshire gentleman. Crofts may have been Sir James Crofts brother, although there were several men of that name. They were gentlemen or esquires, though. A dozen supernumeraries attended Edward's funeral, including Holcroft, Greville, Sir Nicholas Strelley, Markham, Williams, Sir Arthur Darcy, Sir Robert Drury and Sir William Rainsford. The short list suggests the men were drawn from the county elite in general, although Greville was a Dudley client. As no comprehensive list has been found of Edwardian supernumeraries, it is not possible to determine whether Northumberland had altered the composition of this group to favour his own clients. However, his most important clients were already entrenched at court and other means were used to tie centre and localities.¹³

If supernumeraries were not the main means by which ties between centre and localities were increased during Edward's reign, did Somerset and Northumberland try to create a county affinity by other means? In October 1549 Somerset was accused of trying to create a faction: 'what conferences instances and practises he hath had *with* sundry his complices to make himself strong

⁸ BL Royal MS. 7 C xvi, fos. 92r-92v; BL Royal MS. 7 C xvi, fos. 93r-95v; BL Royal MS. 7 C xvi, fos. 96r-97v.

⁹ PRO, LC 2/2/3/1, fos. 86r-88r, 96r-97r, 98r, 109r, 117r, 122r-123r; PRO, LC 2/4/1, fos. 18r-18v, 19v-20v; Guy, 'Thomas Wolsey, Thomas Cromwell and the reform of Henrician government', pp. 53-54, 258, n. 70.

¹⁰ BL Royal MS. 7 C xvi, fo. 92v; BL Royal MS. 7 C xvi, fos. 93r-95r; BL Royal MS. 7 C xvi, fos. 96r-97v.

¹¹ BL Royal MS. 7 C xvi, fos. 93r-95r.

¹² Guy, 'Thomas Wolsey, Thomas Cromwell and the reform of Henrician government', pp. 54-55, 258-259, ns. 73-76.

¹³ PRO, LC 2/2/3/1, fos. 122r-123r; PRO, LC 2/4/1, fo. 24v; Bindoff, i, pp. 588-589, 725-726.

~~leav~~ how he hath repl[aced] suche honest men as wer Justices of peax in every shere putting in their places others of his own broode how he hath bestowed suche offices as of the kinges maiestes as fell dayly vpon his own men'.¹⁴ The language is highly coloured and some of the assertions made elsewhere in the letter are suspect. Therefore, how reliable are these particular charges against Somerset?¹⁵ A tract of the same period made similar points, claiming Somerset rewarded his own servants and monopolised patronage for his own clientele to increase his power by allowing 'unworthie & corrupt' men into office. He intended to overthrow the king and attack the nobility and gentry (the king's traditional guardians) in order to rule through his clientele, who were 'men made upp of naught'.¹⁶ Did Somerset fill the county bench with his clients? JPs were appointed for life and it was extremely difficult to remove them. There is no doubt that Somerset used royal patronage to enrich himself and his clients but he also opened it to his colleagues. He worked through his 'new council' as well as promoting clients and household men to royal offices. Some of them were men of exceptional ability who had substantial gentry connections. However, the evidence suggests that the leading members of mid-Tudor society occupied the commissions in large numbers. Somerset certainly had extensive ties with many of these men, some were even his servants or members of his fidelity of ordinary clienteles, but his relationship with the majority of them was little different from that cultivated by Wolsey and Cromwell, and less programmatic.

The patent rolls list the commissioners of the peace. The letter 'q' was written to the left of the names of members of the quorum. These commissioners were then listed on the right side of the main list as of the 'quorum'.¹⁷ The commissioners, or at least two of them, of whom one must be of the quorum, were to hear and determine the felonies traditionally examined by the commissions of the peace, with the exception of difficult cases of extortion, which should be examined in the presence of the justices of assizes.¹⁸ Therefore, the quorum was the working core of the commissions of the peace and membership of it indicated both heightened importance and the means by which the regime sought to bind centre and locality. For example, eighteen of the fifty five Suffolk commissioners were of the quorum (thirty three per cent), including the administrators and legal officers St John, Sir Robert Southwell, master of the rolls, Sir Thomas Bromley and John Gosnold, *custos rotulorum*, and county gentlemen like Sir Nicholas Hare, Nicholas Bacon, Clement Higham and Robert Brown.¹⁹ The proportion of commissioners on the quorum was usually higher in Mary's reign, although the overall size of the bench tended to go down (reversing

¹⁴ PRO, SP 10/9/41, M. fos. 76r-76v; Pocock, pp. 96, 116.

¹⁵ PRO, SP 10/9/41, M. fos. 72r-81v.

¹⁶ BL Additional MS. 48126, fos. 2v-4r.

¹⁷ PRO, C 66/801, m. 20d; *Calendar of patent rolls*, i, p. 89.

¹⁸ PRO, C 66/801, m. 7d; *Calendar of patent rolls*, i, p. 80; Guy, *Tudor England*, p. 170; see above, pp. 200-202.

¹⁹ PRO, C 66/801, m. 20d; *Calendar of patent rolls*, i, pp. 80, 89. The *Calendar of patent rolls* suggests that about a quarter were named to the quorum of each commission but does not list them. The proportion varies but is higher than this. For example, 44% of the Essex commissioners were of the quorum, 43% in Northumberland, 46% in Oxfordshire,

the trend). Fifty four per cent of the Suffolk bench were of the quorum in 1554. The same pattern of recruitment (law officers and greater and lesser gentry with strong county bases) can be seen in the rest of the commissions between 1547-1558, including Essex, Northumberland, Oxfordshire, Staffordshire and Wiltshire.²⁰ The need for local men was even more pressing because only about half the JPs for each county attended the quarter sessions that handled administrative and judicial business. Instead, the JPs tended to concentrate on matters in the vicinity of their homes.²¹

Many of the most active commissioners were lesser gentry and the knights did not always dominate the bench. The more senior members of the quorum were the legal experts and they were relied on most heavily at sessions. Conciliar directives, especially letters, proclamations and statutes, were sent to the commission as a whole but the quorum would be expected to direct the response (although this did not always happen). St John was on the quorum of all forty two commissions issued on 26 May 1547; Bromley, a puisne justice of the king's bench, was on twelve; Henry Bradshaw, attorney-general, eleven; Montague, ten; Sir Edmund Marvyn, nine; Sir William Portman, a puisne justice of the king's bench, nine; Sir Richard Lister, chief justice of the king's bench, nine; Sir Edmund Molineux, sergeant-at-law, eight; Sir John Hynd, eight; David Brooke, sergeant-at-law, eight; James Hales, puisne justice of the common pleas and sergeant-at-law, seven; Sir Robert Southwell, master of the rolls, six; and Sir Roger Cholmley, chief baron of the exchequer (1547-1552) and chief justice of the king's bench (1552-1553), six. Legal officers, including quite modest sergeants-at-law, like William Cooke (Cambridgeshire and Huntingdon, of which he was *custos rotulorum*), John Pollard (Oxfordshire), and John Whyddon (Devon), and to a lesser extent, financial officers, dominated the quorum. The substantial gentlemen with court connections and the lesser gentry, who remained largely county figures, assisted them.²² This pattern repeated the new commissions of *oyer et terminer* issued as early as February 1547, which, although filled by those who would subsequently be appointed JPs, were also notable for the number of the legal officers selected.²³ Household officers and clergy were also placed on the commissions but they would be men of local consequence, either because they had been recruited from a gentry family or because their living gave them local standing. The bishops were 'governors in a settled society' and substantial landed figures in the localities. For example, Richard Sampson, bishop of Coventry and Lichfield, was on the quorum for six counties. He was relied on to support the regime and appointed lord president of the council in the marches of Wales in February 1547, despite being generally conservative. His income was £703.5.2, giving him

38% in Staffordshire and 30% in Wiltshire: PRO, C 66/801, mm. 10d, 17d-19d, 22d; *Calendar of patent rolls*, i, pp. 83, 87-89, 91.

²⁰ 51% of the Essex commissioners were of the quorum, 32% in Northumberland, 42% in Oxfordshire, 43% in Staffordshire and 54% in Wiltshire: *Calendar of the patent rolls preserved in the Public Record Office, Mary and Philip and Mary*, eds. A.E. Stamp *et al* (iv vols.; London, 1937-1939), i, pp. 16-26; Guy, *Tudor England*, p. 170.

²¹ Beard, *The office of justice of the peace*, pp. 77-78, 123; Guy, *Tudor England*, p. 170.

²² PRO, C 66/801, mm. 7d-24d; *Calendar of patent rolls*, i, pp. 80-92; Guy, *Tudor England*, p. 170.

substantial wealth and influence. However, he was prey to the opportunism endemic under Somerset and Northumberland and was forced to alienate an estate to Paget.²⁴ Robert Warton, bishop of St Asaph, was on the quorum for the same commissions as Sampson. As the quorum was expected to provide legal expertise, this should not be surprising. Their university education would provide a sound background, especially as increasingly the clergy were trained as lawyers.²⁵ Therefore, the system established by Wolsey and Cromwell to create a royal affinity was not completely sustained, although Professor Guy does point out that the territorial power of the crown should not be overestimated, suggesting it had a more limited impact in the first place.²⁶

There is a case for saying that Somerset placed his own clients on the quorum. Dr Loach believed the charge against him could not be substantiated but many of his clients became JPs for the first time in 1547. Peter Courtenay was made JP for Devon, was sheriff from 1548-1549, and was described as Somerset's 'minister' in the county in a tract produced during the October coup. He was accused of being one of Somerset's 'parasites' or 'instruments'. Along with Bonham in Wiltshire, Partridge in Gloucestershire, the customer of Southampton, William Barlow, bishop of Bath and Wells, in Hampshire, and others, Courtenay was described as being sent into his locality to stir up trouble, spy and find out about the wealth and property of his neighbours. Somerset had certainly been acquisitive and relied on his clients in his dealings with the commons during the rebellions.²⁷ Courtenay was an established figure in Devon, whom the privy council hoped would help contain the rising there in June 1549 along with his colleagues, Sir Thomas Denny, *custos rotulorum*, and Anthony Harvey.²⁸ The customer of Southampton was probably Robert Reneger, who replaced Sampson Thomas, a former mayor of the city, as controller of the customs on 14 May 1548. He was a merchant who traded with Spain and had been sheriff of Southampton in 1546-1547. In 1545 he seized a merchantman after becoming 'exasperated' by continued Spanish persecution of his protestantism. As a result, he was rewarded with command of a royal warship. It is less likely that the sources refer to the lesser post relating to the royal customs, that of collector. William Thorpe was replaced by William Knight as collector on 18 January 1549. None of them are likely to have been in Somerset's household, although the ducal servant Thomas

²³ *Calendar of patent rolls*, i, pp. 75-77.

²⁴ MacCulloch, *Tudor church militant*, p. 183; PRO, C 66/801, mm. 12d, 14d, 19d, 23d-24d; *Calendar of patent rolls*, i, pp. 81, 83-84, 86, 88-89; Jordan, *Threshold of power*, pp. 265-266, 380; PRO, SP 10/2/1, M. fo. 1r; PRO, SP 10/4/12 (i), M. fo. 31v; PRO, SP 10/5/17, M. fo. 60v; PRO, SP 10/15/78, M. fo. 163v; APC, ii, pp. 6, 10-11, 62, 448, 487; LJRO, B/A/1/14 iv, fos. 40v-60r; LJRO, B/A/1/15, fos. 1r-7r; LJRO, B/A/2 ii/1.

²⁵ PRO, C 66/801, mm. 12d, 14d, 19d, 23d-24d; *Calendar of patent rolls*, i, pp. 81, 83-84, 86, 88-89; Guy, *Tudor England*, pp. 22-23.

²⁶ Guy, 'Thomas Wolsey, Thomas Cromwell and the reform of Henrician government', pp. 54-56.

²⁷ Loach, *Protector Somerset*, pp. 38-39; PRO, C 66/801, m. 10d; *Calendar of patent rolls*, i, p. 83. Although dated 1551 in the original document, the tract against Somerset is a late sixteenth century copy taken 'out of a booke of Sir Thomas Smiths', and must date from the October coup because it attacks the duke for 'now falslie usurping the name of protector': BL Additional MS. 48126, fos. 2r, 3v; BL Egerton MS. 2815; Bindoff, i, pp. 461-462; DNB, iii, pp. 229-231.

²⁸ PRO, SP 10/7/42, M. fos. 110r-111v; Pocock, pp. 12-13; Rose-Troup, *The Western Rebellion*, p. 150; PRO, C 66/801, m. 10d; *Calendar of patent rolls*, i, pp. 82-83.

Thorpe may have been related to William Thorpe. Again, not all county clients were ducal servants. William Thorpe was a substantial gentlemen and active commissioner. He was commissioner of *oyer et terminer* for Hampshire, Wiltshire, Somerset, Dorset, Devon, Cornwall and Exeter and a member of the quorum for Hampshire. Reneger, Thomas and Knight seem to have been prominent only within Southampton itself. Both the controller and the collector were royal appointments and Somerset may have used his patronage to have Reneger selected. He paid the customer an annuity of £20 between 1548-1551 for his services. This ties in well with the date of Reneger's appointment.²⁹ John Hales was of the quorum in Warwickshire but not William Lucy, despite coming from one of the major county families. However, one of the other leading gentry families was well represented, with Sir George Throckmorton appointed *custos rotulorum* and his sons Robert and Clement named as commissioners.³⁰ Hales was a legal expert with a strong personal association with the lord protector, while the Throckmortons had extensive court connections. The Lucys of Charlecote did not have such strong ties to the centre. Two of Somerset's servants, Thynne and Berwick, sat on the quorum in Wiltshire, even though they were listed in the bottom third of the commission, a sign of newcomers in the order of precedence. Lord Seymour of Sudeley also sat on the quorum but Somerset's other servants and clients on the commission did not. These included Sir Henry Long, Sharrington (really Seymour's client), Sir Edward Bellingham, Sir John and Richard Brydges, Bonham and Colthurst. Sir John Brydges and Tracy were of the quorum in Gloucestershire, while Edmund Brydges was on the commission. Richard Brydges was also on the Berkshire commission.³¹ Thynne was on the quorum in Somerset but Colthurst, his fellow commissioner, was not.³² John Newdigate was on the Middlesex quorum, as was Hales.³³ Partridge seems to have been placed in Gloucestershire, although he was not on the commission of the peace for that county.³⁴

Stanhope was on the quorum for all three Ridings of Yorkshire and for Nottinghamshire, where he was also *custos rotulorum*. His relationship with Somerset may have been the reason for such favour, and perhaps the persistence of his half-sister, the duchess. Whalley sat on the quorum for the North Riding too and was on the commission for the East Riding. However, he was appointed to these commissions under Henry. He was also on the commission for Nottinghamshire from 1543 and, although not listed when the commissions were reissued, it is unlikely that he would

²⁹ I am grateful to Susan Hill, archivist for Southampton Archives Services, for information on the offices of controller and collector of the royal customs of Southampton: BL Egerton MS. 2815; PRO, C 66/801, m. 20d; *Calendar of patent rolls*, i, pp. 76, 84; v, p. 321; Loades, *Northumberland*, pp. 244-245; Longleat, Seymour MS. 10, fos. 166r-170r; see above pp. 70-73.

³⁰ PRO, C 66/801, m. 23d; *Calendar of patent rolls*, i, p. 90.

³¹ PRO, C 66/801, mm. 8d, 12 d, 22d; *Calendar of patent rolls*, i, p. 81, 91, 83-84; Heal and Holmes, *The gentry*, pp. 170-171; BL Egerton MS. 2815; *DNB*, iv, p. 193; Ives, 'The protectorate provisions', pp. 907-908, n. 38; Brady, *The chief governors*, pp. 48-52, 60-62.

³² PRO, C 66/801, m. 21d; *Calendar of patent rolls*, i, p. 89.

³³ PRO, C 66/801, m. 16d; *Calendar of patent rolls*, i, p. 86.

³⁴ Loach, *Protector Somerset*, p. 38; PRO, C 66/801, m. 12d; *Calendar of patent rolls*, i, pp. 83-84.

have been removed. Instead, his name was probably omitted by mistake.³⁵ Kelway was of the quorum for Wiltshire and appointed *custos rotulorum* for Berkshire in 1549, replacing Sir William Essex, despite having only been appointed to the bench that year. Although an able lawyer, he was advanced rapidly thanks largely to his clientage relationship with Somerset.³⁶ Kelway succeeded in making the transition from one regime to another, despite being forced to enter a bond of £100 to present himself before the privy council every week from November 1549 to February 1550. He continued as surveyor of the wards and became a sergeant-at-law in May 1553, having paid £100 to the privy coffers through Sir Andrew Dudley for the position. Northumberland presumably found him too invaluable to remove from authority and Pembroke acted as his good lord.³⁷ Cecil was appointed to the commissions of the peace for Holland and Kesteven (Lincolnshire) in 1547 and became *custos rotulorum* for all three districts in 1549.³⁸ William Grey of Reading was also placed on the Berkshire commission in 1547, although not the quorum.³⁹

Thynne, Berwick, Whalley, Kelway and Cecil seem to have been appointed to the quorum more rapidly than normal and this reflected Somerset's greatly augmented power and influence, manifesting itself more in a desire to reward clients and servants than as a long term project to dominate the county communities. Yet, it cannot be regarded as packing the bench with Seymour clients. These men should generally be grouped with the other gentlemen in the bottom third of each commission who sat on the quorum, men like Robert Chaloner, Thomas Gargrave, Shrewsbury's servant, William Tankard, Richard Yonger and James Foxe, who were of the quorum for the North Riding.⁴⁰ Thynne was an exception to this because he oversaw the sessions of the peace for Somerset and Dorset while sheriff between 1548-1549. This reflects his greater local consequence and interest in county affairs. However, Stanhope, Cecil and Kelway were substantial and/or gifted men.⁴¹ Other important ducal servants like Fisher, Fulmerston and Raves were not on the commissions at all, although they were qualified by experience, ability and status. Somerset's brother, Sir Henry Seymour, was not added to the commission until 1554. Even on the quorums, anybody with a clientage relationship with Somerset, even loosely, would be in a minority. In Wiltshire, Somerset and his clients were in the minority: twelve sat on a commission of forty-four, four were of a quorum of thirteen.⁴² Somerset wanted reliable people, people he knew, but he did not dominate appointments. If anything, the quorum was dominated by the

³⁵ PRO, C 66/801, mm. 11d-12d, 17d; *Calendar of patent rolls*, i, pp. 88, 91-92; Bindoff, iii, pp. 368-369, 594-596.

³⁶ PRO, C 66/801, mm. 8d, 22d; *Calendar of patent rolls*, i, pp. 81, 91; Bindoff, ii, pp. 458-459.

³⁷ PRO, E 101/546/19, fo. 64r; Bindoff, ii, p. 459.

³⁸ See above, p. 58.

³⁹ PRO, C 66/801, m. 8d; *Calendar of patent rolls*, i, p. 81.

⁴⁰ PRO, C 66/801, m. 12d; *Calendar of patent rolls*, i, p. 92; Reid, *The king's council*, p. 167, n. 2. Tankard was also on the quorum in the West Riding and frequently used as a muster commissioner: PRO, C 66/801, m. 11d; *Calendar of patent rolls*, i, p. 92; PRO, E 36/23, fo. 38r; PRO, E 36/41, fo. 1r.

⁴¹ See above, pp. 47-51, 57-67.

preponderance of legal experts, who were attached to the government at Westminster and went on circuit to the various counties in which they sat as commissioners. There, they met the other members of the quorum, who were drawn largely from the resident gentry listed among the bottom third of the commissioners. Even the inclusion of men numbered among Somerset's clients between 1547-1551, especially those who were appointed for the first time at the accession, masks the fact that many were temporary followers drawn to him through expediency, particularly during the period 1549-1551: men like, the earl of Arundel, Sir Thomas Arundel, Sir Thomas Darcy, Grey of Wilton, Holcroft, Paget, John Seymour, and Tracy.⁴³

Somerset was attempting to reward clients and enhancing his relations with the localities but he would have needed to place very large numbers of his people on the bench to alter its complexion substantially. He may have hoped to emulate the policies of Wolsey and Cromwell but with the difference that, instead of placing royal servants on the commissions of the peace, he appointed his own clients. However, this could only be done on a smaller scale. The distinction between royal and ducal servants is blurred, though. Therefore, the case against Somerset is relatively weak and reflects the black propaganda of the London council during the October coup rather than the reality on the ground. During the mid-Tudor period very few JPs were removed from office. The example of Sharrington has already been discussed.⁴⁴ If Somerset's appointees were so unpopular, why were many retained? Cecil, Long, the Brydges, Newdigate, Whalley and Kelway were confirmed by Mary. Former Seymour clients were even added to the commissions as members of the quorum: Kelway and Richard Brydges for Berkshire, and Fisher for Warwickshire.⁴⁵ Others were removed. Hales left England in early 1551 and remained on the continent among the exile community until Elizabeth's accession. Sharrington was dead. Fulmerston, despite supporting Mary in July 1553, was not appointed to the bench, although he received signs of favour. Whalley continued to sit on the quorum of the North Riding and on the Nottinghamshire commission but did not sit for the East Riding.⁴⁶ Thynne was removed from the Wiltshire commission in 1554 but probably remained of the quorum for Somerset. This may have been done both as a result of his protestantism and his involvement with people connected with Wyatt's Rebellion and with Elizabeth.⁴⁷ He remained out of public life in Mary's reign, despite his powerful clientele and the

⁴² PRO, C 66/801, m. 22d; *Calendar of patent rolls*, i, p. 91; Bindoff, iii, pp. 290-291.

⁴³ PRO, C 66/801, mm. 7d-8d, 10d, 13d, 16d, 18d-19d, 21d-22d; *Calendar of patent rolls*, i, pp. 80-81, 83-84, 86, 88-91.

⁴⁴ See above, p. 188.

⁴⁵ *Calendar of the patent rolls... Mary and Philip and Mary*, i, pp. 17, 19, 21-22, 25-26; Bindoff, ii, pp. 176-177, 277; iii, pp. 302-304, 594-596.

⁴⁶ *Calendar of the patent rolls... Mary and Philip and Mary*, i, pp. 17, 19, 21-22, 25; Bindoff, ii, pp. 176-177, 277; iii, pp. 302-304, 594-596.

⁴⁷ *Calendar of the patent rolls... Mary and Philip and Mary*, i, p. 25; PRO, SP 11/2/33, M. fos. 70r-71r; PRO, SP 11/5/6, M. fos. 50v-52v. Elizabeth chose Thynne to be comptroller of her estates in 1555. He maintained a regular correspondence with her through Parry and in October 1558 offered to raise soldiers to ensure her succession. Parry wrote to Thynne on 11 November to tell him 'your remembrances and travaille ar taken in most thankfull parte'. Thynne was expected to be a means of communication between the west country and Hatfield and seems to have

restoration of some of Somerset's estates to Sir Edward Seymour. Stourton wrote to Edward Baynard, esquire, sheriff of Wiltshire, on 20 September 1553 to inform him that the queen did not want 'such spotted persons' as Bonham and Thynne returned as MPs. The local feud between Stourton and Thynne was ongoing. Despite the Seymour rehabilitation, Thynne was still distrusted.⁴⁸ He seems to have busied himself with his building projects at Longleat, instead. Interestingly, Cecil was preoccupied with rebuilding Burghley in Lincolnshire at the same time.⁴⁹ Dr Alford has said more work needs to be done on Cecil's support for the 'theory and practice of "Nicodemism"' and underground support for Protestantism in the 1550s'. Cecil and Thynne appear to have been active in their own way.⁵⁰ Cecil was removed from all three commissions for Lincolnshire in 1555 in what looks like a categorical attempt by Mary's regime to purge the bench of undesirables.⁵¹ In his case, this may have been in response to his parliamentary activities. Despite specific purges, many of Somerset's old clients remained on or were added to the bench.

Northumberland did not get the opportunity to change the complexion of the bench between 1550-1553. This could only come with a new accession. Instead, his most important fidelity clients were already well established. Darcy, Sir John and Sir Henry Gates, Pembroke, Northampton, Huntingdon, Suffolk, Cecil, Sir Anthony Cooke, Hereford, and Clinton were already JPs. Northampton was of the quorum for Essex; Huntingdon was of the quorum for Leicestershire; Suffolk was JP of Cornwall, Devon, Dorset, Somerset, Warwickshire and Wiltshire and of the quorum for Leicestershire; Hereford was JP for nine counties; and Clinton was JP for all three districts of Lincolnshire. Darcy and Sir John Gates were JPs and Cooke was of the quorum for Essex, while Sir Henry Gates sat on the Suffolk bench. Pembroke was of the quorum for Wiltshire and *custos rotulorum* for Glamorgan. More minor clients like Jobson, Cawarden and Sir George Blount were JPs too. Henry or Somerset had appointed these men. Unlike Somerset, Northumberland did not have the opportunity to place his servants on the bench. For example, his steward Henry Broke remained largely a domestic figure, although he had been MP for Newcastle-under-Lyme twice in the 1540s. In contrast to Somerset, Northumberland's household was largely confined to domestic service.⁵² This difference may explain why Somerset was attacked for putting so many of his servants on the bench; it was not that he was dominating the commissions of the peace but that he was placing so many servants on it in comparison with his colleagues.⁵³ It

orchestrated Elizabeth's support there: Bindoff, iii, pp. 465-467; Starkey, *Elizabeth*, pp. 222-225; Longleat, Thynne MS. 3, fos. 21r-21v; Longleat, Thynne MS. 3, fos. 23r-23v; Longleat, Thynne MS. 3, fo. 24r.

⁴⁸ Bindoff, i, pp. 461-462; iii, pp. 465-467.

⁴⁹ Summerson, *Architecture in Britain*, pp. 43-46.

⁵⁰ Alford, *The early Elizabethan polity*, p. 26; Bindoff, i, pp. 603-606; PRO, C 66/801, mm. 14d-15d; *Calendar of patent rolls*, i, pp. 85-86; *Calendar of the patent rolls... Mary and Philip and Mary*, i, p. 21; see above, p. 54.

⁵¹ PRO, SP 11/5/6, M. fos. 38v-40r.

⁵² PRO, C 66/801, mm. 8d, 10d, 12d, 14d-15d, 18d-24d; *Calendar of patent rolls*, i, pp. 81-86, 88-91; Bindoff, i, pp. 445-447, 501-502, 599-602; ii, pp. 14-16, 197-199, 341-344, 444-446; Beer, *Northumberland*, pp. 172, 182-183; PRO, LR 2/118 fos. 34r-39r, 105r.

⁵³ PRO, C 66/801, mm. 14d-15d; *Calendar of patent rolls*, i, pp. 85-86.

is possible to argue that Northumberland did attempt to alter the personnel and complexion of the JPs in one county. New commissions of the peace were issued in Lincolnshire's three divisions (Holland, Kesteven and Lindsey) in May 1547 and the appointees were representative of the county elite. The commissioners were selected by the privy council on the advice of the assize judges, individual privy councillors or courtiers but the selection was more complicated and reflected the two-way relationship between centre and locality.⁵⁴ While travelling through the county in June 1552 with two of the local JPs, Clinton and Cecil, Northumberland wrote to the privy council, recommending new names to be added to the bench. However, Northumberland had received advice from other local JPs on 'very mete men to be placed in Commission for the peace in Lincolnshire', and it was on the basis of this counsel that the names were put forward.⁵⁵

The impact of the locality on the selection for local office was pronounced.⁵⁶ Dr Heal and Dr Holmes have suggested that 'the central government was only intermittently in full control of the process of the appointment and dismissal of JPs'. There was a whole network of local patronage geared towards procuring local office.⁵⁷ Although C.A. Beard asserted confidently that 'the appointment and removal were wholly within the discretion of the crown', it was difficult to remove incumbents and inadvisable to try to do so.⁵⁸ It was only with the accession of a new monarch that commissions were reissued and people could be removed for whatever reasons the crown had. The government did try to ascertain the political and religious loyalty of JPs, permitting it to make a 'discriminating selection'. Measures were taken to diminish the impact of regional politics; retainers and servants were not permitted to sit on the commissions.⁵⁹ Somerset transgressed this law in particular but the retaining of the fifteenth century was precluded and the nature of service had changed.⁶⁰ However, the evidence suggests that even under Somerset the pressure for place was often largely from below and this makes sense because the crown wanted JPs who had local standing and knowledge and who were representative of the county elite. In August 1549 Henry Polstead, a Surrey gentleman, wrote to Cecil to tell him that certain parishes 'are veray weak of men of worship', especially since the death of Sir Christopher More of Loseley, Guildford.⁶¹ Polstead was of the quorum for Surrey and an Essex commissioner of the peace, escheator for Surrey and Sussex in 1549-1550, and closely associated with the More family. He was very active in local government and highly regarded. He had been summoned to Windsor on

⁵⁴ Guy, *Tudor England*, pp. 170-171.

⁵⁵ The enclosure is no longer extant: Hatfield, Cecil MS. 151, fo. 38r.

⁵⁶ Heal and Holmes, *The gentry*, pp. 166-170.

⁵⁷ Heal and Holmes, *The gentry*, p. 170.

⁵⁸ Beard, *The office of justice of the peace*, pp. 118-119; Guy, *Tudor England*, pp. 170-171.

⁵⁹ Beard, *The office of justice of the peace*, pp. 118-120.

⁶⁰ Beard, *The office of justice of the peace*, pp. 119-120; Elton, (ed.), *The Tudor constitution*, pp. 344-345, 372-377; Alford, *The early Elizabethan polity*, pp. 127-128.

⁶¹ PRO, SP 10/8/48, M. fos. 87r-87v.

1 July 1549 to defend the king against the commons.⁶² The ‘men of worship’ Polstead had in mind were new commissioners for the deficient parishes, particularly Guildford, Farnham, Godalming and Chertsey, and he asked Cecil ‘to move my lordes grace [Somerset] for the reneweng of the Comysson for moo Justice[s] of peax in thes quarters of Surrey’. He recommended Sir Christopher More’s son William, ‘as hansome a gentleman as euer I knew bred in the cuntrey’, John Vaughan, John Agmondesham, ‘a veray wyse man and somewhat lerned in the lawe’, and John Byrche of Gray’s Inn, who was ‘veray well studied in the lawe’. All were well connected, of sufficient social standing, particularly in the county, and competent enough to serve. Agmondesham was the earl of Arundel’s servant and had served well during the rebellions and disorders. Vaughan was Edward Vaughan’s brother and married to Lady Knevet.⁶³ This is another good example of the locality petitioning the centre. Only Byrche seems to have been admitted to the commission, probably as a consequence of his character and legal expertise.⁶⁴ Although Northumberland was reacting to petitions from the county JPs of Lincolnshire in 1552, the privy council had the power to vet these candidates: ‘(yf any ~~ther~~ of them be not knowen vnmete vnto you) as heretofore it is informed vs theye have bene’. Northumberland’s behaviour appears to have been correct. It is also doubtful to regard him as dictating to the privy council. Instead, this source is a rare survival of how commissioners were usually chosen.⁶⁵ They were selected on the ground by their peers as part of a competition for place. They were chosen because their background, education and status made them suitable candidates. Broad acres gave them county standing, men to levy for the wars, and increased wealth and status. The shire knights and gentry were keen to procure greater patronage and one of the most desirable rewards was a place on the bench.⁶⁶

Somerset had greater opportunity to make his clients sheriffs. This would really affect local politics because there were fewer sheriffs than JPs (one for each shire and two for most boroughs, rather than a commission), even though their political importance was diminishing. The sheriffs continued to assist the JPs and had a financial role, overseeing things like seizures of felons’ goods. Sheriffs appointed their deputies or undersheriffs and clerks, who had the necessary legal expertise to perform the office, which involved serving royal writs, summoning juries, arranging court sessions, carrying out sentences and collecting fines. The parish and village constables and bailiffs, whose roles were to keep the peace and detect crime, assisted them. Sheriffs also raised ‘the power of the county’, or *posse comitatus*, to defend against invasion or insurrection. This was

⁶² PRO, C 66/801, mm. 10d, 18d; *Calendar of patent rolls*, i, pp. 83, 90, 280-284; ii, pp. 60-61, 135; iv, pp. 142, 395; v, pp. 338, 359, 415; PRO, SP 10/3/16, M. fos. 101r-115v; PRO, SP 10/4/12 (i), M. fo. 32r; PRO, SP 10/5/17, M. fo. 56v; PRO, SP 10/5/18, M. fo. 72r; PRO, SP 10/8/2, M. fo. 2v; Bindoff, iii, pp. 124-126.

⁶³ PRO, SP 10/8/48, M. fo. 87r.

⁶⁴ *Calendar of the patent rolls... Mary and Philip and Mary*, i, p. 24; PRO, SP 10/8/48, M. fo. 87r.

⁶⁵ Hatfield, Cecil MS. 151, fo. 38r.

⁶⁶ Heal and Holmes, *The gentry*, pp. 166-184.

their main political importance under the Tudors until the advent of permanent lords lieutenant. This power and patronage made the office attractive to the local elite, especially the greater gentry, who had the necessary standing and income to carry out the duties. The crown usually made appointments with the advice of the privy council from a list of candidates and it is therefore possible to say Somerset and Northumberland could exercise substantial influence over selection.⁶⁷

The evidence suggests Somerset appointed the local gentry rather than his own clients, reinforcing the traditional hierarchy. This continued Henry's practice. Only four of Somerset's clients were appointed: Partridge for Gloucestershire from 1547-1548; Courtenay for Devon in 1548-1549; Thynne for Somerset and Dorset in 1548-1549; and Bonham for Wiltshire in 1549-1550 (after Somerset's fall). Sir Ambrose Cave was sheriff of Warwickshire and Leicestershire in 1548-1549 and may have been a client because of his close association with Grey of Wilton but his affiliation to Somerset was not too strong.⁶⁸ Instead, Somerset used the office as patronage for the county gentry, attempting to bind them to the interests of the crown as well as his own in a looser ordinary clientage relationship. They would look to him as head of the government and procurer of patronage. This was also similar to his attitude towards the commissions of the peace, where his appointments reflected the structure of power. Men like Thomas Cotton, esquire, Sir Hugh Cholmley, Sir William Brereton, Sir Gawain Carew, Sir George Cornwall, Sir John Copledike, Anthony Colly, Richard Cornwall, esquires, Sir Richard Cholmley and Cuthbert Blount were chosen. Some had closer relations to Somerset than others. Brereton had a military association with him from the late 1530s and commanded men under him during the Scottish campaign of 1544, for which he was knighted. He was probably appointed sheriff on this basis, although there was no closer clientage relationship. Northumberland reappointed him. Sir Hugh Cholmley was an old friend of Thynne and may have owed his election as MP for Cheshire and selection as sheriff to this association. However, generally they were not close adherents of Somerset but substantial county gentlemen, who sat on the commissions of the peace, carried out military duties and fulfilled other local responsibilities, including holding stewardships that allowed them to raise the royal affinity. All were MPs at some point and most were also JPs. They were chiefly recommended because of their military experience, especially under Somerset during the 1540s. This was understandable because of the military duties of the office. Sheriffs were clients of powerful men other than Somerset. Sir Francis Leke, Rutland's uncle, was sheriff of Nottinghamshire and Derbyshire in 1547-1548. Colly was comptroller of the household of the first earl of Rutland and served his son, who assisted his election for Rutland in 1547 and 1553.

⁶⁷ The sheriff also had influence over the selection of the coroner, while escheators were chosen by the lord treasurer: Guy, *Tudor England*, pp. 62-63, 138, 169-176, 223, 242, 311, 360, 389; PRO, E 199/2/32; PRO, E 199/2/33; PRO, E 199/6/32; StaffRO, (D (W) 1721/1/10), fos. 385-386; LPL, MS. 3193, fo. 197; *Calendar of patent rolls*, v, pp. 316-319, 328-330.

⁶⁸ Bindoff, i, pp. 461-462, 594-595; iii, pp. 463-467; *DNB*, xliii, p. 431.

That Colly owed his selection as sheriff to Rutland is reinforced by his subsequent appointment by Northumberland in 1551-1552, who was trying to make the earl an ordinary client.⁶⁹ This shows that the other leading politicians used their influence to procure the office of sheriff for their kinsmen and clients. Russell's heir, Sir Francis Russell, was sheriff of Bedfordshire and Buckinghamshire from 1547-1548, Wharton's heir, Sir Thomas Wharton, for Cumberland from 1547-1548, and Warwick's clients Sir George Harper and Sir Fulk Greville were sheriffs (Kent from 1548-1549, and Leicestershire and Warwickshire from 1547-1548, respectively).⁷⁰

Northumberland's attitude towards the office of sheriff was little different. Perhaps if he had not extended the role of the lords lieutenant, his approach towards the sheriffdoms and escheators might have been more systematic.⁷¹ He found places for several of his military clients, including Thomas Culpepper, esquire, Sir Henry Isley and Sir Andrew Corbet. Others were ordinary clients advanced by him, especially Sir Richard Cotton and Sir George Blount. Sir John Gates was the only fidelity client appointed by Northumberland, who made him sheriff of Essex and Hertfordshire in 1549-1550, and he was a recent recruit.⁷² Most, though, were members of the elite, qualified by local consequence, connection and military experience: John Chichester, esquire, William Herbert, esquire, of Llanwnnog in Montgomeryshire, Sir William Walgrave, Sir Thomas Cornwallis, Sir William Bassett (who was close to Shrewsbury), Sir Anthony Brown of Cowdray Park in Sussex, and Sir Thomas Russell of Strensham and Witley in Worcestershire. Chichester seems an unusual choice because he was Somerset's client and returned his friend Sir Arthur Champernon, another client of the duke, as MP for Barnstable, Devon, in 1547. However, these were ordinary clientage relationships and both men subsequently supported Northumberland. They both participated to good effect under Russell against the western rebels, recommending them for favour. Russell may have been Bedford's client because of a kinship relationship but does not appear to have been too close to Northumberland. Most of these sheriffs were Edwardian MPs, commissioners of the peace and held other local offices, including stewardships. For example, Blount was steward of the lordships of Bewdley, Worcestershire, and Cleobury Mortimer, Shropshire, from 1531, a gentleman pensioner from 1540, and parker of Bewdley by 1547. They epitomised the mid-Tudor elite, holding a range of local and central offices in order to enhance control and connection between centre and locality.⁷³ Although Northumberland favoured Walgrave, he was not an enthusiastic supporter of the regime and, like Cornwallis, quickly gave his support to Mary in 1553. Northumberland may have tried to favour Brown in

⁶⁹ Bindoff, i, pp. 391-392, 445, 494, 572-573, 640-644, 675-676, 694, 704-705, 713-714; ii, pp. 518-520; PRO, C 66/801, mm. 9d-10d, 12d-15d, 18d-19d, 23d; *Calendar of patent rolls*, i, pp. 81-82, 84-86, 88, 92.

⁷⁰ Bindoff, ii, pp. 302-304; iii, pp. 234-236; *The complete peerage*, eds. Gibbs *et al*, ii, pp. 74-76.

⁷¹ *Calendar of patent rolls*, v, pp. 338-340, 347-350.

⁷² Bindoff, i, pp. 697, 711-713; ii, pp. 198-199; LPL, MS. 3193, fo. 69; see above, pp. 180-181.

⁷³ Bindoff, i, pp. 396, 445-447, 513-516, 620-621, 638-639, 697, 708-709, 711-713; ii, p. 344; iii, pp. 236-237, 535-536; PRO, C 66/801, mm. 9d, 19d-20d, 22d; *Calendar of patent rolls*, i, pp. 82, 88-89, 91.

1552-1553, despite the latter's catholicism, having him appointed sheriff of Surrey and Sussex in 1552-1553 and elected MP for Petersfield in March 1553, but he supported Mary too.⁷⁴ It cannot be said that Northumberland clients dominated appointments. Instead, the elite were granted these offices as patronage for good service to the crown and, usually, the main criteria were military experience and good standing among their neighbours.

The lieutenancies were used to secure England and Wales, not the *gendarmes*. This was Northumberland's great innovation in local authority. They were regarded as so effective that a similar solution was used, along with commissions of the peace, to try to bring order to Ireland.⁷⁵ This had its antecedents in Somerset's use of lieutenancies. Initially, the lord protector appointed lieutenants to individual counties to meet specific military needs. For example, Northampton became lieutenant of Essex, Norfolk and Suffolk in 1547, with the task of overseeing coastal defences. In February 1548 Paget had advised Somerset 'to appointe to everie quarter of the Realme suche personages as youe thinke mete to haue the staie of the countreys and to sende home suche of them as be absent from thence'.⁷⁶ The government was becoming increasingly concerned about controlling the localities by the early summer of 1548. This was partly caused by fear of invasion. They wrote in about May to the sheriffs and JPs.⁷⁷ The privy council informed them that the 'speciall men' and JPs of coastal counties had been ordered to man the beacons against invasion by the French. They wanted to create an integrated system of defence and improve communications with the localities. The sheriffs and JPs were ordered to establish beacons within their own counties and were to have the county militia in a state of preparedness 'vnder the conduct of mete captaynes'. The militia were to serve outside the county if necessary and were also to act immediately to put down any unrest. It was hoped that decisiveness would contain disorder. Those mustered should be drawn from the more able and be well armed, provisioned for eight days and paid.⁷⁸

The privy council wrote again in similar terms to the JPs on 5 June.⁷⁹ The JPs were to lead the soldiers to any place where the beacons had been lit in order to serve under the lords lieutenant, 'bothe for the repulse of thennemies and defence and good order of the country as occasin shall serve'. Little is known about the extent of these lieutenancies.⁸⁰ The commissioners of musters were to accompany the county levy, presumably because of their familiarity with the forces

⁷⁴ Bindoff, i, pp. 708-709; iii, pp. 535-536; see below, pp. 272, 277-279, 284-286.

⁷⁵ Brady, *The chief governors*, p. 52; PRO, SP 61/3/39, fos. 104r-104v; PRO, SP 61/3/53, fos. 157r-158v; PRO, SP 61/3/63, fos. 178r-179v; PRO, SP 61/3/74, fos. 214r-215v, 220v-221r.

⁷⁶ MacCulloch, *Suffolk and the Tudors*, p. 77; NRO, F. (M.) C. 21, fo. 5r; Beer and Jack, p. 14.

⁷⁷ PRO, SP 10/4/10, M. fos. 25r-26v, unfinished draft.

⁷⁸ PRO, SP 10/4/10, M. fo. 25r.

⁷⁹ PRO, SP 10/4/12, M. fo. 28r.

⁸⁰ PRO, SP 10/4/12, M. fo. 28r.

raised.⁸¹ The privy council was thorough. It wanted a portion of the local elite to remain in their counties, while the recipients of the letters were to inform the rest of the bench of these developments. Effective ties of communication were regarded as vital in order to maintain control.⁸² Thinking:

it shalbe nedefull to provide also for thorder and stay of those witch shall remaine behinde we think it requisite that some of the gentilmen do remaine also behinde/ we have therfor chosen out of thole names certaine whose names shall appere vnto you in a shedule herin closed/ wich all or so many of them as be resident within that shere may be left at home although the mayn force of the shere do advaunce forwards.⁸³

The reason for this was to maintain order among those not picked to serve. It is interesting because the enclosed schedule shows that the regime appreciated the situation in the localities, had a good understanding of who resided where and effectively utilised the local elite. The enclosure is extant and covers twenty-nine counties.⁸⁴ It is possible that the commissions of the peace were used to supply the names. Deletions were made where necessary, suggesting a good appreciation of who was available and that the regime's knowledge of the localities was updated effectively. Many of those mentioned were drawn from the bench and the privy council probably consulted the patent rolls. For example, eighty eight per cent of those designated to remain in Essex were JPs; thirteen of these were of the quorum. The JP Henry Polstead had been deleted probably because he was among those appointed to lead men to the beacons.⁸⁵ The same pattern emerges for Suffolk, Oxfordshire and Wiltshire.⁸⁶ The sheriffs and JPs were also expected to oversee their counties in order to prevent the spread of disorder. 'And in the mean season that all things may be in good order at home we require you to have a good eye and a speciall regard to the comings of the common people and incase of any misdemeanors vnlawfull assemblies riotts and breaking of the peace to give order for the stay or reformation of the same with all diligence'. The characteristic features of the system of lieutenancies were already taking shape.⁸⁷ Somerset took Paget's advice to some extent and planned to create lords lieutenant for the defence of the various counties if necessary. He created several during the 1549 rebellions, including Russell, Warwick, Willoughby of Parham and Shrewsbury.⁸⁸

⁸¹ PRO, SP 10/4/12, M. fos. 28r-28v. This is the final version of: PRO, SP 10/4/10, M. fos. 25r-26v.

⁸² PRO, SP 10/4/12, M. fo. 28v.

⁸³ PRO, SP 10/4/12, M. fo. 28v.

⁸⁴ PRO, SP 10/4/12 (i), M. fos. 30r-33v.

⁸⁵ PRO, SP 10/4/12 (i), M. fo. 32r; PRO, C 66/801, m. 10d; *Calendar of patent rolls*, i, p. 83.

⁸⁶ Those listed to remain at home in Suffolk, Oxfordshire and Wiltshire were all commissioners of the peace, while half were of the quorum for the former two counties and 43% for the latter: PRO, SP 10/4/12 (i), M. fo. 31r; PRO, C 66/801, mm. 18d, 20d, 22d; *Calendar of patent rolls*, i, pp. 88-89, 91.

⁸⁷ PRO, SP 10/4/10, M. fo. 25v.

⁸⁸ PRO, SP 10/4/12, M. fo. 28r; NRO, F. (M.) C. 21, fo. 6v, Beer and Jack, pp. 23-24; Bush, *Government policy*, p. 127, n. 1; MacCulloch, *Suffolk and the Tudors*, pp. 77-78; see above, pp. 125-126.

Northumberland expanded the traditional functions of the lieutenancies in the wake of the 1549 rebellions, subordinating the shire levies to the privy councillors. His decision to do this may have been influenced by his own experience of the office during the summer of 1549. Sixteen or seventeen councillors monopolised the office of lieutenant, most with extensive military experience and powerful clienteles or administrative expertise. Their role now included policing the counties by supervising the JPs and other local officers. Frequently, specific councillors were sent to their counties to ensure stability.⁸⁹ Reliable men in the localities were essential. In November 1549 a statute was passed establishing the lieutenancies. These could be appointed by letters patent to control the counties during periods of disorder and the JPs, sheriffs, mayors, bailiffs and other county officers were placed under the lieutenants' command in the suppression of disturbances. These commissions were first issued on a limited scale in 1550 and were primarily intended to supervise the summer musters.⁹⁰ As part of this process the military retinues of Northumberland and his allies were increased between 12 April and 27 August 1550. His clients and allies were now permitted to retain men over and above their household servants and those under them in their offices (as stewards, understewards, bailiffs and keepers). This may have been partly a response to fear of unrest during the summer. Among others, Bedford was licensed to retain one hundred men; Cheke, Cooke and Wroth, fifty each; and Winchester, Cobham, Clinton, Ely and Huntingdon, one hundred each. Northumberland himself was licensed to retain one hundred additional men.⁹¹ All of them were reliable and substantial men, who were experienced and either closely tied to Northumberland or sufficiently independent of Somerset.

The first mention of this system of lieutenancy occurs in Edward's journal on 7 May 1550, where he writes: 'the councel drue a boke for euery shier who shuld be lieutenants in them, ~~but the m~~ and who shuld tary *with* me'. However, this 'boke' is not evident in any government papers from the same period.⁹² It was hoped these measures would prevent renewed agrarian unrest in the approaching summer.⁹³ Further evidence that the government intended to create lords lieutenant comes from a proclamation issued on 17 May offering a £20 reward to informants who notified either the privy council or the local lieutenant of conspiracies 'tending to rebellion, murder, and unlawful assemblies'.⁹⁴ These commissions were issued, probably based on the 'boke' drawn up by the privy council. Warwick was appointed to a commission of lieutenancy on 28 May.⁹⁵ His commission also reveals the way the new lieutenancies were expected to operate, binding the localities to the centre through leading members of the regime who held several key local offices.

⁸⁹ Hoak, *The king's council*, pp. 201-203; Guy, *Tudor England*, pp. 245-246; *APC*, iii, pp. 6-7, 215, 258-259; iv, pp. 48-50, 80.

⁹⁰ Thomson, *Lords lieutenants*, pp. 30-31

⁹¹ *Calendar of patent rolls*, iii, pp. 312, 326-327.

⁹² BL Cotton MS. Nero C. x, fo. 21r; Jordan (ed.), *Chronicle*, p. 29.

⁹³ Jordan, *Threshold of power*, pp. 58-66; *Chronicle*, p. 29, n. 44.

⁹⁴ Hughes and Larkin (eds.), *Tudor royal proclamations*, i, pp. 491-492; *APC*, iii, p. 38.

They used these offices to direct the local agents of the crown. Warwick was appointed lord lieutenant of Warwickshire and the new commission reinforced his authority as JP for the county. He was ordered to enquire into all treasons, rebellions and unlawful assemblies within the county and was to orchestrate the activity of the sheriff (Sir Richard Manners) and other county officers, who were to provide him with regular intelligence on the situation in the locality and assist him in the commission of *oyer et terminer*. Warwick was also to take charge of the musters, raising forces to be used against rebels. However, his powers went further. He could declare martial law and punish traitors and enemies when necessary. Importantly, he could operate with his forces outside Warwickshire.⁹⁶ The traditional levy was not obligated to serve outside its county and the new lieutenancies gave the regime greater flexibility to check unrest.⁹⁷ The JPs normally oversaw this activity but Warwick wanted one man to control the entire process on behalf of the regime. He also had the power to appoint his officers (deputy lieutenants and provost marshals).⁹⁸ The implications of these powers were extraordinary. The lords lieutenant could appoint their own clients as deputies or provost marshals. Warwick appointed the leading local gentlemen Sir George Throckmorton, Sir Richard Catesby and Sir Fulk Greville as his deputies in July.⁹⁹

Perhaps surprisingly, Somerset had received a commission by 21 July 1550, when a warrant was issued to the office of the ordnance to deliver to him versatile, high quality guns, some of the most expensive and reliable powder and a sufficient quantity of the increasingly plentiful iron shot becoming available in England through a concerted effort at national autarky (especially of military *matériel*), for what had all the appearance of a military expedition.¹⁰⁰ Somerset acted as a precursor of the wider lieutenancies issued the following summer. Dr MacCulloch thought the privy council was using Somerset's popularity to maintain order; they 'still paid him the grudging compliment of trading on his popularity' by appointing him as 'a roving trouble-shooter to tame the commons over the next two summers'.¹⁰¹ It is likely that this was the main reason he was sent but others were also used in this way and it does seem to be an essay in a new development in the role of lieutenant.¹⁰² Somerset's company may have been similar to the forces that the nobility and leading courtiers took with them to exercise control over their localities at the start of the year, although these may have been drawn solely from their clienteles, whereas his was a mixture of public and private. His force was certainly a forerunner of the *gendarmes* and his expedition similar to others made in the period 1550-1553. It was meant to be rapidly and effectively

⁹⁵ BL Additional MS. Charter 981.

⁹⁶ BL Additional MS. Charter 981; PRO, C 66/801, m. 23d; *Calendar of patent rolls*, i, p. 90.

⁹⁷ Goring, 'The military obligations of the English people', pp. 3-13; G.S. Thomson, 'The origin and growth of the office of deputy-lieutenant', *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, 4th ser., 5 (1922), pp. 150-151.

⁹⁸ BL Additional MS. Charter 981.

⁹⁹ WRO, CR 1998/Box 72/15; see above, p. 192.

¹⁰⁰ *APC*, iii, p. 89; Davies, 'Supply services of English armed forces', pp. 43, 89; Rodger, *The safeguard of the sea*, pp. 213-218; L. Stone, 'State control in sixteenth-century England', *Economic History Review*, 17 (1947), pp. 103-20.

¹⁰¹ MacCulloch, *Tudor church militant*, pp. 51-52.

deployed and demonstrates the extent to which the privy council recognised that his power and authority were largely dependent on influence at court, something Warwick had attempted to curtail, yet he was a useful agent of royal policy.¹⁰³ Somerset's expeditions seem to have been successful. He was sent to keep the peace in Oxfordshire, Sussex, Wiltshire and Hampshire, going to Reading, Berkshire, for the same purpose on 6 August, 'to take an ordre there'.¹⁰⁴ At the same time, Russell and Herbert were ordered to return to the west country. Although there is no evidence that they were appointed as lieutenants, it seems probable. Troops returning from Boulogne were deployed in Dorset, Hampshire, Sussex, Essex, Kent and Suffolk.¹⁰⁵ The imperial ambassador was probably correct in writing that, among other attempts to preclude disorder, military assistance was given to the gentry to break up illegal assemblies.¹⁰⁶

The privy council wrote to the JPs, 'some speciall men also in every shere' and the lords lieutenant in early October. These men were to enforce the new proclamations against hoarding. This reinforces the idea of a working relationship between the centre and localities, especially during crises, with the crown reaching out to those with whom it had close contacts and using the most visible and powerful conciliar agents, the lords lieutenant (most of whom were privy councillors). Another proclamation would be issued on 20 October and continued efforts were made to bring produce to market to reduce dearth. This even had an impact as far away as Newcastle.¹⁰⁷ It is also possible that Somerset and, especially, Northumberland regarded the lords lieutenant and deputy lieutenants as an alternative to the supernumeraries as a means of fostering ties between the centre and localities. Despite professions of unity, the parties were to monitor one another. The 'speciall men' were to oversee the JPs in order to see the proclamations enforced because 'some slaknes hath in tymes past befoure byn founde in many of the said Justices'. These 'speciall men' were not listed but were presumably the members of the county elite, including certain JPs, whom the regime found most reliable; the same men who had been summoned to protect the king in July 1549 and who were relied on for other important tasks.¹⁰⁸ The lords lieutenant were informed of this surveillance of the JPs in October and told to assist.¹⁰⁹ Somerset was used in the same capacity as lord lieutenant again the following summer, breaking up an alleged conspiracy against the gentry by the commons in Wokingham, Berkshire, in August 1551. Once more, his authority in this capacity was reinforced by his position as a local landowner.¹¹⁰

¹⁰² APC, iii, p. 89.

¹⁰³ BL Cotton MS. Nero C. x, fo. 44v; Jordan (ed.), *Chronicle*, p. 88; see above, pp. 226-227.

¹⁰⁴ BL Cotton MS. Nero C. x, fo. 25r; Jordan (ed.), *Chronicle*, pp. 41-42.

¹⁰⁵ Pollard, *Political history*, p. 56; Jordan, *Threshold of power*, pp. 60-61.

¹⁰⁶ Simancas, x, pp. 97, 108-109, 116.

¹⁰⁷ PRO, SP 10/10/42, M. fos. 87r-87v; PRO, SP 10/10/41, M. fos. 86r-86v; PRO, SP 10/10/40, M. fos. 85r-85v; PRO, SP 10/10/43, M. fos. 88r-88v; Hughes and Larkin, i, pp. 490-491, 495-496, 499-509; LPL, MS. 3193, fo. 215; APC, iii, pp. 140, 146.

¹⁰⁸ PRO, SP 10/10/40, M. fo. 85r.

¹⁰⁹ PRO, SP 10/10/43, M. fos. 88r-88v.

¹¹⁰ BL Cotton MS. Nero C. x, fo. 40v; Jordan (ed.), *Chronicle*, p. 78.

On 14 April 1551, the register recorded that new commissions of lieutenancy were to be issued 'throughout the realm for this next sommer'. These covered twenty-nine English counties, Canterbury and Ely.¹¹¹ The commissions were recorded in the docquet book on 4 May but the register is more reliable.¹¹² Somerset, Paget, the earl of Arundel and Shrewsbury were included because of their military and administrative experience and landed estates. Somerset was appointed lieutenant for Berkshire and Hampshire and his commission is recorded in detail. Presumably, the other commissions were similarly worded. He was:

to be the kinges Justice to enquire of all treasons misprisions of treasons insurrections rebellions vnlawfull assemblies and conventicles vnlawfull speaking of wordes. confederates conspiracies false allegations contempte falsehoodes negligence conceylementes. oppressions riot routes murders felonies and other evill dedes whatsoeuer the[y] be and also of all accessaries of the same.

He was to appoint the dates and places where these enquiries would be held within the counties. This sounds like the activity he had already carried out in the summer of 1550.¹¹³ It was more intrusive than the later commissions of lieutenancy, where a major figure from the government was expected to set up a one-man commission of *oyer et terminer* in order to rely on the local elite for support. Somerset was to be lieutenant, levy men for wars and to counter rebellion, 'texecute upon them the marshall law' and, with the assistance of the local officers, to prevent invasion or insurrection within the shires. This commission was not to be 'preiudiciall' to the extant commissions of *oyer et terminer*. It followed the statute of November 1549 quite closely.¹¹⁴

The lieutenants were invariably appointed to counties where they were men of standing and most were closely associated with Warwick. For example, Cheyne was lieutenant of Kent and Canterbury. He was already lord warden of the Cinque Ports, JP for Kent, and held other local offices. His principal estates lay in Kent too. Arundel was appointed with Warwick's kinsman Lord De La Warr for Sussex. Herbert was appointed lieutenant for Wiltshire; Bedford for Dorset, Somerset, Devon and Cornwall; Northampton for Surrey, Northamptonshire, Bedfordshire, Buckinghamshire, Hertfordshire and Cambridgeshire; Ely, Oxford, Darcy and Gates for Essex; Darcy and Gage for Suffolk; and Sussex, Sir Roger Townsend, Sir William Farmer and Robsart for Norfolk. Huntingdon was appointed for Leicestershire and Rutland; Tyrwhitt and Thomas Audley for Huntingdon; Warwick for Warwickshire and Oxfordshire; Hereford and Paget for Staffordshire; Paget and Wroth for Middlesex; Rutland for Lincolnshire; Clinton for

¹¹¹ APC, iii, pp. 258-259; Thomson, *Lords lieutenants*, p. 31, n. 3.

¹¹² Royal MS. 18 C xxiv, fos. 88v-90r; Thomson, *Lords lieutenants*, pp. 31-32, n. 3.

¹¹³ Somerset was listed as lieutenant for Berkshire and Buckinghamshire in the docquet book: APC, iii, pp. 258-259; Royal MS. 18 C xxiv, fo. 88v; BL Harley MS. 5008, fos. 7r-7v; Gammon, *Statesman and schemer*, p. 174.

¹¹⁴ Royal MS. 18 C xxiv, fos. 88v-90r.

Nottinghamshire; Shrewsbury for Derbyshire; Derby for Lancashire; and Ely for the bishopric of Ely. Lieutenants were not appointed for Wales and the north. The appointees were substantial men in their designated localities but the preponderance of some reflected their importance to Warwick. Northampton is the most glaring example. Although wealthy, he did not deserve so many lieutenancies in comparison with Somerset, Shrewsbury or Derby, either based on landed wealth, local connections or civil and military experience. De La Warr, Herbert, Northampton, Huntingdon, Ely, Darcy, Gates, Robsart, Hereford, Wroth, and Clinton were all closely associated with Warwick, and De La Warr, Darcy, Gates, Robsart and Wroth could be described as clients.¹¹⁵

These appointments had a practical effect. The level of co-operation and co-ordination can be seen in developments in the midlands. Clinton wrote to Cecil in September from Sempringham, Lincolnshire, to express gladness at news from him that disorder had been checked. Clinton had written to the local JPs to order them to keep watches to prevent unlawful assemblies and hoped Cecil's father would do the same in his neighbourhood. On 2 September, Sir John Harrington had informed Clinton and Northampton of disorders growing in Leicestershire, Northamptonshire and Rutland on 31 August. With Sir Thomas Tresham, Andrew Nowell, esquire, sheriff of Rutland, and several other JPs for Rutland, Harrington succeeded in nullifying this potential rising at Uppingham. Similarly, Sir Thomas Neville and Kenelm Digby participated in the Leicestershire elite's efforts to prevent four hundred men from Halstead joining the potential rebels less than ten miles away in Rutland. The gentry of Rutland and Leicestershire combined their efforts and kept watch in the towns at night. The danger of this disorder spreading to Lincolnshire and Norfolk led Harrington to advise that the lieutenants and JPs, as well as the gentry, be warned to prepare themselves and take order for their localities. Despite this success, anxiety over disorder persisted.¹¹⁶

The commissions were reissued on 16 May 1552 with basically the same personnel, although quite a few lieutenants were moved from one county to another to accommodate new appointees and because their consequence was perhaps greater in the new locale than the old one. The new commissions also reflected alterations in the wake of Somerset's execution. Thirty-three counties were covered as well as Ely, Canterbury, Durham, five boroughs and Wales. The north was included too. Northumberland was lieutenant for Northumberland, Cumberland, Newcastle and Berwick, giving him authority over the north and the main garrison in England, while he was also joint-lieutenant of Warwickshire with his heir and Staffordshire with Hereford. Winchester replaced Somerset as lieutenant of Hampshire, Northampton replaced him in Berkshire and

¹¹⁵ *APC*, iii, pp. 258-259; Thomson, *Lords lieutenants*, pp. 31-33; PRO, C 66/801, m. 14d; *Calendar of patent rolls*, i, p. 85; Bindoff, i, pp. 353-354, 634-638; see above, pp. 174-199.

replaced Northumberland in Oxfordshire, and Paget and Arundel were removed. Sir Robert Bowes and Sir Roger Cholmley were appointed for Middlesex. Clinton replaced Rutland in Lincolnshire; Huntingdon replaced Shrewsbury in Derbyshire and relinquished his lieutenancy of Leicestershire to Suffolk: Lord Russell, Bedford's heir, replaced Northampton in Buckinghamshire; Rutland replaced Clinton in Nottinghamshire; Rich replaced Ely in Essex; and Sir Robert Dudley replaced Townsend in Norfolk. Herbert was appointed lieutenant for Wales by virtue of his office of lord president of the council in the marches of Wales. Cumberland was appointed for Westmorland. Wingfield and the new Lord Wentworth replaced Gates in Suffolk, Westmorland was appointed for Durham and Shrewsbury for Yorkshire, York and Kingston-upon-Hull.¹¹⁷ Almost every county was covered by lieutenancies by 1553.¹¹⁸ The commissions used very similar wording to those of the previous year, being issued 'in as large manner as the connsailed [*sic*] might doe by theire comissions made the last yeare'.¹¹⁹ G.S. Thomson regarded the new commissions as an attempt by Northumberland to control the country through its military offices, which were divided among his supporters and clientele. The appointment of two of his sons, who were both young men (Dudley being only about twenty), does give weight to this claim. However, Dudley was attending sessions of the peace by 1551 and worked with Robsart, Sussex and Farmer. As already noted, Northampton was unsuited for his pre-eminence, let alone its extension, but the other choices were generally sound. The lieutenancy was a vital office and the importance of local connections was central to it. The men selected had a strong regional base and the necessary experience.¹²⁰

Friendship and familiarity were vital to the effectiveness of the lieutenancies. The lieutenants used their personal relationship with one another and with the sheriffs and JPs to work closely in maintaining order. This was crystallised through the powerful ties of trust and vicinage.¹²¹ The Elizabethan instructions to lords lieutenant are valuable sources for their precursors.¹²² The lieutenants were to make sure their counties were secure against invasion, especially from the coast, and took musters to ensure that defence was maintained.¹²³ They co-operated with the county elite in training the bands.¹²⁴ The lieutenants were entrusted with 'the care and governannce of hir said Connty to be preserved both in quiet both from dannger of Rebellyons and from offence of the enemies' but were not expected to supersede civil government except in time

¹¹⁶ Haynes, pp. 114-116; PRO, C 66/801, mm. 14d-16d, 18d; *Calendar of patent rolls*, i, pp. 85-88; PRO, SP 10/13/37, M. fos. 76r-77v; Jordan, *Threshold of power*, pp. 67-69.

¹¹⁷ *APC*, iv, pp. 48-50; Royal MS. 18 C xxiv, fos. 208v-209v; Thomson, *Lords lieutenants*, pp. 32-33; Bindoff, i, pp. 471-473.

¹¹⁸ Thomson, *Lords lieutenants*, p. 33.

¹¹⁹ A copy of Northumberland's commission was recorded in the docquet book: Royal MS. 18 C xxiv, fo. 208v.

¹²⁰ Thomson, *Lords lieutenants*, pp. 32-33; MacCulloch, *Suffolk and the Tudors*, p. 78, n. 83.

¹²¹ Thomson, 'The origin and growth of the office of deputy-lieutenant', pp. 153, 162-163.

¹²² BL Egerton MS. 2790, fos. 88v-90v; BL Egerton MS. 2790, fos. 117v-119r.

¹²³ BL Egerton MS. 2790, fo. 88v.

¹²⁴ BL Egerton MS. 2790, fos. 89r-90v.

of war.¹²⁵ Therefore, they did not encroach on the remit of the JPs but reinforced their authority and competency. These police powers meant disorder did not return to England and Wales in 1550-1553, although there were constant rumours.¹²⁶

II: The clientele and the counties

Gentry families with service connections to the nobility were colleagues in the political community—they were with their patron from youth and served alongside him in parliament, as sheriffs, as JPs, in royal administration and in war. Younger sons often made their career serving in noble households. The nobility and gentry had their children brought up within the households of their peers.¹²⁷ These processes tended to strengthen the ties within the ruling elite and increased its homogeneity. A good example is the clientele of the sixteenth earl of Oxford. The Essex commissions of the peace in 1547 included eleven of his clients. Those appointed with the earl included, Sir John Wentworth, Sir Thomas Darcy, Sir John Gates, Sir William Walgrave, Sir William Pyrton, Sir Henry Tyrrell, John Wiseman of Felsted, auditor of the court of augmentations, Sir Thomas Josselyn, knight of the Bath, John Lucas, John Danyell, John Tay, and William Cardinall (twenty two per cent of the whole bench). These men came from families that had served the de Veres since the late fifteenth century. Seven of these families had relations serving Oxford in 1550-1551. However, only the relatively modest, but expert, Wiseman and Lucas were of the quorum. Lucas and Walgrave were also on the Suffolk bench.¹²⁸ They were mostly from reasonably important local gentry families, often with strong court or government connections.

Oxford's clientele benefited from the de Vere association in national and local administration and an examination of it demonstrates the reliance of the government on the same core among the county elite for the most important tasks. Lucas, esquire, was not only an Essex landowner and member of the Inner Temple but one of the two masters of requests ordinary, who was appointed to the commission for the sale and exchange of crown lands on 7 December 1552, appointed to hear requests in about January 1553 and listed, along with Sir Robert Bowes, master of the rolls, in a memorandum by Cecil of about March of matters to be 'moued' to the king 'to examyne the fellons in ye Gate house'. He began his career in the court of augmentations and was steward of de Vere estates from 1541 and a member of Oxford's council by 1545. Lucas became the earl's friend, as well as his client. He was probably placed on the bench, made clerk of Colchester and

¹²⁵ BL Egerton MS. 2790, fo. 90v.

¹²⁶ Jordan, *Threshold of power*, pp. 427-439.

¹²⁷ Mertes, *The English noble household*, p. 62.

¹²⁸ PRO, C 66/801, mm. 10d, 20d; *Calendar of patent rolls*, i, pp. 83, 89; Mertes, *The English noble household*, p. 62; PRO, SP 46/1, fos. 144r-144v; Bindoff, ii, pp. 197-199.

elected to parliament as a result of de Vere patronage. He became extremely wealthy as a result.¹²⁹ Lucas had previously been named to the commission of 9 March 1552 to hear requests along with some of the more powerful men in government (Bedford, Darcy, Cobham, Ridley, Mason and Hoby) and his fellow master of requests ordinary, John Cox. With the addition of Sadler, master of the great wardrobe, these were the same men reappointed a year later with essentially the same remit.¹³⁰ In his county capacity, Lucas was among those ordered to remain in Essex prepared against invasion in the summer of 1548, along with Wiseman, Danyell and Cardinall. Many of the others listed were also drawn from the commission of the peace.¹³¹ Like other gentlemen, he was obligated to supply horses for the Scottish campaign in 1548, as were Wentworth, Darcy, Tyrrell, Wiseman, Josselyn, Danyell and Cardinall.¹³² Lucas was also listed to be assessed at his London residence, necessitated by his governmental work, which lay in Farrington Within Ward, but was discharged because he had already been rated within the county of Essex.¹³³ Wentworth, Walgrave, Tyrrell and Josselyn were among those who provided the more expensive great horses for the Pinkie campaign.¹³⁴ Several were MPs and all were figures of increasing independence. Cardinall was MP for Colchester in 1554, a clothier and receiver-general to the sixteenth earl of Oxford by 1558, having entered de Vere service four years previously. His return for the borough was probably due to the earl's patronage. He was also a notable protestant. Lucas was MP for Colchester in 1545, 1547 and March and October 1553. He was steward of several of Darcy's Essex estates from 1553. Lucas signed the device to alter the succession and was also a prominent protestant, who sat on commissions to enforce religious changes. He was briefly sent to the Fleet in Mary's reign as a result. Walgrave, of Smallbridge in Bures, Suffolk, nephew of Sir William Drury, was one of the wealthiest gentlemen in Suffolk, and concerned himself with local administration, the court and military service. He was sheriff of Norfolk and Suffolk in 1550-1551. In January 1553 he was considered as a potential parliamentary candidate with his uncle but Sir Henry Bedingfield was selected instead. Cecil considered him a likely supporter of Jane, along with his uncle, but on being summoned with Drury by Mary to Kenninghall on 8 July, they gave their full support. Both were made muster masters.¹³⁵ Wiseman was an auditor of the court of augmentations for Kent, Surrey and Sussex.¹³⁶

¹²⁹ PRO, SP 10/2/30, M. fos. 103r-103v; *Calendar of patent rolls*, iv, pp. 397-398; PRO, SP 10/14/6, M. fo. 11r; PRO, SP 10/18/12, M. fos. 21r-22v; PRO, SP 10/18/16, M. fo. 29r; Bindoff, ii, pp. 553-555; R.M. Fisher, 'Reform, repression and unrest at the Inns of Court, 1518-1558', *Historical Journal*, 20 (1977), pp. 783-801.

¹³⁰ BL Additional MS. 5498, fos. 58r-58v; BL Additional MS. 5498, fos. 59r-60v; PRO, SP 10/18/12, M. fos. 21r-22v.

¹³¹ PRO, SP 10/4/12 (i), M. fo. 32r; PRO, C 66/801, m. 10d; *Calendar of patent rolls*, i, p. 83;.

¹³² PRO, SP 10/5/17, M. fos. 63v-64r; PRO, SP 10/5/18, M. fo. 77r.

¹³³ Wiseman paid in London, where he had a house in Candlewick Street Ward: PRO, SP 10/5/18, M. fos. 76r-77r.

¹³⁴ Wentworth was assessed at court: PRO, SP 10/2/1, M. fo. 1v-2r.

¹³⁵ Bindoff, i, p. 571; ii, pp. 553-555; iii, pp. 535-536; ITL, Petyt MS. 538/47, fos. 316r-316v; BL Lansdowne MS. 3, fos. 36r-37v; BL Lansdowne MS. 103, fo. 2r; BL Lansdowne MS. 1236, fos. 29r-29v; *APC*, iv, p. 300.

¹³⁶ PRO, SP 10/7/43, M. fos. 112r-113v; PRO, SP 10/7/43 (i), M. fos. 114r-115v; BL Harley MS. 284, fo. 115v; PRO, SP 10/18/40, M. fos. 67r-72v.

Darcy was perhaps the most substantial figure in the de Vere clientele, and Northumberland, who recognised his ability and made him his own client, advanced his career. He had been a ward of another substantial Essex gentleman, Sir John Rainsford of Colchester, also on the commission of the peace in 1547. Rainsford brought him up as a soldier. Darcy was related to the Wentworths of Nettlestead, Suffolk, and his second wife was Elizabeth de Vere, daughter of the fifteenth earl of Oxford. He worked extensively with his brother-in-law and benefited from de Vere patronage, especially after the fifteenth earl's death, acquiring from 1541 three offices traditionally held by that family, the stewardship of St Osyth's and the keeperships of Colchester Castle and Tendring hundred.¹³⁷ Darcy became estranged from the earl over a dispute between Sir John Gates and Oxford in 1542. This originated in a conflict between Gates's sister and Wiseman, the earl's servant. Darcy's attempted mediation failed.¹³⁸ However, another conflict of interest had probably been the main source of alienation between Oxford and Darcy. This stemmed from Somerset's recruitment of Darcy and interference in Oxford's affairs. As lord protector, Somerset was anxious to tie his family to the de Veres, desiring to marry his son, Lord Henry Seymour, to the sixteenth earl's daughter and heiress presumptive, Lady Katherine de Vere. Darcy was Somerset's cousin. Somerset hoped familial relations would secure Darcy's compliance in preventing Oxford from marrying one of the gentlewomen in his household, Dorothy Golding, daughter of John Golding of Belchamp St Paul, Essex. Darcy wrote to one of Somerset's servants (possibly Cecil) on 27 June 1547 from Oxford's property of Hedingham Castle, Essex. The letter records the conversations between Somerset's clients and him concerning Oxford's position. Darcy wrote that 'accurdyng to my late conversacyon had *with* yow in my lordes graces galerye at Westmynstre', he had enquired about relations between Oxford and Dorothy, '*with* whom hee [Oxford] is in Love'. He spoke with them and found that they planned to marry. Somerset had spoken with the earl himself and asked about the situation. Now Oxford was proceeding more cautiously, keeping his conversations with Dorothy secret. Darcy advised the lord protector's client that 'yf yt shall stande *with* my lordes graces pleasure to haue this mater further steyd (as my lorde of oxenfordes honour welthe and preseruacyon consideryd I thynke yt verye expedyent and maye righte well bee) then I beseche yow I maye bee therof aduertysyd'.¹³⁹ This could have been concern for Oxford's reputation on Somerset's part but it does look like undue interference from extremely acquisitive motives. Dorothy was staying in the house of Edward Grene of Sampford, Essex, at the time. Darcy advised that Grene be ordered to prevent communication between the earl and her, while offering to negotiate Oxford's marriage to one of Wentworth's daughters.¹⁴⁰ This suggests Darcy may have considered Oxford's interests to some extent because through

¹³⁷ Bindoff, ii, pp. 14-16; PRO, C 66/801, m. 10d; *Calendar of patent rolls*, i, p. 83.

¹³⁸ Bindoff, ii, pp. 14-15.

¹³⁹ PRO, SP 10/1/45, M. fo. 135r; *The complete peerage*, eds. Gibbs *et al*, x, pp. 249-250; MacCulloch, *Suffolk and the Tudors*, p. 78.

¹⁴⁰ PRO, SP 10/1/45, M. fos. 135r-135v.

marriage the earl could hope to produce a male heir, something Somerset probably did not want, considering his marital plans for his son.

Relations between Somerset and Oxford were already deteriorating rapidly. On 21 May 1547, the privy council had agreed with the lord protector that Oxford should surrender his patent as great chamberlain of England, 'for the clere extinction of his pretenced clayme to the saide office, whereunto he could shewe no thing of good grounde to have right in the same'.¹⁴¹ Somerset had been great chamberlain from before 7 February, being replaced by Warwick on 17 February.¹⁴² Tension over offices pales in comparison to tension over land. Somerset almost certainly wanted to acquire the de Vere lands through inheritance by marrying his son to Lady Katherine de Vere. This was a dangerous course because for the leading figure in government, essentially acting as king, to threaten the rights of one of the most important home county aristocrats to his patrimony, undermined the confidence landed society had in the regime. Traditionally, medieval kings lost the support of the elite if they reneged on their special responsibility to uphold impartial justice in order to maintain property rights, especially by arbitrarily removing those rights, or failed to defend the realm.¹⁴³ The importance of upholding the law remained prevalent during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, especially as the early Tudors sought to bind the gentry more closely to the royal household than to aristocratic clienteles by providing positions near the king as esquires and knights of the body.¹⁴⁴ Oxford tried to retain his clients. For example, he granted some land to Wiseman on 31 March 1548.¹⁴⁵ However, in 1548 Oxford was given a licence to grant land to Somerset, the duke's heirs, Stanhope, Darcy and Lucas, as trustees. These lands were to be enjoyed by Lady Katherine de Vere and Lord Henry Seymour in the event that they married and were to descend to their heirs. If this marriage did not take place before 29 September 1559, she was to marry another of the duke's sons and the lands were to be divided between Henry and her husband. The only safeguard enjoyed by Oxford was the clause that the trustees would return any land alienated if he had a male heir. These extensive grants must have represented a large portion of the de Vere patrimony, if not the entire landed estate, with manors granted in Wiltshire, Buckinghamshire, Devon, Essex, Suffolk, Hertfordshire and Buckinghamshire, including in reversion the dower lands and lands granted to Oxford's brother, Robert de Vere, esquire.¹⁴⁶ This was a means of providing for Somerset's younger sons but the earl's choices were circumscribed. These careful efforts were in vain, though. Oxford married Dorothy on 1 August 1548 and she

¹⁴¹ APC, ii, p. 93.

¹⁴² PRO, SP 10/1/7, M. fos. 22v-23r; PRO, SP 10/1/10, M. fo. 26v; *Calendar of the patent rolls*, i, pp. 180-181.

¹⁴³ Carpenter, *The wars of the roses*, pp. 27-29, 34-44, 47, 52-54; W.M. Ormrod, *Political life in medieval England, 1300-1450* (Basingstoke, 1995), pp. 12, 63-65, 67-72; Given-Wilson, *The English nobility*, pp. 30, 32-33, 46-47, 49-54, 169-171.

¹⁴⁴ Heal and Holmes, *The gentry*, pp. 196-198.

¹⁴⁵ *Calendar of patent rolls*, i, p. 373.

¹⁴⁶ *Calendar of patent rolls*, i, pp. 376-381.

bore him a male heir in April 1550.¹⁴⁷ Somerset had fallen from power by then but it is possible that this de Vere heir would have been effectively disinherited if the October coup had not taken place, despite provision for him. The duke had done this to his own sons by his first marriage.¹⁴⁸ It is not surprising that Oxford was unmoved by Somerset's situation in October 1549.¹⁴⁹

Darcy could also be considered as Rainsford's client (having benefited from his tutelage). This role was reversed as Northumberland widened his own clientele and recruited Rainsford through Darcy, who was now a powerful and trusted adherent. Rainsford then benefited from Dudley patronage. On 17 January 1553, he obtained support from the duke in a letter to the commissioners for land sales (the bishop of Norwich, Sir John Gates, Sir Robert Bowes, Sir Richard Sackville and Sir Walter Mildmay).¹⁵⁰ Here, Rainsford, a 'former protégé' of Cromwell, was the duke's 'loving friend'. Northumberland had learned (probably through Darcy) that Rainsford was a longstanding suitor for land adjoining his 'park pale' and had received 'fauorable warrant' from the commissioners. The duke wanted to assist him against a rival for this land because of 'tholde acquayntaunce that hathe byn betwene him and me' and because of his 'old seruys'. Northumberland asked for the commissioner's 'contemplacion'. This favour probably allowed Rainsford to purchase lands around Mistley, Essex, in June.¹⁵¹ Darcy had effected his change in loyalty rapidly, having already been appointed to the privy chamber in the aftermath of the October coup. This does not mean that everybody deserted Somerset. People still found the connection useful. For example, Sir John York began working for the duke. However, only those seriously in conflict with Northumberland became dangerously committed, men like Vane.¹⁵² Oxford's clientele was important in local politics, as were the clienteles of other powerful nobles. Although his clients were part of a service tradition going back into the late fifteenth century, the structure of his following and the aims and tensions within his clientele were similar to those of more recent nobles like Somerset and Northumberland, whose sons would benefit from the same kind of service tradition.¹⁵³

Relations between the government and the localities could be facilitated by clientage structures, albeit informally. For example, with the dissolution of the guilds and chantries (1 Edward VI, c. 14), Coventry suffered some hardship. John Hales was a resident and wrote to his patron,

¹⁴⁷ *The complete peerage*, eds. Gibbs *et al*, x, pp. 249-250.

¹⁴⁸ Seymour married Catherine, daughter and coheir of Sir William Fyloll of Woodlands in Dorset, before 1527 but repudiated her on the grounds of adultery. He secured an act of parliament (32 Henry VIII, c. 78) in 1540 that disinherited John and Edward Seymour, the sons by his first marriage. He also gained possession of much of Catherine's inheritance, although he did provide for their sons: Jordan, *The young king*, p. 46, n. 1; Bindoff, iii, pp. 292-293.

¹⁴⁹ PRO, SP 10/9/4, M. fos. 5r-5v.

¹⁵⁰ BL Harley MS. 284, fos. 123r-124v; Beer, *Northumberland*, p. 126.

¹⁵¹ BL Harley MS. 284, fo. 123r; Beer, *Northumberland*, p. 126; Bindoff, iii, p. 184.

¹⁵² See above, pp. 206-208, 212, 221.

¹⁵³ Adams, 'The Dudley clientèle', pp. 241-265.

Somerset, to express concern over the decay of the city, whose cathedral had been demolished.¹⁵⁴ In 1548 the citizens petitioned Warwick, one of the greatest landowners in the midlands, to mitigate on their behalf, otherwise if 'by thact the same landes shuld passe from them it shuld be a manifest cause of thuttre desolacion of the cite'. The city was able to repurchase the guild lands for £1315.1.8 through his intervention.¹⁵⁵ Warwick did this because he wanted to increase his ties to the midlands.¹⁵⁶ He visited Coventry in October 1550. While there, he heard that the masons working on Dudley Castle had gone unpaid for at least three weeks. Warwick wrote to George Tuke or Tuckey, esquire, one of his servants, to ensure they were paid. Tuke was 'to be more privy to all my affayres'. The earl warned him that from time to time a good servant should inform his master of things, even if he had not been asked, and 'soche ydle & slowthfull seruannts never shall serue to theyr masters honor nor proffyt but I think yt ys my hape a lon to haue suche'. Warwick could not know what was happening in his country unless his servants and clients kept him apprised of developments and his reputation might be impaired as a consequence. It was important to demonstrate generosity and good organisation, especially through clients.¹⁵⁷ He may have intended to plant his heir in Warwickshire, making him joint lord lieutenant with him in May 1552 and putting him on other local commissions.¹⁵⁸

Despite this Dudley connection, the growing support for protestantism and the Grey interest in the region (including the substantial Astley Castle, Warwickshire), Suffolk was denied entry to Coventry on 31 January 1554 during Wyatt's Rebellion, probably because the citizens recognised the pointlessness of this protest against Mary. Professor Loades pointed out that Suffolk, notwithstanding his regional base concentrated on Bradgate near Groby in Leicestershire, was a poor choice as the midlands was apathetic towards him. He failed to raise the region against Mary. Bradgate was very close to Leicester itself (about five miles away) but the duke had found the gates of that city closed to him on 30 January.¹⁵⁹ However, unlike Warwick, and despite coming from an established midland family, Suffolk rarely made an effort to cultivate local connections. He had substantial success when he did.¹⁶⁰ Warwick did visit the midlands in the summers of 1548, 1549 and 1550, making something of a point about his attempts to plant himself as a midlands noble. This contrasts with Somerset, who, although he continued his west country connections through his servants and clients, rarely went there until after his fall (but this might

¹⁵⁴ M.D. Harris, *The story of Coventry* (London, 1911), pp. 161-162.

¹⁵⁵ *APC*, ii, pp. 193-195; BL Harley MS. 6195, fos. 3v-5r; Harris, *The story of Coventry*, pp. 162-163; Guy, *Tudor England*, p. 34. Beer, *Northumberland*, pp. 176-180.

¹⁵⁶ Beer, *Northumberland*, p. 180.

¹⁵⁷ Tuke was involved in Sir Robert Dudley's land transactions in the 1550s: PRO, SP 46/124, fo. 93r; PRO, LR 2/118, fo. 36r; *Calendar of patent rolls*, iii, p. 63; Mertes, *The English noble household*, pp. 131-133; Adams, 'The Dudley clientèle', p. 251.

¹⁵⁸ *APC*, iv, pp. 49, 276; Adams, 'Because I am of that Countrey & Mynde to Plant myself there', pp. 28-30.

¹⁵⁹ Nichols (ed.), *Chronicle of Queen Jane*, pp. 122-127; D. Loades, *Two Tudor conspiracies* (Cambridge, 1965), pp. 25-31; Chapman, *Lady Jane Grey*, pp. 17-18; Harris, *The story of Coventry*, p. 163.

¹⁶⁰ See above, p. 116.

reflect pressure of work in London rather than inclination). Yet, it is unlikely that Warwick's cultivation of the region benefited him too much, because he garnered little support there during the coup of 1553. His influence was strong but it could not overcome understandable inertia to such a dangerous cause. The mayor of Coventry had considered proclaiming Jane for Northumberland but was overruled by the recorder, who won the city over to Mary.¹⁶¹

The example of the north is instructive. Again, like Essex, the relationships between the local elite underpinned political cohesion. Their role at county level was perhaps more pronounced in national politics than in the south, though. After the treaty of Boulogne, the realm's principal military force was located in the north. Northumberland in particular was obsessed with disorder, especially from this quarter. Apathy to religious changes, relative poverty, instability because of close proximity to the Scottish border and anxiety about the changes occurring in English politics, focusing authority on the court and undermining the feudal power of the magnates in the localities, all destabilised the region.¹⁶² Somerset appointed all the principal military officers as lieutenant general north of the Trent from 1543-1547. He also supported Robert Holgate, lord president of the council of the north, in being appointed archbishop of York. As lord protector, Somerset attempted to intervene to limit private feuding, like that which threatened to break out between Wharton and Cumberland in early 1549 over the latter's hereditary position as ^{sheriff} sheriffwick of Westmorland.¹⁶³ Somerset rehabilitated the Percies and Dacre of Gilsland, Shrewsbury's brother-in-law, as part of this process.¹⁶⁴ The Percies benefited from the ^{'resurgence'} 'resurgence' of established families during the protectorate. The attainder was reversed and a substantial portion of their estates was restored. This was a reaction to Henry's death and provided them with an opportunity to serve the new king. The disgraced Dacre of Gilsland was revived for the same reason, as were the Staffords, Fitzgeralds and Darcies. Somerset tried to work with the political leaders of northern society and Northumberland and Mary continued this traditional policy.¹⁶⁵

Dacre of Gilsland was still vital to border security and had been appointed warden of the west marches on 17 April and governor of Carlisle on 20 August 1549, replacing his brother-in-law, Wharton. He was appointed to the council of the north in the same month. Rutland had been made warden of the east and middle marches by 1 May, effectively replacing Grey of Wilton (the

¹⁶¹ BL Lansdowne MS. 238, fo. 320r; PRO, SP 10/7/35, M. fos. 91r-91v; Nichols (ed.), *Chronicle of Queen Jane*, p. 113; PRO, SP 10/10/9, M. fo. 22r; Longleat, Seymour MS. 4, fos. 15r-15v; APC, iii, pp. 89, 258.

¹⁶² Reid, *The king's council*, pp. 166-167; 'The political influence of the 'north parts'', pp. 208-209; Guy, *Tudor England*, pp. 154-177, 213-214.

¹⁶³ Reid, *The king's council*, pp. 167-168; Reid, 'The political influence of the 'north parts'', p. 209; A.G. Dickens (ed.), *Clifford Letters of the sixteenth century*, (Surtees Society, vol. clxxii; London, 1962), pp. 33-34, 101-104.

¹⁶⁴ S.G. Ellis, 'The Tudor borderlands, 1485-1603', in Morrill (ed.), *The Oxford illustrated history of Tudor and Stuart Britain*, pp. 70-71.

¹⁶⁵ Bush, *Government policy*, pp. 129-131, 141-142; Guy, *Tudor England*, p. 240; DNB, liii, p. 451; *Calendar of the patent and close rolls of chancery in Ireland, of the reigns of Henry VIII., Edward VI., Mary., and Elizabeth.*, ed. J. Morrin (iii vols.; Dublin, 1861-1862), i, pp. 263-264.

king's lieutenant since September 1547) in command of the Scottish campaign.¹⁶⁶ The king incorrectly thought Dacre of Gilsland was replacing Bowes, who was possibly demoted to deputy warden of the east and middle marches, while actually continuing to carry out the offices of warden. Grey of Wilton had informed Somerset on 11 April 1548 that he had told Bowes the lord protector intended him to fulfil the office of both the wardenries, although without increased pay or expenses (he had been warden of the middle march since 1545).¹⁶⁷ Dacre of Gilsland had commanded the three thousand strong rearward at Pinkie. His substantial territorial power assisted him in the execution of his office. He repulsed a large raiding force on 16 August 1550, including French soldiers, under Sir John Maxwell, the earl of Maxwell's brother, who was pursuing a feud against the Grahams. The Grahams, one of the main border surnames, were then under English protection.¹⁶⁸ Interestingly, Dacre of Gilsland put the interests of the state before those of his family, especially concerning a dispute between Sir Thomas Dacre of Lanercost and Richard Graham concerning land beside the River Esk.¹⁶⁹ Dacre of Gilsland seems to have been in a quandary. He did not wish to undermine the interests of his kinsman but was pressured by the government to exercise his office disinterestedly.¹⁷⁰ The critical difference between the English and Scottish governments was that the former could usually enforce its will more effectively, controlling the activities of its wardens and most of the time preventing them from pursuing their own interests at the king's expense.¹⁷¹ However, this did not always work. Dacre of Gilsland's disinterested exercise of his office may have broken down. He was arrested in November 1551 for feuding with the Musgraves.¹⁷² At this point Northumberland, in the process of destroying Somerset, appointed new deputy wardens and made himself warden-general of the marches against Scotland (20 October 1551). However, when effective pressure could be brought to bear, the English wardens were more carefully controlled. Bloodfeud was not a characteristic of English politics.

¹⁶⁶ APC, ii, p. 360; PRO, SP 15/3/27, fos. 59r-60r; PRO, SP 15/3/28, fos. 61r-64v; *The manuscripts of...the duke of Rutland*, i, pp. 33-34; *The complete peerage*, eds. Gibbs et al, vi, p. 184; xi, pp. 255-257. When Grey of Wilton, Wharton and Bowes wrote to Somerset on 27 January 1548, the latter was warden of the east and middle marches and Wharton was warden of the west marches: PRO, SP 50/3/23, fos. 765-768. PRO, SP 15/3/47, fos. 89r-104v; *Calendar of patent rolls*, ii, p. 401; iii, p. 118; Jordan, *The young king*, p. 296; Bush, *Government policy*, p. 129; M.L. Bush 'The problem of the far north: a study of the crisis of 1537 and its consequences', *Northern History*, 6 (1971), p. 55. Dacre of Gilsland was among the councillors who, by reason of the expense of service, 'shall not be bounde to contynuall attendaunce, but to goe and cum at there pleaures, vnlesse they be requyred by the saide lorde presidente to remaine with him for a tyme', nor was he of any quorum: PRO, SP 15/3/47, fos. 92v-94r, 97r.

¹⁶⁷ BL Cotton MS. Nero C. x, fo. 14v; Jordan (ed.), *Chronicle*, p. 12; PRO, SP 50/4/5, fo. 45; PRO, SP 50/4/105, fos. 179-182; Bindoff, i, pp. 471-473.

¹⁶⁸ Patten, *The expedition into Scotlande*, sig. A1r; Pollard (ed.), *Tudor tracts*, p. 78; Jordan, *Threshold of power*, pp. 149-150; BL Cotton MS. Nero C. x, fo. 25v; Jordan (ed.), *Chronicle*, p. 44.

¹⁶⁹ APC, iii, p. 119; PRO, SP 10/14/72, M. fo. 161v; *Calendar of patent rolls*, iv, p. 259; Loades, *The reign of Mary Tudor*, p. 52; Patten, *The expedition into Scotlande*, sig. O4v; Pollard (ed.), *Tudor tracts*, p. 149; PRO, C 66/801, m. 9d; *Calendar of patent rolls*, i, p. 82.

¹⁷⁰ APC, iii, p. 177.

¹⁷¹ K.M. Brown, *Bloodfeud in Scotland, 1573-1625. Violence, justice and politics in early modern Scotland* (Edinburgh, 1986), pp. 74-75.

¹⁷² Reid, 'The political influence of the 'north parts'', pp. 213-216.

Wharton was still central to activities in the west marches. For example, he was informed of Sir Thomas Dacre's appointment as deputy warden of the west marches in November 1552. Dacre was 'to repayre vnto the lord Wharton, for furder knoledge of his ^maiestes^ plessere concernynge theyr placeinge in theyr offyce'. Wharton had a substantial supervisory role as vice-president of the council of the north.¹⁷³ He may have been apathetic towards Dacre of Gilsland and had had to wait until Northumberland's ascendancy to be restored to political consequence in the north. Somerset's policies alienated the local gentry who had been planted there since the Pilgrimage of Grace. Northumberland sent Sir Richard Cotton to secure the north after Somerset's first fall but a more permanent solution was necessary. Northumberland intervened more in northern politics and his attitude towards the local elite, particularly Shrewsbury, was ambivalent. Among other tasks, Cotton and Sir John Harrington were to audit the muster books and accounts of Gregory Railton, the treasurer for the borders, John Brende, the muster master, and the captains, consider the needs of the fortresses at Eyemouth, Roxburgh, Dunglass and Lauder and supply them, and persuade Sir Hugh Willoughby to hold on as captain of the threatened garrison at Broughty Craig.¹⁷⁴ Another example of this attempt to increase control over the localities was the decision to send Dorset to Berwick in April 1550 to work with the JPs for Northumberland, despite having no local connections. This was part of a general policy of sending the elite to their localities, although in this case it was a trusted ally and privy councillor rather than a local man who was sent, and he seems to have operated through his authority as a royal servant and great peer and not through any official appointment.¹⁷⁵ Stanhope had to relinquish his lieutenancy of Hull and other offices on his release from the Tower but had been restored to the constabulary of Hull Castle by August 1550. Bowes was appointed warden of the east marches by February 1550, following his release from Scottish captivity (17 July 1548-20 June 1549).¹⁷⁶ The revived importance of the aristocracy in government, especially local government and military command, a deliberately inclusive policy, led to the appointment of Shrewsbury as lord president during the period when Northumberland was working with Southampton and the earl of Arundel. Although conservative in religion, Shrewsbury was one of the most powerful landowners in the region, with relatives and friends on the council of the north. For example, in May 1548, prior to the arrival of French reinforcements in Scotland, Derby and Shrewsbury were discussing raising new musters with the JPs of Lancashire in order to defend the coast. This was facilitated by their local domination. Importantly, because of his strong regional base he could muster forces for border defence more effectively than could any other peer. However, with the fall of Southampton, Northumberland may have attempted to curb Shrewsbury's power by not granting him the commission of lieutenancy that normally went with his office and by making his own ally Wharton vice-

¹⁷³ *Calendar of patent rolls*, iv, pp. 195-196; PRO, SP 10/14/72, M. fo. 162r.

¹⁷⁴ Reid, 'The political influence of the 'north parts'', pp. 209-211; *APC*, ii, p. 346; PRO, SP 15/3/55, fos. 117r-122v.

¹⁷⁵ LPL, MS. 3193, fo. 217 (1); PRO, C 66/801, m. 17d; *Calendar of patent rolls*, i, p. 87.

president.¹⁷⁷ Dr Bernard has pointed out that the lieutenancy was a temporary office and was usually terminated with the resumption of peace, while Shrewsbury may have had the right to veto Wharton's appointment but chose not to do so. However, there was palpable tension between Northumberland and Shrewsbury and R.R. Reid may have been correct about the reason why the lieutenancy was terminated at this point, especially when the efficacy of permanence was current debate.¹⁷⁸

By April 1550, it was rumoured that Warwick would tour the north in the summer. In an attempt to build a power base in the region, he was appointed governor of Northumberland and warden of the east and middle marches with a fee of £1000 per annum on 27 May 1550. This was cancelled in July. He had himself granted the former Percy lands in Yorkshire.¹⁷⁹ By July Warwick had decided, because of 'urgent considerations', not to go north and remained close to the king instead. Bowes was reappointed warden of the east and middle marches.¹⁸⁰ Warwick was probably not keen to leave the proximity of the court and king so soon, because of Somerset's behaviour, even though Southampton was very ill and would die on 30 July.¹⁸¹ On 21 July, the privy council requested that Shrewsbury move his base in order to maintain closer control over the north, which was becoming unstable through disorder. Dr Bernard thought this was intended to annoy Shrewsbury but it was general policy, especially as the summer approached and anxiety heightened over prospective unrest. It also indicates the privy council's trust in Shrewsbury and confidence in his abilities. The north differed from southern England because its problems partly stemmed from 'beinge nowe boothe dispeopled in great parte and oute of order'. This depopulation was actually displaced population because the region, with limited resources, was supporting unsustainable numbers of border surnames, who lived off raiding. Shrewsbury was to 'reduce the same into frame'. The privy council also requested that the other members of the council of the north reside closer to the border, reflecting Warwick's desire to have the elite *in situ* to contain disorder.¹⁸² The possibility of Warwick going on progress through the north was part of a wider process in which leading privy councillors with strong regional bases were to spend the

¹⁷⁶ APC, ii, pp. 102-103; iii, pp. 361-362, 393.

¹⁷⁷ Reid, 'The political influence of the 'north parts'', pp. 211-212; *Calendar of patent rolls*, iii, p. 404; APC, iii, p. 88; LPL, MS. 3193, fo. 61.

¹⁷⁸ Bernard, *The power of the early Tudor nobility*, pp. 64-65; LPL, MS. 3193, fo. 171; LPL, MS. 3206, fo. 185; LPL, MS. 3193, fo. 209.

¹⁷⁹ Reid, 'The political influence of the 'north parts'', pp. 211-212; *Calendar of patent rolls*, iii, p. 404; APC, iii, p. 88; LPL, MS. 3193, fo. 61.

¹⁸⁰ Bowes, of South Cowton in Yorkshire, was eminently qualified for the position because of his extensive legal training, long military experience and local connections. He had already been reappointed warden of the east and middle marches in January 1550, having served as warden of the middle march since 1545 and warden of both marches since 1548. He was on the quorum for Cumberland, Northumberland, Westmorland, and the East, North and West Ridings, on the council of the north, a commissioner of musters, constable of Barnard Castle, Durham, and Alnwick Castle, Northumberland, and steward of Dunstanburgh and Hexham, Northumberland: APC, iii, p. 88; PRO, C 66/801, mm. 9d, 11d-12d, 17d, 22d; *Calendar of patent rolls*, i, pp. 82, 87, 90-92; LPL, MS. 3193, fo. 147; Bindoff, i, pp. 471-473.

¹⁸¹ See above, pp. 172-173, 185-188, 204, 213-218.

¹⁸² LPL, MS. 3193, fo. 209; Bernard, *The power of the early Tudor nobility*, p. 65.

summer in their counties in an attempt to maintain order. For example, Bedford was 'to lye yn the west contrey' and Herbert was appointed lord president of the council of Wales. At the same time the former lord protector's rehabilitation had reached a pivotal juncture, with Scudamore describing how 'Somerset lyeth at the court and all men seketh upon hym'. Somerset returned to the privy council on 10 April.¹⁸³ However, 'licencies [were] signed for the whole counsel and certaine of the priui chamber to kepe amonge them 2290 ^2340^ retainers' the day before.¹⁸⁴ Warwick's clientele was heavily policing the court.

Northumberland continued his closer supervision of the localities by managing downwards through the local elite. However, he did not consistently appoint members of his clientele to the local offices under him, despite garrisoning Alnwick and Tynemouth with his own men after he was appointed warden-general of the north in May 1552. The barony of Alnwick, and the lordships of Warkworth and Acklington, one-time Percy estates, had been granted to him in January in return for surrendering a life annuity of five hundred marks, while he exchanged lands in Oxfordshire, Worcestershire, Gloucestershire and Middlesex for others in Northumberland and Yorkshire worth £500 per annum.¹⁸⁵ Again, Northumberland was attempting to move his centre of landed power as a means of exercising greater control in certain localities. On 20 October 1551, he had been named warden-general against Scotland, controlling all three marches and overseeing the king's claim of suzerainty over Scotland. He also received command of a company of one hundred cavalry. Northumberland sought more direct control of the garrisons of the north and in April 1552 became chief steward of the East Riding of Yorkshire, with the right to appoint all his officers, and steward of Holderness and Cottingham. He does not seem to have changed the officers under him to his own people. In June he became steward of lands in Cumberland lately belonging to Holme Cultram Priory. Northumberland gained Barnard Castle (April 1553) and was named high steward of the estates of the bishopric of Durham. As a result, he not only controlled the royal estates there but also levied the tenants for war. These positions brought with them substantial fees (two thousand marks as warden-general).¹⁸⁶ As early as April 1552 he was informing Cecil that, through the mediation of Gates, he was pressing the king to have the offices of chancellor and steward of the former palatinate of Durham.¹⁸⁷ He still relied on royal servants. Wharton's importance was underlined by further appointments. For example, he replaced Thomas Gower as marshal of Berwick in November.¹⁸⁸ Northumberland held the palatinate in all but name

¹⁸³ 'Scudamore letters', p. 130; *Simancas*, x, pp. 62-63; BL Cotton MS. Nero C. x, fo. 19v; Jordan (ed.), *Chronicle*, p. 24; *APC*, iii, pp. 6-7.

¹⁸⁴ BL Cotton MS. Nero C. x, fo. 19v; Jordan (ed.), *Chronicle*, p. 24.

¹⁸⁵ Reid, 'The political influence of the 'north parts'', pp. 213-214; *Calendar of patent rolls*, iv, pp. 117-119, 185-186; Beer, *Northumberland*, pp. 181-182.

¹⁸⁶ Reid, 'The political influence of the 'north parts'', pp. 214-216; *Calendar of patent rolls*, iv, pp. 195-196, 344; Loades, *Northumberland*, p. 302.

¹⁸⁷ PRO, SP 10/14/18, M. fo. 29r; PRO, SP 10/18/1, M. fos. 1r-2v.

¹⁸⁸ BL Additional MS. 48018, fo. 406r.

by the end of the reign, having life grants on 2 May 1553 of the stewardships formerly pertaining to it in Cumberland, Westmorland, Yorkshire and elsewhere, while also being constable and keeper of Durham Castle, master forester general and master of the hunt of game. As well as the fees (which amounted to £40.13.4), Northumberland was to 'have the rule and leading of all the king's men and tenants within the premises and all profits' as his predecessors had. He also exercised the patronage of these offices, appointing understewards, clerks of courts, foresters, parkers and other officers of the forests, chases and parks. Again, he did not take advantage of this power of appointment to promote his clients but this may have been because he had insufficient time.¹⁸⁹ His dissolution of the see of Durham in 1552-1553 was not intended to appropriate the revenue for himself. He hoped instead to be able to exercise more control over the north east through this change and wanted Robert Horne, dean of Durham and royal chaplain, to become bishop of one of the two new sees. However, Horne, like Knox, was no longer supporting him.¹⁹⁰

Northumberland drew the public and private interests even closer together when the commissions of lieutenancy were reissued in May 1552.¹⁹¹ Feeling secure in the south, he visited the north the following month in order to redress problems, including feuding, and he disbursed £10,000 to this effect. The duke added the lieutenancy of Durham to his northern offices in May 1553. Durham was a vital staging post for the system of musters and supply in the region.¹⁹² Shrewsbury and Dacre of Gilsland were uneasy. The imperial ambassador thought Northumberland sent Cumberland north as lieutenant and governor. This may have been intended to curtail Shrewsbury's power but close kinship ties between the two earls must have blunted its impact. Cumberland was lord lieutenant of Westmorland and may have been sent to his locality simply to keep order. The imperial ambassador was incorrect in regarding him as lord president or 'governor' of the north.¹⁹³ Although the process of exclusion, caused by distrust, narrowed the base of Northumberland's support, he could be ambivalent. For example, he made Shrewsbury keeper for life of all the royal castles in Yorkshire and Nottinghamshire.¹⁹⁴ Like the rest of England, despite constant rumours of unrest, the north remained quiet and was effectively policed by the government's agents. The close relationship between the local elite and the crown's agents, which made them at times virtually indistinguishable, could work successfully. Like other localities, the north was influenced by the politics of the southeast but political developments were also shaped by local factors. These, in turn, influenced politics in the southeast.

¹⁸⁹ *Calendar of patent rolls*, v, pp. 175-176.

¹⁹⁰ PRO, SP 10/15/35, M. fos. 79r-80v; Tytler, ii, pp. 142-143; Loades, *Northumberland*, pp. 197-199.

¹⁹¹ APC, iv, pp. 49-50.

¹⁹² APC, iv, pp. 276-278; PRO, E 101/62/34, fos. 1r-28r; PRO, E 101/63/9; PRO, E 101/303/4, fo. 2r; PRO, E 351/43; PRO, E 351/44; PRO, E 351/122; PRO, E 351/127; PRO, E 351/134; PRO, E 351/136; PRO, E 351/574; PRO, SP 10/2/1, M. fo. 1r; LPL, MS. 3193, fo. 73; Lodge (ed.), *Illustrations of British history*, i, pp. 154-155.

¹⁹³ Simancas, xi, pp. 44, 51, 55; Bernard, *The power of the early Tudor nobility*, pp. 73-74; APC, iv, p. 278; *The complete peerage*, eds. Gibbs et al, iii, pp. 567-568; iv, p. 22; xi, pp. 711-712.

Northumberland's careful efforts to increase his control over the localities through the lieutenancies and his enhanced role in the north failed to maintain his ascendancy during the succession crisis in 1553. This failure led to the temporary ruin of his clientele, which would take years to recover under his sons Leicester and Warwick.¹⁹⁵ Both Somerset and Northumberland used their control of the king to procure local patronage for themselves and their clienteles. Northumberland was more thorough in acquiring local offices, Somerset preferring to dispense patronage through land grants as much as possible and intruding less into local politics as a result. The dukes did try to bind the centre and localities more closely together, although neither appears to have continued the Henrician policy of bringing men of worship to the court as supernumeraries in any systematic way. However, this may just reflect paucity of evidence. It does seem clear though, that neither Somerset nor Northumberland dominated the commissions of the peace by filling them with their clients. It is doubtful whether this was even possible or desirable. Instead, the local commissions were filled with legal officers and the resident gentry. Many gentlemen were connected with aristocratic clienteles and or the court and owed their advancement to patrons but this is to be expected in a society dominated by clientage relationships. However, the leading politicians were court centred men with extensive landed estates, rather than resident nobles whose establishments were alternatives to the royal household. Local politics was not synonymous with national politics although they influenced each other in fluid and dynamic ways. A closer examination of individual counties, even in the southeast, although not possible in this study, would show how complex and unique county politics could be. The regime relied on a relatively small group of men to maintain law and order, defend the realm and provide the personnel for national and local government, men with a homogeneous outlook, despite religious differences, based on possession of broad acres. The competition for offices and lands was partly based on the desire for worship and impacted on the centre and the localities; county gentlemen went to court to make their careers, courtiers sought county offices and estates in reward for good service. Repeatedly, the regime relied on the same core group within the elite. When these men failed to support Northumberland in July 1553, the Dudley regime collapsed.

¹⁹⁴ PRO, SP 10/9/50, M. fos. 97r-98v; PRO, SP 10/15/51, M. fos. 107r-108v; Reid, 'The political influence of the 'north parts'', pp. 216-217.

¹⁹⁵ Adams, 'The Dudley clientèle', pp. 241-265.

10. The succession crisis

The succession crisis of 1553 probably demonstrates the situation in the localities more fully than any other period in Edward's reign. It illustrates the fragility of the impact of Northumberland's regime in certain localities and the dynamic interplay within clienteles. Northumberland failed to appreciate that the world-view of the reformers and his clientele was not representative of the situation on the ground and gambled on being able to change the succession through personal intervention. Although his own clientele remained largely intact and loyal, most of his political allies deserted him as it became apparent that the county elite would not support his attempt to place Lady Jane Grey on the throne. Instead, royal officers in the counties managed upward and influenced government policy more effectively than the regime could manage downwards. Leading nobles even failed to control their own clienteles. Northumberland did not have the vital popular support. The need for popular support was a new element in Tudor politics and the situation was complicated by the resentment of the commons over their treatment in 1549, which could be regarded as something of a popular reaction to Northumberland's rule.¹ Northumberland's attempt to increase control and security proved fruitless but important connections had been created and fear of social disorder made many in the elite hesitate before committing to Mary. Both parties attempted to persuade the political elite, particularly the nobility, leading gentry, JPs, lords lieutenant and sheriffs, to support them and raise the musters on their behalf. Both queens were portrayed by their supporters as the rightful heirs and accused their rivals of instilling rebellion in the polity, with all the consequent ramifications for social order. Both parties used the same methods to raise support, including sending general circulars to the county elite and targeting particularly important or useful men with individual summons. Both parties thought they had interpreted the situation in the localities well. However, surprisingly, Mary's party was the most successful and through good military organisation and leadership her supporters organised a successful counter-coup. Ordinary and fidelity clientele relationships were central to this. The succession crisis will be examined from the centre and then from the localities.

I: The succession crisis

Northumberland's attempt to place Jane on the throne has been problematic for historians and has coloured subsequent interpretations of him.² As it became apparent in late spring of 1553 that Edward might be dying, Northumberland knew that if he wanted to guarantee the reformation he would have to change the succession. His supporters among the privy council favoured the

¹ D. MacCulloch, (ed.), 'The *Vita Mariae Angliae Reginae* of Robert Wingfield of Brantham', *Camden Miscellany*, 28 (Camden Society, 4th ser., 29; London, 1984), pp. 188-190.

Suffolk line—descendants of Henry VIII's younger sister Mary. Suffolk was a leading protestant and one of Northumberland's closest supporters. On 21 May, Northumberland tied his house to other leading protestant courtier families through marriage. His youngest son, Lord Guildford Dudley, married Jane; his daughter, Lady Catherine Dudley, married Lord Hastings, Huntingdon's heir; and Sir Henry Sidney married another daughter, Lady Mary Dudley. Sir Andrew Dudley was betrothed to Lady Margaret Clifford, the earl of Cumberland's daughter, and Pembroke's heir was betrothed to Jane's younger sister, Lady Catherine Grey. Professor Loades saw these marriages as the 'routine actions of dynastic politics' among the aristocracy. This was solidified by the tendency of protestant aristocrats to marry within their own circle and it may not have been part of a long held plan to place Jane on the throne.³ There was some negative comment on these marriages and general rumours among the discontented during the period 1552-1553.⁴ This included the 'vncvmly saiynge' of Elizabeth Huggins, *née* Gillet, a former servant of the dowager duchess of Somerset and Buckinghamshire gentlewoman, spoken in late August 1552 at Sir William Stafford's house in Rochford, Essex. Her husband, William Huggins, was one of Northumberland's former servants. She allegedly stated, when speaking of Somerset's execution, that 'she Coulede impute his death to no man but to my Lorde of Northumberland, who she thought was better worthie to die then he', while the king 'shewed himselfe and [*sic*] vnnaturall ñe nephewe, and withall did wishe that she had had the Jerkinge of him'. Huggins claimed she had been misinterpreted but her lack of caution is indicative of the bad feeling within Somerset's clientele towards Northumberland.⁵ She said 'the world doth Condemne' Somerset for the death of his brother and Northumberland for the death of Somerset, 'meaninge by the worlde (as she saith) the voice of the people'.⁶ This grumbling may have been widespread during the nuptials in May 1553.⁷ However, historians are divided on the gestation period of Northumberland's plan to alter the succession.⁸ This chapter is concerned about how the coup and counter-coup were executed and the role clienteles played, rather than with an examination of when it became apparent that Edward was dying and when the conspiracy was initiated, because it has not been examined from this perspective as fully before.

² Beer, *Northumberland*, ix.

³ Jordan, *Threshold of power*, pp. 513-514; Beer, *Northumberland*, pp. 150, 153; Loades, *Northumberland*, pp. 226, 238-239; Adams, 'Faction, clientage and party', pp. 35-36.

⁴ BL Harley MS. 353, fos. 121r-121v; BL Harley MS. 353, fos. 122r-122v; *APC*, iv, pp. 120, 288-289; PRO, SP 10/14/72, M. fos. 161v-162r; PRO, SP 10/15/7, M. fos. 11r-11v; PRO, SP 10/15/50, M. fos. 106r-106v; PRO, SP 10/15/34, M. fos. 77r-78v; PRO, SP 10/15/39, M. fos. 86r-87v; Beer, *Northumberland*, pp. 136-138.

⁵ Longleat, Seymour MS. 10, fo. 167r; BL Harley MS. 353, fos. 121r-123r; PRO, SP 10/5/17, M. fo. 64v; PRO, LR 2/118 fos. 34r-39r, 105r.

⁶ BL Harley MS. 353, fos. 121v-123r.

⁷ BL Additional MS. 70984, fo. 247r.

⁸ Tytler, ii, p. 164; Pollard, *Political history*, vi, pp. 89-90; Jordan, *Threshold of power*, pp. 510-520; Beer, *Northumberland*, pp. 147-166; Loach, *Edward VI*, pp. 159-167.

Professor Beer attempted to denote Northumberland's motivation for altering the succession. It is a very important question because Mary's accession 'did not necessarily mean his ruin'. Professor Beer suggested Northumberland could have made peace with Mary and even reconsidered for two days after Edward's death, before finally deciding to initiate the alteration. Northumberland may have taken the latter course because of concern that England would become involved in European wars, renewing the social, economic and political problems of the 1540s as a result, and because he feared he would be made a scapegoat for unpopular policies carried out between 1549-1553.⁹ However, anxiety about religious changes was also very important, especially because of the protestant character of Northumberland's clientele. Professor Hoak believes it is pointless to try to discern if Northumberland was 'sincerely religious', maintaining that as a loyal servant of the crown he followed his monarch's faith.¹⁰ Robert Wingfield of Brantham in Suffolk, who wrote an account of Mary's successful counter-coup, thought Northumberland became 'disturbed by the consciousness of his guilt', seeking to alter the succession because he did not want to lose power and might be accused of extortion or 'lese-majesty'. Yet, in the same account the king explained that Mary must not inherit because of the danger to the protestant commonwealth.¹¹

Northumberland must have been anxious because of what had happened to his father. Yet, why did he commit treason? On 27 March 1550, Hooper famously described him in a letter to Bullinger as 'that most famous and intrepid soldier of Christ'. Three months later, Hooper was more explicit about his importance: 'to tell the truth, England cannot do without him. He is a most holy and fearless instrument of the word of God'.¹² Hooper was expressing these opinions in the aftermath of the struggle between Warwick and the earls of Southampton and Arundel, when fear of a catholic revival was rife. He emphasised the unity and ability of the protestant councillors and courtiers, especially Dorset and his family, Northampton, and Cheke.¹³ Dr MacCulloch has recently demonstrated that the Edwardian reformation was more coherent than generally accepted and that Northumberland's regime did not carry through religious policy simply as a political expedient.¹⁴ Therefore, the prospect of the accession of a catholic woman was catastrophic. The regime feared the subversion of the new religion and, implicitly, their removal from power. This mixed with constant paranoia about the influence and possible intervention of the emperor and or Henry II. Self-identification as protestants created a different type of social allegiance and a more homogeneous class of magistrates.¹⁵ If Northumberland was generally indifferent towards religion, it would be implausible for him to risk all just because it was Edward's desire to alter the

⁹ Beer, *Northumberland*, pp. 147-154.

¹⁰ Hoak, 'Rehabilitating the duke of Northumberland', p. 45.

¹¹ MacCulloch, (ed.), *Vita Mariae Reginae*, pp. 245-247.

¹² Robinson, *Original letters*, i, nos. xxxviii, xxxix, pp. 82, 89.

¹³ Robinson, *Original letters*, i, nos. ii-vi, xxxix, lxxi, pp. 2-11, 88, 140-142.

¹⁴ MacCulloch, *Tudor church militant*, pp. 105-156.

¹⁵ Adams, 'Faction, clientage and party', pp. 34-35.

succession, precipitating the fall of his family and the eclipse of his clientele. It is possible though, that he feared Marian reaction, prompted by men like Arundel and Paget. This would explain his belated attempts to be more inclusive, summoning these men back to the board and remitting the vestiges of his harsh treatment towards them. Arundel was restored to the privy council and his fine remitted on 2 July 1553. Despite the duke's overtures, Paget tried to distance himself. Both Arundel and Paget signed the letters patent but not the bond.¹⁶ Northumberland's following had a strong protestant character and he had been bombarded with sermons from Latimer and other popular reformers—men who had the king's favour. The commonwealth party may have been more apparent than real but the influence of a circle of protestant humanist intellectuals was pronounced.¹⁷ Northumberland was left with 'the thankless task of trying to resolve the growing tension in the church' between the establishment and the hot gospellers, men like Hooper and Knox.¹⁸ Having been the subject of stinging criticism at the hands of Knox, Northumberland sought to justify his protestant credentials to Cecil. He wrote in December 1552 that Knox 'canot tell whether I be a dissembler in relygyon or not, but I haue for xx yere stand to oon kynd of religion in the same *which* I doo nowe profes, and haue I thanke the lorde past no smalle danngers for yt'.¹⁹ The situation at court, and in London and the southeast, with keen support for greater reform at grass roots, distorted perceptions of the circumstances in England and Wales at large. Pressure from the London reformers perhaps encouraged Northumberland to alter the succession.²⁰

Edward also did not want Mary to succeed and, through the persuasions of Gates or other figures in the privy chamber, agreed to the alteration of the succession in favour of the Suffolk line.²¹ Northumberland's policy of placing his clients and supporters in the privy chamber was bearing fruit. The king told the privy council many times of his 'earnest desire and expresse commawndment toching the limitation of the succession'.²² Dr Loach thought an anonymous French source might be referring to Cheke having moved the king to exclude Mary, while Ely also tried to persuade the king to take this course.²³ This may partly explain why Mary was so belligerent towards Cheke and had him kidnapped in May 1555, although the main reason was his

¹⁶ *DNB*, xix, pp. 89-90; Gammon, *Statesman and schemer*, pp. 184-185; BL Harley MS. 35, fos. 369v-370r; ITL, Petyt MS. 538/47, fo. 316v.

¹⁷ Adams, 'Faction, clientage and party', pp. 34-35; G.R. Elton, 'Reform and the commonwealth-men of Edward VI's reign', in P. Clark, A.G.R. Smith, and N. Tyacke, (eds.), *The English commonwealth, 1547-1640. Essays in politics and society presented to Joel Hurstfield* (Leicester, 1979), pp. 23-38; Bradshaw, 'Protestant polemic', p. 125; MacCulloch, *Tudor church militant*, pp. 122-126, 149-153, 156.

¹⁸ Adams, 'Faction, clientage and party', pp. 34-35.

¹⁹ PRO, SP 10/15/66, M. fo. 137r; Bradshaw, 'Protestant polemic', pp. 182-184, 192-193.

²⁰ Brigden, *London and the Reformation*, pp. 423-534.

²¹ ITL, Petyt MS. 538/47, fos. 316r-316v; ITL, Petyt MS. 538/47, fos. 317r-317v; BL Harley MS. 35, fos. 364r-370v; Nichols (ed.), *Chronicle of Queen Jane*, pp. 91-100; ITL, Petyt MS. 538/47, fos. 416r-417xxv; Hoak, *The king's council*, p. 123; Bindoff, 'A kingdom at stake', pp. 642-648.

²² ITL, Petyt MS. 538/47, fo. 316r.

²³ Loach, *Edward VI*, p. 163.

probable involvement in the anti-catholic propaganda being produced on the continent.²⁴ Cheke had become more intimately connected with Northumberland's regime by the end of Edward's reign, having been appointed third secretary because of Cecil's absence from April 1553. Therefore, Cheke found himself in an extremely difficult situation. For example, he wrote the privy council's letter to Rich, lord lieutenant of Essex, on 19 July.²⁵ The result of Edward's command was the letters patent altering the succession. This was conciliarist. A supervisory council would be created for Jane or her sisters and if there was a break in the succession 'the said imperialle Croune and other premisses shalbe gouerned by the Counsell'. This was to be ratified by parliament because the support of the lords and commons was essential.²⁶ Northumberland had the assent of many of his fellow councillors and browbeat the rest, including the legal officers in meetings between 12-15 June (with the exception of Sir James Hales and John Gosnold). He wanted to secure the support of Sir Edward Montague, chief justice of the common pleas, the most respected lawyer of his generation, who advised that absolute legality for the alteration of the succession could only be procured by parliament. Consequently, it was summoned for September. However, the king deteriorated rapidly.²⁷

Despite his efforts to procure the alteration to the succession through his influence at court and on the privy council, when Edward died on 6 July Northumberland was still unprepared. He had hoped to summon parliament to change the succession by statute. This would also have allowed the privy council to gauge their support among the local elite. Northumberland may have felt ambivalent about the alteration to the succession and delayed proclaiming Jane for four days. However, it was normal to delay announcing the sovereign's death. She entered the Tower 'with a grett compeny of lords and nobulls' on 10 July but when the proclamation of her accession was issued it was not well received by the citizens.²⁸ Mary had sent a signet letter to the privy council the previous day asserting her title, reminding them of the legitimate succession, demanding their allegiance and promising to pardon them if they issued her proclamation. The privy council reacted on 10 July by issuing the proclamation of Jane's accession. Mary was at Kenninghall in Norfolk by 11 July, having left Hunsdon in Hertfordshire as early as 3 July. Soranzo and others warned her to move further from London.²⁹ The privy council replied to Mary's letter, rejecting her claim and telling her that Jane had been invested. It was written by Cheke and signed by most

²⁴ Bindoff, i, p. 629.

²⁵ Cecil endorsed this document and noted that Cheke wrote it: BL Lansdowne MS. 3, fos. 50r-51v.

²⁶ BL Harley MS. 35, fo. 369r; Alford, *The early Elizabethan polity*, p. 118.

²⁷ *Historical manuscripts commission. Report on the manuscripts of Lord Montagu of Beaulieu* (London, 1900), vol. liii, pp. 4-6; MacCulloch, (ed.), *'Vita Mariae Reginae'*, pp. 246-249; PRO, C 66/801, mm. 16d, 20d; *Calendar of patent rolls*, i, pp. 86, 89; Loach, *Edward VI*, pp. 164-165.

²⁸ Wriothsley, *Chronicle*, ii, pp. 85-86; Nichols (ed.), *The diary of Henry Machyn*, p. 35; Howell (ed.), *Cobbett's complete collection of state trials*, i, pp. 739-742; J.D. Alsop, 'A regime at sea: the navy and the 1553 succession crisis', *Albion*, 24 (1992), pp. 577-590.

²⁹ Foxe, *The acts and monuments*, vi, p. 385; Nichols (ed.), *Chronicle of Queen Jane*, pp. 1-2, 106-107; Wriothsley, *Chronicle*, ii, pp. 85-87; *Calendar of state papers, Venetian*, v, p. 537; Jordan, *Threshold of power*, pp. 519-522.

of the privy council, including Cecil.³⁰ They wrote to the commissioners (Thirlby, Hoby and Morison) in the Low Countries, informing them of Edward's death and Jane's accession. They explained to the commissioners that they had ordered Mary to 'remayne Quiet' but thought she might 'disturbe the state of this Realme havinge thereunto as yet no manere apparante of helpe or Comforte but only the Concurrante of a ffewe Lewde base people, all other the nobylletye and gentlemen remaininge in their dutyes to our soveraigne Lady Queene Jane'.³¹ This appeared to be true at this early stage.

The letter to the commissioners did not support the idea that Northumberland was attempting to bolster his son's claim to the crown matrimonial by using the royal style. This does not appear to have been his aim. Professor Pollard believed Northumberland wanted Guildford to receive the crown matrimonial. Professor Loades has considered whether or not the duke wanted to attain the crown for his son but in the end dismisses the idea.³² The source of Professor Pollard's speculation about whether Guildford would receive the crown matrimonial or not is a letter from Hoby, ambassador to the emperor, and Morison to the privy council of 15 July. They had spoken with a Spanish mercenary, who offered his services to 'his maiestie' (Guildford) and was surprisingly well informed of the situation in England, knowing more than they did of Edward's alteration of the succession. He said the emperor's subjects would take Guildford 'for your king, withe [*sic*] the consent of the nobles of your contry haue allowed for your king'. Don Diego, although Guildford's godfather, was perhaps under a misapprehension about his new status because of cultural differences.³³ Northumberland was probably thinking of dealing with Jane in the same way he had dealt with Edward. Although a woman was substituted for a minor, both were treated by conventional political thought as incapable of exercising authority in the same way as an adult king.³⁴ Charles was offering tacit support to Mary, while Henry II proffered assistance against her and told the privy council of a conspiracy between her and the emperor.³⁵ Charles realised Northumberland desired that 'the realme sholde be ruled by their [English] owne polycy', rather than through foreign interference, which was one of the chief charges against Mary.³⁶ He knew both parties had gathered forces and thought civil war likely, yet hoped differences could be resolved through parliament. He was also surprised at Cobham's and Mason's reaction to his new ambassadors, including Simon Renard, whom they suspected of complicity with Mary. These men had been instructed to declare the emperor's desire that parliament be summoned. However, their role was more involved than that. They offered the privy council good terms if they would support

³⁰ Foxe, *The acts and monuments*, vi, pp. 385-386; Bindoff, i, p. 629.

³¹ BL Cotton MS. Galba B. xii, fos. 252r-252v; BL Harley MS. 523, fos. 43r-43v.

³² Pollard, *Political history*, vi, pp. 89-90; Loades, *The reign of Mary Tudor*, p. 16.

³³ BL Harley MS. 523, fos. 11v-12v.

³⁴ McLaren, 'Reading Sir Thomas Smith's *De republica Anglorum*', pp. 911-939.

³⁵ Hatfield, Cecil MS. 1, fos. 138r-139v; Lodge (ed.), *Illustrations of British history*, i, p. 226.

³⁶ BL Harley MS. 523, fos. 1r-2r.

Mary. Cobham and Mason had been sent by Northumberland to find out what the ambassadors wanted but then reported to Shrewsbury, Arundel, Bedford, Pembroke and Petre, who were conducting the negotiations. These discussions contributed to the decision to proclaim Mary.³⁷ The imperial ambassadors were shrewd enough to assure the English that Mary should not marry a foreigner and religion should remain unaltered. At the same time, Charles was concerned that Sir Andrew Dudley had been sent to France 'for some practise', although the man sent was actually Lord Henry Dudley, Northumberland's cousin. Northumberland probably sent Dudley to secure the principal garrison and prevent soldiers being despatched to England on Mary's behalf.³⁸

Popular support for Mary was growing.³⁹ The people needed to be 'governed and kepte in ordere' and Northumberland and Northampton were dispatched to pacify East Anglia. On 13 July, after mustering them at his new London residence of Durham Place, while 'cartes were laden with munition, and artillery and felde peces prepared for the purpose', Northumberland led out the gentlemen pensioners, the guard, knights, nobles and those of his clientele then present in London. He did not raise the entire royal household. Perhaps, he underestimated Mary's support (although nobody could have suspected it would grow so rapidly), perhaps there was insufficient time, or perhaps he did not trust the non-military elements in the royal household. Northumberland had about six hundred men with him, with Grey of Wilton among his captains, and expected the privy council 'to sende their powers after him' as promised. They would meet at Newmarket, Suffolk. Charles Wriothesley saw Northumberland leave London 'with a great power of horsmen with artillery and munitions of warre'. The duke took 'gonnars' too.⁴⁰ Northumberland turned to one riding beside him as they passed through Shoreditch and said, 'the people prece to se us, but not one sayeth God spede us'.⁴¹ He did not have the vital popular support. The necessity of such support was a new phenomenon. Yet, Northumberland did not have the wholehearted support of his fellow councillors either. On the other hand, Mary moved to Framlingham Castle, Suffolk, where she successfully raised her own clientele. Her followers were the former Howard affinity and the conservative gentry led by Rochester, Jerningham and Walgrave. These men successfully organised her clientele and drew support from the populace, bitter at their treatment in 1549, in a coalition of interests. Northumberland even failed to maintain the support he had and East Anglia could not be controlled by his clients, even after Sir Robert Dudley was sent there to execute his office of lord lieutenant. The situation hung in the balance for several days but when it became

³⁷ BL Harley MS. 523, fos. 2v-3r; *Simancas*, xi, pp. 82-88, 95-96; Bernard, *The power of the early Tudor nobility*, p. 76.

³⁸ BL Harley MS. 523, fos. 4r-5r. Dudley was sent as captain of the guards at Guînes and was arrested there after 25 July: Nichols (ed.), *Chronicle of Queen Jane*, p. 175; BL Cotton MS. Nero C. x, fo. 70v; Jordan (ed.), *Chronicle*, p. 139; *APC*, iv, p. 111.

³⁹ MacCulloch, (ed.), *Vita Mariae Reginae*, pp. 188-190, 251-254.

⁴⁰ Nichols (ed.), *Chronicle of Queen Jane*, pp. 6-8, 11, 13, n. b; Wriothesley, *Chronicle*, ii, p. 87; Nichols (ed.), *The diary of Henry Machyn*, p. 36; R.C. Braddock, 'The character and composition of the duke of Northumberland's army', *Albion*, 6 (1974), pp. 353-355; Adams, 'The Dudley clientèle', pp. 246-247; Jordan, *Threshold of power*, p. 526. For Northumberland's increases in the number of household guards, see above, p. 20.

apparent that Mary had raised a larger force, Northumberland's claim of general support from the elite proved false.⁴² Mary even had some protestant support from men like the Throckmortons. Sir Nicholas Throckmorton was ambivalent though, and may have initially attempted to secure Northampton for Jane by proclaiming her there. Sir Thomas Tresham then proclaimed Mary and Throckmorton would have been lynched if the local gentlemen had not hidden him. Throckmorton rapidly changed allegiance, joining Tresham as part of Mary's guard.⁴³ Having reached Cambridge and realising that his situation was hopeless, with his men deserting in larger numbers, Northumberland declared for Mary on 20 July. He was ordered to disarm his clientele (including the twenty gentlemen pensioners unfortunate enough to have been serving their rota at court when the king died) and await instructions.⁴⁴ Grey of Wilton ripped the garter from him. This was a blunt indication of Northumberland's degradation from power and probably reflected Grey of Wilton's true feelings towards him.⁴⁵

On 20 July, the privy council proclaimed Mary and wrote to tell her. They explained that they had been unable to proclaim her before without great risk of bloodshed, asked her to 'pardon and remytt our formar infirmities' and sent Arundel and Paget to explain their actions.⁴⁶ Many of Northumberland's closest adherents were probably with him when Arundel arrested him on 24 July and accompanied him to the Tower the following day, to be joined by others over the two days following. These groups included: Sir Thomas Palmer, Sir John and Sir Henry Gates, Lord Hastings, Warwick, Sir Andrew Dudley, Lords Ambrose and Henry Dudley, Edwin Sandys, Northampton, Ridley, Sir Robert Dudley, Montague, Sir Roger Cholmley, Sir Richard Corbet, Rowland Dee, a London mercer, Suffolk, Cheke, Cecil, Sir John York, Richard Cox, the duchess of Northumberland and Hereford. Jane and Guildford were probably already there. Rutland and Lord Russell, Bedford's heir, were sent to the Fleet, and Darcy was placed under house arrest.⁴⁷ Mary was shrewd enough to be lenient. Suffolk was rehabilitated almost immediately.⁴⁸ Other clients were also fortunate enough to make their peace rapidly. By 23 July Clinton, Grey of

⁴¹ Nichols (ed.), *Chronicle of Queen Jane*, p. 8.

⁴² BL Cotton MS. Galba B. xii, fos. 252r-252v; Nichols (ed.), *Chronicle of Queen Jane*, pp. 1-10, 13; BL Additional MS. 5841, fo. 137v; BL Harley MS. 353, fos. 139r-139v; Pollard, *Political history*, vi, pp. 89-90; Beer, *Northumberland*, pp. 148-156; Hoak, 'Rehabilitating the duke of Northumberland', pp. 48-50; Braddock, 'The character and composition', pp. 342-355; 'The duke of Northumberland's army reconsidered', *Albion*, 19 (1987), pp. 13-17; W.J. Tighe, 'The gentlemen pensioners, the duke of Northumberland, and the attempted coup of July 1553', *Albion*, 19 (1987), pp. 1-11.

⁴³ BL Harley MS. 353, fos. 139r-139v; Nichols (ed.), *Chronicle of Queen Jane*, pp. 12-13.

⁴⁴ Beer, *Northumberland*, p. 156; BL Stowe MS. 571, fos. 31r-32r; PRO, E 101/427/4, fo. 10r; PRO, E 101/427/5, fos. 29r-30v; PRO, E 101/427/6, fos. 24r-25v; PRO, LC 2/4/1, fos. 23v-24r; Braddock, 'The character and composition', pp. 353-355; Tighe, 'The gentlemen pensioners', pp. 4-7.

⁴⁵ I am grateful to Dr Adams for this information: Adams, 'The Dudley clientèle', pp. 247, 260, n. 39.

⁴⁶ BL Lansdowne MS. 3, fos. 52r-53v.

⁴⁷ Nichols (ed.), *The diary of Henry Machyn*, pp. 37-39; *Chronicle of Queen Jane*, p. 13; BL Harley MS. 353, fo. 139v; Wriothsley, *Chronicle*, ii, pp. 90-92; APC, iv, pp. 306-308, 311-312, 332; Loades, *Northumberland*, pp. 266-267. Corbet of Assington and Lawshall, Suffolk, was connected with the Wingfields and received favour during Edward's reign. Northumberland probably supported his election for Lynn in March 1553. Sandys, vice-chancellor of Cambridge, preached in favour of Jane on Northumberland's orders: Bindoff, i, p. 701; Loach, *Edward VI*, pp. 171-172.

⁴⁸ Nichols (ed.), *The diary of Henry Machyn*, p. 38; Wriothsley, *Chronicle*, ii, p. 92.

Wilton, Sidney and Crofts, 'with diueres otheres have alreedy their pardon grannted them'. Lord Gerald Fitzgerald, son of the eleventh earl of Kildare, Ormond and Lord FitzWarine supported Jane, perhaps because they were aristocrats and bound to serve, but do not seem to have been closely associated with Northumberland.⁴⁹ They were probably typical of a large number who initially followed the privy council's lead.

II: The localities and the succession crisis

Why did Northumberland's attempts to propagate greater control not secure the projected alteration of the succession in 1553? The answer seems to lie in the localities rather than in London. It was vital to control the counties surrounding the city itself for strategic reasons, to quickly enhance morale, and because forces could be raised from them more rapidly. The proclamation issued by the privy council on 19 July in favour of Mary was rapidly disseminated among the political elite in the localities.⁵⁰ Talbot wrote to Cumberland two days later from York to inform him of it and enclosed a copy. Talbot told Cumberland that Shrewsbury, Ely, Bedford, Arundel and Pembroke 'have proclaimed through the cittye of London, which is the joyfulest news that ever came to England'. Like his father, now that the tide had turned, Talbot expressed his delight with Mary's accession as 'queene of this realme, as of right she ought to be...with whome I will serve duringe my lyfe to the uttermost of my power'.⁵¹ Yet, nine days before this proclamation, the privy council had announced Jane's accession. Shrewsbury signed the engagement to alter the succession and the letters patent (as did Talbot), as well as substantially benefiting from grants of patronage in April and May. His attitude appeared ambivalent.⁵² Similarly, the Irish council received a letter of 20 July informing them of Mary's accession and overturning an earlier letter from Jane. Northumberland's client, Sir Ralph Bagnall, lieutenant of the army and member of the Irish council, had already declared Jane queen of Ireland, for which Mary would dismiss him from office. His brother, Sir Nicholas Bagnall, marshal of Ireland, managed to retain his offices because he did not overtly support Northumberland.⁵³ Talbot's apparent reaction was not universal and even his own behaviour was ambivalent. The mid-Tudor elite found itself with difficult choices.

Mary succeeded because of careful military organisation on the part of her clients and supporters. This took time to organise. Wentworth met the Suffolk elite at Ipswich on 11 July and persuaded

⁴⁹ BL Harley MS. 353, fo. 139v.

⁵⁰ Nichols (ed.), *The diary of Henry Machyn*, p. 37.

⁵¹ R.W. Hoyle (ed.), 'Letters of the Cliffords, lords Clifford and earls of Cumberland, c. 1500-c. 1565', *Camden Miscellany*, 31 (Camden Society, 4th ser., 44; London, 1992), p. 175.

⁵² Wriothesley, *Chronicle*, ii, p. 86; Nichols (ed.), *Chronicle of Queen Jane*, pp. 3, 99; *The diary of Henry Machyn*, p. 35; ITL, Petyt MS. 538/47, fo. 316v; BL Harley MS. 35, fo. 369v; APC, iv, pp. 293, 301; Bernard, *The power of the early Tudor nobility*, pp. 72-73; Loach, *Edward VI*, p. 178.

them to proclaim Jane. The catholic sheriff, Sir Thomas Cornwallis, then made the proclamation and only changed his mind two days later after learning of the mood of the Londoners towards Northumberland. Wentworth changed allegiance when John Tyrrell and Edward Glemham, members of his circle, counselled him to support Mary, while Sussex stopped supporting Jane after his son was captured by Mary. The nobility of East Anglia and further afield then began to rally to Mary's defence, including the earl of Bath, Sussex, Wentworth, Oxford, Lord Windsor and his brothers, Sir John Mordaunt (Lord Mordaunt's heir), Sir Thomas Wharton (Lord Wharton's heir), Derby, and Dacre of Gilesland. The county gentry rallied too; including, Sir Richard Southwell, 'the wealthiest of his rank in all Norfolk', Sir Henry Bedingfield, Thomas Morgan, sergeant-at-law, Sir William Drury, John Higham, Cornwallis, Sir Nicholas Hare, Sir Edmund Rous, Owen Hopton, heir to Sir Arthur Hopton, John Tyrrell, son of the late Sir Thomas Tyrrell, Sir Edward Hastings (Huntingdon's brother), Peckham, Sir Thomas Tresham, Sir John Brydges, his brother Thomas, Thomas Brend, Thomas Golding (Oxford's brother-in-law), Sir Robert Stafford, who led Oxford's clientele 'because of his courage and military skill', Sir John Shelton, Sir John Williams, Sir John Clere, Crofts, and Sir Leonard Chamberlain. Crofts was among Northumberland's closest associates and the unity of the Dudley clientele was under pressure because of the enormity of the situation. Clere and Clinton arrived on 20 July as 'fugitives from Northumberland's army'. Tenants refused to follow their lords against Mary and the privy council became alarmed and isolated. Popular reaction prompted the elite to reconsider their positions. Key members of the Suffolk elite (Bath, Cornwallis, Drury, Sir Clement Higham, Shelton, Sir Richard Southwell, Sussex and Wentworth) were added to Mary's council of war and dominated Suffolk during her reign.⁵⁴

Winchester, Bedford and Cheyne may all have opposed the alteration to the succession. Others were uneasy.⁵⁵ Cecil claimed to oppose it, despite his commitment to a providential protestant commonwealth. Although he absented himself from court by feigning illness and felt strengthened by Hales's and Gosnold's resolve in not consenting to the alteration, he returned on 11 June and signed the engagement supporting it. Cecil told his servant Roger Alford of his concern and claimed not to be too privy to what was happening. It is possible Cheke was appointed secretary on 3 June as a warning to the duke's former confidante. On 21 June, Cecil signed the letters patent for the limitation of the crown, along with the privy council, many nobles, the law officers, the mayor, aldermen, merchants of the staple and merchant adventurers. The London elite may only have signed this when they were summoned to Greenwich to be informed of the king's death on 8

⁵³ *Calendar of the patent and close rolls of chancery in Ireland*, i, pp. 304-305; Bindoff, i, pp. 362-364.

⁵⁴ MacCulloch, *Suffolk and the Tudors*, pp. 79-81; MacCulloch, (ed.), *Vita Mariae Reginae*, pp. 254-258, 260-261, 263-264, 266; Nichols (ed.), *Chronicle of Queen Jane*, pp. 3-6, 8-9.

⁵⁵ *Simancas*, xi, p. 67; Tytler, ii, pp. 164-169; Guaras, *The accession of Queen Mary*, p. 95.

July.⁵⁶ The privy council promised they would ‘to the vttermost of our powers defende and mayntayne’ the alteration to the succession by this engagement. They agreed ‘never to varie or swarve’ from this. Unity would be maintained for the good of the commonwealth.⁵⁷ Cecil later claimed to have reduced his role in procuring support for Jane, having among other things, refused to write ‘publick lettres to ye realme’ and ‘eschewed’ writing the letters calling Mary a bastard, which Northumberland had to do himself.⁵⁸ Cecil later endorsed one of these letters, dated from the Tower on 12 July, the ‘first copy of a *lettre* to be wrytten from ye Lady Jane, whan she came to ye Tower wrytten by ye Duke of Northumberland’. It is Northumberland’s holograph.⁵⁹ Cecil’s part in assisting Mary may have been limited though, amounting to ‘sabotaging’ the privy council’s efforts to prevent her accession without actually openly supporting her. His methods were similar to those adopted by others who were effectively prevented from being more open because they were in London.⁶⁰ He declined to draw up the proclamation against Mary as a usurper, saying John Throckmorton, attorney to the council in the marches of Wales, should do it. Throckmorton was closely associated with both Northumberland and Northampton, who was his cousin, and both men may have helped in his return for Warwick in March 1553. However, he was able to extricate himself from his difficulties, joined Mary and was rewarded by her with an annuity.⁶¹

Cecil did write to the Lincolnshire gentry in July 1553.⁶² He informed them that Clinton, the lord lieutenant, was being sent there. Clinton would be expected to police the county and perhaps raise men. Lincolnshire was strategically important because it lay to the north of Norfolk, where Mary’s power was greatest, and flanked any advance Northumberland would make, especially out of Cambridgeshire. Cecil wrote that Clinton had been ordered ‘to come downe into those parties by order from hence for the good order of that contrye and other service there’. Clinton sent Carew and Eresby first ‘for the more expedition of the same’.⁶³ The latter was probably Lawrence Eresby of Louth, one of Cecil’s Lincolnshire servants, who would know the situation in the county and probably be more familiar with local politics than Clinton. The former was apparently also a

⁵⁶ Alford, *The early Elizabethan polity*, p. 26; Read, *Mr. Secretary Cecil*, pp. 91-97; Tytler, ii, pp. 169-176; APC, iv, pp. 283, 285; ITL, Petyt MS. 538/47, fo. 316v; BL Harley MS. 35, fos. 369v-370v; Nichols (ed.), *Chronicle of Queen Jane*, pp. 2-3, n. b, 99-100. Alford had been in Cecil’s service since Christmas 1547 and appears to have been trusted by him: BL Lansdowne MS. 118, fo. 40v.

⁵⁷ ITL, Petyt MS. 538/47, fos. 316r-316v.

⁵⁸ BL Lansdowne MS. 104, fos. 1r-2v.

⁵⁹ BL Lansdowne MS. 3, fos. 48r-49v; Nichols (ed.), *Chronicle of Queen Jane*, pp. 103-105.

⁶⁰ Tytler, ii, pp. 192-193, 196-197; Nichols (ed.), *Chronicle of Queen Jane*, pp. 12-13, 180; Read, *Mr. Secretary Cecil*, pp. 97-101.

⁶¹ BL Lansdowne MS. 104, fo. 1r; Tytler, ii, pp. 192-193, 196-197; Read, *Mr. Secretary Cecil*, pp. 97, 477, n. 48; Bindoff, iii, pp. 455-456; BL Lansdowne MS. 156, fo. 94r.

⁶² BL Lansdowne MS. 103, fos. 1r-2v.

⁶³ BL Lansdowne MS. 103, fo. 1v.

Lincolnshire man.⁶⁴ As lord lieutenant, Clinton would be expected to secure the county, especially the coast, against invasion and take musters to ensure that defence was maintained. Importantly, all local officials were under his command in military matters and he could lead the musters out of the county.⁶⁵ Although Cecil claimed to know that the Lincolnshire gentry were prudent and diligent 'in the service of your contrye', 'yet for that these my lettres be required to yow as to my frends I thought mete to praye yow at this tyme to serve your selves (as ye have all waise bene) dilligent and redye in the service of your contrye to the best of your powers and the furdurance of the quenes service'.⁶⁶ Professor Read called this letter 'a masterpiece of double talk'. Although it did not specifically say that Clinton was being sent to Lincolnshire to raise men, it seems fair to think that this was the intention. Sir Robert Dudley was sent to Norfolk for the same reason and in the same capacity of lord lieutenant.⁶⁷ While the letter is caged in indefinite terms, other correspondence at this time was also cautious. Professor Read may be correct about Cecil having hampered the regime's efforts to raise the gentry of Lincolnshire and Northamptonshire: 'I witnessed the taking of my horse and the rising of Lincolnshyres [*sic*] and Northamptonshyre and avowed the pardonable lye where it was suspected to be doing'.⁶⁸ Cecil's horses were to be used for controlling these counties and to be used against Mary. He seems to have been expected to raise his tenants there too. However, he countermanded these orders the following day. Similarly, his Wimbledon tenants were meant to serve under Cawarden 'and yet I never gave one man warning so much as to be in a redynes, and yet they sent to me to for the purpose and I willed them to be quiett'. Cecil could have raised one hundred tenants by the quasi-feudal system against Mary.⁶⁹

Cawarden, of Bletchingley in Surrey, had military experience, was a JP for the county, a trusted agent of government policy, handling delicate matters for the privy council after Seymour's fall, and had been a muster commissioner for Surrey in February 1548.⁷⁰ The privy council wrote to him, as one of the deputy lieutenants, and his fellow MP, Sir Thomas Saunders, on 8 July. The letter was also addressed to the sheriff, Sir Anthony Brown, JPs and other deputy lieutenants of Surrey. Cawarden was heavily involved in Northumberland's campaign against Mary. He provided Suffolk with tents from the office of revels for the garrison of the Tower on 16 July,

⁶⁴ PRO, SP 10/10/47, M. fos. 94r-95v; PRO, SP 10/13/39, M. fos. 80r-81v. Eresby was not listed among Cecil's domestics between 1544-1553 and may have been a neighbouring gentleman, rather than a servant. He was certainly closely associated with Cecil, knowing, along with Cooke, Bacon, Roger Alford and William Canewood (another Cecil servant), that the secretary was determined to suffer 'for saving my conscience': BL Lansdowne MS. 118, fo. 40v; BL Lansdowne MS. 104, fo. 1r.

⁶⁵ BL Egerton MS. 2790, fo. 88v; see above, pp. 242-250.

⁶⁶ BL Lansdowne MS. 103, fo. 1v.

⁶⁷ Tittler and Battley, 'The local community and the crown in 1553', pp. 131-139; *APC*, iv, p. 278.

⁶⁸ Read, *Mr. Secretary Cecil*, pp. 99, 477, n. 56; BL Lansdowne MS. 104, fo. 1r.

⁶⁹ BL Lansdowne MS. 104, fo. 1v.

⁷⁰ Bindoff, i, pp. 599-602; PRO, C 66/801, m. 18d; *Calendar of patent rolls*, i, p. 90; PRO, SP 10/6/3, M. fos. 5r-10v; PRO, SP 10/6/4, M. fos. 11r-14v; PRO, SP 10/3/16, M. fos. 101r-115v.

receiving a further warrant for more tents three days later.⁷¹ Cawarden was a substantial man with strong links to his county. This shows that Northumberland was trying to organise a military solution to the succession crisis. Similarly, men and *matériel* were brought to the Tower.⁷² Northampton seems to have been entrusted with maintaining stability in Surrey and garnering support there from the gentry. He was lord lieutenant of the county, as well as of Berkshire, Oxfordshire, Northamptonshire, Bedfordshire, Hertfordshire and Cambridgeshire (only equalled in appointments by Northumberland).⁷³ A second signet letter was sent to Northampton, Brown, the JPs and the deputy lieutenants of Surrey on 10 July. It is probable that letters were sent to other lords lieutenant. Northampton's client, William More, preserved another copy, dated 11 July.⁷⁴ After reiterating the details of the alteration of the succession and the general support of the political nation for her, Jane's letter went on to tell the Surrey elite to do all to 'defend our iuste title but also assist us in our rightfull possession of this kingdom/ And to disturbe repell and resist the fayned and untrewē clayme of the Lady Marye bastard daughter of our great uncel Henry theighth of famous memorye'. They were expected to assist because it was their primary role in society, pertaining to their honour and duty. The deputy lieutenants were ordered to continue fulfilling their functions as set forth in the commission of lieutenancy. Cecil later wrote in the margin '*Jana non Regina*'.⁷⁵ Although it is unknown who were the other deputy lieutenants apart from Cawarden, they were almost certainly acceptable Northampton clients because as lord lieutenant he had the power to appoint his officers, including deputy lieutenants and provost marshals. He also commanded all local officers, whether sheriffs, mayors, bailiffs, headboroughs or constables, in war and all other capacities during emergencies.⁷⁶ G.S. Thomson believed that the vital office of deputy was a later creation but there is evidence that it was at least partially in use during Edward's reign. The county elite was co-opted, with the two to six leading knights of each shire appointed as deputy lieutenants and having effective management of the office most of the time.⁷⁷ Northampton would perhaps have delegated to his clients and friends but they had to be capable men with a substantial county standing. Cawarden was closely associated with the Mores and this may have recommended him to Northampton but his clientage relationship with Northumberland was probably the main reason he was appointed deputy lieutenant.⁷⁸

⁷¹ Royal Commission on Historical Manuscripts, *Seventh report* (London, 1879), pp. 609-610; Bindoff, i, p. 600.

⁷² Nichols (ed.), *The diary of Henry Machyn*, p. 36.

⁷³ Kempe (ed.), *Loseley manuscripts*, pp. 122-124; APC, iv, p. 277.

⁷⁴ BL Lansdowne MS. 1236, fos. 24r-25v; Nichols (ed.), *Chronicle of Queen Jane*, pp. 103-105; Kempe (ed.), *Loseley manuscripts*, pp. 122-124; Bindoff, ii, pp. 624-626.

⁷⁵ BL Lansdowne MS. 1236, fos. 24r-24v.

⁷⁶ BL Additional MS. Charter 981.

⁷⁷ Thomson, 'The origin and growth of the office of deputy-lieutenant', pp. 150-166; WRO, CR 1998/Box 72/15; see above, pp. 192, 245-246.

⁷⁸ Bindoff, i, pp. 599-602.

Cecil also refused to order De La Warr to raise his own tenants against Mary.⁷⁹ De La Warr may seem a strange choice. Although he had been an active JP, a muster commissioner, had large holdings in the southeast, particularly in Sussex, and maintained contact with the privy council, he was old and conservative. However, he would be expected to serve against Mary by virtue of his office as lord lieutenant of Sussex. Perhaps he was chosen for this office (which he had initially been appointed to with Arundel in April 1551) because of his diligence.⁸⁰ De La Warr's ties with the Dudleys were reinforced by kinship. He was close to the duchess of Northumberland, who was his niece, and left lands to her in his will.⁸¹ It is probable that this familial connection explained his office of lord lieutenant too. Like Sir Robert Dudley's father-in-law, Sir John Robsart, De La Warr was elevated because of his close Dudley connection. Between 1549-1553 Northumberland tightened his control of the office of lord lieutenant, especially after Somerset's execution. He also increased the number of shires and boroughs covered from thirty-three in 1552 to forty-one in 1553.⁸² Yet, De La Warr supported Mary instead, being admitted to the privy council on 17 August and receiving an annuity of two hundred marks on 14 November as a reward.⁸³ The gentry of Sussex declared for Mary on 19 July and De La Warr had either interpreted the mood of his neighbours correctly or his changed allegiance meant the county could not be controlled on Jane's behalf. He may have done so because what Northumberland was attempting was too ambitious, especially to an old man.⁸⁴ Another Dudley client had switched allegiance.

Cecil wrote to the Lincolnshire gentry against this background of passive resistance. His letter is remarkable because it lists by county the nobles, gentlemen and others 'who transacted affairs for' Jane.⁸⁵ For example, Northampton advanced her affairs in Northamptonshire. Some counties have multiple names: under Leicestershire were listed Suffolk, Westmorland and Cobham.⁸⁶ The pattern of those who assisted Jane suggests the involvement of the political community and supports the argument put forward by Dr Tittler and Dr Battley that initial support for Mary was

⁷⁹ BL Lansdowne MS. 104, fo. 1r.

⁸⁰ *The complete peerage*, eds. Gibbs *et al*, iv, pp. 156-157; PRO, SP 10/11/10, M. fos. 16r-17v; PRO, SP 10/2/5, M. fos. 9r-10v; PRO, SP 10/3/17, M. fos. 116r-127v; PRO, SP 10/1/30, M. fos. 104r-105v; PRO, E 179/69/51; PRO, E 179/69/75; PRO, SP 10/4/37, M. fos. 71r-71v; PRO, SP 10/11/3, M. fos. 4r-5v; APC, iii, p. 258; iv, pp. 49, 277.

⁸¹ PRO, PROB 11/37, fo. 194r.

⁸² When the commissions of lieutenancy were reissued on 24 May 1553, they were dominated by privy councilors and Dudley supporters: Ely was lord lieutenant of the Isle of Ely, Hereford for Staffordshire, Pembroke for Wiltshire and Wales, Clinton for Lincolnshire, Huntingdon for Derbyshire and Rutland, Darcy and Gates for Essex, Wroth for Middlesex, Darcy for Suffolk and Sir Robert Dudley for Norfolk. Rather surprisingly, Suffolk was not appointed for any county. He had been lord lieutenant of Leicestershire but a new commission was not issued for this county. However, others were not such wholehearted Dudley adherents; Winchester was lord lieutenant of Hampshire and the Isle of Wight, Bedford for Dorset, Somerset, Devon and Cornwall, Cheyne for Kent and Canterbury, Russell for Buckinghamshire, Derby for Lancashire, Rich for Essex, and Shrewsbury for Yorkshire, York and Kingston-upon-Hull: APC, iii, pp. 258-259; iv, pp. 49-50, 276-278; Thomson, *Lords lieutenants*, pp. 30-35.

⁸³ APC, iv, p. 322; Loades, *The reign of Mary Tudor*, pp. 21-22, n. 17; Nichols (ed.), *Chronicle of Queen Jane*, p. 5, n.

a.

⁸⁴ BL Additional MS. 33230, fos. 21r-21v.

⁸⁵ BL Lansdowne MS. 103, fo. 2v.

equivocal.⁸⁷ It is possible that Cecil was citing a list drawn up at the time of the conspiracy of those who were considered reliable. It is dominated by Northumberland's supporters and some names are marked with a '+', suggesting people of particular importance. These include: Northampton for Northamptonshire, Surrey, Oxfordshire and Cambridgeshire; Shrewsbury for Yorkshire; Huntingdon for Rutland and Derbyshire; Clinton for Lincolnshire; Cumberland for Westmorland; and Northumberland himself for the 'bishopryk' of Durham. Although not designated in the same way, Bedford was listed for Somerset, Dorset, Cornwall and Devon, while Pembroke was listed for Wiltshire and Wales, Cecil noting that his selection for the latter was probably by virtue of his office as 'president'. These men had large holdings and local influence in these counties, their countries. Without exception, they were lieutenants of these counties.⁸⁸

Perhaps the reason for designating all the suitable gentry listed with a '+' symbol, was because they were more closely associated with one particular locality, while the court based nobles had larger but more diffusely scattered estates. As it turned out, it was precisely these gentlemen and their kinsmen, including 'the speciall men', who decided the outcome of the struggle for the succession. The 'cheffe Gentillmen' of Norfolk, Northamptonshire, Cambridgeshire, Suffolk, Essex and Hertfordshire were listed. These were either counties directly involved in the succession struggle or adjacent to those that were. The men of Norfolk were 'to stand for yourself'. They were Sir Richard Southwell, Sir Thomas Woodhouse, Sir Michael Strange, Sir Henry Bedingfield and Sir Christopher Haydon. The Northamptonshire gentlemen listed were Sir John Stafford and Sir Robert Kirkham (Sir Thomas Tresham had been deleted); those for Cambridgeshire included, Sir Giles Allington, Thomas Bolder, John Cotton, Charles Badston (Sir John Cutt and Thomas Rudston had been deleted); Suffolk, Sir William Drury, Sir William Walgrave, Sir Thomas Cornwallis, Arthur Rowse, Sir George Somerset, Sir John Clere and Sir Nicholas Hare; those for Essex included, Sir John Wentworth, Sir Henry Tyrrell, Sir John Mordaunt, William Aylef, Sir John Gates and Sir Giles Capell; and for Hertfordshire, Sadler and Sir Ralph Rowlet.⁸⁹ These were leading gentlemen and many sat on the commissions of the peace, raised cavalry for the wars and served in other important local capacities.⁹⁰ For example, Southwell, Bedingfield, Kirkham, Humfrey Stafford, Stafford's kinsman, Clere, Drury and Aylef had been ordered to remain in their localities during unrest.⁹¹ These were the men who were

⁸⁶ BL Lansdowne MS. 103, fo. 1r.

⁸⁷ Tittler and Battley, 'The local community and the crown in 1553', pp. 131-139.

⁸⁸ These '+' symbols may mean something else because the 'names of cheffe Gentillmen' are all marked in this way. However, not all the nobles are so designated. For example, Northumberland was also listed for Westmorland but not marked with a '+'. However, he was not lord lieutenant of Westmorland. It could be that the '+' symbols mean different things for the nobles than for the gentlemen. The entry for Sussex was incomplete, reading just 'Lord', but this probably referred to De La Warr, the lord lieutenant: BL Lansdowne MS. 103, fos. 1r-2v; *APC*, iv, pp. 276-278.

⁸⁹ BL Lansdowne MS. 103, fos. 1v-2r.

⁹⁰ PRO, C 66/801, mm. 9d-10d, 13d, 16d-17d, 20d; *Calendar of patent rolls*, i, pp. 81, 83-84, 87, 89; PRO, SP 10/2/1, M. fos. 1r-3Av; PRO, SP 10/2/29, M. fos. 91r-102v; PRO, SP 10/5/17, M. fos. 55r-67v.

⁹¹ PRO, SP 10/18/44, M. fos. 80r, 81v-82r.

summoned to Windsor to protect the king on 1 July 1549: Capell, Mordaunt, Gates and Tyrrell from Essex; Sadler and Rowlet from Hertfordshire.⁹² Gates was the only lord lieutenant among them.⁹³ They were the gentlemen of the mid-Tudor elite. Of course, this list guaranteed nothing for Northumberland.

Former Howard clients, including the Bedingfields, Walgraves, Cornwallises, Jerninghams, Rochesters and Englefields might be expected to support Mary. This was what happened. Similarly, Southwell had fallen from power in the aftermath of the October coup and could not be regarded by Northumberland as a reliable ally. Sir Robert Rochester was comptroller of Mary's household. Other members of her household included Sir Francis Englefield, Sir Henry Jerningham, Sir Edward Walgrave, Richard Townsend, gentleman, and George Tyrrell. Mary had large concentrations of land in East Anglia, including much former Howard land, and she partially inherited the Howard clientele. Almost forty per cent of the leaders of Mary's counter-coup were East Anglians. Initially, she received support from her household, then fairly modest members of the gentry and the commons. This was striking and Dr MacCulloch has described it as 'the people's revenge on the aristocracy for the events of summer 1549'. Popular support was becoming increasingly important. Rochester, Jerningham and Sir William Walgrave may have contacted their kinsmen, servants, friends and neighbours at an early stage, building Mary's support. Jerningham's nephew, George, was recruited in this way.⁹⁴ Also, the majority of the gentry in Norfolk and Suffolk, especially in the vicinity of Kenninghall and Framlingham and along the routes towards Cambridge, were forced to make a rapid decision about whether or not to support Mary. For example, Richard Freston had retired from court to his Suffolk estate but in July Mary passed by his house on her way to Framlingham and he raised his tenants on her behalf. He was rewarded with a knighthood, a place on the privy council and the office of cofferer of the household. The latter position was granted despite the fact that he had no recent experience of the court and the masters of the household were more eligible candidates.⁹⁵ These East Anglian gentlemen were the same people Northumberland hoped to gain support from in just these crucial areas. At least seventeen of those on Cecil's list, who transacted affairs for Jane, or their kinsmen, would join Mary.⁹⁶ They were not all enthusiastic though, probably because of the consequences of the risks they were taking. Haydon may have havered. He was summoned to Mary's assistance on 18 July, along with Sir Thomas Windham; 'all excuses sett apart, with all speede apoun their allegaunce'. A week later they were summoned again, along with Sir William Farmer, who had

⁹² PRO, SP 10/8/1, M. fos. 1Ar-1Av; PRO, SP 10/8/2, M. fo. 2r.

⁹³ APC, iv, p. 277.

⁹⁴ PRO, E 179/69/65; PRO, E 179/69/66; PRO, E 179/69/67; Bindoff, iii, pp. 534-535; MacCulloch, (ed.), *Vita Mariae Reginae*, pp. 188-190, 251-254; MacCulloch, *Suffolk and the Tudors*, pp. 79-80; Loades, *The reign of Mary Tudor*, pp. 18-19.

⁹⁵ Nichols (ed.), *Chronicle of Queen Jane*, pp. 3-5; Braddock, 'The royal household', pp. 162-163.

been closely associated with Northumberland's regime as lord lieutenant of Norfolk. They were then expected to maintain order in their localities. If there was initial hesitation on their parts, they eventually committed themselves and became reliable and valued supporters of the Marian regime.⁹⁷ Others supported Northumberland, including Lucas, Cox, Sir Richard Thimbleby of Lincolnshire, Aylef and Thomas Roydon of Great Peckham in Kent. Understandably, ducal servants supported Northumberland, including the bailiffs of Lichfield, Walter Grosvenor and Matthew Wrottesley, Fortescue, who acted as treasurer to the duke's forces, and John Appleyard, brother-in-law and servant of Sir Robert Dudley.⁹⁸

As well as the county elite, lords lieutenant, and JPs, the privy council attempted to gain the support of the sheriffs because of their important military role. They wrote to Sir Anthony Neville, sheriff, and the JPs of Nottinghamshire and Derbyshire, on 12 July to request military assistance on Northumberland's behalf.⁹⁹ It is uncertain whether Neville had closer associations with Northumberland or not. He was of the quorum for Nottinghamshire, worth £120 per annum in lands in 1545-1546 and provided two great horses for the Pinkie campaign. He was also on many commissions and, as sheriff, was expected to proclaim the new queen and raise the counties under his command, especially in the absence of the lords lieutenant, Rutland (Nottinghamshire) and Huntingdon (Derbyshire and Rutland). The privy council wrote to the sheriff, Sir John Guildford, and JPs of Kent on the same day.¹⁰⁰ Other sheriffs were probably commanded to raise men too. The Nottinghamshire and Derbyshire commissions of the peace had few, if any, Dudley clients, with the possible exception of Sir Richard Catesby. However, Catesby's 'allegiances were not put to the test' because he died on 8 March.¹⁰¹ Similarly, the privy council wrote to the sheriff and JPs of Wiltshire on 7 and 15 July, telling them the situation. Jane was the true queen, Northumberland was setting out to suppress insurrection, they should maintain control over the county, counter Mary's supporters there, and raise their clienteles (servants and tenants 'beinge under your Rules & office') to create a force of horse and foot ready to respond to the regime's summons. These letters emphasised that Jane would maintain the established religion against the influence of the Spaniards, catholics and other 'straungers' Mary would admit into the country. Wiltshire was still Seymour country. An additional difficulty arises from these letters; did the privy council write to the rehabilitated Sharrington, who died on 9 July, or to his replacement as

⁹⁶ MacCulloch, (ed.), *Vita Mariae Reginae*, pp. 254-258, 260-261, 263-264, 266; Nichols (ed.), *Chronicle of Queen Jane*, pp. 3-6, 8-9; *APC*, iv, pp. 299, 422, 430, 432.

⁹⁷ *APC*, iv, pp. 296, 307, 354-355, 365, 369, 416-417.

⁹⁸ *APC*, iv, pp. 308, 420-421; Bindoff, i, pp. 325-326.

⁹⁹ Nichols (ed.), *Chronicle of Queen Jane*, pp. 107-108.

¹⁰⁰ Royal Commission on Historical Manuscripts, *Report on the manuscripts of A.G. Finch*, eds. S.C. Lomas et al (iv vols.; London, 1913-1965), i, p. 1; Bernard, *The power of the early Tudor nobility*, p. 73.

¹⁰¹ PRO, C 66/801, mm. 9d, 17d; *Calendar of patent rolls*, i, pp. 75, 77, 82, 88; ii, p. 137; iii, p. 216; iv, pp. 141, 395, 451; v, pp. 328, 338, 348, 357, 375, 386, 415; PRO, E 179/69/51; PRO, 10/2/1, M. fo. 2v; *APC*, iv, p. 277.

sheriff, Edward Baynard, esquire?¹⁰² It is likely that these letters are not unique. Jane wrote again to the Surrey elite on 16 July, urging them not to credit any letters received from Mary. This vital county was under threat and it is uncertain how much Northampton had achieved to secure it against Mary.¹⁰³ The letter explained that the new succession had been established to protect the protestant commonwealth but Mary's adherents were counselling her to rebel. Jane would send nobles to rally the county elite and asked that they risk everything to defend her crown from 'out of the *Dominion* of straungers and papists'.¹⁰⁴ Despite the promise of aristocratic supervision, this was hardly encouraging.

There was confusion in the localities. Both queens were proclaimed in the town of Northampton, causing 'greate stire' in the shire. It was reported that Tyrwhitt had mustered 'as many men as he could gette' in Northamptonshire after receiving a letter from Northumberland.¹⁰⁵ Tyrwhitt, who had a house at Leighton Bromswold in Huntingdon, was steward, keeper or constable of three royal properties, including Higham Ferrers in Northamptonshire. If the source is reliable, and it is likely, this would explain why he was treated so coolly during Mary's reign.¹⁰⁶ Tresham received a similar letter from the duke to muster forces on Jane's behalf but 'would not goe', while Sir John Williams was said to have raised six or seven thousand men in Oxfordshire for Mary with the support of Peckham, the sheriffs of Oxfordshire and Northamptonshire (Chamberlain and Thomas Lovet), 'and divers others'. This was according to the report of Richard Sulyerd and even if he exaggerated the numbers raised the implication was clear, Northumberland was losing the support of the elite and the military resources of the country were being raised against rather than for him.¹⁰⁷ Buckinghamshire, Oxfordshire, Berkshire, Northamptonshire, Bedfordshire and Sussex were won over by their gentry to Mary's cause.¹⁰⁸ Mary's supporters in Sussex sought to persuade the rest of the county gentry, including Sir Nicholas Pelham, to join them. This is an interesting example of the dynamics of local politics. On 19 July, Lord Neville (Westmorland's heir), Sir Thomas Wyatt, Sir Robert Southwell and nine others proclaimed Mary and wrote to their neighbours to ask them to do the same in their part of the county, while requesting a meeting of the entire county elite for their 'securitie' as well as the queen's. Jane was 'a quene of a new and pretie Invencion' and the Sussex gentry intended to write to London to petition the privy council to reverse its opposition to Mary. This was remarkable. The local elite was attempting to dictate to

¹⁰² BL Additional MS. 22563, fos. 3r-4r; Nichols (ed.), *Chronicle of Queen Jane*, p. 108; Bindoff, iii, pp. 302-304; PRO, C 66/801, m. 22d; *Calendar of patent rolls*, i, p. 91.

¹⁰³ Kempe (ed.), *Loseley Manuscripts*, pp. 124-126; Bindoff, i, pp. 513-516, 518-521; *APC*, iv, p. 277.

¹⁰⁴ Kempe (ed.), *Loseley Manuscripts*, pp. 124-126.

¹⁰⁵ BL Harley MS. 353, fos. 139r-139v.

¹⁰⁶ Tyrwhitt was also keeper of the manor of Dytton in Buckinghamshire and constable of Kimbolton Castle in Huntingdon: Bindoff, iii, pp. 501-502.

¹⁰⁷ BL Harley MS. 353, fo. 139v.

¹⁰⁸ MacCulloch, (ed.), *Vita Mariae Reginae*, pp. 260, 263; BL Additional MS. 33230, fos. 21r-21v.

the privy council. Local organisation was more successful too, with the Sussex gentry trying to co-ordinate their activities to complement Mary's plans.¹⁰⁹

The outcome was still uncertain. Jane was probably proclaimed more widely than the archives would suggest, the offending entries in borough records being prudently excised. She was certainly proclaimed in Berwick and King's Lynn. However, towns with substantial protestant communities, like Colchester, did not proclaim her. Norwich was one of the first boroughs to proclaim Mary (12 July), as was Bury St Edmunds, while the bailiffs of Great Yarmouth were sent to Framlingham to show their faithfulness. Colchester provisioned her forces. Ipswich also supported Mary and welcomed her on her journey from Framlingham, despite the strong support from protestantism in the town and its initial role as venue for the Suffolk elite's discussion of the crisis and subsequent proclamation of Jane. The general mood among the commons in Lincolnshire was in Mary's favour. This forced the gentry to reconsider for whom they raised their quasi-feudal array. However, the burgesses of Stamford, Huntingdon and Royston (the latter two in neighbouring Cambridgeshire) were too cautious to commit themselves until the outcome was assured. Grantham waited until 21 July before proclaiming Mary. The authorities in York were equally cautious (although they may have initially declared for Jane before destroying any record of it when the tide turned), while Westminster did not proclaim Mary until two days after London on 21 July.¹¹⁰ King's Lynn, Norfolk, procrastinated for a week after Sir Robert Dudley arrived on 11 July to demand the town declare for Jane. It was of vital strategic importance because it controlled the riverine trade of six shires and could curtail Mary's ability to flee to the Low Countries. Dudley returned on market day with a larger company and took the town by force.¹¹¹ Sir Peter Carew of Mohun's Ottery in Devonshire also took matters into his own hands and, despite his protestantism, did not proclaim Jane after receiving the proclamation in her favour from the privy council. Instead, without consulting more important gentlemen, he proclaimed Mary in the market places of the nearest towns to his estates, Dartmouth and Newton Abbot.¹¹² Both parties appealed to the boroughs and the local elite procrastinated over whom to support. However, the tide began to turn in Mary's favour as her forces increased.

Both parties appealed to individual nobles and gentlemen. Jane wrote to Sir John St Loe and Sir Anthony Kingston on 18 July and ordered them to muster forces, especially their clienteles ('either of your seruants tenantes officers or fryndes aswell horsemen as fotemen'), in the west country

¹⁰⁹ BL Additional MS. 33230, fos. 21r-21v; Bindoff, iii, p. 671.

¹¹⁰ Nichols (ed.), *Chronicle of Queen Jane*, pp. 110-114; F. Madden (ed.), 'The petition of Richard Troughton...to the privy council...', *Archaeologia*, 23 (1831), p. 36; Robert Parkyn, 'Robert Parkyn's narrative of the Reformation', ed. A.G. Dickens, *English Historical Review*, 62 (1947), p. 77; D.M. Palliser, *Tudor York* (Oxford, 1979), p. 52; MacCulloch and Blatchly, 'Pastoral provision', p. 463; MacCulloch, *Suffolk and the Tudors*, pp. 79-81, 171.

¹¹¹ Tittler and Battley, 'The local community and the crown in 1553', pp. 132-133; PRO, KB 8/25, mm. 5-6; *Fourth report*, App. ii, p. 239.

and to march to her defence in Buckinghamshire. They were to 'reserve' the clienteles of the earls of Arundel and Pembroke, who would presumably raise them themselves. Similar commissions were issued in order to suppress Mary's counter-coup (which was viewed as a rebellion) to several of 'our good subiectes & gentlemen of suche degree as yow ar to repaire in like maner to the same parties'. It was claimed that opposition would be slight and expenses would be paid. The legacy of the rebellions of 1549 made it imperative that order was restored and the personal relationship between crown and gentry was emphasised: 'our speciall trust is in your corage wisdom and fydelties in this matter'. St Loe then visited Thynne at Longleat. They were in a difficult position because they were committed protestants. They decided to wait and seem to have co-ordinated activities. St Loe's cousin, Sir Nicholas Poyntes, informed him of Mary's accession and he probably proclaimed her in Somerset, while Thynne did the same in Warminster, Wiltshire, of which he was high steward. Thynne, Bonham, Sir James Stumpe and Sir William Wroughton informed Mary on 22 July of their proclamations on her behalf in the west country. They were concerned about whether Stourton had been appointed lord lieutenant and wrote on 24 July to ask whether he had special authority over them. The next day she ordered them to remain where they were. St Loe, Kingston and Thynne would be under suspicion in Mary's reign because of their protestantism.¹¹³ Other former Seymour clients were quick to pledge allegiance to Mary; Fulmerston joined her on 16 July and John Brende arrived the following day. Whalley was released from the Marshalsea on 6 August. The dowager duchess of Somerset was released from the Tower on the same day as Gardiner (11 August) and met Mary when she rode into London in triumph.¹¹⁴ While St Loe and Kingston were considering with their neighbours whether to act on orders from Jane, Sir Henry Gates was proclaiming her in Ware, Hertfordshire. Gates was one of Northumberland's more important clients and the duke had given him the necessary military retinue to support him in a prospective coup by licensing him on 3 May to retain twenty-five men. Sir William Neville and Sir William Fitzwilliam were licensed on the same day to retain twenty men each, Sir Nicholas Throckmorton, twenty five, and Sir Henry Sidney, fifty. On 24 June, the Kent gentlemen Sir George Harper, Sir Henry Isley, Sir George Guildford and Cuthbert Vaughan also received licences but none attempted to support Jane, despite Harper's and Isley's association with Northumberland.¹¹⁵

¹¹² Bindoff, i, pp. 578-581.

¹¹³ Wroughton may have been related to Somerset, who probably promoted his election as MP for Wiltshire in 1547. He was on the commission of the peace for the county and several other commissions. He became Pembroke's parliamentary client after Somerset's death: ITL, Petyt MS. 538/47, fos. 12r-12xv; PRO, C 66/801, m. 22d; *Calendar of patent rolls*, i, p. 91; Bindoff, ii, pp. 469-470; iii, pp. 260, 463-467, 668-669; APC, iv, p. 417.

¹¹⁴ APC, iv, pp. 312, 431-432; Nichols (ed.), *Chronicle of Queen Jane*, pp. 14, 16; Wriothesley, *Chronicle*, ii, p. 97; PRO, LR 2/118, fo. 24r; PRO, E 154/2/39, fo. 37r; PRO, SP 46/163, fos. 72v-74r.

¹¹⁵ Bindoff, ii, p. 197; Loades, *Northumberland*, pp. 252, 276.

Northumberland does appear to have cultivated Kingston's favour, licensing him on 27 August 1550 to retain sixty men.¹¹⁶ It is possible that St Loe and Kingston were incapable of responding because they had insufficient time.¹¹⁷ However, Kingston was initially under suspicion in Mary's reign because of his religion and this reinforces the likelihood that they held back for political reasons. Kingston was a substantial gentleman, steward and keeper of several Gloucestershire estates, including the town and castle of St Briavels, the castle and lordship of Berkeley and the town and hundred of Tewkesbury. He was steward of the duchy of Lancaster estates in Herefordshire and Gloucestershire; JP for Gloucestershire; esquire of the body by 1539, having served in the royal household since at least 1533; sheriff twice (1533-1534, 1550-1551); a muster commissioner; and sat on the council in the marches of Wales. He was appointed *custos rotulorum* in 1546. His stewardship of several of Seymour's estates need not have made him apathetic towards Northumberland. Kingston had been given wide authority in the west country by Russell during 1549 and his protestantism, despite having struck Hooper for castigating his adultery, reinforced his credentials.¹¹⁸ St Loe had an income of £200 in lands in 1548 and was assessed in Somerset. He was of the quorum for Gloucestershire and Somerset, constable of Thornbury Castle in Gloucestershire and had served as sheriff of Gloucestershire (1536-1537) and Somerset and Dorset (1551-1552). St Loe also had extensive military experience, having served in Ireland and been marshal of the army in 1535-1536.¹¹⁹ Jane had written to Poyntes and Sir John Brydges, another figure with strong connections with the duke of Somerset, on 18 July. The lateness of the letter may reflect desperation and the recipients would have had little time before learning of Northumberland's capitulation in which to test their resolve.¹²⁰ Poyntes was a Gloucestershire gentleman and was imprisoned for his association with Somerset but maintained his connections with the duke's family. He lent his support to Mary, despite his protestantism, and does not seem to have made any effort to support Northumberland.¹²¹ This suggests that protestant support for Mary could have been more widespread than thought. Brydges was marshal of Boulogne, member of the quorum for Gloucestershire and commissioner of the peace for Wiltshire, had direct military experience as a garrison officer and was an esquire of the body. He had been constable of Sudeley Castle since 1538 (jointly with his son Edmund from 1542) and was steward of several Gloucestershire estates. He was a conservative and quickly gave his allegiance

¹¹⁶ *Calendar of patent rolls*, iii, p. 327.

¹¹⁷ Bindoff, ii, p. 469.

¹¹⁸ PRO, C 66/801, m. 12d; *Calendar of patent rolls*, i, p. 83; Bindoff, ii, pp. 468-470; Somerville, *Duchy of Lancaster*, i, p. 637; Robinson (ed.), *Original letters*, ii, no. ccviii, p. 442, n. 1; Foxe, *The acts and monuments*, vi, p. 654; Jordan, *Threshold of power*, pp. 300-301, 304. His landed income in 1548 was £266.13.4: PRO, SP 46/1, fo. 219r.

¹¹⁹ Bindoff, iii, pp. 259-260; PRO, SP 46/1, fo. 219v; PRO, C 66/801, mm. 12d, 21d; *Calendar of patent rolls*, i, pp. 83, 89.

¹²⁰ BL Harley MS. 416, fos. 30r-31v.

¹²¹ Poyntes was MP for Gloucester in 1547, keeper of several royal estates, parks and forests in Gloucestershire, local JP from 1537-1539, local muster commissioner, groom of the bedchamber, sheriff of the county twice and a naval officer: BL Stowe MS. 571, fos. 56v-57r; Bindoff, iii, pp. 148-149, 670-672.

to Mary.¹²² Kingston was also Poyntes's kinsman. He too was unmoved. The letter to Brydges and Poyntes was written in terms similar to the one to St Loe and Kingston. Brydges, Kingston, St Loe and Poyntes epitomised the mid-Tudor elite, with their multiple roles and responsibilities, both central and local. These men were being used because of their wealth, consequence, ability and the stewardships they controlled.¹²³

The privy council wrote to Rich on 19 July, asking him to remain steadfast 'like a noble man'. Rich had reported Oxford's defection to Mary. They reminded him of their inability to change their position with honour or safety because they had dangerously committed themselves. Oxford had been forced to abandon Jane by his own servants and by the persuasions of his cousin, Sir John Wentworth. This did much to undermine her position in Essex, leaving Northumberland more exposed in Cambridgeshire, especially as his men began to desert.¹²⁴ Jane made other appeals for military support to the political elite in the hope of dissuading them from joining Mary, who, 'provoked therto by her adherence [adherents]', was writing to them too. The Tudor elite was expected to support Jane as rightful queen.¹²⁵ The general circular of 12 July, in Northumberland's holograph, survives. Like earlier circulars issued during crises, this was unspecific in detailed directions but intended to garner support. These circulars would have been sent to the local nobles and gentry, while more specific letters were sent to the 'speciall men'. The general circulars asked the recipients to do their duty, defend Jane and repel her enemies.¹²⁶ These appeals were largely unsuccessful, though.

Robert Wingfield's account shows how Mary's general recruitment was much more successful but, like Jane, she also wished to appeal to specific gentlemen of proven ability. Several of these letters are extant. She wrote from Kenninghall to Sir George Somerset, Sir William Drury, Sir William Walgrave and Clement Higham, esquire, as early as 8 July. She told them of the king's death and ordered them, as loyal subjects, to join her with all speed 'and put your selves in order' (suggesting they were to bring their clienteles). They were to ignore any letters sent in the king's name. At least three of them joined her, although Drury, his heir, Robert Drury, esquire, and Higham waited until 17 July. Higham was appointed a commissioner for victuals five days later.¹²⁷ Cecil listed Somerset, Drury and Walgrave as either initially supporting Jane or as prospective supporters. Both sides regarded these men as important. Their military competence and proximity made them invaluable. Mary wrote to Sir Edward Hastings, Huntingdon's brother,

¹²² Brydges was appointed lieutenant of the Tower on 28 July 1553, replacing Sir Edward Warner, and created Lord Chandos of Sudeley on 8 April 1554: PRO, C 66/801, mm. 12d, 22d; *Calendar of patent rolls*, i, pp. 83, 91; Bindoff, i, pp. 533-534; APC, iv, p. 422; Nichols (ed.), *Chronicle of Queen Jane*, pp. 44, 52, 57-58, n. d, 109.

¹²³ BL Harley MS. 416, fos. 30r-31v.

¹²⁴ BL Lansdowne MS. 3, fos. 50r-51v; MacCulloch, (ed.), *Vita Mariae Reginae*, pp. 188, 263.

¹²⁵ PRO, SP 15/7/1, fos. 1r-1v.

¹²⁶ BL Lansdowne MS. 3, fos. 48r-49v. Compare with PRO, SP 10/9/1, M. fos. 1r-2v.

on 9 July and asked him to support her and to use his local authority to control Middlesex and Buckinghamshire. His reputation and local consequence, especially in the former county, made him invaluable. Mary wrote of the 'especyall truste and affiance wee have in you/ and as you be a noble man'. It would be a coup to draw Huntingdon's brother away from Northumberland's party. This letter was written in similar terms to the letter to Somerset, Drury, Walgrave and Higham, and, like it, predicated her claim on the succession act and Henry's will as well as 'godes mere providence'. Hastings was also to ignore letters purportedly sent from the king, only serving if summoned by Mary, while defending her right to the throne in his locality 'to the beste of your powre'. Hastings joined her and raised his clientele. He was rewarded with a place on her privy council.¹²⁸

It was necessary to gain Hastings support because both parties were struggling for control of Buckinghamshire and Oxfordshire. Williams proclaimed Mary in Oxfordshire on 13 July, an action that galvanised Pembroke and Cheyne into attempting to leave the Tower and caused the unity among the privy councillors to begin to disintegrate. Winchester did leave on 16 July but was brought back from his London residence at midnight, a stark reminder of the necessity for conciliar unity. However, that unity was breaking the following day when Northumberland was forced back on Cambridge from Bury St Edmunds in Suffolk, receiving no help from the privy council, but 'lettres of discomfort' instead. Dr Bernard has shown how Northumberland was hampered by the inertia of the privy council, several of whom were extremely apathetic towards him.¹²⁹ Like Peckham, Williams, who was treasurer of the court of augmentations, may have been reacting to Northumberland's indifference towards him during Edward's reign. He was in difficulties over peculation and indebtedness from 1552 and was also a conservative. Williams was a commissioner of the peace for Oxfordshire and one of the wealthiest gentlemen in the county, being worth at least one thousand marks per annum in lands and fees in 1547. His active support of Mary in July 1553 forced the privy council to write to St Loe and Kingston.¹³⁰ Word of mouth was used as a means of raising support as well as letters to other special men and general circulars. By 16 July Mary had, through her supporters, control over much of Oxfordshire, Buckinghamshire, Berkshire and Middlesex and had raised ten thousand men, intent on marching to London to seize the armour and ordnance at Whitehall under the care of the unfortunate Jobson.

¹²⁷ BL Lansdowne MS. 1236, fos. 29r-29v; Bindoff, ii, pp. 60-61; *APC*, iv, pp. 345, 415, 432.

¹²⁸ ITL, Petyt MS. 538/47, fos. 13r-13v; *APC*, iv, pp. 293, 301, 418. Northumberland also invoked God's providence in support of Jane's claim. He redrafted the general circular of 12 July to give it a more protestant tone, changing 'god' to 'heavenly Lord': BL Lansdowne MS. 1236, fo. 24r; Nichols (ed.), *Chronicle of Queen Jane*, p. 104, n. a.

¹²⁹ Nichols (ed.), *Chronicle of Queen Jane*, p. 9; Bernard, *The power of the early Tudor nobility*, pp. 72-77.

¹³⁰ Williams was rewarded with office at court and a peerage, being ennobled as Lord Williams of Thame. Hastings was created Lord Hastings of Loughborough, was an important privy councillor, master of the horse, and one of the queen's favourites: Nichols (ed.), *Chronicle of Queen Jane*, p. 9; PRO, C 66/801, m. 18d; *Calendar of patent rolls*, i, p. 88; PRO, E 179/69/51; BL Stowe MS. 595, fo. 44v; PRO, LC 2/4/1, fos. 1r, 24v; Loach, *Edward VI*, pp. 172, 175; Loades, *The reign of Mary Tudor*, pp. 20, 37, 42, 48, 52-53, 55, 135, 207-208, 265, 324, 326, 392.

This force was to 'apprehende' Jobson.¹³¹ Dr Loach suggested a corrective to the view that most of the nobility and gentry of East Anglia supported Mary. She believed Mary received little support from protestant nobles and gentlemen. Catholicism was certainly the basis of her force but several prominent protestants gave her support. Some of her supporters had benefited from the regime of Northumberland (including Drury, Bedingfield and Chamberlain), who had attempted to be inclusive at the local level, if not at court. Prominent protestant gentry families tended not to support her, though. Mary's followers took a great risk, their actions threatening to unleash political and social turmoil, because they believed in her right to the throne.¹³² With this elite and popular support, Mary was able to take the throne, Northumberland having recognised by 20 July that he could not defeat her without greater support among the elite.¹³³

The trials of Northumberland and several of his principal adherents shed light on the activities of his protestant clientele in attempting to prevent Mary succeeding to the throne. It is possible to trace Northumberland's route and activities by examining the various indictments, which corroborate other sources.¹³⁴ Northumberland, Northampton and Warwick were tried on 18 August 1553, their trial overseen by Norfolk, newly released from the Tower and appointed high steward. They were indicted with Huntingdon between 14-17 August.¹³⁵ Northumberland, Northampton, Huntingdon and Warwick were charged with 'considering, machinating, fancying and compassing' to depose Mary and procuring arms and ordnance (including culverins and demi-culverins) for the purpose on 14-15 July. They were said to have proclaimed Northumberland's appointment as lieutenant general of the forces raised against Mary and that Jane was rightful queen.¹³⁶ Northumberland, Northampton and Huntingdon were charged with having levied war against Mary at Cambridge on 16-17 July and marched towards Framlingham the following day with the intention of depriving her of her royal state and killing her there. Warwick was charged as an accomplice.¹³⁷ A special commission of *oyer et terminer* was appointed from among the Suffolk JPs, including Drury, Sir William Walgrave and Higham, to indict the accused for having proclaimed Jane at Bury St Edmunds on 18-19 July.¹³⁸ The peers were empanelled for the trial on 17 August, including several who had been heavily implicated themselves or were at the centre of the Dudley regime: Winchester, Bedford, Pembroke, Cobham, Clinton and De La Warr. Again, like Somerset's trial, it was a fairly representative group. The

¹³¹ APC, iv, p. 293; Bindoff, ii, pp. 444-446.

¹³² Loach, *Edward VI*, pp. 174-179.

¹³³ See above, pp. 269, 272, 278.

¹³⁴ PRO, KB 8/21, mm. 1-27; PRO, KB 8/22, mm. 1-28; PRO, KB 8/23, mm. 1-14; PRO, KB 8/25, mm. 1-9; *Fourth report*, App. ii, pp. 232-240.

¹³⁵ PRO, KB 8/21, mm. 12-13, 19-20, 23-27; *Fourth report*, App. ii, pp. 232-233.

¹³⁶ PRO, KB 8/21, mm. 12, 19, 23-25; *Fourth report*, App. ii, p. 233.

¹³⁷ PRO, KB 8/21, mm. 12-13; *Fourth report*, App. ii, p. 233.

¹³⁸ PRO, KB 8/21, mm. 19-22; *Fourth report*, App. ii, p. 233.

accused pleaded guilty and were sentenced to death. However, only Northumberland was actually executed.¹³⁹

Sir Andrew Dudley, Sir John and Sir Henry Gates and Palmer were tried the following day and found guilty of abetting the leaders of the coup. Dudley and Sir Henry Gates were pardoned. Lord Ambrose Dudley and Jobson were indicted with the others on 14 August but not tried.¹⁴⁰ Sir John Gates and Cheke were indicted for having taken possession of the Tower on 10 July, attempting to bestow the royal title on Jane, recognising her as queen and writing letters and proclamations, which were printed, proclaiming her.¹⁴¹ Gates and Cheke were particularly unfortunate because they oversaw the clerical side of the coup and attempted to secure the throne by procuring the support of the elite through the normal means of communication (proclamations and privy seal letters). Jane was tried and convicted on 13 November, along with Cranmer, Guildford, Lord Ambrose and Lord Henry Dudley.¹⁴² Cranmer had been indicted on 12 August for abetting Northumberland's coup, entering the Tower with Gates and Cheke to establish Jane and sending twenty retainers (including his servants Barnaby Byllet, William Mansford, Robert Durant and Robert Jackson) on 12 July to support the duke at Cambridge. Dr MacCulloch believes all twenty were probably members of the archbishop's household. Cranmer had nowhere to go and was committed to the protestant cause.¹⁴³ The charges against Jane and her husband were: conspiring to depose Mary, taking possession of the Tower, having herself proclaimed and, more specifically, signing various letters 'Jane the Quene', contrary to her allegiance to Mary.¹⁴⁴ Cranmer initially pleaded not guilty but then changed his plea. All were sentenced to death, although Lord Ambrose and Lord Henry Dudley were pardoned.¹⁴⁵ Sir Robert Dudley was not tried until 22 January 1554, being found guilty of taking forcible possession of King's Lynn, proclaiming Jane there and attempting to entice the mayor and others into supporting him. He pleaded guilty and was sentenced to death but pardoned.¹⁴⁶

Northumberland went to the block on 22 August professing 'how I haue bene of longe tyme ledde by false teachers and preachers sumwhat before the deathe of Kyng Henry and euer sence whyche is a greate parte of this my deathe'. This carefully managed speech, in which Northumberland claimed he was 'permytted to speake my concsyence', was a great propaganda coup for Mary. The duke warned the London populace to 'beware and take hede that yow be not ledde—and

¹³⁹ PRO, KB 8/21, mm. 1-7, 10-11; *Fourth report*, App. ii, p. 234.

¹⁴⁰ PRO, KB 8/22, mm. 15-28; *Fourth report*, App. ii, pp. 235-236.

¹⁴¹ PRO, KB 8/22, mm. 10-12; *Fourth report*, App. ii, p. 236.

¹⁴² PRO, KB 8/23, mm. 1-14; *Fourth report*, App. ii, pp. 237-238.

¹⁴³ Byllet was probably a relative of Cranmer's servant Robert Byllet: PRO, KB 8/23, m. 12; *Fourth report*, App. ii, p. 237; PRO, LR 2/118, fos. 44v-45r; MacCulloch, *Cranmer*, pp. 202, 544, n. 75, 556.

¹⁴⁴ PRO, KB 8/23, m. 11; *Fourth report*, App. ii, p. 237.

¹⁴⁵ PRO, KB 8/23, mm. 1-5; *Fourth report*, App. ii, p. 238.

deceavyd by thes sedycyowse and lewde preachers that haue openid the booke and knowe not how to shutt yt'.¹⁴⁷ He implored them to 'retorne home agayne to your true religion and catholyke fathe' because the 'new teachyng' made God plague the realm 'with warres commocions tumults rebellyon pestelence & ffamyne besydes manye more greate and grevouse plagues to the greate decaye of our commonwealthe'. The official view was clear, with Northumberland forced to play the part of mouthpiece: 'good people be obedyent vnto the quene hyr lawes and be content to receave agayne the true catholyke ffathe'.¹⁴⁸ He was under pressure to abjure protestantism but did begin his speech by reiterating his claim that the coup was not 'all to gether of myne owne procuryng' and had been 'incensyd by others whom I praye god to pardon for I wyll name nor accuse anye man here'. He had been moved by the protestant circle at court and by his clientele (particularly Sir John Gates, Ely and Cheke).¹⁴⁹ Therefore, he was speaking his mind to some extent. Why did Northumberland convert? He had vainly attempted to procure a pardon through Arundel on 21 August. Arundel was either unwilling or unable to assist him.¹⁵⁰ It is possible Northumberland converted in order to protect his family and followers, while also guaranteeing the honourable beheading, rather than the commoner's hanging, drawing and quartering. Northumberland met Gates while on his way to the block and asked for his forgiveness, although not without adding that 'you and your counsaill was a great occasion herof'. Gates retorted, 'you and your auctoritye was the onely originall cause of all together'.¹⁵¹ It is an apt example of the dynamic and tension within a clientele. We are unlikely to know for certain who instigated the alteration to the accession. Both men then went with Palmer to their carefully stage-managed executions.¹⁵²

Mary's successful counter-coup has been called 'the last total defeat of the Westminster government by the provinces before 1642'.¹⁵³ Yet, it was not a wholesale demonstration of support by the political elite because many initially supported Jane by accepting the authority of central government. Northumberland attempted to use the relationship, especially with the local officers like the JPs and sheriffs, between centre and localities to maintain authority and alter the succession, as well as his new innovation, the lieutenancies. However, the men in the localities discussed the situation among themselves and were moved by their clienteles to support one party or the other. Boroughs often tried to remain neutral, unless pressured by committed nobles and

¹⁴⁶ PRO, KB 8/25, mm. 1-9; *Fourth report*, App. ii, pp. 239-240; Tittler and Battley, 'The local community and the crown in 1553', pp. 131-139.

¹⁴⁷ BL Cotton MS. Titus B. ii, fos. 144v-145r; BL Harley MS. 284, fos. 127r-127v; BL Additional MS. 20774, fos. 71r-72v; BL Harley MS. 353, fo. 142r. The speech was printed by John Cawood, the royal printer, with Latin and German translations, and widely circulated: Beer, *Northumberland*, p. 161.

¹⁴⁸ BL Cotton MS. Titus B. ii, fos. 144v-145r.

¹⁴⁹ BL Cotton MS. Titus B. ii, fo. 144v.

¹⁵⁰ BL Harley MS. 787, fo. 61v; Beer, *Northumberland*, pp. 156-157, 159-161; Loades, *Northumberland*, pp. 269-270.

¹⁵¹ Nichols (ed.), *Chronicle of Queen Jane*, pp. 19-21.

¹⁵² Elton, *Reform and reformation*, pp. 374-375; Nichols (ed.), *Chronicle of Queen Jane*, pp. 20-24.

¹⁵³ MacCulloch, *Suffolk and the Tudors*, p. 79; *Vita Mariae Reginae*, pp. 188-190.

gentlemen. The county elite even advised the government against supporting Jane and popular support for Mary was a new and important factor. The popular politics Somerset had unleashed was coming back to haunt Northumberland and the privy council. The dynamic interplay within clienteles can be seen during the crisis as members of Northumberland's clientele and those of his colleagues often made individual choices or changed allegiances. All powerful men were subject to the same pressure from their clienteles. Both parties claimed legitimacy and portrayed themselves as conservative, while attempting to recruit support by accusing their opponents of being rebels. Both parties also used the traditional recruiting methods of the government. However, Northumberland misinterpreted popular support for the reformation and Mary's clientele organised her following into a more powerful military force. These two factors began to tell as the standoff continued and more people openly supported Mary; Northumberland's power ebbed away with his deserting troops. Northumberland was spurred on by anxiety to preserve the protestant commonwealth and had he succeeded he might have been better remembered for his successes in government than as the figure of the 'black legend'.

CONCLUSION

Faction and religious differences did not lead to feud and religious war. Although Northumberland was regarded by generations of historians as an intriguer against the interests of the commonwealth, recent work on his regime provides a necessary corrective. He also suffered from misunderstanding about the role of clienteles in political society. Similarly, Somerset is no longer generally regarded as the 'good duke', despite recent important and essential attempts at partial rehabilitation.¹ The gentlemen governors of mid-Tudor England were acquisitive and self-interested in their attempts to found aristocratic fortunes but they were also conscious of their role as custodians of the polity during minority government. It was essential to maintain stability through strong ties between the centre and localities, and the regime largely succeeded in this by increasing contact through a stream of letters, proclamations and other messages. They depended on the local elite to govern the counties through the commissions, especially as JPs. The JPs were expected to carry out a wide variety of tasks, including administering law and order, policing the counties and, with the other county gentlemen, executing specific orders from the privy council. The Tudor polity could not function without the co-operation of these men. Contact was heightened through clientage and patronage, the two-way relationships underpinning political society and acting as a stabilising force. The privy council had to know who constituted the county elite in order to select the best men for sensitive and vital tasks, including mustering men and horses for war, leading the county levies, remaining in their localities to defend against insurrection or invasion and, perhaps most important of all, bringing their clienteles to Windsor to defend the king against rebellion in July 1549. The government relied on a core of men within the county elite most heavily. These in particular, were 'the speciall men in every shere'.²

Although high politics was often factional, this should not mask the positive achievements of the period. Somerset and Northumberland had to deal with the 'acephalous conditions' of Edward's reign.³ Their regimes came to be characterised by one-party rule and both men tried to control the court and government. However, Henry's will envisaged a 'hermetically sealed political system' that would contain the problem of faction.⁴ This would effectively be one party-rule by the privy council. Both Somerset and Northumberland tried to create parties by co-opting conciliar colleagues but they still relied on their clienteles. These could influence their patrons as much as their patrons influenced them and increasingly took on religious propensities during the mid-Tudor period, whereas before they had been largely motivated by service and politics. Clients were not

¹ Hoak, 'Rehabilitating the duke of Northumberland', pp. 29-51; Shagan, 'Protector Somerset and the 1549 rebellions', pp. 29-51.

² PRO, SP 10/4/12, M. fo. 29v.

³ Collinson, 'The monarchical republic', p. 115.

⁴ Ives, 'Henry VIII's will', pp. 799-802.

creatures of the dukes but substantial and capable men, who, like the privy councillors, had proven themselves through years of royal service, often carrying out a variety of roles at the centre and in the localities. They too could be identified as 'the speciall men'. The leading politicians generally worked well together and had a homogeneous outlook based their role as landowners and their experience as Henrician politicians and courtiers. Their authority and consequence was enhanced and extended by their clienteles. Somerset tried to resolve the problem of minority rule by behaving like a king through his office of lord protector and overturned Henry's will, albeit by legal authority. Northumberland attempted to identify his own interests as the king's. They alienated their colleagues and consequently relied more heavily on their fidelity clients, who strongly influenced their religious, economic and social policies. The king's chief servants now made policy more than ever before. This was perhaps a consequence of the creative opportunities provided by the minority or a response to the reformation.

Political life was centred at court. Control of the court was vital to the exercise of authority. Although Somerset did not fill the court with his clients, he made sure that trusted adherents held certain key offices providing control over access. He had a supervisory role over his nephew through his office of governor of the king's person. Although it cannot be said that he closed the privy chamber, Somerset did monitor it closely. The court was still largely Henrician in character. Northumberland was more thorough and used household patronage to put more of his clients in the privy chamber but many of them were already there, having served since Henry's reign.

There was still a strong collegiate identity during the protectorate until the crises of 1548-1549. The failure of Somerset's Scottish policy, factionalism within his own clientele and the popular rebellions, undermined his support among the executors. Both sides had divergent opinions on the nature of the protectorate and Somerset's style of government, irregular and dictatorial, impeded the ability of his colleagues to discuss policy and proffer counsel. They too, had a duty to uphold the commonwealth and they reminded Somerset of this during the October coup.

Initially, Northumberland headed a regime that contrasted with his predecessor's because it had wider support and regularised administration and policy making. However, he identified his clientele's interests as synonymous with the king's (albeit in a different way). He attempted to increase the wealth and influence of his clientele, while trying to extend the collegiate identity of the privy council. Northumberland's regime improved government and policed the localities more energetically than before. He tried to exercise more effective control over administration and the court in order to increase his security against potential rivals. He was also a victim of circumstance, with inflation, the legacy of warfare, dearth and increasing religious division, even within reforming circles, among the more critical problems he had to deal with. Northumberland

isolated himself by relying on too small a party in 1551-1553, perhaps in response to Somerset's ambivalent activities. He misinterpreted popular support for the reformation outside London and the southeast and attempted to overturn the succession. Although he utilised his clientele, it was not enough. Mary organised her own following more successfully, based on the remnants of the Howard clientele, and received vital popular support, a new and increasingly important factor in politics.

Neither Somerset nor Northumberland sought to dominate the localities by extending either the king's affinity or their own by filling the commissions of the peace with their clients. While they dominated government, the local elite complied with royal directives. However, there was, as there had always been, a dynamic relationship predicated on clientage and mutual assistance between centre and localities. Although aristocratic county clienteles were still important, high politics was increasingly court-centred and the court feuds of the reign did not erupt in the counties as they had in the fifteenth century. This was a legacy of the early Tudors.

Was there a pattern to clientage in mid-Tudor England? It was less rigid than in Scotland or Europe and less dominant (although the situation was perhaps different in Ireland). It was also largely court-centred and usually a positive force in early modern society unless it became factional. In order to prevent faction, a collegiate identity had to be fostered within the ruling elite to maintain open channels to patronage and influence. This was less easy to achieve during a minority and one-party rule emerged. Yet, this should not obscure the positive achievements of the period, especially administrative and religious reforms, in which clienteles played a part. Somerset tried to temporarily replace the king by acting as an alternative, placing himself as an adult in control of the organs of government in a way a child could not. Northumberland used the fiction that Edward was taking up the reins of power. Although the king was becoming more articulate, this approach did not entirely work either. Neither duke felt they could trust Henry's will, which intended "single-party" rule during the minority by the privy council, not by one man. Attempts to enhance relations between centre and locality were only successful when both parties felt their interests were being upheld.

Clienteles, kinship, friendship, religion, communications, conversations and patronage were among the vital aspects of the social dynamic of mid-Tudor politics. It is worth considering a final example. Northumberland wrote to Cecil on 25 November 1552. He told him that he favoured the suit of one of Hereford's Irish kinsmen to purchase lands worth £20. Hereford had sent his relative to see Northumberland. Northumberland wanted to assist his client, Hereford, and, by doing so, enlarge his clientele. He adopted his usual method of working through his people to persuade the king to offer royal patronage to Hereford's kinsman, telling Cecil to ask Darcy and

others in the privy chamber to petition Edward to favour the suit. Northumberland also spoke with Hereford's kinsman, having taken him 'a farr of', and asked him about the state of Ireland. The duke liked him, finding him sober and intelligent. He asked what religion he thought the earl of Desmond was and was told he was of no religion or, if anything, catholic.⁵ This incident encapsulates the social dynamic of clienteles and their relationship to political society. Clientage in the interests of the commonwealth was a valued aspect of political society. Although an ideal, this was fitfully achieved in Edward's reign. It was essential that the lines of communication and ties of good governance and good lordship went out to the special men in the country.

⁵ PRO, SP 61/4/64, fo. 219r.

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E 199 Exchequer, Sheriffs' Accounts of Seizures.

E 351 Exchequer, Pipe Office, Declared Accounts.

E 404 Exchequer of Receipt, Warrants for Issues.

KB 8 Court of King's Bench, Crown Side, Baga de Secretis.

LC 2 Lord Chamberlain's Department, Records of Special Events.

LC 5 Lord Chamberlain's Department, Miscellaneous Records.

LR 2 Office of the Auditors of Land Revenue.

LS 13 Lord Steward's Department, Miscellaneous Books.

PROB 11 Prerogative Court of Canterbury and related Probate Jurisdictions: Will Registers.

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